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OPPRESSION

A STUDY
IN SOCIAL AND CRIMINAL
PSYCHOLOGY

by

TADEUSZ GRYGIER

Founded by KARL MANNHEIM
Edited by W. J. H. SPROTT

This book attempts to examine the psychological effects of oppression in an experimental way. Although the author spent several years in the U.S.S.R., at first in a forced labour camp and later in the Diplomatic Service, the bulk of his material was collected in Germany shortly after the war, and consists of interviews and projective tests of carefully matched samples of former inmates of concentration camps and other Displaced Persons. The book analyses the implication of the findings from the point of view of the modern theories of personality and culture, and compares the effects of oppression with neurosis, psychopathy, delinquency and racial prejudice. The approach is dynamic, mainly Freudian, but all results of projective tests are analysed statistically and the requirements of strict scientific experimentation adhered to. Both in its method and in the unusual material which has never been secured by other investigators it represents an original contribution in the field of social psychology, criminology and race relations.

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PSYCHOLOGY

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TADEUSZ GRYGIER

foreword by

HERMANN MANNHEIM

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FOREWORD

By HERMANN MANNHEIM

The author of the present book is a psychologist interested in criminological problems rather than a professional criminologist, and for this reason, if for no other, this Foreword might better have been written by a psychologist. When, in spite of this, I gladly accepted Dr. Grygier's invitation to introduce him and his book to the public I did so on account of my long and close official and unofficial connection with him and his work, and because of its considerable interest to criminology.

To supervise the research of a student of Dr. Grygier's calibre is, inevitably, a source of both intense pleasure and anxiety: the pleasure of watching an original, resourceful, and scholarly mind at work, and the anxiety of having to restrain his ambitions and his inquisitiveness from overstepping the natural boundaries of a doctoral thesis. As everyone knows who has to act as supervisor of research students there are two categories of them: those for whom a suitable subject has to be found and those who produce it themselves. The author, quite definitely, belonged to the second group. When he applied to the London School of Economics and Political Science for admission as a Ph.D. student it was already with the object of making a study of the 'social and criminal psychology' of Polish displaced persons, and all his supervisors could do was to give him every help to enable him to carry out this project in the best possible way. To him who, as he makes it clear in his book, not only was but also felt as a displaced person himself this research must have been more than merely an intellectual exercise—it gave him, at the same time, profound emotional satisfaction.

In spite of this strong emotional element, the author has, I believe, succeeded in raising himself and his work to the higher level of detached scientific investigation. Indicative of this are his repeated attempts to present an objective assessment of the national characteristics of his own Polish compatriots.

It has been said, not without reason, that recent researches in the social sciences have tended to produce either entirely insignificant material for the solution of very big problems or ample

material concerning problems hardly worth bothering about. Dr. Grygier's problems are no doubt big enough. It was his object to study 'personality changes following on recent developments in Europe' (p. 29); more specifically, 'to examine the changes in the psychological aspect of culture under oppression' (p. 290); and to see whether an oppressive environment produces certain measurable changes in personality favouring, in Nietzschean terminology, the formation of a Dionysian rather than of an Apollonian culture. With regard to criminal psychology, it is the thesis of the present book that oppression tends to produce in the oppressed an extra-punitive attitude, i.e. greater readiness to put the blame on other people, and that it leads to psychopathy and crime; that higher degrees of oppression produce more crime than lower ones; and that, consequently, there is a positive correlation between crime and the tendency to direct aggression outwards and, on the other hand, between neurosis and the tendency to direct aggression inwards. While the author makes no claim that this is an entirely original thesis he believes that his research has provided the missing quantitative evidence for it. Whether he has fully succeeded in this will have to be judged by specialists in the techniques of projective tests. In any case, however, I venture to think that our understanding of the psychological mechanisms leading to crime has been enriched by his study and that whatever weaknesses it may show have been due to factors beyond the author's control such as the nature of his material and the circumstances in which the tests had to be applied.

HERMANN MANNHEIM

*The London School of Economics and Political
Science (University of London)*
5th September 1953

PREFACE

My intention to write this book started in a conversation between myself and a British friend, concerned with inter-allied affairs, whom I met shortly after my arrival in England from Soviet Russia and the Middle East in 1945. I was then at the Department of Studies at the Polish Ministry of Information in London. We talked about the U.S.S.R. and Iran, Poland and Egypt, the social structure of the Soviet Union, and the culture of the Komi, a Finno-Ugrian tribe surrounded by the Slavonic sea and the Arctic Ocean. A few months later the Polish Government in London ceased to be recognized by the Western Powers. Most of my colleagues complained bitterly of how their professional friendships evaporated quickly in the wind and heat of the political manœuvre. Their letters were left unanswered, nobody was at home when they telephoned: those days were grim. I, frankly, did not even try. But this British friend (who insists on anonymity) approached me first and asked me what my plans were. I answered that I had none; only wishes. Since I knew of no practical ways of arranging my life I could allow my imagination full rein in thinking of what I should like to do: to forget about diplomacy, public relations and Government administration and to become a student again, to learn Anglo-Saxon methods in the social sciences, and to do some research which would integrate my principal interest, which was in psychology, with my other training and experience in sociology, law and international relations.

All this was very vague, and perhaps very ambitious. Nevertheless my anonymous friend put me in contact with people in my field of interest. Without the encouragement given me at that crucial time, this book could not have been written.

The choice of a topic emerged in the course of another conversation, this time with Dr. Wiktor Weintraub, now Associate Professor of Polish Literature at Harvard. I am writing my Preface at Harvard, and he remembers our talk in London of nearly eight years ago.

Then came the officially academic side of my undertaking. I wanted to write a book which would be acceptable as a thesis for the degree of Ph.D. (In 1950 its substance was, in fact, accepted

for that degree by the University of London.) What I proposed to do was mainly social psychology, but partly criminology. In the end therefore I had two supervisors at the London School of Economics: Dr. Julian Blackburn and Dr. Hermann Mannheim. They were both immensely helpful, friendly and encouraging, and if the book is not entirely lost in wild generalizations, if some balance is maintained between painstakingly collected and evaluated evidence and far-reaching conclusions, it is largely due to their efforts. Dr. Blackburn had to leave for Canada to take a Chair of Psychology there; Dr. Mannheim remained my supervisor throughout my studies, and continued to advise me at my first job in England, at the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency. His balanced judgement and his wide knowledge of scientific literature were of great benefit to my work.

Since I wanted to examine the impact of oppression on the human mind and culture, I had to make a field study in an 'oppressive' country. For obvious reasons I could not go to Soviet Russia for this purpose. I had already been there in various capacities: as an inmate of a labour camp, deported from Poland after the Russo-German invasion of 1939, as a psychologist in a psychiatric hospital, as a delegate of the Polish Embassy to the Komi Republic (the main centre of the Soviet concentration camps), then at the Embassy itself. All this provided a useful background of information and experience, and in a way I am even grateful to my oppressors; especially since they let me go in the end. Now, however, I wanted to make a scientific study of oppression, to use projective techniques and other psychological tests, and to select samples of people by strictly scientific methods, so as to be able to apply statistical and other analyses to the material. The only country in which I could do this was Germany, just defeated, still crushed and full of ex-inmates of concentration camps and other deportees, of victorious Allied armies and intelligence and counter-intelligence units, of welfare societies and black-marketeers, of criminals and heroic saints.

I tried to get there through UNRRA, and M. A. Delierneux, now of the UNO Secretariat, was very helpful there; but in vain. Finally I went to Belgium and France with a strange document, testifying that I was supposed to collect material which might be of interest to the Polish Red Cross in London (now the Relief Society for Poles), and with Dr. Mannheim's letter of recommendation, as well as his promise that he would do his best to get me out of prison and back to England if I were arrested for breaking the security laws of one or another country. I tried in vain to enter Germany from the Belgian side; then from the French; then from Belgium again. The fact was that I had no official business in Germany which would justify my entry, let alone my conducting

complicated investigations. Yet finally, with the help of the Polish Red Cross in Brussels and the Polish Military Mission in Paris (both recognizing the Free Polish Government in London), I officially crossed the German border near Strasbourg, clad in a uniform from which no one could tell just what my unit was, nor whether it were civilian or military.

While negotiating with the various authorities about my admission to Germany I never tried to conceal the real aim of my trip, and upon arrival there I fully revealed the purpose and methods of my investigation to the U.S. Military Government of Bavaria. I received their full support: access to prisons and camps, their own data on delinquency, billets and transport facilities, in fact all the help I needed to complete my inquiry. Their attitude showed courage, insight, generosity, and an unusual understanding of the practical value of research in the social sciences, and I am very grateful to them.

The subsequent steps belong to the investigation proper and are described in the text. I also mention there the names of a few persons out of the many in Germany who made this investigation possible. I am grateful to all of them, even to those of my subjects—very few indeed—who resisted all my attempts to gain their co-operation, and who revealed in this way that mistrust of human beings which is the true mark of oppression.

In the end I collected all the material I wanted within the limits of this inquiry and arrived back in England, one day before the expiry of my visa, with two suitcases of notes, test materials and memoirs, but with no money on which to live whilst analysing it all. I am grateful to the British Committee for the Education of Poles, to the Trustees of the Pinsent-Darwin Fund and of the Rockefeller Foundation, and to Sir Frederick Bartlett, F.R.S., then Professor of Experimental Psychology at Cambridge, and to the late Dr. John T. MacCurdy of the same department, for their help in this respect. Dr. E. J. Lindgren, M.A., Associate of Newnham College, Cambridge, whom I first met as Liaison Officer for Allied Research Organization at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, gave me much welcome encouragement during this difficult period.

The process of writing up and editing is sometimes quite as dramatic as the inquiry itself from the point of view of the author, but much less so from that of the reader, so I shall only mention that I adopted the unusual method of learning a language by writing a book in it. I did not know English when I came to London, and my first conversations with British colleagues were conducted in French. Any reader who is shocked by a sudden lapse in style or grammar which has escaped the eye of my editors will, therefore, I hope, forgive me.

At this stage several people helped me a great deal by reading the manuscript in whole or in part and suggesting alterations or refinements of statistical analysis. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Charlotte Banks, Sir Frederick Bartlett, Mr. Mark Benney, Professor Morris Ginsberg, Dr. Edward Glover, Dr. Hilde Himmelweit, Mr. A. R. Jonckheere, Dr. J. H. Robb, and Professor Edward Shils.

Dr. H. J. Eysenck gave me valuable advice on the use of tests and lent me a few which were at the time unobtainable through the normal channels. The late Dr. Karl Mannheim encouraged me to give a wide scope to this research, and to write a book which would be worthy of publication in the International Library, of which he was then the editor. His successor, Professor W. J. H. Sprott, has given me valuable editorial advice in the last stages before publication.

In addition to the personal contacts mentioned I am indebted to all those authors, alive or dead, who have inspired me through their writings. They are quoted or referred to in the text. Freud's influence, both direct and through his disciples, has been particularly strong. I am indebted to the Rockefeller Foundation for helping me to visit the U.S.A. and to meet some of the American authors in person, in particular: Dr. Franz Alexander, Professor G. W. Allport, Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, Professor Gustav Bychowski, Dr. Thomas French, Dr. Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Professor Sheldon Glueck, Dr. Daniel Levinson, Professor Donald MacKinnon, Dr. Karl Menninger, Professor Henry A. Murray, Professor R. Nevitt Sanford, Mr. Clifford Shaw and Professor Florian Znaniecki. Had I met them earlier and been able to discuss many baffling points arising from my research, I might have written a different book.

It might have been more theoretically integrated and richer in concepts. But a writer's first duty is to be faithful to his material, not to his theory. And, much as I owe to the writers who inspired my thinking, my greatest debt is to my subjects, whom I loved but for whom in all my analysis I had no mercy.

TADEUSZ GRYGIER

Cambridge, Mass.
1st August 1953

PART ONE

THE PROBLEM AND METHOD

Chapter I

THE PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the research described in the following pages is to examine the psychological changes in people subjected to various forms of oppression. It is assumed here that the complicated set of environmental conditions which may be termed 'oppression' has been rapidly increasing in strength and frequency during the past years. Its influence on the human mind must be deep, its effect grave enough to upset the existing patterns of culture. As such, the influence of oppression warrants investigation, both clinical and experimental, even if the experiment is only a pilot one and its results are modest in relation to the magnitude of the problem.

During recent years we have witnessed the development of new systems and gigantic, totalitarian states. Almost the whole of Europe and a great part of Asia have been invaded, millions of people have undergone all kinds of oppression, and have been deprived of freedom, of food and clothing, of home and privacy. Millions have been displaced, whether they travelled as members of the invading armies or as refugees; others have suffered starvation and slavery, in concentration camps, or as prisoners of war. We have lived through two world wars, and through one world crisis, and seem now to be in the midst of a second one, of a different origin but with possibly no less serious consequences. All these catastrophes must have produced deep changes. In the words of Leon Blum (89)¹ 'no crisis in a people's history leaves the previous equilibrium undisturbed. That is why a crisis is always something of a revolution, whatever its material consequences may be. At the end of a long war, victory, like defeat, changes everything.'

In order to make an experimental study of oppression which would offer some contribution to the study of cultural changes we must select: first, those features of thought and behaviour which are important for cultural patterns, are changing rapidly and thus

¹ Numbers in parentheses in the text refer to entries in the bibliography.

creating tensions, and can be measured or, at least, directly observed in controlled situations; and secondly, those environmental forces—especially of the oppressive kind—which may be held responsible for the changes in the selected aspects of personality.

When we have selected the main conditions hypothetically responsible for the apparent changes in human behaviour, the task is to establish the existence of a definite relationship between this set of conditions, and a certain pattern of behaviour. If we take a representative sample of the population, and measure, with the aid of personality tests and other techniques, the mental changes that occur in them under conditions by which many people have been affected, we may get some idea of psychological changes of a more universal nature. The measurement may be inexact, the ideas few and less brilliant than the situation demands: but these ideas will at least be based on research and experiment, not merely on speculation. The results, however modest, will be concrete, and may bring us a few steps towards the establishment of a rational and empirical, that is, scientific, control of human affairs, which, as Malinowski once said (435, p. 199), is the only way out of the straits.

It has been accepted that we must experiment in order to widen our knowledge. But here the problems concerned are very general in nature and the task becomes much more complex, and calls for a careful selection both of the questions and of the subjects. If we want to know anything about the value of the social institutions we have created, or of the actual possibilities of creating new ones—we must study individuals who have been formed by the institutions of the present, and will create those of the future.

We cannot possibly study all the aspects of the human mind. Nor can we trace all the changes in the numerous social institutions which are being transformed in the present crisis. We may find that recent developments affect very many aspects of life which either cannot be investigated experimentally at all, or only with extreme difficulty. We considered it necessary to limit our study of the human mind to certain of its features (their importance, rapidity of change, and measurability being the main criteria), and we must similarly restrict our selection of environmental conditions to those which are widespread, seem to be changing rapidly, and might be held responsible for whichever psychological changes we select.

This selection of the material to be studied constitutes one of the limitations of this research. As the aim of this work is to attack certain aspects of the recent changes, with the aid of sociological and psychological techniques, the other aspects, however important, must be left aside.

Secondly, as Sir Frederick Bartlett rightly remarked (51, p. 304),

all research must be given an arbitrary end somewhere. If we consider purely technical difficulties, the limitations of the present work must be considerable. Still greater will they become when we pass from the general problems to the technique employed and material collected. The particular interests and qualifications of the writer also determine—even if unconsciously—the direction of thought and the scope of research.

In order to select the features of personality, whose changes under oppression are to be examined, I shall first make clear what I think are the various aspects of civilization, and what, in particular, is its psychological aspect.

2. SELECTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES

(a) *A four-dimensional concept of culture*

The following definitions may help to clarify the concept:

We use the words 'civilization' and 'culture' synonymously. That is, unfortunately, the common usage, and the distinctions introduced by various writers differ between themselves. For Malinowski, for instance, civilization is 'a special aspect of more advanced cultures' (436, p. 621). For Alfred Weber (707), it seems to be the opposite.¹

We distinguish four aspects of civilization:

The creative aspect: of intellectual and artistic achievements, including the amount of knowledge, technical equipment, or power over nature. This aspect has in itself an element of striving and construction as well as of cognition.

The sociological aspect: the institutions.²

The historical aspect: the dimension of time.³

The psychological aspect, with which we are mainly concerned.

Both the sociological and the psychological aspects seem to have the character of a dynamic equilibrium. It is not an equilibrium

¹ He distinguishes the process of socialization (or social process, *Gesellschaftsprozess*) which directs the primitive impulses and driving forces into the general forms; the process of civilization, as the development of consciousness, knowledge and technique; and the cultural process of a more spiritual nature.

² In this sense culture has been defined by Malinowski (437) as 'an integral composed of partly autonomous, partly co-ordinated institutions'. Another of Malinowski's definitions (*ibidem*) is closer to our multi-dimensional concept: 'It is a system of objects, activities, and attitudes in which every part exists as a means to an end.'

³ Einstein's views (203) are pertinent here: 'In their applications space (place) and time always occur together. Every event that happened in the world is determined by the space-co-ordinates x , y , z , and the time-co-ordinate t . Thus the physical description was four-dimensional right from the beginning.' The same should apply to social analysis.

between material and spiritual values, but rather one within the set of institutions, and within the personality structure of every individual. Thus sociologically 'civilization is the child of the marriage of law and force' (232), or a hierarchy of freedoms, by which the less valuable are relinquished for the more valuable (34). One of the functions of law (in Kant's philosophy *the* function of law) is to organize and harmonize these freedoms.¹ In order to examine more closely the problem of psychological equilibrium, we have first of all to clarify the relations between culture and neurosis.

(b) *Culture, neurosis and crime*

As the relation between civilization and neurosis has been investigated mainly by Freud, and by both orthodox and unorthodox followers of the psycho-analytic school, we will begin the discussion by a brief presentation of Freud's views.

In view of the fact that his main work on the subject (257) is widely known, our summary might appear superfluous. There are, however, two reasons why it must be presented:

Firstly, Freud's concept of civilization has been strongly criticized, mainly by Fromm (264), and Horney (337), as being static, and identifying culture with repression, thereby implying the growth of neurosis in the process of civilization. If that were true, Freud's conception of civilization would be one-sided, and represent the opposite of that dynamic equilibrium which I believe to be the basis of the psychological aspect of civilization. I think, however, that the above mentioned authors misrepresented Freud's views, and accordingly I should like to present them once more, using quotations to avoid further misunderstanding.

Secondly, although I cannot claim adherence to any of the psycho-analytic schools, I must make it clear that Freud's views on civilization gave me directly and indirectly—mainly through the experimental work of H. A. Murray and S. Rosenzweig—the general foundation for my research. Practically none of Freud's assertions were taken for granted; some of them, as will be shown in later chapters, seem to have been confirmed, others not. It is necessary, however, to make clear what I understand by Freud's ideas, and in what way I want to use them.

¹ Cf. Toynbee (691) who defines society and civilization (he uses these terms synonymously) as a system of relationships between individuals and a result of interaction between the biological and environmental factors. He does not stress, however, the moment of equilibrium. Cf. also Suttie (663, p. 126) who defines ideal culture as 'that which gives the maximum socially permissible freedom of expression and development to human nature (the minimum restriction and coercion) along with the most effective substitution and suppression where this is inevitable'.

Freud starts with the assertion that 'Human life in communities only becomes possible when a number of men unite together in strength superior to any single individual and remain united against all single individuals. The strength of this united body is then opposed as "Right" against the strength of any individual which is condemned as "brute force"'. This substitution of the power of a united number for the power of a single man is the decisive step towards civilization. The essence of it lies in the circumstance that the members of the community have restricted their possibilities of gratification, whereas the individual recognized no such restrictions. The first requisite of culture, therefore, is justice—that is the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favour of any individual. This implies nothing about the ethical value of any such law.' (257, p. 59).

Although Freud maintains that liberty of the individual is not a benefit of culture, and was greater, although not so valuable, before any culture existed, he allows that the desire for freedom may prove favourable to a further development of civilization. (*Ibidem*, p. 60). 'A great part of the struggles of mankind centres round the single task of finding some expedient (i.e. satisfying) solution between these individual claims, and those of the civilized community.'¹

He emphasizes the role of sublimation in the development of culture: 'Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural evolution; this it is that makes it possible for the higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, ideological activities, to play such an important part in civilized life.' (p. 63). It must be noted here that sublimation may be regarded as a satisfactory compromise between impulses and conscience.² As the conscience is largely formed, according to psycho-analytic theory, through the 'introjection', or incorporation, of the moral standards of the family³ and (though this is insufficiently recognized by most authors of this school) of the community as a whole, sublimation seems to produce an equilibrium between the original wishes of the individual and those of society.⁴

¹ It can be seen from this that Freud's concepts are not static nor do they imply a simple relation between the amount of restriction and of culture. Elsewhere he only emphasized (perhaps overmuch) the repressive side of culture.

² It must be admitted that in its dynamic aspects sublimation is more than a compromise: it is a radical instinctual alteration (desexualization).

³ Cf. Flugel (224, pp. 35 ff.).

⁴ One of the best presentations of the burden of conscience in literary works seems to be that by Somerset Maugham (455, p. 38): '... conscience is the guardian in the individual of the rules which the community has evolved for its own preservation. It is the policeman in all our hearts, set there to watch that we do not break its laws. It is the spy seated in the central stronghold of the

Later Freud deals with the sexual and aggressive instincts which make the existence of culture necessary: '*Homo homini lupus*; who has the courage to dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in history?' As aggression constitutes 'the most powerful obstacle to culture' (p. 102), civilization takes certain measures to check it. The most important is the introjection or internalization of aggressiveness: 'it is sent back where it came from, i.e. directed against the ego.' Then the super-ego, 'in the form of "conscience", exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would have liked to enjoy against others. The tension between the strict super-ego and the subordinate ego we call the sense of guilt; it manifests itself as the need for punishment.' (p. 105).

Freud distinguishes the two stages, and two sources of feelings of guilt; 'that arising from the dread of authority and the later one from the dread of the super-ego' (p. 111). At this second stage of development 'the more righteous a man is the stricter and more suspicious will his conscience be, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried holiness farthest who reproach themselves with the deepest sinfulness'.

According to Freud, a savage, instead of throwing the blame on himself, throws it on his fetish,¹ where in the development of civilization 'the sense of guilt may swell to a magnitude that individuals can hardly support'. (pp. 121-2).

Thus, in Freud's view the sense of guilt is 'the most important problem in the evolution of culture' (p. 123); and we might formulate the first questions to be answered in our research as:

(a) Is it true that there is a positive relationship between the strength of conscience expressed in social behaviour, and the strength of guilt feelings? In other words, is social behaviour accompanied by a tendency to direct aggression inwards, blaming oneself instead of others, and vice versa? Here a study of criminal and non-criminal groups seems to be most appropriate.

If this relationship can be established, we come to the next questions:

ego. Man's desire for the approval of his fellows is so strong, his dread of their censure so violent, that himself has brought his enemy within his gates and it keeps watch over him, vigilant always in the interests of his master to crush any half-formed desire to break away from the herd. It will force him to place the good of society before his own. It is the very strong link that attaches the individual to the whole. And man, subservient to interests he has persuaded himself are greater than his own, makes himself a slave to his taskmaster. He sits him in a seat of honour. At last, like a courtier fawning on the royal stick that is laid about his shoulders, he prides himself on the sensitiveness of his conscience.'

¹ In view of the anthropological evidence this statement seems to me too simple.

(b) Do men under oppression tend to direct their aggression (whether a primary instinct or a reaction towards frustration) more and more outwards, or inwards; or do they tend to repress it?

Do they react flexibly and differently in different social situations, or rigidly and inadequately?

In other words, are they becoming more balanced, more neurotic, or more antisocial and savage?

Strictly speaking the first question implies a hypothesis of a positive relationship between social behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression inwards, and between antisocial behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression outwards. The subsequent questions imply three mutually incompatible hypotheses of positive relationships between oppression in the environment and (i) excessive outward aggression, (ii) excessive inward aggression, and (iii) balanced personality structure. Confirmation of one of these hypotheses automatically disproves the other two.

To clarify these questions; and relate them to the concept of civilization as a dynamic equilibrium, let us attempt to distinguish between *neurotic*, *psychopathic* and *criminal* personalities.

I shall not try to base this distinction on any theory of crime and neurosis. I shall only make certain definitions or descriptions in order to delimit concepts as they are used in the following pages.

I consider all three above concepts as describing *maladjusted personalities, with abnormalities of character*.

Social adjustment as a test of sanity, and still more as a test of moral values, has often been criticized, and the paradox that Freud might have been regarded as insane until his theories came to be sufficiently accepted to be a source of income (594, p. 185) has certainly a grain of truth. But the difficulty, theoretically insurmountable, loses much weight in practice, especially when we consider larger groups of individuals, and we can hardly conceive a community composed solely of Freuds continuously psycho-analysing each other as being sane.

Similar is the weakness of Fromm's criticism (264, p. 119) that in a well-adapted person all genuine individuality and spontaneity may have been lost, while a neurotic is one who is not ready to surrender completely in the battle for his self.¹ In practice it is doubtful whether a well-adjusted and balanced personality ever

¹ A similar distinction is made by Thomas and Znaniecki (680, p. 1871), who oppose the Philistine type—with a complete repression of all dangerous possibilities, with no problems of self-development left, no internal contradictions to solve, no external oppositions to overcome—to the Bohemian type 'which in its highest form, as artist, thinker, religious reformer, social revolutionist, may even succeed in producing, but whose products will always lack the internal harmony and social importance of the true creative type.'

completely surrenders, or loses his individuality and spontaneity.

Spontaneity may be defined as a tendency to act on impulses which are not inhibited by control. I should distinguish 'primary spontaneity', due to lack of control (a child is 'primarily spontaneous'), and 'secondary spontaneity', due to the integration of personality and to the redirection of drives in accordance with control. Thus the control is not felt as impeding satisfaction, the impulses are not repressed, but find outlet and expire in a sublimated form, releasing tension. A neurotic is not spontaneous.

Lack of spontaneity in a neurotic may be explained by the fact that although he has lost his primary spontaneity, he has not been able to acquire the secondary sort. A well adjusted mature individual is, on the other hand, secondarily spontaneous.¹

The difficulty of assessing maladjustment has some source in the different criteria of adjustment. Thus we may agree with Max Weber's observation that in primitive societies psychopaths are new prophets and reformers, as they are unadjusted and dare to break old habits. But we may also say that the whole primitive community was not adjusted to its environment and was, therefore, psychopathic, and that new prophets and reformers were *better* adjusted to the social reality than the rest of the group.²

From the medical point of view it may be advisable to call a person 'abnormal' and 'maladjusted' when he deviates from the cultural patterns of his society, although even here it should depend on the pattern from which he deviates. The situation is completely different when we want to examine not the deviation of the individual from the group, but the deviation of the group from equilibrium.³ It is difficult, indeed well-nigh impossible, to define this equilibrium or balance, but it will probably require flexibility of behaviour, the ability to criticize oneself as well as others,

¹ This view corresponds roughly to Fenichel's conception of neurotics. He defines them as persons who are alienated from their instinctual impulses, who 'do not know them and do not want to know them' (217, p. 477). I want to make it clear, however, that I do not consider *neurosis* a character change. Neurosis is an illness and a person affected by it can adjust normally in his unaffected personality. He will lack spontaneity only in respect of his symptoms, not his personality. The situation is different when we define as neurotic not a person affected by neurosis but a specific *total character structure*. It is in that latter sense that I am using the term 'neurotic' here. I shall refer to this problem in more detail in the following pages.

² Cf. Margaret Mead (462, p. 291) and B. W. Aginsky (13) who speaks of maladjusted culture which does not fit into the cultures surrounding it. This concept seems to me artificial: cultures cannot be well- or maladjusted, they may only constitute causes of individual maladjustment, and they may be created by maladjusted individuals. Society, as R. Benedict says, is never an entity separable from the individuals who compose it.

³ In this sense the group is merely a sum of deviating individuals. No 'group mind' is implied here.

to repress some feelings but express others, to remedy some situations by oneself but to request help from others when necessary. If we are moving towards the attainment of this flexibility we may speak of the development of the psychological aspect of civilization in the sense of dynamic equilibrium. If not, we have three possibilities: neurosis, psychopathy, or crime.

I consider a person neurotic or psychopathic when he presents an abnormal personality pattern, but does *not suffer from any morbid process*. Here I differ from generally accepted views, as usually we speak of neuroses, or psycho-neuroses (326, 505, 660) and not of neurotic personalities. Even psychopathic personalities are often defined as borderline cases, standing between sanity and psychosis (130, p. 595), or referred to as 'psychopathic states' (324, 325), to stress the dynamics of the process. I do not wish to deny the dynamic character of the processes leading to deformation of personality structure, but I would say that in both neurotic and psychopathic personalities these processes are different from those occurring in neuroses and psychoses. Neuroses and psychoses are always morbid. The process of the neurotic illness is a symptom formation which may or may not be strong enough to affect the total personality. The psychosis always affects the total personality, remaining, nevertheless, a morbid process developing like a foreign body in the pre-psychotic psyche. Thus both neurosis and psychosis should be as clearly distinguished from that of neurotic personality structure as general paralysis is from mental defect.

As some writers point out (217, p. 18), in personality deviations the subject does not appear to be disturbed only by some interrupting event, by symptoms, which are to a neurotic patient strange and meaningless; here his whole mind is so involved in the process that one cannot say at what point the 'personality' ends and the 'symptom' begins. When we have a definite *symptom formation*, we have a process belonging to the field of psychological medicine. The *personality deviation* is of a more general nature. It is this entity only that pertains to my concept of the psychological aspect of culture and for that reason I shall limit my discussion to it and shall attempt to assess it quantitatively later on.

Some writers (220) group neurotic and psychopathic personalities together into one class. Even in the elaborate classifications of some German writers (79, 80, 299, 358, 621) we find designated as psychopaths people who would be described by others as neurotics. In this book both neurotic and psychopathic personalities are conceived to be to a certain extent rigid types, whether formed in infancy or developed later on. These types, however, differ considerably from each other.

Eysenck (210) is inclined to regard neuroticism as a 'general

factor' in the conative sphere, in the same way as 'g' is one in the cognitive sphere, and as introversion may be regarded in the affective sphere. This general factor is described as characterized by a badly organized personality, abnormality before the onset of the actual illness, abnormality in the parents, unsatisfactory home, poor muscular tone, etc., while a bipolar factor opposes the dysthymic group of symptoms to the hysterical group of symptoms. Thus the general factor covers both personality and its environment and even the subject's heredity.

The general factor of neuroticism as described above would roughly cover all personality deviations from equilibrium in the frame of reference of the present writing. Its measurement would involve too much to be practicable in our research. The bipolar factor, however, is more closely related to our classification: it seems to me that in hysterics the id achieves a superior position, while in dysthymics the super-ego is stronger; dysthymics are inhibited, while hysterics are asocial (*Ibidem*, pp. 247-8); it follows that dysthymics are neurotics in the sense used in the present writing, while hysterics might be classified as psychopaths. According to our terminology, however, we should classify as psychopaths only those subjects (often termed 'hysterical personalities') whose personality structure is abnormal and not those affected by the morbid process of the hysterical neurosis. Even then it is doubtful whether we could classify all hysterical personalities as psychopathic individuals; but there is some evidence for assuming that many of them belong to that category. For example, in the classification of abnormal delinquents made by the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Warsaw, with which I was concerned before the war, the hysterical group proved to be the most numerous and comprised 40 per cent of the total (427).¹

The dysthymic-hysterical dichotomy is related, according to Eysenck, to Jung's intro-extraversion; and this is similar to Bennett's view (63) that neuroticism is a deflection of interest and drive from the environment to the self; and to Alexander's (17) that the neurotic tendency to renounce real satisfaction and to content oneself with gratification in phantasy is constitutional introversion.²

Following these lines, we should regard psychopaths or criminals as extraverts, and look for some evidence in support of this hypothesis. Unfortunately, the evidence collected so far suggests either

¹ Other groups were: irritable 12 per cent, impulsive 11 per cent, sexual deviations 7.5 per cent, all others 29.5 per cent. The Schneider-Kahn system of classification was followed. All the cases fell into sixteen groups.

² Thurstone and Thurstone (685) take a similar view, saying that the fundamental characteristic of the neurotic is an imagination that fails to express itself effectively in external social reality.

that intro- and extraverts may produce different types of criminal behaviour but are equally inclined to indulge in delinquency (726), or even that criminals are more introverted than normals. In one investigation (45) 31·7 per cent criminals proved to be decidedly introverted, while only 10·3 per cent were extraverted. Moreover the scores for introversion were higher than the scores for extraversion.

It would be difficult to explain that phenomenon. It may well be that the psychological classification according to the introversion-extraversion dichotomy gives an erroneous picture of temperament in the prison situation, as long imprisonment tends to make inmates more introverted. This was why another investigation on the same lines (383) was abandoned. It may be that extraverted individuals are in general more easily adjusted, while introverts tend to become either neurotic or criminal. We may, I think, conclude that the evidence relating the intro-extraversion dichotomy to the neurotic-antisocial dichotomy is too conflicting for us to take the factor of introversion as the basis of our research.

Kurt Schneider (621) describes a psychopathic person as possessing an abnormal character and either suffering from this abnormality himself or producing suffering in his environment. This definition covers both neurotic and psychopathic personalities, and even criminals. We shall therefore limit the concept of *neurotic* to a person who *himself mainly suffers* (as Horney says, the neurotic invariably suffers), while *psychopaths and criminals produce suffering in their environment*, although they may, and usually do, suffer themselves as well.¹

While a neurotic or a psychopath may be characterized as suffering from internal disharmony (358) and mental conflict, the criminal may have no moral conflicts at all. As Thomas and Znaniecki (680, p. 1796) put it, he knows only conflicts between momentarily opposing wishes, but no moral conflicts between wishes and general norms of behaviour voluntarily accepted as binding.

The nature of the mental conflict in neuroticism and psychopathy may be disputed. Freud relates mental conflict in neurosis—and his concept also covers the personality deviations we are discussing—to frustration, by which it is produced. In order to become pathogenic the external frustration must be supplemented by internal frustration, so that all possibilities of satisfaction are excluded (258, pp. 293-4). As we may regard the external frustra-

¹ Cf. Karpman's views (361). He maintains that the more unfavourably society is affected, the stronger become the psychopathic aspects of the individual's defences. None the less, he says, they remain 'basically neurotics'. According to Wegrocki (709) the individuals who, psychodynamically considered, show a picture of a neurosis should not be classified as psychopaths.

tion as a precipitating factor only, the essence of the mental conflict seems to consist in the coexistence of two conflicting tendencies: one to bring satisfaction and the other to prevent it and bring 'internal frustration'. This second tendency may be conceived as aggression that has turned from the external world and become internalized. Freud himself admits (256, p. 141) that he doubts whether all this aggressiveness is bound by the super-ego, or whether a part of it carries on its activity in the ego and the id. Fenichel (217, pp. 129 ff.) defines the neurotic conflict as one between the id and the ego, the super-ego merely complicating the affair by participating on one or the other side.

It would be futile to try and solve this theoretical problem here—especially as it would involve a highly technical discussion in psycho-analytic terms, and taking for granted the essential concepts of that school. However, it seems safe to assume that in both neuroticism and psychopathy we have a mental conflict between impulses and controls, with controls dominating impulses in the neurotic, and with impulses getting the better of controls in the psychopath. In both cases the impulses are out of harmony with the demands of Society, but the manifestations of the conflict will be antagonistic to Society in psychopathy, and to the individual himself in neuroticism.¹

A neurotic person is usually not antisocial;² while a psychopath is almost by definition criminal³ and in any frustrating situation will tend to turn all his aggressive impulses outwards, rather than repress them or turn them inwards.

We might summarize our classification as follows:

A neurotic personality tends to turn his aggressive impulses inwards, or repress them, and deviates from the norm (or balance) by an inability to express aggression in situations which call for it.


A psychopathic or criminal (antisocial) personality deviates from the norm by an excessive tendency to turn his aggressive impulses outwards and an inability to turn them inwards or to repress them in appropriate situations.

¹ Cf. Barbara Low's similar views on the subject (417, p. 93). Also Karpman (361) and Greenacre (297) who stress the importance of the disturbance of conscience in psychopathic deviations; while Lindner (409) notes the verbal rather than emotional, acceptance of social precepts. Cf. also Kinberg (368), Adams (6), Cason (143), Lowy (422) and Fromm (266).

² East (199) mentions neurosis only in connection with suicide, which is essentially 'anti-self' rather than 'anti-social', and not with any other crimes.

³ Cf. Taft (673), L. G. Brown (119), and many others. Birnbaum (79) gives a similar view, classifying psychopaths as (a) thymopathically antisocial, (b) antisocial in their structure. Thus both groups are essentially antisocial. So is Partridge's 'sociopath' (511), and this term roughly corresponds to my present use of the concept of psychopathy.

In tabular form we may classify mental disorders as follows:



However crude this classification, it indicates clearly the position of our concepts as compared with some related entities. It is realized that no one individual can be put safely *in toto* into one of these (nor, for that matter, into any other) categories. Similarly artificial is the discussion on aggression as if it were a pure factor, whereas in fact it never is. Dr. Edward Glover has pointed out that aggression is closely related at all points with libido, and that in neurosis frustration is essentially libidinal while aggression is secondary. These weaknesses are unavoidable: whenever we try to find illumination in new concepts, the shade of over-simplification and unreality goes with us.

(c) *The quantitative approach*

It must be admitted that the above classification is very rough, and does not take into account various complications of the affective processes, the vicious circles of aggression, anxiety, striving for power, inferiority feelings and the need for affection, as described by various psycho-analytic writers (19, 20, 337, 370). Almost all psycho-analytic work on delinquency, for instance, is based on the assumption that crime is a most complex phenomenon. I do not deny this complexity—but for our purposes I find we must disregard it. We cannot deny the evidence given by Freud (252), Alexander and Healy (19), or Aichhorn (14), that in some cases crime is based on unconscious feelings of guilt—even one of my own cases, presented later on, is evidence for this. But for this study I shall mainly confine myself to guilt feelings or aggressive tendencies at the level of personality, directly influencing behaviour. If I find people inclined to blame others, instead of themselves, I shall say that they turn their aggression outwards, although deeper analysis may show that some or all of them have uncon-

scious feelings of guilt or inferiority which they merely project on to others.¹

This tendency to simplify complex phenomena and to class them on a single scale with one single variable may seem deplorable, but it is a necessity if we are to use a quantitative approach. I do not claim that the quantitative approach is the only possibility for scientific thought. The work of Pavlov is sufficient evidence that we may be scientific although not quantitative (594). But if we say with Bergson that psychologically speaking every difference of quantity or degree is a difference of quality, we may also take the difference in quality and try to translate it into quantity. Even if we do not succeed in translating qualities into pure numbers, it will help us to understand the nature of the existing differences.²

In a similar way, we may wonder about the subtleties and complexities of our thinking processes, but when we want to study abilities and measure them in the light of effect, we translate the whole cognitive side of personality into one representative number—the Intelligence Quotient. For some purposes, especially for arriving at definite general conclusions, this method seems to be inevitable, and later on I shall try to translate the changes in our subjects into numbers representing the character, as the I.Q. represents the intelligence.

The scale according to which we shall compare our subjects will be based on the amount of aggression turned outwards as against the amount turned inwards or repressed. The technique of measurement will be described in detail in Chapter III.

(d) *Plus and minus deviations from the balanced personality structure*

Neurotics, then, will find themselves on the opposite end of the scale to psychopaths and criminals, with the imaginary 'normal' individual somewhere in the middle. In statistical language, we shall have in the amount of overt aggression deviations plus in psychopaths and criminals, and deviations minus in neurotics.

I am thus in open disagreement with most psychiatrists who define psychopathy as a deviation in any direction (86, 220, 505, 660) or think that the concept is ill-defined and should not be used at all (198, 360, 528).

I also seem to differ completely from those psycho-analytic

¹ Adler, discussing the similarities between neurotics and criminals, maintains that while the neurotic believes he desires to co-operate but is unable, the criminal refuses to co-operate. Thus going deeper into unconscious and biological urges, we may find that all people are alike, but on the conscious or more superficial unconscious level the differences are striking. Cf. also similarities between neurosis and prostitution, discussed by Aichhorn (15).

² Sir Cyril Burt (127), arguing for quantitative method in the analysis of temperament, expresses the opinion that without numerical devices research is almost impossible.

writers who have concentrated on the similarities between delinquents and non-delinquents instead of examining their differences, or on mental conflicts rather than on antisocial character formation. As a result crime appears, in their works, to be rather a symptom of neurosis than, as it seems to me, a symptom of the conflict between the individual and society. This tendency to look for 'interesting cases' of mental conflict is quite natural, but it does not follow that the authors believe that crime and neurosis are exactly the same: on the contrary, Aichhorn (14), whose case histories seem to have been selected as giving most interesting examples of unconscious motivations, himself stresses that we should apply 'the simplest measures first' (p. 37). Among the differences, mentioned in the psychoanalytic writings, between neurotics and criminals, one, discussed by Alexander and Adler in particular, is considered merely superficial: at a deeper level neurosis and crime are essentially the same. They maintain that the neurotic and the criminal exhibit the same kind of failure, and indeed hardly differ in their respective psychological contents, but that 'the neurotic expresses symbolically by means of his symptoms, which are socially innocuous, the same things which the criminal does by means of real actions'. (20, pp. 40-1. Cf. also 434).

This statement seems to say that we all kill our fathers in our dreams, while the criminals kill them (or their substitutes) in reality. There is 'almost' no difference between us.

In practice, however, this difference is well worth consideration. Even in day-dreams 'normal' people seem to differ from criminals, and Healy (321) sets forth 'criminalistic imagery' as one of the bases of delinquency.¹ In the following chapters we attack this problem experimentally, examining the imagery of criminal and non-criminal groups by means of the Thematic Apperception Test. But even if we assume that in our dreams we are as criminal as, if not more than, the most atrocious murderers, there must be some psychological mechanism preventing us from direct action, and confining our gratifications to the symbolic realm. When Alexander and Staub say that 'the only difference between the criminal and the normal individual is that the normal man partially controls his criminal drives and finds outlets for them in socially harmless activities' (20, p. 35), they stress the word 'only', but this difference is nevertheless very important. They say that in a normal individual or in a neurotic criminal² one part of the personality takes the side of society, while in the 'normal' criminal 'the whole conscious personality takes the side of the criminal act,

¹ Shaw's *Jack Roller* (pp. 62 ff.) gives a good example of this.

² Their 'neurotic criminal' and 'neurotic character' correspond to the 'psychopath' in our classification; and the term 'neurotic'—distinct from 'neurotic character'—corresponds to the same term in our classification.

facing with the combative attitude all the social demands of the community' (20, p. 97). Thus the personality of the real criminal is homogeneously antisocial, while that of the 'neurotic character' is not homogeneous, one part of his personality condemning the acts which he is unable to control.¹

From this we might go a step further and say that in the normal individual that part of the personality which represents social demands is strong enough to control his actions in normal situations; in a neurotic the stress set up by that controlling side of the personality is so great as to hamper any action. As the imaginary 'real criminal' has no mental conflict, and follows his own impulses without regard to the demands of society, so an imaginary 'real neurotic' would have no mental conflict, and would absorb society into his personality altogether. With all his spontaneity killed, and any individual desires repressed, he would know only conflicts between various 'taboos' of society, as the criminal knows only conflicts between his momentarily opposing wishes. When we experience real moral conflict, we are normal.

If we now repeat, in terms of aggression, what has just been said, we are back at our original scale with the direction of aggression as a single variable. In a 'real criminal' we have aggression turned outwards, no moral conflict, but a conflict between the individual and society. In a psychopath we have the beginning of moral conflict, but most of the aggression still goes outwards, with conscience, representing self-aggression, too weak to check the impulses. In a normal individual we have a proper balance between the demands of the individual and of society, between aggression turned inwards, and that turned outwards. In a neurotic most of the aggression turns inwards, and the demands of society lie as a heavy burden on the whole personality.²

There are certainly some similarities between people representing different deviations from the norm—such as lack of balance, mentioned in various writings on both neurotics and psychopaths; or rigidity in reaction, mentioned by Horney, and characteristic of all kinds of deviation from the normal personality structure.³

¹ Op. cit., p. 116. Cf. also (17), and, for somewhat similar classifications, Friedlander (260) and Schmideberg (616).

² The experimental evidence of Adams (6) seems to support our views in this respect. He found the neurotics *more* co-operative, more anxious to please, asking more helpful questions, easier to make appointments with, more punctual for appointments, etc., than stable individuals. Both groups were studied in a situation of experimentally induced frustration. Extreme intraggression may be exemplified by suicide: Hans von Hentig (328, p. 390), commenting on the statistical evidence given by W. A. Lunden, says: 'Murder and suicide are complementary phenomena: the total amount of available destructiveness is discharged in two psychologically similar, socially distinct Gestalten.'

³ Horney's 'neurotic personality' seems to comprise both neurotics and psychopaths.

There are also differences between neurotics and psychopaths, for instance those observed in intelligence testing (112, p. 137), where neurotics score higher on verbal tests and similarities, and psychopaths on performance tests and object assembly.

I have chosen, perhaps arbitrarily, one factor, that of the direction of aggression, which I consider most essential, and on which I propose to base my research. The changes in that factor under oppression, the development of the tendency to direct aggression more and more outwards, or inwards, is the main object of my study.

3. SELECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES

(a) *General remarks*

Heretofore we have been dealing with various problems of neurosis and crime connected with the central topic of the psychological aspect of culture. We have been trying to find the most important elements in the human mind working for the development or for the decline of culture (through a deviation from equilibrium), the development of co-operation, or of hostility and delinquency. Here I shall assume that such forces do exist—whether in the form described by the psychoanalysts or in some other form—and shall look for the environmental factors which change the strength and shape of these selected elements of human nature.

I have touched on some of these environmental factors already, although from a different angle. I have been trying to find some elements in the human mind working for war, delinquency, or other forms of conflict; but we may certainly say that war, delinquency and hostility; themselves influence our behaviour. Criminals living together form delinquency areas: and delinquency areas, through the creation of a specific culture, produce juvenile delinquency and engender crime. The influence of war on human behaviour has an established place in criminological literature (441), and may be held responsible for producing all sorts of antisocial behaviour, including warlike attitudes themselves.

As we have had two world wars within one generation, and as the present 'peace' is hardly peaceful and co-operative, we might have included war in the most important causes—as well as results—of the present-day psychological changes.

War is not a single phenomenon, however. It affects various groups of people: adults and children, men and women, soldiers and civilians, in most varied ways. I can hardly think of any method of reducing war to a single, representative situation, which could be held responsible for influencing human behaviour. If we

could imagine such a uniform set of conditions which we could call the 'War-situation', and then study the changes in the patterns of human behaviour, as induced by that situation, we could claim that we were experimentally studying the influence of war upon human psychology. I do not think we can do that and, therefore, although admitting the importance of the problem, I shall dismiss it from our discussion.

By focusisng our minds on oppression we have to disregard other important factors which might be held responsible for the emergence or disappearance of certain patterns of behaviour, and of tendencies which we have already discussed. We could have regarded the economic categories of modern society, or religion, as the most potent force in shaping Man's character (676, p. 22). Or we could have proclaimed the End of Economic Man, and perhaps of Religious Man as well, the end of the concept of the nature of Man on which both capitalism and socialism are based (187). Here lies the crucial methodological question: how can we detect the most important of the environmental conditions shaping the souls of existing and future generations?

I think there is no other way than to make an arbitrary judgement, based on personal experience of the writer, on literature dealing with the present cultural crisis, and on the practical possibility of organizing a research according to the chosen set of conditions.

I have chosen five such conditioning factors, the combination of which I have called 'oppression'. I am well aware that this choice may have been affected by my personal and national bias, and by my own war-time experiences. Such a bias can hardly be completely excluded, and it is better if the writer is at least aware of its presence.

The factors I have chosen are: lack of freedom, disregard of personality, isolation, insecurity and frustration. They have always existed, but their importance has greatly increased since the emergence of the new totalitarian systems, and since the recent wars and the resulting enslavement or displacement of great numbers of people.

I propose, therefore, to carry out the research on the influence of these factors on human behaviour and on aggressive tendencies in particular, assuming their growing importance in the present world. This assumption may be wrong, but I do not think that should affect the scientific value of the proposed research. We must assume the existence of a certain set of conditions if we want to start any research on the influence of the environment on human behaviour. If the assumption is wrong, if these conditions disappear in the near future—their influence will also disappear. Once we have established a relationship of cause and effect, it is sufficient to observe the cause to predict the effect.

It is apparent, however, that my chosen conditions have already exerted their influence on the people, and may have started a vicious circle of domination and slavery, isolation and insecurity, frustration and aggression, every phenomenon being both cause and effect. The fact that all these phenomena are interwoven makes them increasingly influential and important.

(b) *Slavery and isolation*

It is no accident that among most popular books on contemporary problems are those 'dedicated to the fight against the slavery of man' (67)—freedom, like air, is fully appreciated only when we suffer from the lack of it. In prison it becomes almost an obsession.

In recent publications the dilemma of freedom has become such an obsession. It is regarded as the most dynamic, essential, and general factor in the problems of to-day (438).

There is some 'Value judgement' in this realization of the importance of freedom. It may be said that the introduction of value judgements into science is most dangerous to an objective and scientific approach, and should be avoided. If we despair because we are losing our freedom and individuality in the great machine of the modern community (449, pp. 19-20), because we have entered the era of 'Mechanized Barbarism' (*Ibidem*, p. 139; and 435), we are implying a value judgement: we believe that freedom is a good and should be preserved.

It is not one of the requirements of scientific procedure that such implications should be avoided. They cannot in fact be entirely avoided. They can only be repressed from the consciousness of the investigator—the most dangerous and unscientific procedure. Once value judgements are realized, we are on safe ground.

We may, however, simply state that recent events have largely destroyed faith in constant human progress, and of reason and freedom in particular.¹ The foundations of freedom have been shattered, and we should examine objectively the implications of that fact.

In some instances it has been our own fault. In some countries freedom has been abandoned voluntarily; in Germany millions were 'as eager to surrender their freedom as their fathers were to fight for it', when 'other millions were indifferent and did not

¹ Some authors, like Mumford (488), still maintain this view, saying (p. 10) that the 'path of human development has been from sensation to significance, from externally conditioned to the internally conditioned, from herd-like cohesion to rational co-operation, from automatism to freedom'. Even this author, however, contradicts himself in the later pages of his book, when speaking of the 'Coming Slavery' (p. 329).

believe the defence of freedom to be worth fighting and dying for' (E. Fromm, 264, pp. 2-3). This self-imposed slavery must also have had some effect on both the general population and their leaders, especially if it is true, as Plato said, that the enslaving of another is also the enslaving of oneself.¹

Fromm gives an excellent explanation of self-imposed slavery, of the escape from freedom. He regards the loss of individuality, the feeling of complete identity with a group or system of beliefs as a refuge from isolation and insecurity. In a structuralized whole the individual 'may suffer from hunger or suppression, but he does not suffer from the worst of all pains—complete aloneness and doubt' (264, pp. 28-9).

He does not escape from suffering, however: nor often from isolation and insecurity. The individual often feels his isolation more painfully when he is in a crowd. His escape, like the escape from reality into mental illness, does not solve any problems. The illusion of security within a group breaks down quickly when the group itself makes for disaster. This attempt to undergo slavery in order to reach security and unity with others is not only disastrous in its consequences—it does not even offer anything but an illusion.

Others did not escape from freedom—it was taken from them. Almost the whole continent of Europe has been occupied by military and police forces, imposing new political systems without the consent of the population, transferring vast numbers of people from one country to another, putting the others under a régime of compulsory labour and concentration camps. War does not only imply violence—it also implies lack of freedom, and abrogation of law, which is the main regulator and distributor of freedom.

I shall not attempt any theoretical analysis of freedom here.² For practical purposes we might define freedom of the individual as the minimum of restraint compatible with the freedom of others. This definition implies a kind of balance, and a set of relations

¹ The other country of which self-imposed slavery is fairly characteristic is Russia. It is interesting to note that I. P. Pavlov described a special 'freedom reflex' in dogs and showed how this reflex may be inhibited by setting off another against it—the reflex for food (513, pp. 11-12). He admits that some animals have this freedom reflex to such a degree that when placed in captivity they refuse all food, sicken and die, but that can hardly be applied to men. As for the Russians, in addition to the fact, mentioned by J. T. MacCurdy (429, p. 96), that the idea of political liberty cannot develop among people who are living at a bare existence level, I may quote Berdyaev again who saw among Russian émigrés 'the same revulsion from freedom, the same denial of it as in communist Russia' (67, p. 17). Also Dostoevski in *The Brothers Karamasov* describes the 'pressing need' of surrendering one's freedom, and, less explicitly, it can be traced in much of the literature and popular songs of that country.

² I will only refer to the literature on the subject, which is partly reflected in the bibliography.

with others which are largely regulated by law. With the abrogation of law in war, the lack of restraint in some spheres must bring about the increase of restraint in the whole.¹

We have at present a state of civil war in Asia, with millions of people in compulsory movement or under the rule of inimical forces. What is worse—we have grounds to fear that this state of affairs is not dying away, but is rather embracing more territory, people, and spheres of life.

Most of the abrogations of freedom seem to be caused by oppression. Perhaps—we cannot predict it—slavery of the oppressed will have somewhat different psychological consequences from those of the self-imposed kind of slavery. Probably they will have many elements in common. But in our selection it will be safer to confine the planned investigation to those who were subjected to slavery against their will. The maximum deprivation of freedom our age has achieved is the régime of concentration camps. We have here already the first indication of where to look for our sample of population. The changes in the minds of people who spent some years under a régime of complete slavery may give us some hint of the consequences of a lack of freedom.

(c) *Insecurity*

The feeling of insecurity is another factor of growing importance. Security is not only recognized as one of the representative values in society;² the lack of it may be regarded as one of the most important causes of delinquency (323, 679), of the disintegration of socially established attitudes, (448) and of the impulse to dominate others, one of the primary factors in the causation of war (308). As a feeling of insecurity within a group may lead the members to resent the intrusion of strangers into the group, it may also be held responsible for increasing tension and hostility, for creating scapegoats and hindering co-operation.³

The tendency to escape into slavery to gain security has already been mentioned. It may be added that the feeling of freedom itself is impossible once we feel insecure. Another phenomenon is the specific feeling of insecurity caused by a miscarriage of justice, by the abandonment of the main safeguards of the rights of the individual: for instance the rule that *lex retro non agit*, and the principle of no punishment without a fair trial. The fact that in the

¹ Cf. Malinowski's views (438). He regards war as the main large-scale abrogation of freedom (pp. 276 ff.).

² See H. D. Lasswell (389, p. 3, and 390, p. 25). Similar is the opinion of the general population: in a working-class district in London when people were asked to vote on what they considered was most conducive to their happiness, security received the most votes (273, p. 91).

³ On the fear of the stranger see Lasswell (389, pp. 165 ff.), and Durbin and Bowlby (190, p. 9) who take a similar view.

recent political trials all over the world, and in the 'administrative measures' of police states, these corner-stones of individual liberty and security have been discarded, must have a deep effect on the moral condition of society. Law imposes certain restrictions on the individual, but it offers him security. If, in addition to these restrictions, which are felt as a necessary but heavy burden, the individual cannot achieve security because justice is not done, we may expect a regression in social development, the abandonment of all restrictions, and the denial of civilization itself.¹

(d) *Frustration*

Frustration is the next—we may even say the all-embracing—factor. Lack of freedom, isolation and insecurity, may all be regarded as sources of frustration. Indeed they are usually representative of one particular kind of frustration—that caused by oppression.

This is a very important distinction. Hunger, disease, economic crises, unemployment or overwork, each cause different kinds of frustration, and thus produce different reactions in the people who suffer from them.

Perhaps some of these frustrations may lead, as Berdyaev (66) wished, to a revival of spiritualism and personalism. Perhaps there are, as he says, two kinds of suffering: 'a dark suffering leading to perdition and an illumined suffering leading to salvation.'

Frustration has been regarded as a force leading to highly desirable or to highly undesirable results, to the acquisition of new modes of adjustment, or to a regression to previously abandoned modes of behaviour. We may construct a whole list of factors determining whether frustration will result in favourable or unfavourable consequences,² and may expect the correlation between some of them and general adjustment to be far from linear. Thus we may expect that at a certain level the correlation between the amount of frustration and cognitive and orectic adjustment will be positive, and any increase in demands will result in an increase of efficiency. There will probably be an optimum, with greatest efficiency, and a subsequent deterioration of adjustment if the amount of frustration (other factors being constant) becomes too great.

(e) *Oppression*

The suffering of the oppressed presents a specific problem, however. Its influence is probably deeper, its bitterness greater than in other kinds of misery, although most of the effects may be similar

¹ Cf. Alexander and Staub (20) who rightly point out that miscarriages of justice transform static embitterment into dynamic rebellion.

² An interesting review of these factors is given by Mowrer (585).

to those described by writers concerned with the general problem of frustration.

The world of oppression, in the terms of Lewin's theory of personality (404), is a world of negative valences and strong barriers. The high walls and wires of concentration camps represent vividly Lewin's physical barriers which thwart the usual tendency of going-out-of-the-field, the best solution of a conflict situation with two or more negative valences. Compulsory labour and constant threats of punishment represent negative valences, producing withdrawal and retreat. Objects with positive valences are few and unobtainable—whether they are behind physical barriers or are linked with the terror of death.

The world of oppression is also characterized by a constant recurrence of frustration. And although there is some evidence (341) that neither the mode of conflict resolution nor the consistency of response are much affected by the knowledge that the situation will recur, people who have been subjected to extreme oppression give a rather different picture.

Oppression may be conceived as representing the extreme authoritarian 'social climate'; and some experiments in this field by Lewin, Lippitt and White (407), and Mowrer (484), will be referred to later on.

Criminological research, especially on psychoanalytic lines, links frustration, particularly if excessive, with delinquency¹ and, regards 'mental dissatisfactions' as its principal base (321, 323). Kate Friedlander goes so far as to define delinquents as 'persons who have been frustrated in their human relationships' (260).

Durbin and Bowlby (190) show how national frustration may lead to war, and how frustrated people may constitute aggressive nations; while Dollard and others (183) put the general proposition that every aggression is a result of frustration and every frustration results in aggression, although aggression may be temporarily compressed, delayed, disguised, etc.²

I am not prepared to endorse Dollard's view; I do not believe that the character of aggression is determined only by four factors: amount of frustration, inhibition, displacement and catharsis. At least the *load* of aggression may be determined biologically as well (if not exclusively). Possibly both are present: primary and secondary aggression may be merged together when expressed in overt behaviour. But even if we have, aetiologically speaking, two kinds of aggression, in their expression we cannot have more than one drive. As every individual is the interplay of biological and en-

¹ Aichhorn (14, pp. 200 ff.) distinguishes two types of delinquency: that caused by excess of love and that caused by excess of severity. The latter is much the more frequent of the two.

² This statement has since been revised (469).

vironmental forces, but in his behaviour forms a single unit—so we may conceive aggression as the result of biological and environmental forces, but, in the study of behaviour, look solely for its mode of expression, whatever the origin.

Biological forces remain relatively constant, while environmental factors fluctuate. We may see the change not only in the amount of frustration around us, but also in the way in which it affects us. Perhaps what matters is the 'spirit' in which frustrations are imposed rather than the frustrations themselves (Horney, 337), and perhaps this 'spirit' determines the amount and direction of the resulting aggression.

Horney does not explain what she means by the 'spirit of frustration'. If we want to make use of the term it should be more explicit, and I think its essence consists in the kind of inhibition implied in the frustrating situation. If the frustrating situation contains no inhibition, we might expect an outburst of aggression. If we are prevented from expressing our aggression, we may expect suppression or repression, but the further fate of unexploded aggression will depend on the existing tendencies of the personality structure, and the character of the external inhibition. If the frustrator is somebody whom we love and who, we think, means well even though inflicting pain, we may expect some identification with the frustrator—he will become incorporated into the self and the inhibition will be felt as self-imposed. If we treat the frustrator as our enemy the identification will be less likely to occur, he will be felt as an external agent, and the inhibition, if any, will retain its external character. That inhibition will be felt as a new kind of frustration, instigating us to other forms of aggression, and possibly resulting in a general tendency to direct aggression outwards. On the other hand if we accept Dollard's observation (183, p. 34), that self-imposed inhibition of aggression creates a tendency to direct aggression against the self, we may expect a strengthening of conscience (super-ego) whenever we incorporate a frustrator into our mind. Frustration, depending on the kind of associated inhibition of aggression, may thus be responsible for both our morality and our misconduct.¹

¹ This remark corresponds to the previously noted observation that both lack and excess of suffering in childhood may result in the formation of anti-social character. Similarly Friedlander (260, p. 52) refers to anxiety which may drive the child to control either his instinctive urges or the outside world. Elsewhere (262, p. 206) she remarks that 'each further frustration, if administered by the person whom the child loves, and if handled in a way the child can easily endure, contributes to a deviation of energy from the instincts to the ego'. 'If the gratification derived from the love object is insignificant or followed by too much displeasure, the self remains cathected to a much larger extent' and this leads to disturbance of the ego development and to anti-social character formation.

As already mentioned, present day frustrating conditions are largely of the oppressive type. If we suffer from a lack of freedom, this lack is rarely self-imposed or sought. We suffer from isolation, although the age of hermits has passed, and evacuation, transfers of population, separation of families in war, can hardly be regarded as voluntary, or as natural calamities for which no one is responsible.

The existing political situation in large parts of the world is oppressive, and the dangers which threaten people under police or military régimes are actually hostile, not merely unpleasant. If the feeling of general insecurity is growing, the insecurity of the oppressed is greater and deeper—for them it means the danger of complete annihilation.

If we accept respect for the individual as the central value of Western Civilization (Gollancz, 291) its extinction must be the cause of deep frustration. There is no doubt that this value is now everywhere threatened, but under totalitarian systems it is completely renounced.

Gollancz is apt to think that in fascism contempt for personality reaches its peak 'for it passes beyond contempt, and becomes hatred'. We may perhaps find other examples of this extreme repudiation of the individual. Wherever the individual's rights depend entirely on his functions, wherever he may be arbitrarily imprisoned, deported, killed, or put into a concentration camp, the mechanism is the same. But in Germany these conditions existed under a system which has now been destroyed. The masses of Displaced Persons, deprived of all human rights, deported for compulsory labour, persecuted in concentration camps, and threatened with torture and death at every instant, may give us some indication of what these conditions produce in the minds of men subjected to them.

(f) *Displaced Persons—subjected to all the factors combined*

Displaced Persons and inmates of concentration camps lived in conditions which, in a milder form, affect millions of people to-day. Even in their extreme form these conditions have not entirely disappeared, and are still threatening the rest of Europe. The population of Europe has already undoubtedly undergone deep changes, due to the conditions during and after the recent war. Although concentration camps represent the extreme form of slavery, insecurity and humiliation, the entire population dominated by the Hitler régime was affected by the system of contempt for personality, of restrictions and extermination. That system has in part survived, and shows no tendency to disappear.

Displaced Persons represent the extreme form of isolation. But the transfers of population are still going on, and even those who

have stayed in the same place are affected, one might say, by a kind of 'psychological displacement'—psychologically speaking, we are displaced every time we undergo a complete change of environment, and our actual geographical position plays only a secondary role.

We are all drifting in unknown waters, driven by the unknown tides of a new environment. All our minds are affected by the conditions of the critical period our civilization has entered. I am well aware that my own mind must have been affected by the conditions summarized above, in which I spent some time during the war. We can find no fixed point from which to take our bearings: but we may at least find some place where the tide is stronger, and determine its relative speed and direction.

The Displaced Persons, the inmates of concentration camps, are well in the main tide of the new world. If the conditions which affected them during the recent war are threatening the remainder of the population, it may well be that the psychological impact will be the same. A study of Displaced Persons may indicate the direction in which many minds are drifting; and, through careful sampling and analysis, we may infer with some probability what occurs to the psychological aspect of culture under oppression.

The limitations of the present study are obvious. Life is too complex to be condensed to a single representative situation, the human psyche too complex to be reduced to 'primary' factors. But every investigator has to formulate general concepts and hypotheses, and examine their validity, although these concepts never entirely correspond to real life. I also have started with the most general and all-embracing concepts, which I can test only by the use of small and concrete samples. This fact already presents inherent difficulties—the discussion in the following part of the book on the method adopted will undoubtedly introduce new limitations, and show new, partly unavoidable weaknesses.

Chapter 2

SELECTION OF THE SAMPLES

I. INTRODUCTION

In the introductory part of this work we were selecting prominent personality traits which could be studied scientifically, and environmental conditions which could be held responsible for moulding the personality structure of a large number of people.

Here we must start with a new selection: we have to find the people whom we intend to examine, evolve a method which will allow us to proceed with this examination, and produce some valid results justifying, at least to some extent, the ambitious programme undertaken. The selection of the sample (i.e. of the group or groups of people to be examined psychologically), is thus the next topic to be dealt with.

2. THE BASIS OF SELECTION

The most obvious and usual basis, the best criterion for the selection of a sample, is the degree to which it may be considered representative. Here, I must admit, this criterion is hardly applicable.

As we are interested in personality changes following on recent developments in Europe, the cradle of Western civilization, a representative sample should embrace all nationalities, all ages, professions and types of cultural background, and also cover all possible variants of the conditions in which these millions of people have lived and may be expected to be living in the immediate future. In practice, it would be utterly impossible to find any such representative sample, and even if the idea were approached such research would be made impossible by a further difficulty, namely, that if we wish to study psychological changes in a group of people affected by a given set of conditions we must examine them twice—before and after they have been exposed to these conditions. If therefore we wish to study the effects of oppression on a group, we must examine them psychologically first, then

subject them to some form of oppression (e.g. by putting them into a concentration camp for a few years) and give them a second examination to observe the difference. It is clear that any attempt to adopt such a method would be out of the question.

There is, however, another possibility. Instead of examining one large sample of population, representing all environmental conditions in all possible degrees, we may examine several samples, each of which represents a different set of conditions. If our samples are equated, i.e. if the groups of people living in the various different conditions are exactly the same in all but the particular to be studied, one examination will be sufficient. If we put a pair of identical twin babies into two different environments, the psychological difference between the twins, when adults, will represent the difference between the two environments in which they were brought up. As their original endowment was the same, differences subsequently found in psychological structure must be due to the influence of environmental conditions.

Difficulty arises, however, when we have no identical twins at our disposal. We cannot assume that any two groups of people who have lived in different kinds of environment were the same before they were submitted to these conditions. On the contrary, they could not be exactly the same.

The only remedy seems to be to make these groups as similar as possible, and increase their size in the hope that the individual differences will cancel one another out. If individual variations are small, and the difference between the psychological profiles of the groups is great enough, we shall find a significant difference between the means in the statistical analysis of the test results. In other words, if we select two groups of people, similar in all important aspects but one—their environment during recent years—any difference in test results, if statistically significant, will be evidence of the influence of this variable on those aspects of personality reflected in the test.

This method, which was adopted in the present research, is a combination of John Stuart Mill's method of difference with modern statistical technique. Mill assumed that if a different effect is preceded by only one different condition (all other important conditions being the same) that one condition is the cause of the different effect. Statistical analysis helps us to determine with a degree of probability amounting to scientific proof—whether that difference in effect is significant, or whether it can be ascribed to an error in sampling.

By adopting the method described above, we have changed the basis of sampling. Without aiming at the selection of one completely representative sample, we want several equated groups drawn from the same population but each having been subjected

to a different set of environmental conditions. As it is assumed that slavery, isolation, insecurity and frustration form such environmental conditions, and, taken together, could be considered as representing the state of oppression, we might look for different degrees of that state and see whether a change in the degree of oppression results in a corresponding change of personality structure in the oppressed. These 'levels' of oppression should be sharp and easily defined in order to avoid any border-line cases which would make distinction more difficult and artificial. On the other hand, we want the subjects from the different levels of oppression to be in the same situation while being tested; otherwise, the difference in the test results might be due to differences in the test situation.

There are in Europe two main sources of experimental population suitable for the purposes of our research: people under German and under Russian domination. In both cases, the subjects can easily be divided into classes representing different levels of oppression. Thus according to Polish documentation¹ Polish subjects deported by the Nazis belonged to the following categories:

- Prisoners of war;
- prisoners in concentration camps and Gestapo prisons;
- deported to compulsory labour in industry and agriculture;
- mobilized by the German Army as living in territories incorporated into Germany (following the Ribentropp-Molotov pact, 1939);
- mobilized by the Todt Organization for work in special labour detachments.

Those under the Russian régime were classed as:

- prisoners of war;
- prisoners in concentration camps (called 'labour camps') and N.K.V.D. prisons;
- deported to compulsory labour in industry and agriculture;
- mobilized by the Red Army, as having acquired the Soviet citizenship by living in territories incorporated into the U.S.S.R.;
- mobilized by the special labour organization for work in labour detachments.

The above classifications closely resemble each other, and a deeper analysis would show that the general conditions in which people belonging to these categories lived were also very similar. In both cases, prisoners in concentration camps suffered more persecution than any other group, and their death-rate was the highest. Resemblances between the other categories were also very

¹ See in particular the article (in Polish): 'The Nation of Deportees' (*Polish Thought, Fortnightly Review*, No. 93, June 1945). The same classification was adopted in practically all Polish works and official documents on the subject.

close, although on the whole there was under the Germans more mass murder, and more organized and sadistic cruelty, while in Russia climatic conditions, lack of food, and complete isolation from the civilized world were the main sources of frustration. It would therefore be most useful to study people deported under both types of régime—German and Russian.

Unfortunately any study of people deported by the Russians is impracticable. Of nearly 2 million Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians and others deported to the Soviet Union (377), only 77,200 Polish soldiers and 37,300 Polish civilians (including Polish Jews) were evacuated; most of the others remained in Russia and cannot be contacted at all. Those evacuated have since been placed in the most diverse conditions: many of them joined the Polish Army, some were evacuated to India, others to Africa, the Lebanon, Palestine and other countries. The conditions in which they lived after evacuation were thus different and we would have too many variables to be able to deal with them properly. The variations caused by this post-evacuation period would be too great to be ignored, and it would be extremely difficult to find any two groups, coming from different categories of displacement while in Russia, but from exactly the same post-evacuation conditions.

From this point of view, the situation in Germany was much more favourable. Immediately after liberation by the Allied forces, most people from concentration camps or deported for compulsory labour in industry and agriculture were transferred to the Displaced Persons' Camps organized by U.N.R.R.A. Thus, all were living in—and could be tested under—similar conditions. A period in a comparatively favourable environment would probably have smoothed out any sharp differences in the reaction of these people to liberation. Their attitudes would have become stabilized, and any differences in their personality structure could hardly be regarded as superficial; if people have lived in the same conditions for a year (that was roughly the time between their liberation and their subsequent examination by the present writer) and still show significantly different characteristics, the difference must be regarded as deep and important enough for serious consideration.

3. THE EXPERIMENTAL POPULATION

(a) *Visit to Germany*

A visit to Germany was accordingly arranged to collect the necessary information, documentary and statistical material, and to conduct experimental research with personality tests. The trip to the Continent lasted from the 26th April to the 11th July 1946,

and included a short stay in Belgium and France. The time for research was therefore very limited, and the whole plan would have proved impracticable if all the obstacles raised by the Administration had not suddenly evaporated when I crossed the border of the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany.¹ Only then, with the help of Professor Walter A. Lunden (Prison Officer, Military Government for Bavaria) and the U.N.R.R.A. welfare authorities² could I devote all my time to testing and interviewing, having no personal worries whatsoever about lodging, food or transport facilities.

The southern part of the U.S. Zone was selected as most suitable for organizing the research, as it contained a greater number of Displaced Persons than the French Zone, and a greater variety of categories of previous displacement than northern Germany. In the British Zone, for instance, the number of ex-prisoners of concentration camps was comparatively small. The decision was taken after some consultations with the Polish welfare organizations, the French 'Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Patriotes', 'Fédération Nationale des Déportés du Travail', and kindred committees. The above bodies also helped me in acquiring a considerable number of memoirs, personal diaries and documentary books on conditions in the concentration camps and on compulsory labour in Germany.

In Munich, in consultation with Professor W. A. Lunden, the U.N.R.R.A. authorities, the Polish Welfare Committee and the Union of Former Political Prisoners of Concentration Camps, I selected the prisons and Displaced Persons' Camps which I wished to visit. The basis of selection was: prisons where there was a greater number of Displaced Persons held for offences committed after liberation, and camps where there was a comparatively large number of ex-prisoners from concentration camps. Camps where any specific local conditions, either good or bad, might have perceptible influence on the psychology and resultant behaviour of Displaced Persons were excluded.

While the study of Displaced Persons in the U.N.R.R.A. camps aimed at examining the influence of previous conditions of displacement, the inquiry made in the prisons had a twofold purpose: to study the above influence on a special group of people and to compare this special group with the general D.P. (Displaced Persons) population and to verify the hypothesis set out in the first chapter above, viz. that there is a negative relationship between

¹ Difficulties made by the Administration up to that moment would merit a special study in Social Psychology.

² I am greatly indebted to Mr. W. S. Boe, Miss Marnie Bruce, Dr. F. C. Foster, Mr. Israil, Mr. A. Krzczunowicz, Mr. W. Kula, Capt. C. W. LeGrand and Mr. H. A. Washington in particular.

the strength of guilt feelings on the conscious (or superficial unconscious) level and antisocial behaviour. Verification of this hypothesis was necessary, if any valid conclusions were to be drawn regarding the development of social or antisocial tendencies, on the basis of a study of the direction of aggression.

(b) *Determination of the levels of oppression*

The next step was to determine the 'levels of oppression', to which the various categories of Displaced Persons had been subjected. Of the five categories mentioned above, I had to exclude Prisoners of War, as their position at the time of my study was different from that of other categories of Displaced Persons. They lived in special camps and had more rights than the ordinary D.P.s and therefore any comparison was impossible, as any differences observed might have been due to the differences in their present environments rather than to the influence of the previous type of displacement. Similar considerations applied to people called up for service in the German Army. The number of people detained in Gestapo prisons was comparatively small, as those who survived the period of examination and trial were immediately sent to concentration camps.

Thus after preliminary consultation with the welfare authorities, and the Displaced Persons themselves, a threefold classification was adopted, dividing the experimental population into the following groups: (a) those who had passed through the most frustrating conditions of the concentration camps; (b) those deported to industrial centres, where they were constantly overworked and under-nourished, but had some human rights (pay, working hours, etc.); (c) slave labourers allocated to individual farmers; members of this last group were better off physically, but were in more frustrating psychological conditions, the farmer (*Bauer*) having absolute power over them.

While the degree of oppression and resultant frustration was clearly greatest in the concentration camp group, the other two groups were not so easily comparable. Although, on the whole, the 'agricultural' group seemed to be more frustrated than that of 'industry', there were individual exceptions, as there were some humane farmers who did not take full advantage of their right to treat the worker allocated to them as a slave. These individual variations did not, however, justify any further sub-classification.¹

In the group drawn from concentration camps (the most illuminating for our study), I tried to distinguish between the camps with strict internal order; those without any discipline, where the staff acted unjustly and flouted prescribed regulations; those where

¹ That was the unanimous opinion of the subjects concerned.

the junior staff were nominated or elected; with and without labour; and with torture or extremely bad conditions. I learned, however, that overall variations due to time exceeded by far any differences between the individual camps. Thus, up to a certain date (1943), almost all concentration camps were by way of being extermination camps; subsequently, more stress was put on labour and efficiency, as factors helping the war effort. The policy of the German authorities varied with the progress of the war, and, in individual cases, with changes of camp administrators. There were some periods when no discipline was enforced, especially in transfer centres; there were periods of acute hunger, or of a higher death-rate in the gas chambers. It was, however, the opinion of all those whom I interviewed, that, on the whole, conditions in the concentration camps were uniform enough to justify including them all in one group.

(c) *Formation of the equated samples*

To obtain comparable data, and ascertain clearly the effect of conditions of displacement, the following technique was adopted: Displaced Persons now living in identical conditions in U.N.R.R.A. camps or prisons were divided into three groups according to their previous type of displacement: concentration camps, agriculture and industry. Those whose type of displacement varied, who were, for example, transferred from industry to agriculture, or interned in concentration camps after some years of labour in agriculture or industry, were excluded. So were all those who did not remain for more than a year in concentration camps or forced labour (the majority stayed three to four years, some for as much as five and a half years).

Groups were selected from the same population, the only major difference between them being the above-mentioned variation in displacement. To ensure that the groups were identical, each person selected for the concentration camp group had two 'controls', one in the 'industry' group, and one in the 'agriculture' group, of the same sex, age, intelligence (as measured by the Otis Intelligence Test), profession, education, nationality and citizenship,¹ and coming from the same district and type of community (e.g. big towns, small towns, country).

It was believed that if every subject in one group had his 'con-

¹ The term 'nationality' has a different meaning in Poland and some other continental countries from that usually employed in Britain and France. Here these terms are employed as in the *Oxford Dictionary*: 'nationality' is defined as 'the fact of belonging to a particular nation', whereas 'citizenship' is defined as 'the position or status of being a citizen with its rights and privileges'. In other words, it may be said that 'nationality' denotes a person's relationship to his nation, national feelings, culture, language, etc., whereas 'citizenship' denotes his relationship to the state, his legal status, civic rights and duties.

trols' in the others, all three groups might be regarded as being to a large extent identical, and should show similar psychological reactions, unless there was some important factor present in one of the groups and absent from the others, or present in all the groups but at different intensity.

There was, however, one serious danger. In most countries the people sent by the Germans to the concentration camps, while varying in sex, age, intelligence, education, profession, etc., were selected either because of their resistance to the Nazis or because of their criminality. For this reason as far as most national groups were concerned, concentration camps included ardent patriots and criminals, but no 'normal' individuals, such as were most of the deportees in industry and agriculture.

If we applied ethical criteria the distribution of the concentration camp population would be bimodal. The same would probably apply to some personality traits. On the other hand we should expect people selected by the Germans as most dangerous to be more ascendant (the more submissive group collaborating with them), and more prone to conflict with the existing authorities. If we use Nietzsche's dichotomy (501) we might say that non-plastic, vehement, ecstatic, 'out of bounds' Dionysians would probably be more likely to be imprisoned than an Apollonian governed by the law of measure in the Hellenic sense. Heroism may be regarded as a crisis phenomenon, showing a weakening of the ordinary ideas of service and fulfilment of duty. It may be that heroes, in the fanaticism of a popular movement will become 'the henchmen of murder' (343, pp. 147-9). On the other hand, some studies of criminal groups show an urge to be heroic, more prominent than in the non-delinquent population (see Bender, Keiser and Schilder, 61). Both a member of a resistance movement and a common offender would prefer being a dead hero to a live coward.

If conscience and cowardice are really the same things, as Oscar Wilde once said (725), we cannot expect people selected either for their courage or for their lack of conscience to have the same personality structure as the rest of the population.¹

¹ Similar views have been expressed by Goethe. See also Shakespeare (*Hamlet*, Act III, Scene 1):

*'Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn away,
And lose the name of action. . . .'*

If a certain similarity between heroism and criminality is nevertheless usually overlooked, and to Adler (8) 'every murderer is a coward intoxicated with the

There were, however, two national groups where such selection was not employed—the Polish and the Jewish group.¹ Towards both these groups the Germans conducted a policy of extermination, and the concentration camps contained Poles or Jews who had neither committed any crime, nor been especially active against the occupying power. The mere fact of being a Jew, or in the case of Poles, of living in a district where a German had been shot, or of belonging to a certain profession (e.g. teacher, lawyer, etc.), in a particular district, was sufficient.

Those Poles and Jews who were arrested for taking an active part in the resistance movement were either shot outright, or 'liquidated' in a concentration camp through especially harsh treatment, so that very few had a chance to survive.

In some cases, an offence was quoted as the reason for arrest. But even when these ex-prisoners admitted in interviews to having committed an offence against the German administration, they claimed that during the occupation almost everybody was flouting some regulation or other. Interviews with other Poles, who were merely deported to compulsory labour, or who were imprisoned in concentration camps without any formal legal foundation, revealed that they had also committed innumerable offences for which they could have been deported or even shot, but that they were lucky enough not to be caught. It seems to have been almost impossible to live a day under the German occupation in Poland or in Jewish districts without breaking some rules or regulations.² The only alternative was complete collaboration with the enemy, so exceptional in the case of Poles and Jews that it could be ignored; especially as any active collaborators would scarcely be found among those deported in the other two groups examined (i.e. to compulsory labour in industry and agriculture).

For these reasons, Poles and Jews formed the best material for this research, and, with some exceptions to provide illustrative data, the investigation was limited to these two groups.

idea of being a hero', this may be due to our own bias. As Bergman (70) points out, 'psychologists and psychiatrists—no different in their prejudices against the criminal than other scientists—have failed to examine the possibility of establishing links between criminality and any traits which, in harmony with their cultural environment, they consider valuable'.

¹ I was able to establish this fact (a) through many interviews with Displaced Persons both those who had been in concentration camps and those who had not; and (b) through the study of German orders regarding policy towards Poles and Jews.

² Similarly, according to Bettelheim (61) in concentration camps 'since practically everything was forbidden and punished severely and since the prisoners who did not transgress any rules did not fare any better than those who did, due to the arbitration of the guards, all rules were broken'.

4. FINAL SELECTION OF THE GROUPS OF TESTEES

With the technical help of Military Government and U.N.R.R.A. authorities research was organized in prisons containing Displaced Persons, in Polish Displaced Persons' Camps, and in Jewish Displaced Persons' Camps.

(a) In the prisons

Research was conducted in the Landsberg Prison—40 Poles and Polish Jews held, 33 examined; in the Kempten Prison—7 Poles held, 6 examined; in the Stadelheim Prison (Munich)—134 Poles, Polish Jews and some others claiming Polish citizenship held, 63 examined. Altogether in the prisons concerned there were 181 Polish citizens, 102 of whom were examined. The others were in hospital, working outside the prison, or could not be examined for other such reasons; only one (not a Pole) refused to co-operate.

Among the 102 prisoners examined, more than half showed an intelligence level too low to complete the personality tests. The fact that Displaced Persons held in prisons were mostly of similar age and similar profession allowed, however, of the formation of two control groups, one consisting of former prisoners of concentration camps and one from the mixed 'industry' and 'agriculture' group, each comprising fifteen Polish subjects. These two groups completed all the prescribed tests. Some illustrative material was collected from the Jewish and other groups.

The fact that more than half of the prisoners had to be excluded from the personality tests as unable to complete them¹—whereas in the groups of people studied in the U.N.R.R.A. camps the percentage of subjects excluded on these grounds amounted to about 33 per cent—seems to indicate that D.P.s detained in prison have a lower standard of intelligence than the average Displaced Person population. No attempt was made, however, to study this question in detail.

(b) In the Displaced Persons' camps

The research was conducted in the Polish Displaced Persons Camp in Kempten, containing 1,169 persons, in the Kempten D.P. Hospital containing 331 persons, and in various camps, included in the 194 U.N.R.R.A. team, Weilheim-Murnau district, and containing 2,610 persons. Here Poles who had been in concentration camps were selected and examined with the Otis Intelligence Test.

¹ It was found that one could not expect subjects with less than a certain score (57) on the Otis Intelligence Test, to understand and answer properly the remaining personality tests; while those with higher scores had no such difficulties. Exceptions to this were rare.

Then those whose mental level permitted the completion of the personality tests, underwent further examination with these tests. Groups of Displaced Persons who had been deported to compulsory labour in industry or on farms were selected to match the group of ex-prisoners in concentration camps. As the total number of ex-prisoners in concentration camps in the districts under investigation did not exceed 160—about 4 per cent of the total number of Displaced Persons, it was easier to make the selection from among the much more numerous 'industry' and 'agriculture' groups to fit the less numerous 'concentration camp' group than vice versa.

A preliminary selection of suitable subjects was made in consultation with the camp authorities, with the more active members of the self-government of the camp, and with the leaders of various voluntary associations, in particular that of former political prisoners. The card-index system, used in most of the camps, gave some information about the inhabitants (name, age, sex, education, profession, etc.), and in order to find suitable controls approximately 4,100 such cards were examined.

In the next stage supplementary material was sought, as the card-index not only omitted certain data (on the history of displacement in particular), but was often far from accurate. Thus the profession or education claimed in the card did not always correspond to reality, nor did the nationality and citizenship. Some Ukrainians and Bielorrussians claimed Polish nationality, Poles from the Soviet Union claimed Polish citizenship, and some people from the eastern Polish provinces pretended they were born and had lived all their life in the West.¹ In consultation with the camp leaders, the teachers (who were a reliable source of information as they often knew the siblings or children of my prospective subjects), and other informants, I was able to exclude most of the 'doubtful' cases, suspected of giving false personal data.

The next stage was to interview the prospective subject of the psychological examination. This was usually done shortly before the examination with the Otis Intelligence Test, but sometimes after this test, or even after the completion of all the tests. I avoided any formal or rigid system in these interviews, which were conducted 'casually' and it is hoped that most subjects were not aware they were being interviewed at all. There was usually one short interview before the intelligence test began, and any additional information and corroboration was sought subsequently, if the score in the test proved satisfactory.

The aims of these interviews were to create the necessary rapport,

¹ The reason for this was fear of compulsory repatriation to U.S.S.R. All Soviet citizens were subject to such repatriation and there were fears that the other categories mentioned above might also be affected.

to ascertain that the history of displacement was long enough (at least one year before the end of hostilities) and of the same length as that of the subjects selected as controls, to verify that displacement could be classified under one of the three headings (concentration camp, industry, agriculture) and did not contain any unusual features differentiating the subject from the rest of the group, and to confirm the personal data (in particular profession, education, nationality, citizenship and the district of permanent residence in the country of origin).

The last question was of particular difficulty, as it was often necessary to conduct a real 'cross-examination', while at the same time remaining friendly and not terrifying the subject. People were so frightened by the constant 'screening' by military and welfare authorities, and of the compulsory repatriation which might result from it, that it was easy to lose the confidence of the subject concerned, and through him of the others. Fortunately enough, the character of these interviews and of my whole research, as well as the fact that I came from London¹ aroused some confidence, and usually people who had given false personal data to the various authorities concerned were soon telling me what I still think was the truth. In the case of some Soviet subjects, and some Ukrainians and Bielorrussians of Polish citizenship who did not trust me enough to be sincere, I did not press very deeply. Certain inconsistencies in their stories, some singularities of pronunciation and intonation,² and characteristic spelling mistakes in the responses to their personality tests, gave, I hope, sufficient evidence to enable me to eliminate all those who on account of their nationality, or the cultural background of the district of permanent residence, were not comparable with the other subjects of my research. Most of the subjects eliminated in the last stage of selection passed through the personality tests in the usual way to avoid any ill-feelings, but the material obtained was only partly elaborated, and was not included in the statistical analysis of the results.

The extreme care with which the above question was tackled may appear as a sheer waste of time and effort. I suspect, however, that without that painful procedure the samples of concentration camp population would have contained relatively too many people of Polish nationality from the central and western districts, while the 'industry' and 'agriculture' groups would have contained

¹ In Polish circles the word 'London', as the residence of the Polish Government in exile, and the former centre of the resistance movement against the Nazis, had still a magic effect. In Jewish camps the reaction seemed to be the opposite, and 'London' was thought of as the main obstacle to the Palestine programme.

² Here my studies in phonetics and knowledge of Russian proved of invaluable assistance.

other nationals, and too many people from the eastern Polish provinces. Thus any differences in the results of personality tests, even if statistically significant, might have been ascribable to differences in cultural background and national characteristics, and not exclusively to the history of displacement and consequent level of oppression.

Similarly, as deportation to concentration camps affected the town population more than the rural districts, insufficient attention to this factor would have resulted in my 'identical' samples having, in fact, a different composition.

Before actually beginning the examination, I thought of only one device that might have simplified the selection. Instead of trying to match all the controls in respect of intelligence, I considered merely comparing the average intelligence of the entire groups. However, it was clear that two groups of the same *means* might have a different *dispersion* of intelligence, and therefore different characteristics. A group of people of average intelligence is not comparable with one containing a mixture of very dull and very superior subjects; similarly a group of dull clerks and intelligent farmers may not be comparable with another composed of intelligent clerks and dull farmers. There was, I think, no alternative to matching every subject with his two controls.

5. THE JEWISH GROUP: AN EXPERIMENT WHICH FAILED

I tried to undertake a similar investigation in the Jewish U.N.R.R.A. camp in Landsberg, containing 5,002 Jewish Displaced Persons, most of whom had been in concentration camps and had undergone several years' detention in conditions worse than those experienced by any other national group. In spite of instructions issued by U.N.R.R.A. H.Q., I was not admitted to the camp by the acting team, for reasons with which I myself agreed. The camp was conducted exclusively by Jewish officials of U.N.R.R.A. (most of them American citizens), but even they complained that they had no satisfactory co-operation in running the camp. The inmates did not feel that the American Jews belonged to their group, as they had not suffered in the concentration camps. Psychological investigation, based on Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Test, was undertaken by the team's psychologist, Dr. Leo Srole, but had to be abandoned for lack of the necessary rapport.

Moreover, at the time when I visited the Landsberg Camp, tension was unusually high. A large group of inmates had been found guilty of assaulting American soldiers (in a clash between Jews and Germans in which the U.S. authorities intervened) and had been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by the military courts.

The fact that the Jews, who, living as they did in camp conditions, were easier to detain, suffered punishment, while the Germans did not, caused bitter feelings which made any attempt to start a psychological investigation impossible.

My endeavours to collect some test material from the Jewish camp in Weilheim or from the Jewish inmates of the Polish Displaced Persons' camps in Kempten and Murnau similarly ended in failure. Only a few subjects agreed to answer the tests, and even their co-operation was poor. The great majority categorically refused to co-operate. The few subjects who agreed to be tested thus formed a highly selected group of greater sociability than the average, and any conclusion drawn from the results obtained would not apply to the whole population.

In the Polish groups, great care was taken to test *all* the subjects of the given sample. Sometimes it was fairly difficult to convince a subject that he should submit himself to this laborious investigation for the sake of Science. It would often have been much quicker to test several others instead of the reluctant one. Nevertheless, with only three exceptions¹ in about 750 persons tested, all the Poles were induced to complete the required tests, and, once having started, showed much interest in their performance.

As this procedure was not possible with the Jews, the material obtained from them has less value. The failure of the experiment is in itself significant; to my mind it indicates the influence of extreme forms of oppression upon the Jewish population.

The lack of co-operation and the asocial behaviour and hostility manifested might be taken as indicating that the Jewish Displaced Persons in Germany are less co-operative and more antisocial than the Polish ones. On the other hand, neither criminal statistics nor my own previous experience would allow the general conclusion to be drawn that Jews are more antisocial than Poles. During the war I had occasion, while in charge of welfare services for Polish citizens in northern Russia, to work with both Polish and Jewish Displaced Persons, many thousands of whom had been liberated from concentration camps in that district. In my work I did not find any definite difference between the two groups from the point of view of antisocial behaviour, in cases where they had come from the same set of conditions.² In Russia, I was not handicapped in my relations with the Jewish population, and national differences were not felt to be important. The Jews deported to Siberia were not persecuted as a distinct racial group, and when set free after the Sikorski-Stalin agreement, they felt their liberation, just

¹ All of them from the ex-concentration camp group.

² Some American investigations show that Jews have even a smaller delinquency rate than other nationalities. So in the very mixed population of New York City the proportion of Jews among delinquent children in 1933 was

as formerly their persecution, to have been due to their Polish citizenship. For good or evil, both these groups were treated together.¹

In Germany my Polish nationality, as well as the fact, that I came from London, proved a handicap in my relations with the Jewish population in U.N.R.R.A. camps. It did not handicap co-operation in the prisons, though. The Jews imprisoned by the American authorities for offences committed after the end of hostilities accepted me as 'one of them' and co-operated readily in interviews and tests. In general, relations between Jews and Poles in the prisons seemed to be satisfactory and rather friendly, for instance, Jewish prisoners told me that they were being sent parcels from Jewish welfare organizations, and asked me to try and arrange similar help for the Poles; the Polish prisoners did not complain of any discrimination, and merely confirmed the above fact without expressing any ill feelings towards the Jews.

Outside the prison walls the picture was completely different, however. There antagonism was not centred on Germans and Americans, who served as scapegoats in the prison situation. National feelings ran high and a more diffused hostility hindered any co-operation with people who did not belong to exactly the same group.

I admit that my endeavour to organize psychological research among the Jewish D.P. population was made in a tense and unfavourable political atmosphere. It is also possible that I did not develop the right attitude myself, and that I am at least partly to blame for the failure.

The fact remains, however, that when I met a group of people who had suffered an unprecedented degree of persecution on account of their race all attempts to create a positive rapport and an atmosphere of co-operation ended in failure. I was told explicitly that I could not be trusted, for the same reason that had caused the former persecution. I was successful only in the prison situation, where a new form of pressure had directed all the accumulated hostility against the American and German authorities.

Thus vicious circles are created. National or racial persecution

about half the proportion of Jews in the total child population of the city (439). In Poland the position seemed to be different and the data published by the Polish Head Office of Statistics (279,280) show the proportion of Jews in the whole population of the country as 7.8 per cent, but among the persons convicted in the same year (1924) as 13 per cent (928 in 6,949). If instead of nationality we take religious denomination as the basic criterion, the difference will be smaller: 10.5 per cent and 13.5 per cent respectively.

¹ In my experience in Russia I found that Polish leaders, if sympathetic towards the Jewish population, were even more easily accepted than Jewish leaders. On the other hand some Jewish leaders proved very successful in districts with a predominantly Polish population.

brings about exaggerated in-group feelings. External pressure brings about hostility and lack of co-operation. The remedy seems to be more pressure, and the concentration of aggression on a scapegoat, just as the national group which had formerly suffered oppression had served as a scapegoat for the persecuting group.

My experiment and its failure in the Jewish D.P. camps gave me the same feeling as that formulated by another student of the problem, Gerald H. Singer, as a conclusion on the influence of sudden oppression on a racial minority (638): 'We persecute a minority for its alleged negative racial qualities and create and intensify those qualities for which in turn we continue and justify the persecution.'

The events now generally known to have taken place in the D.P. camp at Wolfrathausen, Bavaria, in charge of U.N.R.R.A. team 106, District 1, U.S.A. Zone, together with the subsequent reactions, are among some of the most characteristic occurring in a Jewish centre. According to one of the victims, and a few witnesses, what happened was as follows: On 23rd July 1945, about midnight, a red limousine drove up the public roadway near the camp, followed by a motor-cycle on which rode two uniformed German policemen. Shots were fired from the direction of the motor-cycle at two Jews walking along the road towards the camp. One shot killed the first Jew outright; the second shot wounded the other Jew in the arm. This event took place some weeks after an ugly situation had arisen in Landsberg as a result of the disappearance of two Jewish boys who had been on guard outside the camp during the night. This was ascribed by the local D.P.s to the activities of the Germans. This camp was accordingly the scene of unfortunate disturbances, which were put down by the American military police. As a result, a number of Jewish D.P.s were brought before a military court for active resistance and incitement. No trace of the lost boys was ever found.

The happenings at Landsberg soon became known in all the Jewish camps, arousing panic and frustration. The fact that revenge for injuries inflicted by the Germans had resulted in a number of Jews being brought before a military court created the impression that Jews were still being persecuted, particularly as the German wrongdoers had not been punished.

A similar effect was produced by the two fatal shots in the road near Wolfrathausen—the reason for which has never been discovered. Immediately after this occurrence the camp was surrounded by a military guard, with the aim of avoiding any new outbreak of revenge on the Germans, with consequences similar to those which had already taken place at Landsberg. No D.P. might leave or enter the camp without a permit. This position continued for weeks, and produced depression, bitterness and frustration among the inhabitants.

In both instances (in Landsberg and in Wolfrathausen) the groups of people attacked by the Germans were punished either for their actions—which, even if defensive, were criminal in character—or for anticipated action which did not in fact take place, while aggressors were not punished, as they could not be found.

In many interviews and informal talks with members of the administration, I heard complaints of the trouble created by former inmates of Belsen, Mauthausen and other places of torture. The administrators were concerned with these difficulties and made certain speculations on the subject. The conclusions, usually not formulated clearly but put in a vague or disguised form, were based on the axiom: 'You cannot change human nature.'

If there was any trouble in a Jewish camp, or if the Poles from concentration camps were found to be the source of uneasiness and excitement among the Polish refugees, the reasoning was that the culprits must have always been riotous and disorderly and that was why they had been put into concentration camps. If they were, as I tried to argue, ordinary people and not especially selected criminal specimens—then it was argued that the whole national group 'must' be similarly antisocial. The argument that completely honest people, when subjected to oppression, sadism, privations and ill-treatment, may acquire some habits and modes of behaviour which have been foreign to them before imprisonment; that, in addition to their sufferings, they have experienced a psychic trauma from which it is difficult to recover and for which they are not to blame—all this was too horrifying to be accepted.

The more the Displaced Persons had suffered under the Nazis, the more grateful they should be for liberation. The more unhappy they had been in the concentration camps, the happier they should be now, even if the conditions of U.N.R.R.A. barracks were not exactly what they had dreamt of behind the wires. The fact that extreme forms of suffering can make any subsequent happiness or comfort more difficult to experience¹ is too unpleasant to be readily accepted.

We are taught that the more we suffer on this earth the greater happiness we shall enjoy in heaven, and we are prepared to believe this. The idea that extreme pain and torment can poison our souls and make them unworthy of celestial bliss is too contrary to our sense of justice to be accepted by the mind, and we repress it.

¹ Bettelheim (73) describes how in a concentration camp, after the extreme hardship of standing at attention on a terribly cold winter night, when over eighty prisoners had died and several hundred had their extremities so frozen that they had later to be amputated, the prisoners were permitted to return to their barracks: they did not experience the feeling of happiness they had expected.

When we find a criminal in a slum, we think that even the slum is too good for him, and we put him into prison. Then our sense of justice is satisfied—he who is guilty is punished.

6. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE EQUATED SAMPLES IN THE D.P. CAMPS

The general considerations governing the selection of samples suitable for statistical analysis and adapted to scientific procedure considerably decreased the size of the groups under investigation, especially as I was bound to exclude all the doubtful cases. In some instances a minor error of spelling, like the omission of the letter 'i' before the letter 'e' in some Polish words, was taken as a sufficient ground for exclusion from the sample, as that particular mistake is characteristic of people of Russian or Ruthenian cultural background.

The subsequent reduction in the size of the samples made it more difficult to meet purely statistical requirements. It is an old truth that the bigger the number of subjects under investigation the easier it is to arrive at statistically significant results. It was felt, however, that in order to have *scientifically* significant results, it is not enough to operate with numbers in a highly technical way. Sometimes, in order to meet certain demands of scientific procedure, we must partly sacrifice other needs. The value of the method depends on the total scientific procedure, on the balance between the various requirements, as well as on the degree to which they are met.

Even with all these considerations, I am well aware of the weaknesses of my method, and of the personality tests used. The conditions in which research was conducted were as far from the laboratory situation as first aid on the battlefield is from a surgical operation in a modern hospital. But it is a most unfortunate fact that in psychology, as in the social science, major operations often have to be conducted in the field, under changing conditions responsive to no control. Sometimes, as H. A. Murray said, psychology has the choice of two alternatives: to study important problems with as yet inadequate instruments, or to study with adequate instruments unimportant problems. I tried to keep some balance between the significance of the problems and the exactness of measurement; but it was impossible to keep the size of the samples related to the size of the problems without abandoning certain essential demands of scientific procedure.

Thus out of roughly 4,100 subjects available for investigation only 650 were found on examination of their files to be eligible, and took the intelligence test; 230 took the personality tests, and 122 fell into groups sufficiently equated to give adequate grounds

for statistical analysis and the drawing of valid conclusions. A certain uniformity of age, education and profession, prevailing in the D.P. camps, made it possible to arrange: three groups of Polish men from Kempten (concentration camps, industry, agriculture) numbering eighteen subjects each; two groups of Polish men (concentration camps and mixed industry and agriculture) of twenty-one subjects each, in Weilheim-Murnau; and two groups of Polish women (concentration camps and mixed industry and farms) of thirteen subjects each in Weilheim-Murnau.

Some illustrative material was also collected from Polish, Ukrainian and Russian D.P.s.

The three groups of Polish men in Kempten contained:

- 6 agricultural workers (that is, 2 in each group)
- 27 craftsmen (fitters, riggers, joiners, bricklayers, butchers, bakers, blacksmiths, shoemakers and tailors)
- 3 tradesmen
- 6 secondary school pupils
- 3 subjects of similar, but not identical profession (a police constable, a forest guard and a non-commissioned officer¹)
- 3 clerks
- 3 clerks with technical qualifications (1 book-keeper, 2 technicians-calculators)

All controls were equated in educational standard. The age ranged from twenty to forty-nine years. Younger subjects were matched within two years in age; for people around forty a few years difference was permitted.

The group from which the additional material was drawn included two groups of women with backgrounds of compulsory labour in industry and agriculture respectively. These groups could not be sufficiently equated, however. Women in industry were older, of better education, and from urban areas, while most women allocated to individual German farmers were younger, had had less education and came from rural districts. It seems, therefore, that the Germans took more care in selecting women for work in industry or agriculture, than they did in allocating men.

The number of Polish women from concentration camps was very small in the Kempten district.

As the preliminary scoring of personality tests indicated a certain similarity of responses between the groups from industry and agriculture, with a striking difference between both these groups and that of former prisoners of concentration camps, the subjects in the Murnau-Weilheim district were arranged in two groups

¹ These subjects had similar backgrounds. Older men in police in rural districts, and in forest guards, were usually former non-commissioned officers in Poland. These men had seen many years of service in similar environments, with a specific system of values and habits.

only: one from concentration camps and one mixed (with approximately equal distribution) group from industry and agriculture. This procedure made possible an increase in the size of the male samples and the formation of two samples of women.

The male samples consisted of:

- 1 pair of agricultural workers
 - 5 pairs of craftsmen (joiners, shoemakers, interior-decorators, fitters, electricians)
 - 1 pair of pupils from trade schools
 - 1 pair of engineers (lower technical education)
 - 1 pair of students from technical schools
 - 1 pair of secondary school pupils (working class)
 - 2 pairs of secondary school pupils (lower middle class)
 - 1 pair of secondary school pupils (professional class)
 - 1 musician (light stage music) and 1 ballet artist
 - 1 band musician and 1 band singer
 - 1 pair of physical training instructors
 - 1 pair of butchers
 - 1 pair of journalists (with university education)
 - 1 pair of clerks (secondary school education)
 - 1 pair of clerks with unfinished university education
 - 1 pair of university students (faculty of Science)
- Age range 20-42 years

The samples of women contained:

- 1 pair of shop assistants
 - 3 pairs of dressmakers
 - 1 pair of students from trade schools
 - 1 pair of elementary school pupils (working class)
 - 2 pairs of secondary school pupils (lower middle class)
 - 1 pair of secondary school pupils (professional class)
 - 2 pairs of clerks
 - 1 teacher and 1 clerk
 - 1 pair of housewives (upper middle class)
- Age range 19-42 years

The whole experimental population can be arranged in the following tabular form:

	<i>Number of the Subjects</i>	
	<i>In the prisons</i>	<i>In the D.P. camps</i>
Personal data examined	181	4,100
Took the intelligence test	102	650
Took the personality tests	50	230
Included in the equated samples	30	122

To sum up:

All the groups were of the same nationality, citizenship and religion, and each was homogeneous with regard to sex. There

was some variation within the groups with regard to age, intelligence, profession, education, district, and type of community, but very little variation between the groups since every individual was matched in these respects with an individual in the control group. The 'level of oppression' was the same for every individual within a group but differed between the groups. Thus the only respect in which there was a definite variation between, and little within, the groups, was the 'level of oppression'.

The design of the experiment may be termed after Chapin (126) an '*ex post facto* design', since the present effect is 'traced backward to an assumed causal complex of factors or forces operating at a prior date', in this case to the level of oppression.¹ The fundamental rule of the experimental method that one should vary one condition at a time and maintain all others rigidly constant, was obeyed as far as practicable. But this rule implies an exact knowledge of all 'other conditions'. This cannot be achieved in social science at present, and the only solution seemed to be to follow McNemar's (461) advice: to resort to logical consideration and to equate experimental and control groups by pairing, assuming that knowledge and intuition² will allow our selecting, out of the available variables, those which are really pertinent.

Once we have done that we shall attempt to observe and measure the differences between the groups, to see whether these may be due to 'chance', or whether they are statistically significant. By chance we mean, after Chapin, a large number of small causes, for it 'never means, in the language of science, the absence of cause' (148, p. 50). If we find out that a difference between the groups representing various levels of oppression is of the magnitude which could occur very infrequently as a result of 'chance', we shall claim that it is probably due to the factor of oppression. But 'no proof can be accepted short of confirmation of the results by repeating the study under like conditions' (148, p. 29) and we shall be limited in our conclusions by the inescapable fact that we can never control all social conditions of an experiment in the field, and our assumptions as to the pertinence of those conditions

¹ Sir Frederic Bartlett (41) makes a useful distinction between experimenting and testing. 'An experiment applies specifically controlled situations (groups of stimuli) with the object of demonstrating what are the conditions of the resulting reactions *within* these situations.' 'A test applies some specially devised situation in such a way that behaviour within this situation may be made the basis of prediction of behaviour in other, related situations.' Our study is a combination of the two. Instead of applying *direct observation within* the conditions of oppression, it employs *tests after* their termination.

² Scientific intuition is defined by Chapin (148, p. 27) as 'judgement based on the convergence and integration of former impressions of memory into a pattern of explanation in which the perceptual details are not at the threshold of perception'. Knowledge is more explicit and based on evidence.

which we control, and irrelevance of those which we disregard, may be wrong. Nevertheless we are bound to make these assumptions, in the light of the experience we possess. Only further experiments will allow us to control more conditions. That is why social science must proceed by steps—it cannot profitably start from scratch, assuming that we do not know *any* conditions or causes, and it cannot bring final proof since we never know and control all conditions.

7. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE EQUATED SAMPLES

If we compare the distribution of the experimental population in the D.P. camps with the tables given in the Appendix presenting the distribution of population in Poland, and some data on Displaced Persons in Germany, according to age, sex, and occupational groups in urban and rural areas, we shall see that the proportions of Polish farmers and agricultural workers are not adequately reflected in our samples. Unfortunately (from the point of view of our procedure) most of these people found themselves in one category of displacement, that of compulsory labour in agriculture. The deportations to labour in industry and to concentration camps mainly affected the urban population. Among those peasants found in the concentration camp and industry groups, and tested by the intelligence test, a comparatively large number failed, and were unable to complete the personality tests. The same applied, to a still greater extent, to unskilled urban workers; in spite of the great number of these present in the D.P. camps, I was unable to find among them any one pair of controls, capable of completing all the prescribed tests.¹

The same applies to urban and rural background. In Poland the percentage of urban population amounted to less than 30 per cent (see Appendix), while in our samples it was nearly 80 per cent. The districts of Poland (central, eastern, western and southern) are comparatively well represented in our samples, and only southern Poland has a rather inadequate share. The question of age and sex needs no comment.

Thus our samples cannot claim to be representative either of the D.P. population or of the country of origin, although on the other hand, they are not composed solely of exceptional cases, and the

¹ Some individuals completed all the tests, but are not included in the main material (that is, in the samples), as they have no controls. Their answers are included in the additional illustrative cases. Others (who failed in the Intelligence test) proved unable to grasp and follow the instructions for completing the personality tests. They tried to find the correct answer when asked to associate freely, gave detailed descriptions instead of the interpretations asked for, etc.

personal data of the subjects studied are fairly characteristic of the majority of the European population. They reflect a population with the extremities cut off—with no children, no old people, no subjects under a certain level of intelligence and education, and practically no people above the middle standard. Most prominent men perished during the war; among those who survived deportation, a certain number joined the Polish Army under British command, went to western Europe, or returned to Poland immediately after the liberation. For the rest, either there were no controls, or they managed to obtain a position in the U.N.R.R.A. administration, or in some voluntary association, giving them certain privileges and thus changing their present situation. As it was essential for the purposes of the research that all the subjects should have been living for a considerable period under the same conditions, it was useless comparing people still confined to barracks with those who had obtained a position outside, especially if it entitled them to wear a uniform.¹

As explained before, I had to sacrifice the principle of a fully representative sample to satisfy the other principle of the completest possible equation between two or more groups. The above discussion of the degree to which the subjects of my investigation were characteristic of the whole D.P. population, or of the country of origin, was necessary to show that they were just ordinary people, and not highly selected specimens who might be suspected of showing peculiar reactions, specific to one group, but unlikely to occur in any other. The study of special groups, such as university students or mental patients, suffers from that drawback and makes any generalizations even more dangerous. It was fortunate for this research that I had access to a large number of ordinary people, in almost the same way in which a psychologist usually has access only to his patients and his students.

¹ At the time the research was conducted the question of status was extremely important in Germany, and there were many signs of power or inferior standing. There were special distinctions, identity cards of various colours, and many uniforms worn by the Military Police, U.N.R.R.A. officials, Red Cross, and others. I was frequently told that there were three distinct species in Germany: human beings—the Germans; infra-human beings—the D.P.s; and 'supermen'—all people in uniform. The fact that I belonged to the third category had a considerable influence on the success of my research.

Chapter 3

THE TESTS

I. CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE

The tests used were: the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability Test, Rosenzweig's Picture-Frustration Study (P.-F.S.), and the Thematic Apperception Test (T.A.T.), shortened version.

Some of the reasons for the choice of these tests will be given later in the discussions on each particular technique. Here only a summary of these reasons will be given, together with short notes on the various techniques which were considered during the planning of this research, but which were eventually discarded as unsuitable.

Both the P.F.S. and the T.A.T. are interesting, and it was comparatively easy to get co-operation from the subjects who were attracted, often fascinated, by the pictures in the T.A.T., and who were immediately involved in the social situations presented in the P.F.S. Any test using more abstract stimuli would have been less effective on this point, especially considering the mental level and social setting on the subjects of the experiment. The question of co-operation is vital enough in any investigation of personality, but here we had the additional difficulty that our subjects were not patients seeking advice or therapy, nor students eager to learn about themselves and the world around them. Most of them were conditioned to distrust any examination, and the tests themselves had to serve as one of the means of breaking down their resistance.

All three tests are easy to administer; the Otis and the P.F.S. are easy to score. They could all be given in group form, and such speed of administration is vital to any research as limited in time as this was.

As regards the reliability of the P.F.S. scoring, Clarke, Rosenzweig and Fleming (1955) found 82-85 per cent agreement between two examiners. The reliability of the Otis and the T.A.T. is discussed below.

They were suitable for the mental level of the majority of the experimental population. Most personality tests are either designed

especially for children or are unsuitable for subjects of less than average ability. Thus any test based on free or controlled association without the striking stimuli of the P.F.S. and T.A.T., would probably have yielded meagre results with most of our subjects. Although no such test was used during this investigation, I tried the technique of free association with some of my subjects in an attempt to obtain supplementary material. I found the procedure very time-consuming and inconclusive, as most people complained that 'nothing was coming to their minds', although they were perfectly able to construct whole stories for the T.A.T.

The discussion on the concepts on which the P.F.S. is based will show how close they are to our concept of the psychological aspect of civilization, and of the two deviations from the balance of personality structure: towards neuroticism, or towards psychopathy and crime. This similarity of concepts is an enormous advantage. It means in practice that the P.F.S. is assumed to measure those factors which differentiate between two basic kinds of maladjustment: neuroticism and delinquency.

This differentiation, essential in our study, has not so far been achieved by other personality tests, neither attempting to measure such supposed traits as trustworthiness, honesty, etc., (151, 259, 319, 321, 350, 465), or degrees of neuroticism. Neurotic inventories in particular, whatever their value, make no such differentiation, with the result that delinquent children have been found to be in some respects better adjusted than their non-delinquent controls (465). That these tests do not distinguish between the two kinds of maladjustment considered basic in the present study can be well understood, as the underlying concept of neurotic personality is generally much wider than the one used here, and covers any personality deviations and maladjustments (63, 685). Similar from our point of view, is the weakness of the Pressey X-O test, the annoyances test, and various related techniques.¹ As for the older tests, Healy (322), who made extensive use of them, found none of value either for disclosing mental conflict in general or for indicating the type of personality that is particularly prone to such conflicts.

The T.A.T. on the other hand, as has been admitted by Tomkins (688), sheds little light on the meaning of antisocial be-

¹ The experiments of Mervin A. Durea (192-7) carried out with juvenile delinquents along these lines do not seem to be scientifically very sound. The results are not compared with results obtained from similar groups, the conditions of testing and the motives of the testees are not taken into account, the same group is used for the standardization and validation (194) while elsewhere (192) the 'moderate significance' of a Critical Ratio of .85 is taken as indicating a 'co-variation between emotional age and the delinquency index', and serves as a basis for far-reaching conclusions. These conclusions have been challenged by other studies (106, 140, 506).

haviour, but it reveals other facts which enable us to attack the root of the problem. Some special studies, attempting to determine whether the T.A.T. yields significant material not obtainable by other methods already in use, have achieved most promising results (43, 44, 644). The additional material collected might be obtained without using the test, but only after intense probing and psychotherapy (587). Investigations carried out with the extensive use of the T.A.T. pictures (687), and with the use of the shortened version (311), suggest that a shortened T.A.T. can be as valid, and nearly as productive, as the complete set of twenty pictures. This finding is especially important in view of the limited time for field work in this research.

Compared with kindred techniques employing auditory stimuli, like the tautophone (568) or gramophone records (378), play technique (38, 568) and toys for constructing dramatic events (92, 335), social situation pictures (a technique intermediate between the T.A.T. and the P.F.S. developed for the study of delinquent boys and described by Schwartz, 623), or the story completion method (718, 749)—the T.A.T. has reached a higher stage of development, has been extensively validated; and has been used in clinical practice with neurotic and psychotic patients (39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 174, 208, 269, 372, 392, 453, 454, 536, 544, 582, 734); in criminology (465, 713, 727) and in the study of cultural and interracial relations (235, 327, 681) with considerable success. The sentence completion test (655, 669) is also relatively highly developed, but does not give the wealth of material afforded by the T.A.T.

Three types of questionnaires were considered as possibly useful in this study: a questionnaire especially devised to collect information on the subject's experience and psychic reactions in displacement, a personality questionnaire, and an attitude scale.

A questionnaire, especially devised for collecting information on the points mentioned above, was tried out, but without any success. It was constructed after a considerable number of interviews had been carried out. It had a wide circulation among Displaced Persons and was made known to some German ex-prisoners of concentration camps. It was printed in several publications circulating among Displaced Persons in Germany, with introductory notes or articles. Very few Polish subjects responded and only one German; and even their questionnaires contained little information. Some letters suggested that answering any questionnaire on the subject would be disagreeable, as it touched on experiences that everybody was trying to forget.

This resistance is quite understandable, and it was encountered in testing and interviewing as well. But the personal approach in the test or in the interview situation was enough to break down this resistance comparatively easily.

The basic outline of the questionnaire (see Appendix) was used in interviews, with a totally different effect—a considerable amount of information was obtained, and most people enlarged on the subject, making suggestions as to the points they felt were important, even if they were not touched upon by myself. Without the personal approach the whole idea of giving the same information was repulsive to most subjects. These exhaustive interviews were carried out after all the testing in the camp had been completed. It was felt that otherwise the interviews might have influenced the test results.

No personality questionnaire was tried as the weaknesses of this technique were considered too great for it to be practicable. To the whole list of points which have been raised against personality questionnaires, as given by Ellis in his extensive review of the literature on the subject (204), one might add yet another given by Blackburn (82), here especially important in view of the considerations mentioned above. It is, that the accuracy of a questionnaire result is much more affected by the good will of the person investigated than is the accuracy of a test result. This may also be the main reason why most validity investigations carried out on the questionnaires at present in use in this country and the U.S.A. give inconclusive or negative results (204); and why the technique has failed to differentiate clearly between normal and delinquent children, adjusted and definitely maladjusted, neurotic and psychotic subjects, or other similarly opposed groups.

In general, projective techniques appear to be superseding personality questionnaires as psychological tools, as they are able to reveal far more than an individual's opinion of himself (582).

Similar considerations led to the decision not to use attitude scales. The importance of attitudes cannot be denied, although most psychologists would not go as far as Thomas and Znaniecki (680, pp. 1834-5) who treat temperament and character as organizations of attitudes and values. But the importance of certain factors does not imply any necessity to measure them directly, and in the case of attitudes such a possibility is doubtful. An attitude may be conceived as a potential tendency, not necessarily expressed in behaviour (Znaniecki, 748). It has been otherwise defined as 'a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related' (Allport, 22). Already the above definitions indicate the difficulties of measurement, as we cannot measure directly anything that is merely potential, or estimate a state of readiness by simply asking the individual if he is ready to act. It has even been doubted whether attitude tests measure what people really think or merely what they think they think or what they

think they ought to think (207).¹ Moreover, as has been noted by Allport (22, 23), the more generalized an attitude is, the more it resembles a trait, which is an element of personality; and a trait, in spite of its real existence (as Allport says: 'they are really there', and not merely in the observer's mind), cannot be directly observed.

No theory of traits has been accepted or implied in this work but there is no doubt that the method employed led to the measurement of some factors which could be called 'common traits' as defined by Allport, and revealed other more specific traits and attitudes.

By employing the projective techniques those attitudes were measured not after the elaboration, rationalization, or other conscious or unconscious falsification by the individual, but in *statu nascendi*, when they were just becoming active in the subjects' first reactions to the stimuli; in other words, at the level of perception and apperception. For—as has been convincingly proved in extensive experimental studies by Sir Frederick Bartlett—'what is presented at once stirs up in the subject some preformed bias, interest, or some persistent temperamental factors, and he at once adopts towards the situation some fairly specific attitude' (51, p. 44). Both personality tests used in this study present the individual with complex social situations, and even help him to create such situations or to elaborate them in fantasy. By thus observing the attitudes in both formation and action, a much more valid personality picture can be obtained than by any attempts to measure the attitudes already formulated—that is necessarily distorted—in attitude tests.²

Ink blot projective techniques, either in the form developed by Bartlett (50) and used in this country as well as in the U.S.A. (718), or in the form of the Rorschach Test—have no weaknesses of the type described above. The Rorschach especially has been widely used in criminal practice and considerable work has been done to study its reliability and validity. Although the Rorschach has been described by Vernon (699) as a psycho-diagnostic instrument of the play-technique type which is not a test at all and cannot be regarded as a substitute for objective tests, it must be

¹ A questionnaire study by Corsini (163), whose convicts stated that they had benefited from being put into prison, may serve as an example of the misuse of this technique of simple questionnaires; while studies by Horsch and Davis (339, 340), and a review by Super (661), illustrate exaggerated claims and inconclusive results with the use of the Bernreuter Personality Inventory. See also report of the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection (719).

² Adler regards criminals as having 'a private logic, a private intelligence'. They have 'a different way of looking at things, a different scheme of apperception' (10, p. 204).

admitted that the T.A.T. resembles the play-technique even more. Some of the writers using the T.A.T. admit that this technique does not give so definite a picture of personality make-up as the Rorschach; nor afford the direct basis for estimating the degree of affective disturbances furnished by the Rorschach (152).¹ As the Rorschach and the T.A.T., when used concurrently, have been found to give both some common and some specific information, thus supplementing and supporting each other (269, 311, 312, 372, 534, 639), there were good grounds for employing them both, if not the Rorschach alone.

However, in spite of what has been said above, the Rorschach was not used in this research because of the following considerations:

Both these techniques have been employed in a study of a similar population—Polish Displaced Persons in the Polish Army in Great Britain—by B. Wysocki and K. Serwas. Their preliminary results showed clearly, that the T.A.T. gave richer material pertaining to the war history of the subjects, while the Rorschach gave the individual personality structure of each subject, in spite of the common history and situation.² Generally speaking, the T.A.T. revealed what certain groups of people had in common—the point in which we are interested—while the Rorschach gave mainly the individual differences.

The evidence offered by Vernon (700) is also relevant here. He found Rorschach total score results of an individual valid, correlating highly ($r = .833$) with other personality estimates, while abstracted Rorschach scores gave low correlations with other measures of traits and abilities. This finding supports the view that the Rorschach presents a picture of the total personality; since we are interested only in certain aspects of personality structure, in which the Rorschach seems to be less valid, Vernon's evidence is against the use of this test in our research. Most delinquency studies using the Rorschach technique show similar results. The only assumption that could be made from a review of such investigations (620) is that delinquents show a variety of Rorschach patterns which are similar only in that they are not as a rule normal.

Another investigation, carried out on Spanish and English refugee children (693) brought out some differences between the two groups, but showed none of the effects of their war experiences. The differences, according to the Rorschach findings, referred

¹ An opposite view has been expressed by Leitch and Schafer (392) who used a large battery of tests, including the Rorschach, at the Menninger Clinic. They found the T.A.T. crucial for differentiating between psychotic and non-psychotic degrees of maladjustment.

² The same point has been made by Ericson (208) and Garfield (269).

mainly to what we know of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon temperaments.

The effects of war experiences, and of concentration camp imprisonment in particular, reflected in a Rorschach study by Levy (402), does not seem to reveal very much: the usual records included more skeleton responses, responses of crushed, battered, and misshapen parts of human bodies, varieties of blood stains, and responses indicating some form of violent action.

In a study by Hunter (344) of 200 subjects with the different backgrounds of the white and Negro populations, the only observable difference between the two groups on the Rorschach was that the white group was slightly more introversive. Similarly insignificant were the results of a group study by McCandless (458).

To sum up, the Rorschach technique may be extremely useful for studying the personality make-up of an individual, but the T.A.T. seems to yield more material pertaining to his cultural and social background, and appears to be the more useful for tracing major differences between whole groups of people.

As most T.A.T. fantasies represent to a large extent the individual's projected world, the test provides a link between the experiences of the subject and his personality structure. It reflects an individual's own evaluation of the present situation, of the past and of the future.

As it was essential in the present study to trace the influence of the environment on certain aspects of personality, it was advisable to use a test presenting the organism and the environment in interaction. The examples of T.A.T. stories given later show how this could be achieved by the use of this test.

The T.A.T. is, in structure, related to a certain extent to the other test used, the P.F.S. Owing to a great elasticity in the T.A.T. analysis this bond could be still further strengthened in the elaboration. As the P.F.S. measures reactions to standardized social situations on the superficial level, very close to the level of action, it was advisable to employ some test illustrating reactions to non-standardized social situations, apperceived by the same subjects in fantasy. With large personnel and a considerable amount of time it may be better to use a battery of tests entirely unrelated to one another; but within the limits of this study it was more practicable to restrict the aspects of personality studied, and thus to be able to examine the chosen aspects more thoroughly. By using both the P.F.S. and the T.A.T. we could not only measure the tendency to direct aggression in a certain direction, but could also trace the psychological mechanism underlying this tendency. It is clear that the Rorschach would not have supplied the same amount of information on this particular subject.

In the Polish study mentioned above it was found to be easier to arouse interest and co-operation in the subjects (who were similar to our population) by employing the T.A.T. than by using the Rorschach. Although it had been claimed—in particular by Jaxa Bykowski (351) who tested 12,887 students of secondary schools with batteries of various tests—that Polish students exhibit a peculiar development of imagination as compared with those of other nationalities, the responses of the D.P. population in the Rorschach group test were below expectation.

The same problem of co-operation debarred the use of both the T.A.T. and the Rorschach. It was feared that an additional test would spoil the co-operation in all the tests, and although most of the subjects were, in fact, kept interested in the investigation until the end of the testing, it is doubtful whether they would have remained so if told to complete four tests instead of the three.

An additional test meant additional time, and my stay in Germany was limited. The only remedy would be a less careful selection of the subjects, or fewer subjects tested. In either case the samples of the D.P. population would become too unrepresentative to provide an adequate basis for any evaluation, whether statistical or not.

2. THE OTIS

The Otis Alpha Test is non-verbal and was originally devised for children. It consists of a series of ninety rows of pictures, four in each row. Three of them represent objects from ordinary life, numbers, letters or geometrical figures, having one essential characteristic in common. The fourth picture, superficially similar, lacks that characteristic, and is therefore a misfit in the group. The subject is asked to select the picture in each row which does not correspond to the others. Selection increases in difficulty from very easy rows (e.g. three animals and one inanimate object), to comparatively complicated combinations of geometrical figures and drawings. The time limit is twenty minutes. The test is fairly reliable and valid (reliability coefficient .865; validity coefficient .84).

Further reasons for using this test, in addition to its reliability and validity, were the ease of administration and scoring, and the speed of application to comparatively large groups. I was able to test groups of twenty people and score the results at about forty-five minute intervals.¹ As, for reasons beyond my control, the whole research was very limited in time, the fact that this preliminary test was economical in this respect was of primary importance: in addition it suited the mental level of the people with

¹ Within this time I would also give a short introductory talk on the purpose of my research and tests, and would answer questions.

whom I was concerned. The level was rather low, and ability to deal with the test situation was probably additionally hampered by the kind of life the subjects had led during the war and, subsequently, in U.N.N.R.A. camps. I was well aware of this before undertaking my trip to Germany, and subsequent experience confirmed my suppositions. There were very few people for whom the test was too difficult, and still fewer who were able to complete it within the time limit without a number of mistakes. It is generally recognized that tests devised for children give more accurate measurements of the lower mental ranges among adults, than tests devised for adults (145). I concealed from my subjects the fact that the test was originally meant for children.

While the test is non-verbal, it is not a performance-test. I wanted to avoid a verbal intelligence test as that would discriminate between people's familiarity with the language in which it was given. A verbal test would also have handicapped those who had had little opportunity of speaking their native language while in Germany.

The test is interesting, and it was very easy to induce people to co-operate in its completion. The fact that, at the beginning, the pictures dealt with material all the subjects were used to, gave them the encouragement they needed. On the other hand, those who felt that the test was too easy for them were assured that the speed required and the progressive difficulty would demand quite a lot of thinking and that it was almost impossible for anyone to answer all the questions correctly within the time-limit prescribed.

The material consisted of pictures. As the subsequent personality tests also dealt with pictures it was an advantage to have the subjects familiar with such material when faced with the more subtle task of completing the personality tests.

The results of the personality tests will be given in the next part of the book. But as the intelligence test was only used in the selection of samples, and not in the measurement of changes in personality structure, some notes on the material collected are given here.

Altogether about 800 subjects of Polish, Jewish, Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and Bielorrussian nationality took the Otis.

People deported for forced labour in industry showed a higher mental level than agricultural workers, irrespective of their previous type of employment. In order to find suitable controls for the subjects from concentration camps, I had to discard all individuals who were either too bright or too dull to match the prisoner in question. In this process of selection I more frequently had to discard people from industry as having too high an intelligence level, and from agriculture as having too low a level, to form suitable controls. Although this difference was slight and is

probably not statistically significant, it meant that without the intelligence tests, the samples of D.P. population would not have been properly equated. The concentration camp group seemed to be more balanced in this respect, and although smaller in number, was more representative of the whole experimental population than the other two.

My material was too small and unrepresentative to allow of any comparative study of national differences. On the whole, experience showed that it would be hard to detect any significant difference between the intelligence of any national groups where educational and social background were constant. The striking feature was however the greater dispersion of intelligence in the Jewish group. This group had on an average, a similar level of intelligence to other national groups, but produced a higher percentage of subjects who were unable to complete the test, and of subjects who did remarkably well. This observation, even if only casual and based on insufficient data, is certainly suggestive, and the problem is worth further study, as a high dispersion of intelligence in a national group may produce a high proportion of prominent people without raising the average standard, and also certain peculiarities of social stratification (e.g. high degree of dispersion of property, with extreme wealth and extreme poverty). It remains to be seen how far a high degree of dispersion of intelligence is the cause, and how far the effect, of social factors.

Another observation made in the course of applying the Otis concerns the egocentric type of thought among adults of the lower mental ranges. The essence of the task presented by the test is an appreciation of the relations existing between the four objects in each row of pictures. Some subjects were incapable of perceiving these relations, and were only able to see the relation of each object to their own needs. Instead of selecting the picture which did not fit into the relationship linking the other three, they selected the picture they preferred. As one subject, who failed, expressed it: 'I can tell what I like, or what is useful to me, but I do not know what is going on (what the connection is) between these things in the pictures.' For such individuals any combinations of numbers or geometrical figures were of course completely meaningless.¹

3. THE PICTURE-FRUSTRATION STUDY

(a) *General description*

The Picture-Frustration Study, or, as it is sometimes called by its author, Dr. Saul Rosenzweig, 'the picture-association method for

¹ I mention this as an illustration of some well-known theories, in particular that of Piaget.

assessing reactions to frustration' has been fully described in an article, published in 1945 in the first number of *Journal of Personality* (569). As pointed out in the above article, it stands midway between the word-association technique and the Thematic Apperception Test.

The Picture-Frustration Study (the P.F.S.) has been used in general psychiatric diagnosis, but in my own experience I have found it particularly useful in the diagnosis of behaviour disorders. When P.F.S. scores were correlated psychiatric diagnosis excluding behaviour disorders (psychopathic personality), the results were disappointing (see Simos, 636). But when used for character sketches, I have found it to be more valid in the diagnosis of anti-social conduct than any other personality test I used at the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency in London.


The Test consists of twenty-four pictures containing two or more people, engaged in some form of social intercourse not yet completed. A person on the left hand side of the picture is represented as saying certain words to a person on the right; whose reply is not given. The subject is asked to examine every picture and to write down the very first reply occurring to him as given by the person portrayed on the right.

The pictures represent adult persons, male and female (in some pictures only male, in some only female, in some both sexes). To facilitate projection and identification the facial features and other expression of personality are omitted, and the drawings are very sketchy in character. How far this proved successful could easily be seen when the test was administered to my subjects. When they were not sure they had understood a pictured situation and asked questions, they referred to the persons in the picture as e.g. 'the girl', 'the woman', or 'the lady' and the actual expression used depended not so much on the character of the picture, as on the age and social position of the subject himself. The drawing might just as well represent a 'girl' as a 'woman' or a 'lady', and the interpretation of the age and social class as being similar to that of the subject was the beginning of projection.¹

The situations depicted in the test are common occurrences of mildly frustrating character and are of two types: 'ego-blocking situations' in which the subject replying is frustrated by some obstacle or disappointment (his clothes are splashed by somebody's car, he is awakened in the night by an erroneous telephone call, etc.); and 'super-ego-blocking situations' in which the subject is accused or incriminated by the person shown on the left hand

¹ The subjects were asked to raise a hand and to ask questions quietly when I was close to them, so that the others would not hear. This was done to avoid influencing the work of the others and to avoid interference with their own projections and interpretations.

side of the picture, of e.g. having caused a car accident, or having lost the keys, etc. There are many cases, however, when the testee can interpret a 'super-ego-blocking' situation as 'ego-blocking' or vice versa, or interpret the situation as not frustrating at all. Thus picture No. 3 represents two female subjects sitting in a theatre or a cinema behind a person in an enormous hat. The female person on the left is represented as saying: 'you can't see a thing.' The situation of the subject on the right is described by Rosenzweig as essentially 'ego-blocking', but my experience shows that it may well be interpreted as 'super-ego-blocking', as the subject may feel herself blamed for having chosen the place without sufficient care, and answer: 'I am sorry. I should have looked for a better place for you.' It may also be interpreted as not frustrating at all, when the answer given might be: 'on the contrary, I can see perfectly well.'



(Reproduced by permission from the Rosenzweig
Picture-Frustration Study)

The fact that each situation in the test can be interpreted in several ways is an advantage rather than a weakness. As in real life, the subject's reaction to a situation begins at the level of perception, and his interpretation of an event throws as much, if not more, light on his personality as does the adequacy of his action. Similarly, if a paranoiac kills another person whom he considers his persecutor, the action itself may be quite justified: if the actual situation were as it appears in the patient's mind, we could not blame him for acting in self-defence. Insanity may well lie mainly in perceptions themselves, not in inappropriate reactions to them.

Although the whole test contains twenty-four 'picture situations', only twenty-one were considered in my research; of the remaining three, No. 21 produced many ambiguous responses, No. 7 produced responses showing that the subjects had not understood the situation, and No. 10 produced responses uncharacteristic of the subject, e.g. an expunitive answer in an otherwise intropunitive¹ subject, and vice versa.

Some of the responses to this picture (No. 10, where the subject is accused of being a liar and of knowing it) were, however, significant: a considerable proportion of the ex-prisoners from concentration camps then serving prison sentences for offences committed after the liberation, gave an intropunitive or impunitive response of the type: 'One cannot live otherwise nowadays', or 'If you were in a concentration camp, you would get into the habit of doing so too': 'I got used to telling lies in the concentration camp', etc.²

Although I had to exclude the above situations from my research, I must admit that in other circumstances they would probably be well understood, and the response would have the full diagnostic value. Thus the difficulty of Picture 7 consisted mainly in the ambiguity of the phrase, which is perfectly clear in English, but could not be well expressed in Polish (the language in which the test was given), and allowed far too many different interpretations on lines not intended by the test.

(b) *Types of responses and scoring*

Each response was scored for two factors, the type of reaction and the direction of aggression.

¹ See below for the meaning of these terms.

² Most of these responses belong to the Rosenzweig group 'T', in which the subject, while admitting his fault, stresses the extenuating circumstances. Similar spontaneous statements were noted by Bettelheim (73) in the actual camp situation. He observed that the inmates of the concentration camp in which he was detained, when reprimanded for antisocial behaviour would nearly always answer: 'We cannot behave normally to one another when living under such circumstances.' They spoke harshly of the others and argued that 'this is no place to be objective'.

The *type of reaction* may be:—

(i) That of obstacle-dominance, with the frustration situation, standing out in the response (the frustration is emphasized, or denied, the situation interpreted as favourable or unimportant, etc.).

(ii) Ego-defensive reaction, where the subject's ego plays the main part in the response. The subject is not interested in the obstacle or the frustrated need, but is engaged in protecting the integration of his personality and interprets the whole situation as a threat to the ego. He either blames himself, or someone else, or declares that no one is responsible for the frustrating event.

(iii) Need-persistent reaction, regarding the frustrated need, where the subject tries to find a solution in spite of momentary obstacles. The subject tries to satisfy his needs, and to correct the situation, to repair and atone for the wrong he has done; he expects the solution to come from somebody else, or the situation to be ameliorated without any action.

According to Rosenzweig's views, expressed in earlier writings (566, 567), need-persistent reactions invariably occur after frustration, while ego-defensive reactions occur only under special conditions of ego-threat. On the other hand need-persistent reactions are more limited in their aim which is only to achieve satisfaction, even if some deviation in the direction of the need or disguised expressions have to be adopted. This happens in symptomatic gratification, and in sublimation, which are types of disguised need-persistent reaction. According to Rosenzweig, the psycho-analytic mechanism of projection mainly concerns the ego-defence, while in reaction-formation we have a fusion of ego-defence and need-persistence.

Experiments, carried out by Rosenzweig, have shown that up to a certain degree of stress need-persistent reactions are formed; in states of higher emotional tension, with greater ego-involvement, ego-defensive reactions prevail. Either reactions may be adequate or inadequate (e.g. we may have inadequate persistence in pursuing an impossible task).

The study of personality types according to their preferred *direction of aggression* was started by Rosenzweig incidentally, when he observed marked personality differences between subjects tending to recall successes more frequently than failures and those tending to recall failures rather than successes. This observation led him to a series of experiments on repression (561, 564, 565, 567, 586, 610) and to the distinction of three general directions of aggression in three kinds of reaction:

Extrapunitive reaction (E), in which the individual aggressively attributes the frustration to external persons or other objects. This reaction is accompanied by aggressive needs outwardly directed in the sphere of drives, by anger, hostility and resentment in the

sphere of emotions, by condemnation of the outer world in the sphere of judgement, and by projection as a mode of defence. The extrapunitive tendency may be met with in its extreme form in psychotic and psychopathic paranoid reactions. The corresponding Freudian libidinal type is narcissistic.

Intropunitive reaction (I) (Menninger, 464, uses the term 'self-punitive' which seems to me more explanatory and expressive), in which the individual aggressively attributes the frustration to himself. This type of reaction is accompanied by aggressive needs inwardly directed in the sphere of drives (with outward aggression inhibited), by guilt feelings and remorse in the sphere of emotions, by condemnation of self in the sphere of judgement, and by isolation and displacement as a mode of defence. Psychasthenic neuroses, compulsive and obsessional mental disorders exemplify the extreme form of intropunitive tendency. The corresponding Freudian libidinal type is compulsive.

Impunitive reaction (M), in which there is no apparent aggression, either in the actual behaviour or in the motives of the individual. Social and erotic tendencies prevail in the sphere of drives. The frustration is denied altogether, or an attempt is made to regard it as unavoidable, with nobody to blame. The associated emotions are embarrassment and shame; condonement of others and self prevails in the sphere of judgements, repression (with self-deception) is the principal mode of defence, and certain forms of hysteria exemplify the pathological conditions. The corresponding libidinal type is 'erotic'.

I should like to add, however, that many hysterical cases I have met with appear to me more narcissistic than social, and more extrapunitive than impunitive in their reactions.

My casual observations suggest that in complexes, which may be defined as circumscribed areas of low frustration tolerance (566), with failure of adjustment, the situation varies. In some cases the reaction is totally different from that generally exhibited, and for instance a usually extrapunitive subject is apt to blame himself for everything associated with his complex. In other cases the general tendency is maintained and even exaggerated in this area. An impunitive subject will repress everything connected with his complex, while an extrapunitive individual will show extreme hostility and aggressiveness. There is one general tendency however—to give many inadequate and extreme reactions in the complex area, whether extra-, intro-, or impunitive, and whether in accordance with, or in contrast to, the subject's general personality trend.

(c) Scoring factors and their corresponding symbols

From the combination of the three types of reaction (obstacle-dominant, ego-defensive, and need-persistent) with the three

directions of aggression we obtain nine scoring factors. With two more variants added there are eleven scoring factors with eleven symbols used for marking. All the following examples are responses to the 'picture-situation' No. 3, reproduced on p. 63. The scoring factors and symbols discussed in this paragraph are Rosenzweig's, but the examples are mine.

Symbol 'E'. Obstacle-dominant extra-punitive reaction. The existence of the frustrating obstacle is emphasized, and the blame is thereby put on the frustrating agent. I also used this symbol when the subject himself was the frustrating agent, and minimized the frustration caused to others.¹

Example of the first variant of this type of reaction would be: 'I can't indeed.'

Symbol 'I'. Obstacle-dominant intropunitive reaction. The frustrating situation is regarded as beneficial when the subject is affected, and is emphasized (with accompanying embarrassment) when the subject is blamed for having frustrated another person.

Example of the first variant of this reaction would be: 'I think it is very convenient here.'

Symbol 'M'. Obstacle-dominant impunitive reaction. The frustrating situation is minimized and interpreted as unimportant.

Example: 'It does not matter. I know the whole play by heart.'

Symbol 'E'. Ego-defensive extrapunitive reaction. The blame is put directly on some external agent, and the hostility and aggression, in the form of accusations, threats, invective, abuse or sarcastic remarks, is directed outwards.

Example: 'Some people in big hats have no brains to think of others.'

Symbol 'E'. Another variant of ego-defensive extrapunitive reaction, in which the subject aggressively denies that he is to blame. Usual in super-ego-blocking situations (or situations interpreted as such).

Example: 'How do you think I could find a better place when there was no light?'

Symbol 'I'. Ego-defensive intropunitive reaction. The subject puts the whole blame for the frustrating situation on himself in the form of an expression of guilt or inferiority.

Example: 'I should have bought better tickets.'

Symbol 'P'. Another variant of the above reaction in which the subject admits his guilt but stresses extenuating circumstances.

¹ In this case I do not agree with Rosenzweig, Fleming and Rosenzweig (581), who think that belittling the damage one has done to others is impertinent and should be scored 'E'. I agree that it is impertinent, but this impertinence is worked out through the area of obstacle-dominance and not that of ego-defence, and I prefer to adhere strictly to the conceptual scheme on which the test is based.

Example: 'I know I should have bought better tickets but I had not enough money on me.'

Symbol 'M'. All blame for the frustrating situation is evaded, and the frustrator, if at all indicated, absolved.

Example: 'She probably cannot remove her hat without disarranging her hair.'

Symbol 'e'. Need-persistent extrapunitive reaction. The subject desires satisfaction of the frustrated need, and that the situation should be solved by another person (i.e. not by the subject, but by his frustrator or somebody else).

Example: 'Will you remove your hat, please?'

Symbol 'i'. Need-persistent intropunitive reaction. The subject himself offers reparation or a solution of the problem, usually implying a sense of guilt.

Example: 'I will try to find better seats.'

Symbol 'm'. Need-persistent impunitive reaction. The hope is expressed that the need will be satisfied and the problem solved automatically in the course of time.

Example: 'She will remove her hat when the curtain goes up.'

Each response in the test may be scored for one or more of the above factors. For instance, in addition to the one-factor responses to situation No. 3, given above, we may have a three-factor response: 'Of course I can't see. What a stupid woman. Perhaps she will go soon.' This response would be scored E'/E/m.

In his instructions Rosenzweig recommends the use of another score, called the Group Conformity Rating. This score is alleged to give an estimate of social adjustment by measuring the capacity for conformity with conventional behaviour under stress. He assumes that maladjusted subjects will give many unconventional responses to the picture-situations. I did not use this score because my subjects came from a different cultural background from that of the population on which the test was standardized: and their conventionality (or the reverse) by American standards would have little bearing on their adjustment in Europe. Since my investigation was completed, Taylor and Taylor (677) have found that the reliability coefficient of this score was $-.04$ in a group of 130 adult males referred for vocational guidance or personal evaluation. Variance among items was found to be highly significant but variance among individuals was negligible.

Rosenzweig also recommends the analysis of 'trends' in reaction patterns, in particular in the testing of children, for which he constructed a special children's form of the test (584). He assumes these trends to be important as they provide clues to the subject's 'reactions to his own reactions'. A stable individual will probably meet each situation in its own setting and react to it in an appropriate manner. 'If, on the other hand, his reactions are unstable,

perhaps as an expression of conflict, his behaviour in a later situation may represent a compensation for, or a reaction against, his previous reaction.' For instance, a subject who feels guilty because of his earlier expression of aggression may in the latter half of the test show a shift towards intropunitiveness.

In my material no consistent trends were detected; I have therefore not used Rosenzweig's method in that respect, and will make no further reference to the analysis of 'trends' in reaction patterns.

A discussion on the technique of summary and interpretation of results will be given in the next chapter, together with the actual results of the investigation. Here it may be useful to summarize the method of scoring in tabular form:

<i>Direction of aggression</i>	<i>Type of Reaction</i>		
	<i>Obstacle-dom.</i>	<i>Ego-defens.</i>	<i>Need-persist.</i>
Outwards: extrapunitive	E'	E, E	e
Inwards: intropunitive	I'	I, I	i
Repressed: impunitive	M'	M	m

(d) *The meaning of the factors: their correlations*

Each of the scoring factors has its own meaning and significance. Each could be discussed in detail to show whether and how its relative frequency might be symptomatic. Personality profiles could be drawn to illustrate peculiar combinations of certain factors; and their correlation with certain types of behaviour, or with clinical pictures of mental disorder would be very suggestive.

Such discussion, however, is beyond the scope of the present investigation. The significance of the relative frequency of certain scoring factors will be discussed later on, and will be limited to a few items only. Only those showing striking differences between groups formerly subjected to different levels of oppression will be considered, as some additional light may thus be thrown on the changes in personality structure and behavioural tendencies in certain environmental conditions.

Here I want to limit the argument to the general tendencies only: extra-, intro-, and impunitive. Their meaning, correlation with certain other personality traits, must be thoroughly understood. Only by appreciating the main tendencies which the test attempts to measure can we realize its value in our study. Without this appreciation, the idea that a person's attitude to a hat had any bearing upon the fate of our civilization would sound impertinent.

One of the best ways of appreciating a tendency is to see how it correlates with certain other trends. Here an experiment made by Donald W. MacKinnon (432) on violation of prohibition is very suggestive.

MacKinnon devised a situation in which his subjects were given a set of rules (prohibitions). They were given an opportunity of breaking these rules without knowing that their behaviour was observed and noted by the investigator.

Some striking correlations were found between the tendency to break rules, and to attack problems verbally and blame them for failures (extrapunitive attitude towards the frustrating object). The violators exhibited destructive aggressive behaviour, such as scuffling the feet, stamping on the floor, kicking the leg of the table, etc., much more frequently than the non-violators (31 per cent as against 4 per cent), who exhibited some self-aggression. 'In the frustrating situation of the experiment the violator reacts aggressively, the non-violator regressively. The non-violator regresses when he sucks his thumb or bites his finger-nails. The violator tends, on the other hand, to push ahead and seek gratification not at a lower earlier level but at the level of frustration' (op.cit. pp. 493-4).

The non-violators were characterized by a tendency to make verbal attacks on themselves, or blame themselves for failure and frustration (intropunitive reaction), while not a single violator reacted in this way. Nor was the opposite tendency to depreciate the problems (extrapunitive reaction) found among the non-violators.

The violation of prohibition was highly correlated with a lack of guilt feeling both in the test situation, when the violators felt no shame at having cheated, and in everyday life. On the other hand the non-violators often felt guilty, and in this respect the results support Freud's statement that 'the more righteous a man is, the stricter and more suspicious will his conscience be, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried holiness farthest who reproach themselves with the deepest sinfulness'. This statement, as mentioned above, was one of the starting points for our discussion of the psychological aspect of civilization. Thus intropunitiveness may be conceived as correlated with strict conscience and holiness, with masochism and with a lack of overt aggressiveness against the external world.

Impunitiveness was found (in a series of experiments by Rosenzweig and Sarason, 586, 610) to be correlated with hypnotizability and suggestibility as personality traits, and with repression as a favourite mechanism of defence, while non-hypnotizability was found in positive association with displacement and projection as defence mechanisms, and with intro- and extrapunitiveness as types of reactions to frustration.

Although some of these associations are significant, the correlations are not, as may be expected, perfect, as all these traits have specific as well as common factors. Repression in particular is a more unconscious process than impunitive reaction.

Shmeidler (615) found two significant correlations of P.F.S. scores with the extra-sensory perception (E.S.P.) scores obtained by 446 subjects in a clairvoyance type experiment. Impunitiveness correlated positively with E.S.P. score, extrapunitiveness negatively. Other P.F.S. scores yielded no significant correlations.

Falls and Blake (216) studied the correlations of various types of reaction towards frustration, as determined by the P.F.S., with ratings on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Bernreuter Personality Inventory, Bell Adjustment Inventory, Allport-Vernon Study of Values, Sims Score Card for Socio-Economic Status, the results of the Psychological Examination, and other tests. Unfortunately the study was based on a small and highly selected sample of twenty-five students of an advanced Psychology course, superior both in I.Q. and academic achievement to 'normal' undergraduates. Very few correlations reached the level of significance and even those cannot be accepted as valid for the general population. Linearity is not as frequent a phenomenon as is sometimes assumed, and many correlations, even if significant and corroborated by other studies, would probably be reversed if the investigators cared to examine groups composed of other than student (or other highly selected) populations.

Some of the weaknesses mentioned above were avoided in a series of experiments by H. A. Murray and his associates (496), and by J. F. Brown (118) who devised a modified edition of the Picture-Frustration Study for the purpose, and showed the correlation of extrapunitiveness with prejudice, racial hostility and anti-Semitism and anti-Negro attitudes.

Extrapunitiveness also correlates with Aggressiveness +.67, with Dominance +.51, with Exocathexis +.60, with Super-Ego Conflict —.53.

The negative correlation with Super-Ego Conflict is especially interesting. As has been said before, we cannot expect linearity in any correlation between moral conflict and the direction of aggression. In the case of extreme extrapunitiveness the conflict is obviously externalized—there is no moral, internal conflict, but only a conflict between the individual and society. In a normally balanced individual, with moderate extrapunitive tendencies, we have moral conflicts on the conscious level. In a neurotic, the tendency to check the drive may be so strong, as to repress it from consciousness altogether, so that the mental conflict becomes unconscious.¹

¹ Cf. H. G. Gough's (293) views on the subject. He stresses the fact that the psychopath does not show intrapsychic conflict, or self-ambivalence, as does the neurotic, and does not ordinarily seek counsel or therapy. He is not at odds with himself, but with the group.

(c) *Direction of aggression, neurosis, psychopathy and crime*

The reader may have noticed from our previous discussion on culture, neurosis and crime, that there are grounds for supposing a close relationship between intropunitiveness and neurosis, and between extrapunitiveness, psychopathy and crime. Psychopathy and crime are conceived—within the frame of reference of this book—as psychiatric and social phenomena exemplifying the direction of aggression outwards, as neurosis exemplifies the direction of aggression inwards. The extrapunitive reaction is taken as directing aggression outwards; the intropunitive, inwards. Thus the concepts of psychopathy, crime and extrapunitiveness appear to be almost synonymous, just as, on the other hand, those of neurosis and intropunitiveness are closely related. Only the impunitive reaction introduces a certain complication, since it reveals no clear direction of aggression.

An argument restricted to these concepts would not be very convincing, however. It is only too easy to treat a whole class of highly complicated phenomena within one frame of reference, to give a definition covering the whole of the concept, and then to state that this simple definition corresponds to another one, given for another class of phenomena. It is clear that these two classes covered by one definition constitute, in fact, one single class. But as we classify people and events, as we conceptualize things and change them into ideas, they always become clear and easy to arrange. They are simple, but they have lost part of their reality; by becoming concepts or numbers they have ceased to be things; and it may be argued that the object of science is the discovery of truth about things, and not about ideas.

We cannot avoid a certain—even a large—degree of conceptualization. But in order to keep in touch with reality we should examine our concepts in the light of experience. In our case it is indispensable to find out whether there is any evidence that psychopaths and delinquents are more extrapunitive than 'normal' people or neurotics, and that neurotics are more self-punitive than the others. If we find significant differences in extrapunitive tendencies between delinquent and socially adjusted people, that is, if we can prove an association between extrapunitiveness and delinquency (and, perhaps, other tendencies towards conflicts), we shall be in a better position to attack the crucial psychological problem of personality changes occurring under various degrees of oppression: whether they tend towards equilibrium, or towards psychopathic or neurotic deviations.

In all discussion of the existing evidence as to extrapunitive tendencies among psychopaths and delinquents the concept of extrapunitiveness will be restricted, of course, to the *prevailing*

mode of behaviour. There is nothing wrong or antisocial in such reactions as those described above: e.g. 'Will you remove your hat, please.' What may be symptomatic is the persistence of one type of response in various situations. In most of these situations, this type of response may be perfectly adequate. The reaction expressing the urge to obtain satisfaction of the need through the agency of another person is as 'normal' as one that shows the subject's readiness to solve the problem by himself. What may be significant of maladjustment is a tendency to expect that *all problems* will be solved by somebody else. Thus extrapunitive (as well as intro- or impunitive) represents not an extreme form of response in certain situations, but rather the persistence of one type of response whatever the situation.

If in certain situations, we detect extreme reactions at variance with the subject's general behaviour, we may suspect that these situations touch on the area of a complex.

The usual tendency, however (if complexes are excluded), is for extreme *forms* of response to be associated with the persistence of the *type* of that response. In other words, if we see that a certain type of response persists in an individual's behaviour whatever the situation, we may expect extreme forms of this response in certain, even in many, situations. An individual whose usual response is extrapunitive will sometimes be extremely aggressive, more so than a person whose usual response is intro- or impunitive.

The evidence for this general tendency, as well as some exceptions, will be discussed later on, in the light of the material collected in my research.

4. THE THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST

(a) *General description*

The Thematic Apperception Test is now widely known, and its value in the study of personality is accepted by many writers. It was adopted for the present research on purely practical grounds, no theoretical considerations (as was the case with the P.F.S.) being involved.

The discussion of this test will, therefore, be very short and confined mainly to the simplified method of administration and scoring adopted in my study.

I should not recommend the method described below for the purposes of clinical testing. In clinical research at the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency I myself used a more flexible technique which was more suitable for individual examination. This other, individual, method has many similarities with the dynamically oriented clinical interview, while presenting what

Rapaport (534) regards as the particular advantages of a projective test: easy and objective observation and registration, systematic analysis and scoring, and evolving material the true meaning of which is unknown to the subject tested. Most accepted manuals and textbooks—in particular those by Morgan and Murray, the creators of the test (478, 479), by Murray (498), Bell (56), Gurvitz (306), Rapaport (535), Schafer (613), Stein (656), Tomkins (688), and White and Sanford (724)—describe the individual, i.e. clinical, method of scoring and interpretation. Some of them (56, 306, 535, 613) treat the T.A.T. as one of a battery of tests which should be treated in conjunction in order to give an all-round picture of the personality.¹

Taken in isolation the T.A.T. is probably not the best diagnostic tool. Its aim is rather to reveal the strivings and identifications of the subject (534). To my mind the greatest advantage of the T.A.T. in clinical work is its ability to picture the subject in *interaction* with his environment, both past and present, real and imaginary. Very few tests can do this, and probably none is so good in relating the deeper layers of personality to the subjectively experienced reality. Also, probably none of the other popular tests can provide the interpreter with as much material that will enable him to trace the patterns of inner reactions of the subject in various situations, and the function of other individuals in the subject's life. In my clinical experience I found the T.A.T. particularly illuminating when I wanted to know the subtle ways in which the attitudes of the subject to the members of his family were differentiated and modified in the course of his life, to reveal themselves in a disguised form in his attitudes to other persons and social institutions.

The T.A.T. investigates personality by presenting a series of standardized pictures and encouraging the subject to construct stories around them. These stories should be invented on the spur of the moment, and the thoughts given as they come to the subject's mind.

The original test consists of twenty-nine pictures and one blank card. The subject is given one picture at a time, and is asked to use his imagination to make up a story for which the given picture might serve as an illustration. He is asked to tell what has led up

¹ Rapaport (535, Vol. II, pp. 396-7) is worth quoting in this respect: 'It was our purpose to include a test in our battery which should give us an appraisal of the subject's experiencing of his own world and of himself as a part of it. In a sense, we wanted to obtain thereby a direct picture of the material dealt with by the intellectual conceptual apparatus and personality dynamics of the subject, which were incidentally indicated by the other tests. Therefore, we had to find a test which would supply us with more than incidental information about these contents and attitudes. . . . Our choice fell on the Thematic Apperception Test.'

to the event shown in the picture, to describe this event, the characters, their feelings and thoughts, and then give the outcome. When given the blank card he is asked to imagine his own picture, to describe it in detail, and then to make up an imaginary story in the same way as for the given pictures.

The test is based on the observation that, when attempting to interpret a complex and ambiguous social situation, people are apt to tell as much about themselves as they do about the given situation (478).¹ The link is even stronger when the subject can easily identify himself with the person in the situation presented. He is then powerfully induced to project his own trends and, in the case of the T.A.T. pictures, his own fantasies, revealing his more pressing underlying needs. The original T.A.T. is constructed in such a way as to enable subjects of both sexes and various ages to identify themselves with the persons in the pictures, of which there is a large variety. Eleven cards are used for both sexes and all ages, but other cards have only a limited application and are marked 'BM' (for boys and men), 'GF' (for girls and women), 'BG' (for boys and girls), etc. Thus the number of pictures for any one subject is twenty, including the blank card. In this research, both the place of the T.A.T. and the age of the subjects to be tested were confined within certain limits; nor was the aim a detailed study of each individual, but rather the comparison of whole groups of subjects. Therefore only four pictures (one for men only, one for women only, two for both sexes) and one blank card were used. They are reproduced facing page 76.

These pictures were selected in consultation with the Psychodemographic Department, Polish Army H.Q., in London, where the whole series of T.A.T. pictures was used to test Polish men from the Forces. The pictures selected had been found to give both richer and less uniform responses than the average.

The pictures were given to female subjects in the following order:

1. A picture of a young woman standing with bowed head, her face covered with her hand; the other hand is stretched against a wooden wall or door.
2. A picture of a young woman's face against a man's shoulder.²

¹ It was some years earlier that Bartlett (50), in his experiments on perceiving and imaging, observed the tendency on the part of adult subjects to say something *about* material presented as well as to say *what* is presented. He found 'an effort after meaning' in all acts of perception—'in no case is perceiving merely a receiving of something given: there is always some discrimination and selection.' Bartlett, following Pillsbury, uses the word 'apperception' to represent the influence of general experience on consciousness, just as an association represents the influence of particular idea upon particular idea.

² Both faces are only vaguely outlined to leave more opportunity for interpretations. They may almost as well represent people of either sex.

3. A picture of a gaunt man or woman with clenched hands, standing among gravestones.

4. The blank card.

Pictures were given to male subjects in the following order:

1. A picture of an elderly woman, standing with her back turned to a tall young man with a perplexed expression on his face (usually interpreted as Mother and Son).

2 and 3. The same as for female subjects.

4. The blank card.

It will be seen that the first picture for male subjects does not correspond to that for female subjects. They were chosen separately, on the basis of the experience of the Psychodemographic Department.

The aim in using the Thematic Apperception Test was to determine the individual tendencies within each group of Displaced Persons (to aggression, intraggression or abasement; dominance and achievement, or dejection; disappointment, depression, despair, etc.); to trace the prevalent thought content; to reveal the attitude towards the environment, whether regarded as congenial or inimical and aggressive; and finally, to estimate the groups' ability to face new situations, and their tendency to concentrate and ruminate on unhappy past experiences. It was interesting not only to see whether different types of displacement and frustrating conditions produced different sentiments, drives and tendencies, but also how they correlated with the reaction towards frustration measured by the Picture-Frustration Test.

The following examples illustrate the kind of stories obtained.

The first series was given by a telephonist, a girl of twenty-eight, evacuated in 1942 from a large town in eastern Poland. During the investigation it was discovered that she had not been deported but merely evacuated, and she was therefore not included in the Industry group, to which she would otherwise have belonged.

1. O, poor creature! What a tragedy happened in your life. What sad thoughts are troubling your unhappy head. Her whole appearance expresses deep sorrow. She was deported and now she has received bad news from home. To hide from people whose eyes are too inquisitive she went out and leaned against the wall of her home—the camp hut. She pressed her head, full of various feelings, and directed her thoughts towards her home, far away.

Perhaps they are just burying her father, her mother, or somebody else. Perhaps they are being deported or something else happened. And she is so far away. She is lost in thought: when will it all end? Will it be long?

There will certainly be an end, one must only wait patiently. You must exert your will, suffer, and wait. The brighter, happy days will come soon. If you have lost somebody, you will not be alone in that, there are hundreds and thousands of others.

Life is ahead.



Picture No. 1 for women.



Picture No. 1 for men.



Picture No. 2.



Picture No. 3.

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 —*Thematic Apperception Test*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

2. War. Years are passing, father is only at home occasionally, when on leave. Such moments of happiness are very short. He is away again. At home the solitude is grey and monotonous. From time to time there are letters—the last one with the news that he has been killed. There are days and months of waiting. Perhaps? . . . And so one day there is a wonderful surprise. A ring at the door—little Richard runs, trembling with impatience—perhaps? . . . In a moment he is hanging to his father's neck—he will never give him away for all the treasures in the world. Do not be afraid—you will not lose him. Victory—the war has ended.

3. So they went. There were missiles and bullets whistling and whirring above them, thousands of guns were bringing destruction and death. They did not care, and struggled forward. All for the Motherland. That was the order. After a bloodthirsty struggle they succeeded, some of them passed through, although dozens or hundreds of them were killed. A graveyard was erected at the site of the glorious battle, endless crests are stretching their arms as if they wished to speak. They were killed here for the freedom of the World, and the simple graves make people wonder. Everything is mysterious and peaceful. They have reached eternal peace. Only in the evening a ghost passes along the graves to see that they are not disturbed. The Ghost is taking the Last Parade.

4. It was last summer. I escaped from the besieged town which was continually bombed. . . . The front line was 45 kilometres away. Our train was sent from one line to another, from one town to another. There are alarms and the glaring of fires. . . . I am sitting in a deep cavity in the fields, looking with fear at the destruction around. The earth, railways, stones—everything is blown up. A terrific blow threw me against the earth and buried me completely. I lost consciousness, and when I regained it the attack was over. I learned that a bomb was dropped a little further on, there are killed and wounded. I thanked God for salvation and since then, in spite of all difficulties I had to encounter, I started to value Life.

Now, when all my experiences are clear in my mind, I am glad of the fact that I have survived when millions of others died, that I am well trained for the struggle of life. I will show how full of life I am to have overcome all the obstacles.

The next series of stories, very short ones, was given by a male subject, a locksmith, aged thirty, of slightly lower intelligence than the telephonist; he was deported in 1942 from a little town in south-eastern Poland to a concentration camp. This series illustrates a different treatment of the same pictures (with the exception of the first one), although there is a certain similarity in the themes:

1. Here are Mother and Son. They are bidding farewell to each other. He must hide from the Germans. She fears that he will be killed. He is trying to make her believe that it is better to die from a bullet, than to be killed by Nazi hangmen.

He will be caught, put into a concentration camp, and suffer terribly.

2. Here are Sister and Brother. They have met in a concentration camp. Here they are mad with joy, kissing each other, and telling what they have gone through.

They will be liberated from their oppressors in the end.

3. Here is an inmate of a concentration camp. After all he had to go through, he is here at the cemetery. He is still alive, and he is praying. He is imploring the Lord to take him.

He will not be liberated.

4. They are escorting hundreds of people to the cemetery. Children, mothers, old people. All mad with fear. The head of the SS guard gives the order. They stop and everybody has to undress. SS guards are hitting people with the butt-ends of their rifles. A shot. That is the end.

(b) *Analysis and scoring*

As may be seen from the examples given above, the T.A.T. cannot be easily scored and neatly put into straightforward tables if we want to make full use of it.¹ The scoring and interpretation of the results depends here much more on the ability and training of the interpreter than in the case of the P.F.S. To a large extent, especially in our case, it depends on the purpose of the investigation.

The T.A.T. is mostly used to assign marks to each subject on most of the latent personality variables (479), and a rating scale is employed. Murray distinguishes forty-four such variables of personality, twenty of which are manifest needs, eight latent needs, four refer to certain inner states, and twelve are general traits (495). The concept of needs on which the T.A.T. is based is, as Murray points out (493), necessarily hypothetical, since no motivational processes within the organism can be directly perceived by the senses. Any behavioural pattern—called by Murray 'actone'—and any trend (which is the actone without effect) may be attributed to a need, being a hypothetical force within the organism (494). Murray gives (493, 494, 495) elaborate classifications of needs and actones, each of which may prove important in individual cases.

One of the difficulties of quantitative elaboration is that the personality variables detected by the T.A.T. and other projective techniques can be multiplied almost indefinitely. The elements on which the interpretation is based may range from grammatical peculiarities to dominant themes (723, 724), and the method of assessment from one as objective as counting the number of times every word occurs in a story, to one so subjective that it is based entirely on intuition (492).

¹ Cf. Wyatt (740). Some recent attempts to establish norms for the T.A.T. (59, 572, 579, 732) did not go beyond a preliminary stage, and are of doubtful value.

The usually accepted method is to distinguish various points, variables or categories around which the quantification of the T.A.T. stories is centred. Frenkel-Brunswik (237), for instance, employs five such points: the relative frequency of certain themas, inter-personal relationships within the themas (the roles and function of central figures, whether they are aggressive, active, passive, submissive, etc.), defence mechanisms used in the stories (such as projection, reaction formation, etc.), cognitive categories especially suited to the age levels under observation and character syndromes, primarily those postulated by psychoanalysis, such as the anal or oral character.

It will be seen, however, that not all the points mentioned above have bearing on our investigation. The analysis of cognitive categories would probably not be very fruitful, while the analysis of defence mechanisms might be interesting but would involve too much speculation on psycho-analytic lines to provide a sound basis for a quantitative elaboration. Finally, the examination of character syndromes—whatever its value in other types of investigation—would be irrelevant to this study (see the discussion on anti-social character structure, Part II, Chapter 8, Section 1).

Tomkins (688) based his scoring on four main categories: vectors, levels, conditions, and qualifiers, but his scheme is too microscopic to be useful in an investigation aimed at detecting major personality differences between groups. Such elaborate and time-consuming schemes may be illuminating in clinical practice, but the more variables we distinguish, the more particular they become, and the more difficult to treat statistically. To arrive at any statistically significant differences between the various groups of Displaced Persons by using Tomkins's method may be ruled out straight away.¹

For our purpose a simpler method might yield more revealing results. I therefore accepted the following general suggestion made by Morgan and Murray (478);² namely, that every fantasy, as well as every actual event, may be analysed into a driving force, or fusion of forces, in the subject, an object or group of objects with relation to which the force is directed, and the outcome of their interaction expressed in terms of subjective feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Every fantasy and every T.A.T. story may be treated as an interaction of needs, or need and 'Press', forming a 'Thema'. The term 'Press' designates a directional tendency in an object (personal or

¹ Cf. also other methods of interpretation, used by Combs (158, 159), Thompson (681), Shorr (633) and Sarason (609).

² It is also indicated in the T.A.T. manual by Murray and the staff of the Harvard Psychological Clinic (498), and partly adopted by White and Sanford (724).

impersonal) or situation, which is perceived as able to harm or benefit the subject. The 'Thema' is generally a combination of need and Press, of the forces within the individual, and of the forces pressing on him from without. A single Thema may be defined as 'the dynamical structure of a simple episode, a single creature—environment interaction' (Murray, 494). Biography may be conceived as a 'historic route of Themas'.

Thus the three points on which the analysis of the stories may be based—and was based in the present investigation—are the Hero and the forces acting within him (his thoughts, feelings and behaviour), Press, and Thema.

The *Hero* is that person in the story with whom the subject has identified himself. He is usually the central figure in the story, described in more detail than the others and usually of the same sex as the subject tested. The Hero's age is usually the same as that of the subject, but he may be younger (especially when the story has been taken from the subject's past experience), or older (when the Hero represents the subject in the future).¹

There is usually only one Hero (as in stories No. 1 and No. 3 of the male subject quoted above); but sometimes the subject may identify himself with two or more people in the story: thus the female subject apparently identified herself with the whole group of soldiers in her third story, especially with those who succeeded. The figure among the gravestones, interpreted as a ghost, has a purely symbolic meaning and is not a Hero. Similarly in the story told by the male subject to the blank card, all people tortured and murdered by the S.S. guards are the Heroes of the story. Here the subject was asked to describe his own picture and tell a story about it. Instead he identified himself with the whole group of people—he is among them somewhere and is shot with them.

Sometimes identification shifts from one person in the story to another, or from the principal person in the story to the narrator. In this case the shift may indicate the co-existence of two different sides to the subject's personality: thus the girl depicted by the female subject (story No. 1) represents one side of her personality while the narrator's comment at the end represents her other, more energetic side.

If the Hero—the person with whom the subject has identified himself—is of the opposite sex a strong feminine component is indicated in the case of males, or masculine in the case of females (498). Our female subject's story No. 2 is an example of this.

¹ According to Stein (656), the Hero can be identified as (a) the first person mentioned in the story, (b) the centre of the subject's attention, (c) the initiator of important activities, (d) the centre of the story, (e) the person acted upon by most other people, or (f) showing most similarity with the subject in terms of age, sex and other personal factors.

In some cases there is no discernible Hero. In our material, this sometimes occurred with picture No. 3. In all doubtful cases the story was treated as having no Hero.

It might be argued that identification of the female subject with the boy in story No. 2, or of the male subject with the people murdered by the S.S. guards, belonged to that category of doubtful cases. But the story of the boy has too many elements in common with story No. 4, (in which the subject depicted herself directly), to be dismissed as only accidentally linked. As regards the male subject, to avoid any misunderstanding, I asked him outright where he was in the picture he described, and reminded him that he had been instructed to describe his own picture. His answer, given with a certain hesitation, was: 'It was so difficult But I knew I was with them. . . . I was one of them.'

Once the Hero of the story is determined, his actions, thoughts, feelings and motives provide a basis for the analysis of the subject's tendencies. Murray's Manual (498) permits the use of any set of variables in describing or formulating the reactions of the Heroes. These range from the observation of a few traits—the most frequent, the most uncommon, or most important from the investigator's point of view—to very elaborate and comprehensive conceptual schemes.

In our research I decided not to devise any *a priori* scheme. The analysis and grouping of the Hero's reactions were, therefore, based entirely on the actual material collected. Only those tendencies which were strong and frequent enough to be accepted as fairly characteristic of the whole group of subjects were taken into account in the elaboration of the results. As this part of the method was closely related to the actual material collected during the investigation, it will be described more fully in the Part dealing with the results.

The definition of *Press*, given above as those forces in the Hero's environment perceived as harmful or beneficial to him, implies to some extent the existence of a Hero. Once we have a Hero we may look for his environment, but not before. In practice, however, we found some cases with *Press*, yet with no Hero. Picture No. 3 particularly was often interpreted as symbolizing the whole World, the forces of destruction in the World, the forces of death and oppression, etc. Here, there is no Hero, sometimes even no plot, but the subject's concept of his environment is nevertheless depicted.

Press may be personal (the persons in the environment), and as such may have all the tendencies attributable to the Hero himself (such as love or hatred, dominance or submissiveness, etc.). It may also be impersonal, and concern an object or the whole situation (i.e. danger, bombardment, imprisonment, etc.).

As in the case of the Hero, the detailed analysis of the forces within the environment was based on the actual material collected and will be discussed more fully under 'Results'.

The next central point used in our analysis is the *Thema*, a press-need combination, and an interaction between the forces within the Hero and those of his environment. The *Thema* may be described as the episode depicted in the story, together with the outcome, successful or no. The *Thema* is the result not only of the quality of the forces within the Hero, and those around him, but also the relative strength of (a) the forces within the Hero plus those helping him, and (b) the forces opposing him.

For our purpose, analysis of the *Thema* should answer the following questions:

What are the main events that come to our subject's minds, and what are the problems depicted in these events?

What is the relative strength of the forces making for success and those making for failure (the ratio of successful to unhappy endings)?

What is the source of these forces? Is the Hero happy because he is strong, or because others helped him? What are the conditions of good and bad endings? Which needs are gratified and which remain ungratified?

How adequate is the Hero in the situations depicted in the stories? Can he cope with the situation by himself?

As regards the last question the subject's own feelings are more important than any objective criteria. For instance, objectively speaking, the female subject was just lucky in story No. 4, and the fact that the bomb dropped by a plane fell a little further on, killing other people, could hardly be ascribed to *her* strength of character. Subjectively, however, it is ascribed to her, at least unconsciously. Reasoning in a way which is a kind of magic thinking she asserts that *she* is so full of life, that she survived 'when millions of others died', and was able 'to have overcome all the obstacles'.

On the other hand, all the Heroes of the male subject from the concentration camp are strikingly inadequate, and although one of them (story No. 2) is successful in the end, there is no indication that his liberation from the concentration camp is due to his own competence.

(c) *Reliability and validity of the test*

One of the main considerations in assessing the value of a test is its reliability and validity. In the case of personality tests, this is usually an awkward question.

It is particularly difficult to estimate the reliability of personality tests, as personality variables fluctuate far more than those

measured by cognitive and special ability tests. As the T.A.T. responses reflect to some extent the actual life situation of the subject, and also his mood at the moment of testing, the repeat reliability of this test cannot be expected to be very high (498). It varies according to the time interval, the stability of the particular personality, and the stability of the subject's environment (688). It has been found, however, that at least one of the central points—the Thema—is relatively independent of conscious mood, and that very grim stories may be elicited, even by pleasantly toned pictures, even from a subject tested in a state of euphoria (687).

The interpreter reliability—i.e. the extent of agreement between independent interpreters—has been found to vary between $+30$ and $+96$ (688).

On the whole it must be admitted that up to the present little has been done to measure the reliability of the T.A.T., and in this respect the test is probably inferior to the Rorschach, although by no means to other personality tests.

As regards validity, the T.A.T. is a favourable exception among personality tests, and seems to be more valid even than the Rorschach (500).

The validity of the T.A.T. has been measured by several means:

By comparison with past history of the individual as revealed by other techniques (159–161, 492, 688), in particular by checking item by item against hospital case histories (311).

By correlating such personality information as interests, attitudes, traits, problems and conflicts, deduced from the T.A.T. stories, with hospital case records (Harrison, 311, obtained a degree of validity of 83 per cent).

By checking material analysed from the T.A.T. stories (such as strong latent homosexual drives, sibling rivalries, mother fixations, repressed guilt feelings, early traumas, etc.) with the psychotherapist in cases in which a long therapy had been carried out, and by suggesting interpretations to the psychiatrist who would test them in subsequent interviews (587).

By comparing the material obtained with that revealed by psychoanalysis (688).

By correlating the findings with those obtained by Rorschach and other personality tests (327, 492, 688).

By matching the pairs of test stories by examiners who had not taken part in the testing (492).

By matching analyses with biographies (492).

By predictions of future behaviour (R.W. White, 721, 722, found a rank correlation of $+72$ between his predictions based on the T.A.T. stories and the actual behaviour of his subjects in an experiment carried out later).

As calculated by these and other methods, the validity of the

T.A.T. seems to be high; but it varies, depending on the method of analysis, on the ability of the interpreter, possibly on the population tested and, particularly, according to the level of personality from which the projections are made. The T.A.T. appears to be the opposite of a microscope; for while the latter can be so adjusted that the desired layer is clearly seen, the former presents for our inspection one or more personality layers, and we must—if we can—determine their positions.

On the whole, two levels of functioning may be distinguished; actual physical (including verbal) behaviour and wishes, ideas, plans, fantasies and dreams about behaviour (498). The content of T.A.T. stories belongs to the second level and we may find subjects whose mental activities, especially in fantasy, have little relation to their overt behaviour. In such cases, the T.A.T. may reveal trends different from, even opposite to, those in the manifest personality. Investigations carried out by Symonds (667, 670) illustrate this.

The correlations between the personality variables measured by the T.A.T. and those manifested in overt behaviour should be highly positive if the projections are from the superficial layers of personality. The perfectly conscious needs and perceptions, revealed by the T.A.T., may also be manifested in public and private behaviour.

The correlations should be negative if we compare the overt behaviour with the inner layer of personality, with the unconscious tendencies which are so far repressed as to be unable to find an outlet in action.

Finally the correlations should be low, positive or negative, if we compare the subject's actions with the tendencies of the middle layer of his personality, that is, tendencies only partly conscious, rarely manifested in behaviour, and involving conscious or unconscious inhibitions.

According to Murray (498) the T.A.T. mainly reflects this middle layer, but the correlations vary according to the extent to which the tendencies manifested in the test are restricted by cultural sanctions. Thus such needs as creation or dominance show positive correlations between T.A.T. findings and overt behaviour, but sex shows negative correlations.

The material collected in the present study undoubtedly reflects many different layers of personality. It would, however, be very difficult to estimate the depth of projection as we do not know enough about our subject's manifest personalities to detect or analyse any discrepancies between their conscious and unconscious trends. Although some basic information on every subject's age, sex, nationality, education, social background, recent personal history, etc., was obtained, it was insufficient for individual treat-

ment of each case. The aim of this research was the examination, not of individuals, but of significant trends in whole groups of subjects, and the technique employed was adequate only for this purpose.

In addition, the test was given in groups; some subjects would be writing their stories, while one, who found an oral response easier, would be quietly talking to the investigator in the corner of the room.¹ In these circumstances each individual subject's behaviour in the test situation could not be observed in detail, nor could the extent to which his personality was involved in the task be ascertained. Although the general conditions of the test were controlled as far as possible (they will be described later) and, within limits, everything was done to put the subjects at their ease, they yet varied greatly in their involvement in the task.

In these circumstances any depth analysis of the stories must be considered as out of the question, and we can only assume that the personality trends revealed by the test are rather superficial, although probably deeper than those measured by the Picture-Frustration Study. The analysis of the stories was made on this assumption.

This may be disappointing to a psycho-analytically-minded reader, for while the technique of psycho-analysis is largely extensive (making use of dreams, free association, etc.), the T.A.T. procedure is, or at least should be, intensive, and should utilize the limited material to the fullest extent (739). Here, it must be admitted, the procedure was neither extensive nor intensive—it was limited, and as objective as possible, to avoid 'private meanings', however fruitful.²

¹ Eron and Ritter (209) analysed T.A.T. productions of two groups of subjects, of which one gave the stories orally and the other in writing. The only significant differences were found in the formal aspects of the stories (the orally given stories being longer), but not in the content.

² Schettler (614) finds that the relations between 'private' and 'common' meanings are often overlooked, which causes misunderstanding in evaluating personality tests. To illustrate this she notes that the birth cry was heavenly music to Semmig, a cry of indignation and wrath to Kant, a feeling of inferiority to Adler, a sneeze to Darwin, and a reflex to most physiologists. 'The same thing, i.e. the birth cry, is a common meaning. The different reactions to this common meaning are the private meanings.' Although we should try to operate with common meanings as far as possible, Schettler admits that the private meaning provides frequently the real significance of an individual's reactions.

Chapter 4

ADMINISTRATION OF THE TESTS

Some details of the administration of the tests used have already been given, together with their description. Here more details will be presented describing the test situation, the way in which co-operation was sought, and some additional instructions necessary to clarify certain items of the tests.

The description will be given in two parts: (1) general remarks; (2) the administration of the particular tests: (a) Otis, (b) P.F.S., (c) T.A.T.

I. GENERAL REMARKS

(a) *The test situation*

Testing always took place in a big room, with separate tables and chairs, or school benches. Most subjects were tested in the local camp schools, in one of the classrooms for older children. Even in the Stadelheim Prison the prisoners were tested in a place called 'The School', a big room set aside for educational courses (although, as far as I know, none were actually given at that time).

Unfortunately, I could not use the local school when testing a group of Jewish Displaced Persons. I used a recreation room instead, but I found that there the atmosphere was somewhat different, and less favourable for testing. That may be one of the reasons why testing the Jewish subjects proved to be a failure.

In other camps, in Kempten and in Murnau, the tests were given in the classrooms, and I found that this helped greatly in creating a favourable relationship in the test situation.

It must be remembered that Displaced Persons had been conditioned to regard any examination with distrust and anxiety. Any test situation was inclined to revive the feelings of fear and suspicion, created in Gestapo investigations, in roll-calls in concentration camps, or in various 'screenings' by the Allied authorities in the period after the liberation, usually resulting in unpleasant consequences for some of the persons investigated. For these reasons it

was particularly important to follow the suggestions, given by Carroll (141) in a symposium on 'the unwilling patient'—to avoid identifications with the persons connected with any proceedings directed against the subject, and to assist the rapid development of a positive rapport and of identifications with friendly persons. As most of the unwilling subjects could have fitted into the category of the 'sulky patient' (in a classification by Woodcock, 735), it was essential to create an atmosphere of happier days, unconnected with war and deportation.

In this respect the atmosphere of the school was extremely favourable. Although it may be taken for granted that not all the subjects liked school when they were young, being older they certainly liked the idea of getting to a similar situation again. Especially before the administration of the Otis Test the atmosphere I was aiming at was of a happy regression into the past. Wide, bright classrooms, with children's paintings on the walls, contributed at least as much to that regression as my own efforts to create it, and many subjects stated explicitly that they felt happy to be 'at school again'.

Before any of the tests were given to a group of subjects, and before I started interviewing and giving instructions on how to answer the sheets of personal data and the particular tests, I gave a short introductory talk, after which the Otis Test was given.

The talk was given in the room already prepared for testing, to groups of about twenty subjects, selected in accordance with the procedure described before (Chapter 2), and invited with the help of the local authorities. I had to repeat my talk every time a new group was called in, but I feared that if I tried to avoid that repetition and organized a big meeting, the contact would be less personal, and would certainly not last long enough to induce people to undergo psychological examination later on. The national characteristic of the subjects tested—an inclination to be impressed and to follow a lead for only a short time—had to be taken into account.

The aim of the introductory talk was twofold: to establish the proper relationship, that is research relationship, and to gain co-operation. To achieve both these aims a frank outline of the purpose and method of the research seemed to be the best procedure.

In an exhaustive classification of interview situations Prof. E. W. Burgess (125) gives a list of possible relationships with the indication of their relative value. The list ranges from 'the punishment situation' in which the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewed is one of accusation and defence, through 'the official situation' providing routine information only, to the two situations giving the most reliable and valuable material: 'the professional situation' (relationship between a person in difficulty and an

expert, as lawyer, physician, psychologist, etc.) and 'research situation' in which a person interviewed and the interviewer are both 'motivated by a common desire to make a contribution to the science of human behaviour'.

There is little doubt that the last two situations are likely to be most favourable not only in interviews, but in personality testing as well. As my subjects did not seek counselling or therapy the establishment of the research relationship was the best I could aim at. Only in the prisons did our relationship provide a mixture of the 'professional' and 'research' situations; it is described below in the discussion on personal factors.

I felt that if I wanted to be trusted by the subjects I was going to test I owed them a clear exposition of my aims and methods.¹ I feared that if I used tricks to gain greater co-operation—for instance, by promising rewards for the best answers to my questions—I could not be convincing enough, and I should spoil the whole attitude of my subjects. What I wanted was to create in them the same attitude as my own—the wish to help in the understanding of the psychological problems of displacement and oppression. I told them that I was myself a Displaced Person, and that although I had been deported to another part of the world, I encountered similar problems that I wanted to clarify, and that I trusted I should be helped by them. I reminded them of a fact which was known to me from personal experience, namely, that practically everybody arrested or deported by one of the occupying powers had a strong desire to make some contribution to a documentary case against these deportations as soon as he was set free, and back in the civilized world.² Psychological research, I argued, could serve this purpose, by providing an analysis of the ideas and feelings of people affected by the war experience. By a scientific approach, and by the use of methods recognized in Great Britain and

¹ I did not follow the advice given by Rosenzweig in his article on 'the experimental situation as the psychological problem' (559). He thinks that the experimenter should overcome his natural inhibitions and should deliberately mislead his subjects by assigning a false object at the very outset of the experiment.

² Similar, in my experience, was the attitude of many Russians arrested for political reasons by the Soviet authorities, but the attitude of the Germans in similar circumstances appeared to be different. Bruno Bettelheim (73), who spent approximately one year in the big concentration camps of Dachau and Buchenwald, asked more than one hundred political prisoners the following question: 'If I am lucky and reach foreign soil, should I tell the story of the camp and arouse the interest of the cultured world?' He found only two who made the unqualified statement that every one escaping Germany ought to fight the Nazis to the best of his ability. All the others were hoping for a German revolution, but did not like the idea of interference on the part of a foreign power. When English and American newspapers published stories about the cruelties committed in the camps they 'insisted that it is not the business of foreign correspondents or newspapers to bother with German institutions and expressed their hatred of the journalists who tried to help them.'

America, this research could both make a strong case against oppression and deportation, and bring some understanding of the psychological difficulties and problems of the people concerned.

It may be doubted whether the approach described above would be very effective with other national groups. It certainly proved effective in groups in which Polish nationals were in the majority. The Poles are probably no more inclined to sacrifice themselves for the common good than any other people; they are as egoistic, lazy, and unco-operative as any other nation. But they are comparatively easily induced to make great—even if short—efforts if shown a noble cause with ardour and conviction.

As this was the case in the present research, my talks were usually received favourably and rather warmly, with various spontaneous exclamations that left no doubt that rapport had been established.

I then asked if anybody wanted to put any questions. There were questions, but as a rule they were unconnected with the proposed research. Some people would ask additional details about myself: from what part of Poland did I come, for how long did I stay in Russia, where was I deported to, when did I leave London, etc. I felt that some of these questions aimed at making sure whether I could be trusted, and I answered them willingly.

Only in one case was I attacked rather aggressively by a series of questions put by a man who considered himself to be the leader of the group, and was, at the time of investigation, imprisoned for an alleged political crime.¹ He stated that he wanted to know exactly who I was, and whether my aims were as honest and clear as I pretended. He also asked me to present my documents, and I handed him all the papers I had on me.

As most of these papers were written in English and he had some difficulty in understanding them, I asked whether anybody he could trust, not belonging to the prison administration, would be able to help him. I also thanked him for the personal courage shown in asking me these awkward questions and congratulated him on his ability to conduct this inquiry in the interest of his comrades. I added that if any doubt were left in the mind of any of the prisoners lest I was their enemy, it would be better not to start testing at all. In reply he handed me back my documents, stated that he was satisfied with the evidence I had presented, and that he was willing to be tested and answer any questions I found appropriate. He also addressed his fellows in my support. Later on he revealed in the T.A.T. his political attitudes so clearly that his confidence in my good faith was plain. Had he had any doubts he would have certainly been more careful.

¹ Both he and all his comrades were tested in a rather unusual situation, with armed German guards surrounding the room; they were under death sentence, hence special precautions had to be taken.

Other questions presented usually concerned either political problems, or those of the particular camp or prison. I was asked about the Polish Government in London; where were General Bor-Komorowski and General Anders? What was the attitude of the British people towards the Poles who did not want to go back to their country? Was it true that this camp was to be transferred again? What happened to the cigarettes which were expected to be distributed in the camp a month ago? etc.

I always answered a few of these questions as well as I could, to show that I had nothing to hide any more than I wanted them to hide anything from me, but then I would remark that the time was getting on and that I should be willing to answer any questions unconnected with the proposed research after the testing. Usually there would be no more questions then, and I would add that all precautions had been taken not to disclose the identity of people interviewed or tested, and that any test material or information printed or otherwise made public would not reveal the name or even initials of the person quoted.

Then I would ask everybody to take his seat, and would start giving instructions how to fill in sheets of personal data and answer the first test (the Otis). Once I got to this stage, co-operation was secured.¹

(b) *Personal factors*

Some of the personal factors which hindered the study of the Jewish groups, contributed to greater co-operation in the Polish groups.

An investigator's ability to judge personality is said to be improved if he is of the same nationality, cultural background, social status, system of values, age and sex as the person investigated (23, 733). A common background of experience, e.g. deportation, may be considered similarly helpful.²

¹ All the resistance I encountered was against coming to the meeting at all. It was sometimes fairly difficult to induce people to come, and I had to use the influence of the administration, or the personal friends of reluctant subjects, of the local social committees, etc. In the most difficult cases I intervened personally.

² This has been pointed out by Somerset Maugham (456), in a splendid passage which is worth quoting: 'It is very difficult to know people and I don't think one can ever really know any but one's own countrymen. For men and women are not only themselves; they are also the region in which they were born, the city apartment or the farm in which they learnt to walk, the games they played as children, the old wives' tales they overheard, the food they ate, the schools they attended, the sports they followed, the poets they read, and the God they believed in. It is all these things that have made them what they are, and these are things that you can't come to know by hearsay, you can only know them if you have lived them. You can only know them if you are them. And because you cannot know persons of a nation foreign to you except from observation, it is difficult to give them credibility in the pages of a book.'

It would be a mistake, however, to treat these factors as working in only one way—by enabling the experimenter to be a better judge of personality. Most of them act both ways, increasing the value of the experiment not only through the personality of the investigator, but also through the personality of the subject.

The similarity of social background and war experience was probably the main reason why the Polish Displaced Persons accepted me as one of themselves. In interviews they often remarked: 'You know that. . . . You will understand', and then complained that people who have not been oppressed can never understand. Their complaints about the lack of understanding from people who 'have not been in' may not be entirely justified—but they certainly represented the feelings of everybody, without exception, to whom I touched upon this question.

I was slightly older than the average age of the D.P.s studied. Being a man is always rather an advantage for any investigator of Polish adults, as women are traditionally distrusted in situations of counselling or therapy which have a certain similarity to research situations.

I wore a Polish military uniform with the Red Cross signs—both of which had a strong positive value for the Polish D.P. population at the time of the investigation. I have already mentioned London—the place from which I had come—as having positive prestige value among the Poles, and negative among the Jews. Whenever I met a new group of Poles I was recommended to them by those whom I had met earlier, as a man who 'has just come from London', and was therefore a reliable source of information on practically everything. I avoided identification with any particular institution or political party, and tried to be cautious and matter-of-fact when giving any information, eagerly sought by people so cut off from personal contacts with the outside world. My prestige value therefore, having a vague basis, was acceptable to most people—I was connected with 'London in general' and not with any particular organization, open to criticism by some section of the population; with deportation in general, and not with any particular type of it. My experience in Russia was of a mixed character, having certain elements in common with both German concentration camps and other types of displacement; this was important as at the time of the investigation there was a certain amount of antagonism between groups with different histories of displacement.

My education and professional training (in law and in psychology) had a sufficiently different significance for Displaced Persons in U.N.R.R.A. camps and for those held in prison to warrant separate treatment here.

In U.N.R.R.A. camps my main concern was that I should not be treated as a psychiatrist, and I had to make it clear over and

over again that I had no medical training, and that psychologists deal with normal people. Mental abnormality and the psychiatric profession are filled with negative connotations in the minds of most people with the cultural background of my subjects, and there was besides an important additional factor to be taken into account.

This was the attitude of the inmates of concentration camps, most of whom had struggled to maintain the integrity of their personalities. Bettelheim, for instance, describes (73) how, throughout his time in the camp, his main problem was 'to safeguard his ego in such a way, that, if by any good luck he should regain liberty, he would be approximately the same person he was when deprived of liberty'.

He even ascribes the excessive fear of any change in the home situation of the prisoners, to 'magical' reasoning: 'If nothing changes in the world in which I used to live, then I shall not change, either.' I realize that I experienced a similar kind of 'magical' reasoning when, at the time of my arrest, I struggled to keep my books, feeling that they would protect me from disintegration.

These attitudes survived in most inmates of concentration camps that I interviewed. There was a realization that people in general changed under camp conditions, but a defence mechanism was brought into play, whereby the interviewed subjects maintained that the 'other' groups, people of age, sex, profession, nationality, and social background different from their own, disintegrated more than the given person and his group. The subject being interviewed would himself not have changed at all—'just become a little nervous'.

Any psychological investigation with people who have adopted this attitude risks evoking the defence mechanism of non-co-operation. I had to make a subtle distinction between people's 'minds', and 'the feelings and ideas that come to their minds', and pretended to be interested in the latter only. The administration of the Picture-Frustration Study and of the T.A.T. as described below made this artificial distinction look plausible, and I explained that the tests I was using were intended to study the ideas which came into people's minds, and that these might be different according to the former type of displacement.

In spite of these precautions it must be admitted that I did not entirely escape suspicion, and once I was asked straight out by a prisoner: 'Do you think we are all crazy?' My arguments that in that case I would be 'crazy' myself, and that it is a well-known fact that very few people (probably no more than the average in the general population) have been found to be suffering from psychoses after imprisonment, did not seem to convince him.

The dangers of being treated as a psychiatrist in the prisons were similar. When Clemmer (1956) states that in prison 'except for syphilis almost nothing is taboo', he makes an important omission. Insanity is also taboo, and so are people whose profession it is to treat it.

In this respect my legal training and practice at the Warsaw Bar before the war were of great advantage. Among the prisoners I investigated there were always one or two 'old lags' who, when they learned that I was a lawyer, greeted me as a personal friend and recommended me to the others. At the question time after the introductory talk most of the queries concerned legal and administrative problems, people asked for 'private talks', and the whole attitude of the subjects towards the investigator seemed like that towards an old and powerful friend for whom they had been waiting a long time.

There is no doubt that I was myself influenced by the attitude of the prisoners and in the talks with them adopted the pose of a defending counsel. I 'felt' more like a lawyer than a psychologist whenever I was not actually testing. But the special conditions in which the prisoners found themselves: their deportation, the foreign country, the German guards, the isolation from their families and social circles, and the fact that I was the first person they met in prison who was from their own country, wearing a uniform, free to go in and out of the prison, and even having the whole prison administration at his disposal to help in the investigation¹—all this created an atmosphere of trust and confidence that I had never experienced before.

2. ADMINISTRATION OF THE PARTICULAR TESTS

(a) *The Otis*

While administering the Otis Test I was still trying to make the subjects at ease, and to disperse any feelings of anxiety. I therefore tried to be witty, to tell some amusing anecdotes before the test started, and to encourage any sign of good humour from the audience. As I would start giving little doses of wit at the end of the question time (and some questions provided ample opportunity in this respect), before the actual testing began, there was usually quite a lot of noise going on, the subjects occupying their places with a childish rush, shouting witty remarks at each other, etc. The whole atmosphere was that of playtime in school.

Then I would stop the noise and explain that all the tests contained pictures, and that this first one was given to measure 'per-

¹ I owe my gratitude to Prof. Walter A. Lunden, then Prison Officer, Military Government for Bavaria, for making all the necessary arrangements.

ception' (I avoided the term 'intelligence'). Those from the three groups (concentration camps, industry and agriculture), who had 'a type of perception wanted for the other tests with different pictures' would be selected for further investigation. I would add that a certain 'degree of perception' was necessary for the other tests, and that I wanted to have all the three groups equal in this respect.

The instructions given in the administration of the Otis were the same as in the standard procedure. I would walk among the benches making encouraging remarks from time to time. At the end of the prescribed time everybody was stopped, among exclamations of disappointment by those who had not completed the test (very few were able to do so). Then those who had not achieved an adequate score were released, and the remainder were asked to complete the following tests. Some of the subjects, whose intelligence level was adequate for further testing but which did not fit that of the available controls, were also discarded.

It was interesting that most of the people who were not selected for further testing felt disappointed. This was especially so in the prisons where those who were left out asked me to continue with 'any investigation I wanted', or promised to keep quiet if I allowed them to stay in the room. In Kempten Prison I tested a small group of prisoners on Sunday—the only day they were free from work, and on which I was free. They all failed the Otis Test and I told them that they need not stay. This announcement was greeted with such spontaneous outcries of regret and sorrow that I had to stay with them for long hours, talking and listening to their personal stories.

It must be admitted, however, that I was never asked to provide a new test by people who had completed the whole series of them. As testing was getting on people lost the interest and zeal shown at the beginning, and many needed encouragement to complete all the prescribed items. Given that encouragement they were co-operative throughout, and no Poles, who had passed the Otis and were selected for further examination, refused to co-operate. The only refusals I encountered concerned three men (one in the Kempten district, two in Weilheim-Murnau), all ex-inmates of concentration camps who categorically refused to take part in any testing, even preliminary, and would not even start the Otis Test.¹ Two of them struck me as being of low intelligence and I expected them to fail the intelligence test anyway. All three argued that they 'knew' about tests, and that tests in general 'do not tell any truth'. In spite of the similarity of the arguments they could not possibly have influenced each other: only two were from the same

¹ In all, about 750 subjects took the Otis Test.

D.P. camp and knew each other, but they belonged to different social classes, and, as I learned, were not even on speaking terms with each other.

It may be suspected that their strongly expressed disbelief in the validity of psychological measurements concealed a fear that tests do tell the truth, and that, as far as they were concerned, the truth might be unpleasant. People are often afraid, like Dorian Gray, to show their portraits to anyone, and they deny the existence of any true picture. They may even be afraid to look at the picture themselves.

(b) *The Picture-Frustration Study*

While administering the P.F.S. I was no longer concerned with getting good rapport. Those selected for further testing after completing the Otis were already reassured by their ability to cope with the test. As most of them had not completed the Otis, they were told that there would be no time limit in subsequent tests. This brought sighs of relief from the subjects who felt 'sure' they would complete the test without a single mistake if given more time to think.

On the other hand it would have been dangerous to start the administration of the P.F.S. in as light-hearted an atmosphere as that of the Otis.¹ The probable result would have been a tendency to give facetious replies. Instead of becoming involved in the social situations presented, and identifying with the frustrated persons in the picture, they would have tried to regard the events from a comical point of view.

To prevent this I reminded the testees before starting to give the actual instructions that we were coming to the measurement of more important factors which would be indirectly reflected in the very simple situations depicted in the test. I said that this work had to be taken seriously if we wanted to obtain any valid results. The tone of these remarks, as well as the slight tension produced by the quick tempo of the Otis would considerably alter the atmosphere of the group. It would now be similar to that after the introductory talk except that there was no longer the anxiety unavoidable before the first test. The subjects were now acquainted with psychological testing, and they felt reassured that I was not going to measure any person individually. What I wanted, I argued, was to grasp the difference between various *groups* of people in the kind of ideas that come into their minds. If anybody did not follow the instructions exactly, he might affect the results of the whole group and so destroy the aim of the investigation: namely a better understanding of the psychological problems of Displaced Persons.

¹ This atmosphere changed during the test, and within a few minutes of the start considerable tension was produced by the task.

The instructions were then given. It was found that the instructions suggested by the author of the P.F.S. were not as a rule grasped by the unsophisticated subjects of this investigation, and that some items needed clarification and repetition. They were therefore supplemented by additional remarks.

Rosenzweig's instructions were:

'Each of the following pictures contain two or more people. One person is always shown saying certain words to another. You are asked to write in the empty space the very *first* reply to these words that comes into your mind. Avoid being humorous.¹ Work as quickly as you can.'

As the subjects were influenced by having just completed the Otis, it was necessary that it should be made clear to them that there was no time limit, but they should try to work as quickly as they could, and that while in the Otis Test some answers were correct, and others not, here each person could give a different reply—whatever came first to his head—but all the replies would be correct: 'You must examine the picture and imagine the whole situation, imagine the person on the left as saying the words indicated in the test, and then imagine the person on the right as giving a reply. If you do that, and give the first reply that comes to your head, everything will be correct.'

Even then there would be queries. Questions were allowed and people were usually uncertain whether they should give the reply that 'ought to be given' or the reply that they thought they would give if they were that person. Some people asked whether it were permissible to give an impolite reply.

As the aim of the P.F.S. is to examine what people really think and feel, and not what they think they ought to say, I had to make it clear (and include the item in the instructions) that I was not interested in their opinions but in their ideas as they came into their heads: 'You must imagine that person on the right. He may be rich or poor, polite or not, pleased, angry, or indifferent. It is up to you to imagine that person and his feelings. When this person's reply comes to your mind write it down. You may find that you yourself would not actually give that reply if you were in his place—that does not matter.'

Other questions had an individual character, and the answers to these were not given in public, but in a low voice to the person concerned. The subjects were asked to raise a hand and to ask the questions quietly when I had come close to them, so that the others

¹ This admonition to avoid being humorous has since been omitted from Rosenzweig's instructions (573). He has also given many examples as to how to score humorous responses. I still think that in my research it was better to keep the admonition, but humorous responses were received nevertheless, and I scored them in accordance with Rosenzweig's method.

would not hear. This was important because most often questions were of this kind: 'I gave the reply: "You damned fool, you should be more careful." Is that correct?' If such 'questions' had been asked out loud, every second reply would have contained the expression 'damned fool', sanctioned as 'perfectly correct'.

When any additional explanations of any particular picture-situation were asked for, they were given with strict adherence to the text and to the sketch itself. For instance, picture No. 1 represents two people sitting in a car and a man standing nearby (on the right). One of the persons in the car is saying: 'I am very sorry we splashed your clothes just now, though we tried hard to avoid the puddle.' The subject is asked to give the reply of the man standing on the right. It would be a mistake to say that 'the people in the car splashed the clothes of the man on the right'—as that would eliminate the interpretation represented by the reply: 'It's all right. You didn't splash my clothes at all.' Similarly, suggesting that the people in the car actually 'tried hard to avoid the puddle' would eliminate such answers as the one I received in one of the prisons: 'I saw you, you bastards. You didn't try at all.'

The only way was to say something of this kind: 'Here are two people in the car. Here is a man standing on the right. This man from the car is saying something to the man on the right. What he is saying is written here. Can you imagine this situation?' Now imagine this man as replying: 'What do you think he would say?' Although with this 'explanation' no new element was introduced, the usual result was an instant 'illumination' followed by the reply.

(c) *The T.A.T.*

The atmosphere of the test situation throughout the administration of the Otis Test had a universal character, and all the subjects were affected by the generally prevailing mood. With no verbal contact, sitting on separate benches at separate tables, they yet undoubtedly had a subtle influence on each other. It was easy to see—through such signs as fidgeting, uncertainty of movements, hasty turning over of the pages of the leaflet, etc., that there was a growing amount of tension as the end of the time approached, and that practically everybody was affected by it in a similar way.

It would be more difficult to define the general atmosphere existing during the P.F.S. If any such general atmosphere existed at the beginning, during the instructions, it was soon dissolved into individual attitudes, and each subject seemed to be immersed in his own emotional reactions to the 'picture-situations' presented.

In the Thematic Apperception Test it was obvious from the presentation of the very first pictures that each person was showing his individual emotional reactions, comparatively unaffected by those of the others.

The test was presented to very small groups of subjects—usually three, and never more than four subjects being tested at the same time. Even then they were not treated as a group, but each received his instructions separately. This technique differed considerably from the group method of administering the T.A.T. adopted by Clark (154), and was comparatively close to the method of individual testing, although testing three to four people at once saved a considerable amount of time. From the point of view of the experimenter it became a group test, as he was unable to note reaction times, or to make detailed notes of the subject's behaviour as suggested by Rotter (588) for individual testing. From the point of view of the testee, however, it was an individual test, as he received all the instructions personally; and then was either left alone in his corner of the room if he wished to write undisturbed, or he could tell his story to the experimenter if he preferred to express himself in that way. In either case he was constantly in touch with the experimenter, was given encouraging remarks and additional questions, and even physically was nearer to him than to the other subjects.

In this way the subjects became more involved in their task of evoking fantasies, and psychologically aloof from the other subjects present. It is doubtful whether we can indulge whole-heartedly in day-dreaming while sitting in a crowded room with everyone trying to produce their own fantasies and construct stories.

The degree of involvement in the task varied. While for most people it appeared to be a great emotional experience, some seemed to be only intellectually concerned with constructing the stories. While the former could actually 'see' things happening, and described in words images stimulated by the picture, but having, so to speak, an existence and life of their own, the latter were writing their stories more or less as one writes an essay.

The former sometimes sat with their eyes closed or staring into space, making involuntary gestures, smiling, blushing, suddenly sweating, the women sometimes with their eyes full of tears, or blowing their noses in an attempt not to cry. Their whole behaviour bespoke a preoccupation with vivid images, and was similar to that of those psychiatric patients who, in similar circumstances, might be described as 'apparently hallucinating'.

The others expressed no deep emotions by their behaviour but rather appeared to be thinking hard, although some of them later admitted that they had been deeply impressed by the pictures and by the associations they had invoked.

The instructions given did not differ essentially from those suggested by Murray, and are described above in the general description of the test. The actual form of these instructions varied, to suit the individual subject.

When a subject stared at the picture, unable to evoke any fantasy or construct a story, he was advised not to look at the picture any more, not to 'stick' to it mentally, but to close his eyes and to reproduce the picture in his own imagination. Then he was told: 'When you can see the picture without having it actually before your eyes, try to animate it, to imagine people, not static and inflexible as they must necessarily be in a picture, but moving and acting as though in a film. Then it may be easier for you to give a description and to construct the story I want.'

The same procedure was found helpful when a subject started giving a detailed description of a picture, instead of interpreting it. He was then reminded that I was not interested in his ability to describe a picture, but in the fantasies which came to his head; and that if these fantasies did not entirely correspond to the details of the picture, it did not matter. This seemed to facilitate projection and make misrecognitions more frequent. The misrecognitions (i.e. descriptions and interpretations not corresponding to the actual stimuli) not only gave material of considerable value, as described by Rotter (588), but were also found to indicate a deeper emotional involvement in the task, and a greater element of fantasy in the story.

When presented with the blank card the subject was asked either to imagine his own picture on the card or to close his eyes and evoke a mental picture in this way. He was never asked to construct a story without first picturing mentally some scene, as was suggested by Lasaga y Travieso and Martinez-Arango (384), who found such a procedure more useful. In our research it was found that the ease with which the stories were constructed did not always indicate their validity, and those who, after some delay, were able to evoke their own image in fantasy, appeared to reveal more genuine feelings and trends than others, who facilitated their task by disobeying the instructions.

Similar considerations might apply to the choice of vague and ambiguous pictures. Symonds (665) observed that lack of detail (vagueness) in the picture presented correlates highly with the general good quality of the stories (as rated by two judges), with their variety, their genuineness, and the extent to which they represent fantasy; this was my impression also, in spite of the fact that my subjects complained that vague pictures were 'more difficult', and that they could not see all the details. In such a case they were told to imagine the details themselves and describe them in any way they liked. When they did what they 'liked'—significant projections were bound to appear.¹

¹ A recent experiment by Weisskopf (710) does not, in fact, contradict this finding. She used six T.A.T. pictures (a) photographed with reduced exposure, (b) having certain contours omitted, and (c) projected on to a screen for one-

Owing to the peculiar difficulties of the research it proved impossible to interview each individual after the T.A.T. session to trace and discuss the sources of the various stories, as suggested by Murray (498), or to have the subjects' own interpretations of their fantasies (a technique employed by Bettelheim, 75).

Such interviews were arranged whenever possible—when the examiner and the subject had enough time at their disposal and the subject was willing to discuss his own productions. They were not systematic, however, their time varied considerably, and so did the technique—it ranged from a few additional questions to the application of free associations and the collection of biographical data on a subject.

The material collected in these interviews is insufficient for any quantitative treatment, but some tentative suggestions will be presented in the next part of the book, dealing with the results of the investigation. Here it will only be appropriate to note one aspect of the information furnished by the interviews—the subject's realization of his own projections.

This insight varied considerably. Sometimes it was completely absent, and the subject did not even realize that the pictures could be interpreted in any other way than his own. In spite of my clear instructions and the information that the T.A.T. is an American test developed before the war, and that the pictures were made in the U.S.A., many subjects found it hard to believe that the pictures used in the study could represent anything else but scenes in concentration camps—sometimes they doubted that any interpretation other than their own, perhaps a long and complicated story, would be justified by the 'obvious' character of the picture itself.

Others, however, realized that their interpretations had a subjective character, but were not clear in their mind why they had chosen one and not another possible solution.

Finally, some subjects reached a comparatively high degree of insight, they knew that whatever the stimulus—a blank card or a T.A.T. picture—they were speaking or writing about themselves, describing largely their own feelings, thoughts and experiences. This insight was in most cases gained during the final stage of the test, while dealing with the blank card—they then realized that

fifth of a second. The responses to the pictures so presented were compared with others evoked by the normal T.A.T. pictures and without a time limit. The reduction in brightness of the pictures did not affect the responses, but both the omission of contours and the reduced exposure on the screen resulted in statistically significant reduction in fantasy material. In my opinion the fantasy material was reduced not by the vagueness of the pictures, but by the artificial character of the experiment: exposing the T.A.T. pictures on the screen must have affected the fantasy content whatever the time limit, while the drawings with contours omitted were too bad to evoke fantasy.

their own image and the new story did not essentially differ from the former ones, and that they had in fact been speaking about themselves when describing the persons portrayed on the actual pictures of the test. In other cases, this realization came during the earlier stages—after the first or second story had been constructed; or it came in the course of the interview with the examiner.

These interviews aimed at gaining information on the sources and meaning of the T.A.T. stories, and had nothing to do with other interviews mentioned earlier: namely, interviews carried on in the process of selecting the subjects for the equated samples of the D.P. population (i.e. for the testing), and interviews carried on independently of any testing—after the whole session of tests had been completed, to secure information on general conditions of displacement and psychological reactions to them.

PART TWO
RESULTS

Chapter 5

THE PICTURE-FRUSTRATION STUDY OF THE DELINQUENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

The aims of the study described in this chapter were twofold. The principal aim was to test the hypothesis that there is a positive association between delinquency and the tendency to direct aggression outwards. This was the basic assumption of this whole project and we put the following questions to which a study of criminal and non-criminal groups should offer some answer:

‘Is it true that there is a positive relationship between the strength of conscience expressed in social behaviour and the strength of guilt feelings? In other words, is social behaviour accompanied by a tendency to direct aggression inwards, blaming oneself instead of others, and vice versa?’

Further on we defined psychopathic and criminal personalities as deviating from the norm, or balance, by an excessive tendency to turn aggressive impulses outwards and an inability to turn them inwards or repress them in situations demanding this.

Even though some evidence was offered in support of the above hypothesis and of the following classification of personality deviations, it remains to be seen whether the hypothesis can be proved, and the classification validated, by the results of this study.

Only if we find significant differences between criminal and non-criminal groups, by using the direction of aggression as the principal variable and employing a given technique, can we use the same variable and the same technique to study psychological changes apparent after oppression. Only if we discover the meaning, in terms of social behaviour, of the variables measured by a particular technique can we employ the same technique in the study of personality changes, and hope that the measurements will have a definite significance.

The subsidiary aim of this study was to examine the influence of various types of displacement—of imprisonment in concentration

camps in particular—on the personality of the offender. To achieve this, two equated samples of fifteen subjects each were formed. One sample represented the ex-concentration camp group, the other represented the milder oppression, of deportation to industry and agriculture. Some relevant statistical data were also secured.

The material collected in connection with the second problem—the influence of the type of displacement on the prison population—suggested some modification of the procedure in regard to the major problem. The order of presentation of the material is, therefore: firstly, the influence of imprisonment in concentration camps; and secondly, the comparison of the criminal and non-criminal groups, selected in accordance with the findings on the influence of imprisonment.

2. THE INFLUENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS AS REFLECTED IN THE DELINQUENTS

(a) *Statistical data*

It was impossible to find any data showing the rate of delinquency among Displaced Persons in relation to pre-war standards, as there was no real division according to nationality. E.g. Russians or other Soviet citizens habitually claimed Polish nationality when arrested and faced with the possibility of compulsory repatriation. Even if such data existed, one could hardly compare delinquency in different countries, different situations, and under different laws. Thus our material was mainly based on prisons and other centres in which this research was conducted. Some data on the sex, age, profession and 'displacement history' of Displaced Persons now in prison were obtained in the course of giving the tests. Some additional information was supplied by the prison authorities.

The most striking fact was, that of the 100 Displaced Persons tested whose type of displacement was established, only 37 had not been detained in concentration camps. The post-concentration camp group therefore forms 63 per cent of the delinquents studied, while the post-concentration camp group does not exceed 1-2 per cent of the Displaced Persons population of Bavaria. Thus, the delinquency rate among people who have been in concentration camps is about 80 times that of the other groups:

$$\frac{63 \times 98}{37 \times 2} = 83.4 : 1$$

In Kempten, where records of the proceedings of the D.P. Camp

Court were examined (this court was set up by the American authorities to deal solely with Displaced Persons), the Polish ex-concentration camp group formed about 4-5 per cent of the D.P. population,¹ but 9 cases in 12 convicted by this court for offences against the public were from the concentration camp group. The delinquency rate was thus 57 times higher— $(95 \times 9) : (5 \times 3) = 57.0$ —in the concentration group than in the remainder of the Polish Displaced Persons. As far as could be traced, there was no pre-war conviction in any of these cases.

It must be admitted that the above figures require qualification. The prison population comprised only males aged 16 to 47 years. Thus we want to know, not the percentage of ex-prisoners of concentration camps in the whole population, but the percentage of prisoners in the male population, aged 16-47. Even in the Kempten D.P. Camp Court where females were included, the majority of offenders were males, and the majority of ex-concentration camp inmates were also males. It might be argued that if the percentage of concentration camp inmates in the male adult group is much greater than in the whole D.P. population, our data would show no greater delinquency rate in the concentration camp group.

No figures showing the actual percentage of ex-concentration camp prisoners in the adult male D.P. population were obtainable.² An approximate percentage can, however, be computed.

The report of the Statistics and Reports Branch, U.N.R.R.A. Headquarters, U.S. Zone, containing the number of Displaced Persons by age and sex in U.S. Army Area for 29th June 1946 (the period of the present field work) gives the following figures for District No. 5 (Bavaria) with which we are concerned:

Men aged 18 +	54,834
Total D.P. population	119,122

Thus the percentage of adult males in the total D.P. population would be 46.03 per cent.

These figures must be modified, however, as they include evacuees from the Baltic states and the Ukraine where the percentage of women and children was greater than among people

¹ This relatively high number of ex-prisoners of concentration camps was the reason why the Kempten Camp was chosen for this research.

² The estimate of the proportion of ex-concentration camp prisoners to the total D.P. population was arrived at by a comparison of the lists of former concentration camp prisoners with the numbers of Polish D.P.s in the same districts of Bavaria and during the same period. The lists were examined in the H.Q. of the Union of Former Political Prisoners of Concentration Camps, in Munich.

deported for compulsory labour; the percentage of Polish adult males in the total Polish D.P. population is probably higher.

A Polish report (536) based on the combined data of the Polish Liaison Officers' H.Q. of the Polish Welfare Societies, of U.N.R.R.A., and of the Combined Displaced Persons Executive, G-5, Div. U.S.F.E.T., gives the following figures for the whole of western Germany (excluding the Soviet Zone):

Polish adult men	445,626
Polish adult women	275,395
Polish children	89,217
Total	810,238

Thus the percentage of Polish adult males in the total Polish D.P. population would be 55 per cent.

This figure, although referring to the whole of western Germany, does not greatly differ from the data for the District No. 5 for the total D.P. population, and is probably rather more exact. The percentage of male adults of all nationalities in the U.S. Zone is slightly above 46 per cent (male adults=166,948; total=368,210), which is the same as figures given above for District 5; and there is no indication that in the rest of western Germany the situation is much different.

It seems therefore safe to assume that the percentage of adult males in the Polish D.P. population in Bavaria at the period of investigation was approximately 55 per cent.

Even if we assume that all the inmates of concentration camps were adult males, whereas in fact some of them were women, or even children, their percentage in the total adult male population will not be greater than 3.6 per cent.

Taking this as a basis we find that:

$$\frac{63 \times 96.4}{37 \times 3.6} = 45.6 : 1$$

Our conclusion is: the delinquency rate in the ex-concentration camp group is eighty-three times greater than that in the total D.P. population; when corrected for the influence of age and sex it is still approximately forty-five times greater.

In other words, in the prisons under investigation I found forty-five times more ex-prisoners of concentration camps than would formally be expected.

The age distribution in the prison population was as follows:

Age	Concentration Camp Group	Others	Total
16	1	0	1
17	0	1	1
18	1	0	1
19	4	2	6
20	2	6	8
21	5	6	11
22	6	5	11
23	6	3	9
24	2	5	7
25	5	3	8
26	4	1	5
27	2	0	2
28	3	0	3
29	2	1	3
30	4	1	5
31	3	0	3
32	2	1	3
33	2	0	2
34	2	0	2
35	0	1	1
36	2	1	3
37	1	0	1
40	1	0	1
43	1	0	1
44	1	0	1
47	1	0	1

These figures suggest that two factors contribute to delinquency in the group studied: age, and concentration camp experience.

The age group 16-25 yields more delinquents than the age group 26-39, and far more than the age group 40. There is no exact information on the age distribution among Polish Displaced Persons in Germany, but from personal observation I should say that it is different from the age distribution in the prison population. Even if the largest age group in the U.N.R.R.A. camps is the 16-25 year group, there are still relatively many more older Displaced Persons in Germany (both with and without concentration camp experience), than there are in the prisons. This higher percentage of delinquents from the age group 16-25 among the Polish Displaced Persons in Bavaria is in general agreement with the statistics of crime in Europe and America.

Moreover, even in this age group ex-prisoners of concentration camps contribute far more than their share of delinquents. In older groups the influence of concentration camp experience is even more striking, and in the age group 40+ all the delinquents had suffered imprisonment in the camps.

It does not follow that concentration camps influenced the older people more than the younger. But in the younger generation there is delinquency even when there is no experience of concentration camps—and Displaced Persons are no exception in this respect—while in the older generation there is very little such delinquency.

An analysis of the *offences committed* by the Polish Displaced Persons in Germany is extremely difficult, and any conclusions must be accepted with the greatest caution for the following reasons:

Only the two largest prisons in Bavaria were studied (Landsberg and the Stadelheim Prison in Munich), where 174 Displaced Persons claiming Polish citizenship were detained for having committed a total of 185 offences (some of them were convicted for more than one offence).

My data include men and women from all the major national groups living within Polish boundaries before the war, but it could not be claimed that Polish Displaced Persons, particularly those detained in prison, form a representative sample of the population of Poland.

Polish criminal statistics with which rough comparisons can be made concern 'persons finally sentenced' in 1936, while our data concern persons *detained* in prison in May–July 1946. There is usually a great discrepancy between data on persons sentenced and on those detained in prison, as the numbers of the latter is affected by the length of the prison sentence. In our case this discrepancy is comparatively small, as our data only concern persons who had committed offences since the end of 1945 and are, therefore, little affected by the length of the sentence, but it cannot be denied that a certain discrepancy exists.

The offences in Germany were committed under different social and political conditions, and were treated under different laws from those in Poland before the war.

With these reservations a rough comparison may be made, and tentative conclusions drawn, from the following data.¹

¹ Based on the table of persons finally sentenced in Poland in 1936, *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland*, published by the Polish Government in London in 1941 (523, p. 152), and on the data supplied by the Administration of the Landsberg and Stadelheim Prisons.

TABLE I

Offences committed in Poland in 1936 and by Polish D.P.s in Germany in 1946

	<i>Poland, 1936</i>		<i>D.P.s in Germany, 1946</i>	
	<i>No. of Offences</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>No. of Offences</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Felonius homicide	1,416	0.2	19	10.3
Wounding	35,969	6.6	7	3.8
Robbery	1,534	0.3	24	13.0
Larceny, burglary, etc.	133,959	22.4	42	22.6
Receiving stolen goods	16,938	2.8	2	1.1
Embezzlement, swindling, fraud	33,925	5.7	1	0.5
Procuring, white slavery	1,413	0.2	4	2.2
Black market offences	—	—	27	14.6
Illegal possession of arms	—	—	50	27.0
Other offences	373,680	62.4	9	4.9
Total	598,834	100.0	185	100.0

From this the conclusion may be drawn that the greatest discrepancy existing in the group of 'other offences' (Poland 62.4 per cent; Germany 4.9 per cent) is probably caused by the fact that in Poland this group comprised all minor misdemeanours, the majority of convictions not involving prison sentences, while in our group all 'other offences' involved prison sentences, and comprised a few offences under special military laws, a few cases of drunkenness, and one case of rape. Thus these figures are not comparable and, in addition, they cause a general shift in the figures above so that all other percentages for Germany are overestimated.

Procuring, white slavery, etc., appear to show a considerable increase in the D.P. population. This increase may not be genuine, however, and may be explained by the fact that detection and conviction of such offences is generally very difficult, while in D.P. camps it is very easy. Thus the increase in convictions may involve no increase in offences.

Black market offences were unknown in Poland before the war, illegal possession of arms very infrequent. The former affected the whole continent of Europe as a result of the war and is not specific to the D.P. population.

The illegal possession of arms seems to have, on the other hand, a specific psychological significance. As far as I can judge from interviews with Displaced Persons, welfare authorities, etc., many of these offences were not connected with any criminal aim. The

firearm was often treated not as a criminal tool, but as a symbol of power and security,¹ a symbol so cherished, that even strong penalties failed to induce most people to abandon it. It is interesting to note that the Poles 'specialized' in the illegal possession of arms, the Jews in black market offences, while the Ukrainian group showed no specific preference for any type of crime.

The most important and significant shift in the percentage of offences among Displaced Persons in Germany appears to be towards felonious homicide and other crimes of violence. The inmates of the prisons I visited were, according to Professor W. A. Lunden, the Prison Officer for Bavaria, with whom I discussed the matter, fairly representative of the whole D.P. delinquent population. It appears therefore that the shift is genuine and that our figures show that Displaced Persons choose more violent and aggressive forms of delinquent behaviour than did the Polish population before the war. Instead of engaging in the 'milder' forms of theft, receiving, swindling, fraud and embezzlement, our delinquent population tends to murder or robbery with violence.

It must be noted, however, that all the reports I have seen since I left Bavaria indicate a subsequent considerable decrease of crime in general, and of crimes of violence in particular, among Displaced Persons in Germany.

(b) *The Picture-Frustration Study of groups with different backgrounds of displacement*

The responses were grouped according to the direction of aggression and the scores obtained for the twenty-one picture-situations for each individual were added. If a picture-situation involved two responses, both were taken into account. If, however, the response could be interpreted in several ways—for instance as very polite, or as ironical, as implying more than was expressed, or as expressing a wish that something should be done to mend the situation but without a clear idea who should do it, etc.—the response was classified as 'not clear' and discounted. All responses classified as 'faulty', where the subject did not understand the situation, did not follow the instructions, gave his own remarks instead of those which could be ascribed to a person on the picture, etc., were also discounted. In all, 10.01 per cent responses had to be discarded.

Fifteen pairs of Polish subjects were compared in this way—one group with concentration camp experience, the other with experience of forced labour in industry or agriculture. In addition a small group of Jewish subjects, all with concentration camp experience with unusually harsh treatment, was examined as a comparative material.

¹ I am not speaking here of the sexual meaning in the psycho-analytic sense.

TABLE II

P.F.S. scores of Polish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, grouped according to the direction of aggression

Pair No.	Concentration Camps			Industry and Agriculture		
	E	I	M	E	I	M
1	14	3	4	20	1	1
2	12	1	7	13	2	4
3	12	3	7	21	5	3
4	6	1	1	10	2	3
5	14	2	1	13	6	4
6	15	1	2	10	2	8
7	15	4	8	9	7	6
8	21	1	3	10	9	5
9	14	7	3	16	4	8
10	15	10	4	16	3	7
11	16	6	10	14	4	5
12	18	3	3	13	1	9
13	9	4	6	18	4	3
14	7	5	4	16	2	5
15	15	4	4	19	5	4
Total	15	199	56	218	57	75
Per cent		62.0	17.4	62.3	16.3	21.4

'E' denotes all extrapunitive answers, aggression directed outwards.
 'I' denotes all intropunitive answers, aggression directed inwards.
 'M' denotes all impunitive answers, no aggression expressed.

The first five pairs of subjects were tested in the Landsberg Prison, the others in the Stadelheim Prison. Both members of a pair were from the same prison to avoid the influence of the different local conditions.

This table suggests the following conclusions:

There are great individual variations in the scores, although in every case extrapunitive responses predominate.

The scores do not seem to be correlated in spite of the arrangement in closely matched pairs. As we shall see later, this is the case throughout our results. The correlation coefficient (calculated elsewhere) is for men $+0.040$, for women -0.172 , neither of them significant.

When we add up the scores we find practically no difference between the average of the two groups of prisoners, in spite of their different backgrounds of displacement. The percentages of extra-

punitive, intropunitive, and impunitive responses are almost the same for both groups.

It does not follow that imprisonment in concentration camps does not influence the personality of the inmates, or that our test is unable to detect this influence. We have seen already that concentration camp experience produces a delinquency rate forty-five times higher than that of other types of displacement, while we still do not know how much greater the rate may be in comparison with normal standards. This increase is too great for the effect of concentration camp experience to be treated as non-existent or merely superficial. We shall see also later on that the Picture-Frustration Study is, in fact, capable of differentiating between the groups of people with different backgrounds of displacement.

The meaning of our results seems to be this: whatever the genuine difference between two groups of people in relation to given variable, none may appear in the research if we do not take our sample at random, but allow it to be influenced by self-selection. Convicted offenders are such a self-selected group: it is not by chance that they are all in prison.

We are trying to measure the personality variables which cause antisocial behaviour. We may find that in one group of people these variables are forty-five times more frequent than in other groups. But once these personality variables have brought people to prison, those within the walls may all be the same. There are forty-five times less delinquents in the industry and agriculture group than in the group which has endured the highest level of oppression. But those few in the former group who are delinquent, may be as aggressive, as antisocial, and as extrapunitive as the more numerous delinquents from the concentration camp group. When the levelling influence of detainment in prison is also taken into account, we cannot be surprised at finding no difference between our two equated samples.¹

¹ The following fictitious example may illustrate a similar phenomenon. In a large survey we may find that priests and gangsters, university professors and blacksmiths, have all different personalities, and that certain standards of behaviour are typical of certain occupations. But we shall probably find no difference between people of such different backgrounds if we select our sample from the ward of a psychiatric hospital. There we may find the ex-gangster behaving strikingly like the ex-priest—if they are both schizophrenics their former occupations may not be easy to detect.

Similarly in order to study the relation between certain occupations and the ability to play tennis we may take a random sample of agricultural workers and a random sample of university students. We may find then that only 1 per cent of the agricultural workers can play tennis, compared with 40 per cent of the university students. But if we select both our samples at a tennis court—we shall find both agricultural workers and university students who can play tennis—even if we compare their performance we may find no difference between the two groups. Our samples will be prejudiced by the process of self-selection.

The Jewish group was too small to produce any significant results but even the data based on the performance of the four subjects tested suggest that their problem may be rather specific.

This may be seen from the following table:

TABLE III

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of Polish and Jewish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, grouped according to the direction of aggression

	<i>Per cent</i> <i>E</i>	<i>Per cent</i> <i>I</i>	<i>Per cent</i> <i>M</i>
Polish industry and agriculture group	62.3	16.3	21.4
Polish concentration camps group	62.0	17.4	20.6
Jewish concentration camps group	76.2	14.3	9.5

It may be seen that the Jewish group gave more extrapunitive responses, and far less impunitive ones than either Polish group. The Jews tested in the prisons seemed to have a particularly strong tendency to blame others in conflict situations, but when they do not blame others, they blame themselves. They seem to be preoccupied with the problem of guilt.¹

Evidence presented later and based on the T.A.T. and a larger number of subjects shows that in spite of the microscopic size of the sample here we have touched on an interesting psychological problem, which is worth noting even if we are unable to produce evidence amounting to scientific proof.

In the last Table we grouped the responses according to the direction of aggression: here we will consider whether the subject is preoccupied with the barrier which has caused the frustration, or with the protection of his ego (his personality integration), or with the fate of his frustrated need which still demands satisfaction.

The results have been summed up in the following table:

¹ This might be considered as symptomatic of regression. Durbin and Bowlby (190) rightly point out that children 'do not do things by halves' and are 'ruthless towards evil in themselves as well as in others' (p. 88). Thus children may be considered extremely extra- or intropunitive while impunitive tolerance would be a sign of maturity. We shall see later on, however, in the light of the evidence collected in this research, that extreme extra- and intropunitiveness may be symptomatic of other psychological phenomena besides regression.

TABLE IV

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of Polish and Jewish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, grouped according to the type of reaction

	<i>Per cent</i> <i>O-D</i>	<i>Per cent</i> <i>E-D</i>	<i>Per cent</i> <i>N-P</i>
Polish industry and agriculture group	17.9	54.1	27.9
Polish concentration camp group	16.4	50.0	33.6
Jewish concentration camp group	17.1	65.7	17.1

O-D is the reaction of obstacle-dominance, with the barrier causing frustration dominating the response (for instance the responses: 'That was a blow to me', 'How awful!' 'Damn it!' 'I'm disappointed', etc., or: 'It doesn't matter any way', 'It wasn't too bad', 'I don't care', etc.—either emphasizing or minimizing the frustrating obstacle and the frustration itself).

E-D is the ego-defensive reaction, with the protection of the ego and the problem of guilt dominating the response (for instance the responses: 'You should never do it', 'It is my fault', 'It could not be helped any way').

N-P is the need-persistive reaction, with the demand for satisfaction of the frustrated need dominating the response¹ (for instance the responses: 'You should repair it, I still want it', 'I shall try and find a remedy', 'It will clear up in time', etc., all with emphasis on the future solution of the problem).

Here, again, we cannot see any striking difference between the two Polish equated samples, but the Jewish group (not equated with the others) shows a certain neglect of the frustrated need, the main attention being concentrated on the protection of the ego and the problem of guilt.

The P.F.S. scores for each individual are given in detail in the Appendix. Here they are summarized in Table V. The mixed answers (contrary to the formation of the tables above) are treated separately here: when a response shows two different directions of aggression it is tabulated under 'mixed answers': when it shows one direction of aggression expressed in different types of reaction, it is tabulated as e^2 , i^2 and m^2 respectively.² The meaning of the scoring factors and symbols has been discussed in the general exposition of the test (Chapter 3).

¹ The detailed discussion of these responses and further examples illustrating each type have been given in Chapter 3.

² For instance the mixed response of the kind: 'You are guilty, but it does not matter, I will repair it' was classed as a 'mixed answer', but a response: 'You are guilty and should repair it' was classed as e^2 .

TABLE V

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of Polish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, in detail. Group A denotes 15 subjects with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture, Group B the 15 controls with concentration camp experience

	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not clr.	Faulty	Total
A	32	76	10	30	14	0	1	12	19	0	9	25	15	1	47	10	14	315
B	23	63	12	48	11	1	3	12	17	0	13	23	11	1	37	11	29	315

These figures show that although in many respects our two groups of prisoners are nearly equal, some differences are suggestive.¹ In particular when aggression—outside the region of ego-defence—is directed outwards, the former inmates of concentration camps do not tend to ruminate on the frustrating experience as much as do the controls, but want the frustration to be removed, and want others to do it (reaction 'e').

To test the significance of this difference the χ^2 method was applied. The aim was to check whether the ratio of the E' and e scores differed significantly for the two groups. A similar method (based essentially on the ratio of two scores or other variables) was applied in most χ^2 calculations in this book. To avoid any under-estimation of the results because of the small numbers, a correction for continuity was applied.

The calculation was as follows:

	E'	e	Total
Concentration camps	23 (29·36)	48 (41·64)	71
Industry and agriculture	32 (25·64)	30 (36·36)	62
Total	55	78	133

$$\chi^2 = 4.2780$$

There is one degree of freedom. χ^2 is therefore significant, and P (the probability that our result might have been obtained by pure chance) lies, according to Fisher's table of χ^2 (219), between

¹ The term 'suggestive' applies throughout this writing to all evidence which either (a) was tested for significance reaching a probability of between 0.05 and 0.1, or (b) was not tested for significance at the stage described, but the superficial examination of which indicated a definite trend. In the latter case the significance of this trend was, whenever technically possible, tested elsewhere, and the difference, merely 'suggestive' when two small samples were concerned, often became 'significant' when the test was applied to a larger number of subjects. Unfortunately this was not always practicable and some of the evidence still remains merely 'suggestive', requiring more research with larger samples to which tests of significance may be reliably applied.

0.02 and 0.05. The difference between the ex-inmates of concentration camps and the control group of prisoners in respect to the P.F.S. scores E' and e is therefore significant and can hardly be ascribed to chance.

This state of mind of former inmates of concentration camps was not only reflected in the P.F.S. In the course of interviews with the prisoners I noted that an unusual number of demands were made by this group. They required special privileges because of the concentration camp experience, special parcels from the Red Cross as former political prisoners, and better food, as they had suffered more malnutrition than the other prisoners. One might say that all these demands were objectively justified: they certainly had a strong objective basis which cannot be denied. But at the same time they expressed a subjective state of mind, a certain outlook which operated even in the standardized social situations of the test and found numerical expression in the table above.

The other differences great enough to require comment were in the number of mixed and of 'faulty' responses.

The first difference seems to show that the concentration camp experience has decreased our subjects' ability to look at a situation from several points of view: their reactions are poorer and simpler, their aggression is concentrated in one direction, instead of being dispersed by blaming various agents, including themselves. That is to say, former inmates of concentration camps appear to be more egocentric—egocentricity being the tendency to regard all situations only from one's own point of view.

The analysis of 'faulty' responses corroborates the hypothesis of increased egocentricity, although superficially, from the figures above, I appear to have made a mistake. That ex-prisoners of concentration camps give more incorrect responses, indicating that they were unable to follow the instructions correctly, might show that the two samples were insufficiently equated for intelligence.

In fact, the two samples were carefully equated for intelligence and this discrepancy was not caused by the intellectual factor. It is true that the intellect played a certain role and in both groups the subjects sometimes failed to grasp the 'picture-situation'. But in addition a conative factor was hindering the application of the instructions, and this factor was more strongly operative in the concentration camp group than in the control.

The following example will illustrate this point. In the 'picture-situation' No. 1, two people sitting in a car are represented as saying certain words to a man standing near by. The subject is required to give the response of the latter. What happened in most 'faulty' responses was that, instead of giving the response of the man standing outside the car, the subject gave an additional re-

mark made by the people in the car. He did not switch his attention from one person in the picture to another. Having heard the views expressed by the people in the car he was unable to express another point of view, that of the man standing near by. Giving his response, in spite of all the instructions, our subject was still, so to speak, in the car, and could not get out of it.

Throughout the 'faulty' responses concentration camp men displayed a certain rigidity of behaviour and, again, difficulty in regarding a situation from several angles.

χ^2 was applied to see whether the ex-inmates of concentration camps when compared with 'normal' prisoners gave significantly fewer 'mixed answers' (indicating an inability to look at a situation from all sides) and more 'faulty answers' (indicating an inability to switch from one point of view to another).

The calculation was as follows (expected frequencies in brackets; a correction for continuity was applied):

	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Faulty</i>	<i>Total</i>
Concentration camps	37 (43.65)	29 (22.35)	66
Industry and agriculture	47 (40.35)	14 (20.65)	61
	84	43	127

$$\chi^2 = 5.3274$$

χ^2 is again significant, P lies between 0.02 and 0.05, and the difference between the two groups can hardly be ascribed to chance.

While in the tables above we were dealing with *responses* and measuring the tendency of a group of prisoners by simply adding the P.F.S. scores, here we shall consider another aspect of the same data. As extrapunitive tendencies seem to prevail in all our groups of prisoners, and as there is some evidence for a close association between extreme forms of extrapunitiveness and antisocial behaviour, we shall see how many *subjects* in each group have more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses.

The data are presented in the following table:

TABLE VI
Polish and Jewish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946,
giving more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>		<i>Percentage of Subjects</i>	
	E > 50%	E < 50%	E > 50%	E < 50%
Polish industry and agriculture group	13	2	87	13
Polish concentration camps group	13	2	87	13
Jewish concentration camps group	4	0	100	0

As far as we can judge from the figures above nearly all the delinquents tested exhibited strong extrapunitive tendencies, and we cannot find here any evidence to suggest the influence of extreme forms of oppression on extrapuniteness.

Next we shall introduce a slight modification into our tables presenting the scores of direction of aggression. We noticed (Table V) that former prisoners of concentration camps gave fewer 'mixed answers', and so tended to concentrate their aggression more than the control group. Now we shall compare the groups only in respect of more concentrated form of aggression.

TABLE VII

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of the Polish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, grouped according to the direction of aggression, with mixed answers excluded

	E	I	M	% E
Industry and agriculture	176	32	51	67.954
Concentration camps	168	33	49	67.200

It can be seen that here again both groups exhibit similar tendencies and that the total score of extrapuniteness in both groups is slightly increased.

The difference between the concentration camp and the control groups, obtained by the above modification of procedure, was very slight. Now, in order to have a clear picture of any difference between our two equated samples of prisoners, we shall go further in the same direction, and discard more responses in which the direction of aggression is not clearly expressed.

Excluding *E* and *I* responses seems to be the next fruitful step in such a modification of procedure.

From the theoretical discussion on the P.F.S. scores (Chapter 3) it will be seen that whereas the nine scoring factors (*E*, *E'*, *e*, *I'*, *I*, *i*, *M'*, *M*, *m*) differ between themselves very clearly from the qualitative point of view, the difference between the two additional variants *E* and *I* is merely quantitative. Both these responses are usual in 'super-ego-blocking situations'; in the response *E* the subject denies his guilt altogether while in the response *I* he admits it, but stresses the extenuating circumstances. The practical problem is that while in the response *E* the admittance of guilt may be rated as 0 per cent, and stressing the extenuating circumstances as 100 per cent, in the response *I* the admittance of guilt might sometimes be rated as 1 per cent and stressing the extenuating circumstances 99 per cent—not a great difference in fact.

To give an illustration, the driver accused by the police officer

of exceeding the speed-limit (picture-situation No. 19) may deny his guilt by saying: 'I had to go fast—I am a doctor and I had an emergency call' (score *E*), or admit his guilt rather formally, but stress the extenuating circumstances that practically explain everything: 'I am sorry, but I am a doctor and I had an emergency call.'

Thus the difference between the two responses *E* and *I*, great in theory, is often slight in practice, and I sometimes encountered a difficulty in assessing delinquents' responses as to whether the subject implied that he was completely guiltless, or was willing to admit his guilt to a certain extent.¹

It may also be noted that while in the response *I* some amount of aggression is directed outwards (on the extenuating circumstances) even in the response *E* the subject at least admits that he is accused. In the response *E* the direction of aggression outwards is much more definite, as in the following example for the same situation: 'You shouldn't have stopped me. Can't you see that I am a doctor and I am going on an emergency call?' Similarly the direction of aggression inwards is much more definite in the response (quoted from Rosenzweig): 'I am sorry. It was very thoughtless of me.'

Because of the above considerations all the *E* and *I* responses were excluded from the following table:

TABLE VIII

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of Polish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, grouped according to the direction of the most explicit aggression

	E	I	M	% E
Industry and agriculture	166	20	51	70·042
Concentration camps	156	21	49	69·027

The only conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that, even in the most explicit forms of direction of aggression, no influence of concentration camps can be detected in the groups of prisoners tested.²

¹ No such difficulties existed in relation to any other scoring factors, and as both responses *E* and *I* were rather infrequent in my material, the amount of arbitrary judgement in the scoring of the test was very small and could hardly affect the results.

² χ^2 , based not on percentages, but on the original scores, gave the very small figure of 0·0290. With two degrees of freedom the probability that any differences indicated above can be ascribed to chance lies between 0·98 and 0·99.

(c) *Summary and conclusions*

An attempt to detect the influence of imprisonment in concentration camps was made in a study of Polish Displaced Persons (Poles, Jews, Ukrainians and some others) imprisoned for offences committed under the American jurisdiction after the end of hostilities, in the period autumn 1945 to the end of June 1946.

It was found that the delinquency rate among Displaced Persons with concentration camp experience was eighty-three times greater than in the remaining D.P. population. When corrected for the influence of age and sex it was still at least forty-five times greater.

It was also found that their offences took more violent forms than those of the population of Poland before the war. Some peculiarities of the kind of offences committed were indicated.

When the two equated samples of Polish offenders—one with concentration camp experience, the other with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture—were compared by the application of the Picture-Frustration Study, the results were inconclusive. It appeared that both groups gave many extrapunitive responses, indicating their antisocial tendencies, but they were approximately equal in this respect. It is suggested that no variable can be studied by comparing two groups which have gone through a process of self-selection. The main variable which interests us in the study of the prison population is the amount of outward aggression; and this same variable probably contributed to their imprisonment and so affected the selection of our samples. Although we have presented some evidence that in the general D.P. population a high amount of outward aggression is less frequent than in the ex-concentration camp group, those people from the general population who become offenders may be expected to exhibit as much outward aggression as delinquent ex-inmates of concentration camps. They are a highly selected group and cannot form a 'control' sample for the purpose of this research.

The only differences that could be detected and proved statistically significant were, that instead of stressing the existence of the obstacle causing the frustration the former inmates of concentration camps tended to express a wish that some other person should remove the obstacle and satisfy their needs, and that they tended to regard every situation from only one point of view, concentrated their aggression in one direction, and were often unable to change the object of their identification.

In addition a small group of Jewish Displaced Persons, with a background of even more severe oppression than that of the majority of Poles, was tested with the P.F.S. The results showed a still more extreme form of extrapunitiveness and the paradox that

the aggression, if not directed outwards, tended to direct itself inwards; the impunitive reconciliation to the disagreeable situation, the 'forgive and forget' attitude, was comparatively rare in this group. These results indicate a preoccupation with the problem of guilt, as if the subjects would say: 'Somebody must be guilty, probably the others, perhaps even myself, but there is guilt in this situation and there must be punishment.' These results were corroborated by the fact that the Jewish group also gave an unusually high percentage of ego-defensive reactions, which concern the problem of guilt and the protection of personality integration. We cannot attempt to find any solution to this problem at this stage, but further evidence, obtained in testing and interviewing Jewish Displaced Persons in the prisons and in the D.P. camps, will be given later, and tentative explanations offered.

3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DELINQUENT AND 'NORMAL SUBJECTS'

(a) *Introductory remarks*

The results of the investigation presented above, on the influence of imprisonment in concentration camps, have shown that former inmates of these camps have an unusually high delinquency rate. This raises some difficulty in the use of people with concentration camp experience as controls for a study of delinquency.

When comparing delinquents with non-delinquents we want the latter group to be 'normal'. We want neither a selected group of saints or neurotics, nor a selected group of antisocial people. A group with an extremely high delinquency rate may be suspected of belonging to the latter category.

It is impossible to find any Displaced Persons who could claim to represent 'normality' or 'the average'. Their experience has been too far from normal to allow that, and the position of inmates of concentration camps was still more unusual. If a population as a whole has a great many offenders, one might suspect that the antisocial tendencies of this population are not entirely concentrated in those who have been convicted. The remainder may be nearly as much affected by the process of disintegration. It seems therefore to be a much safer policy, in selecting delinquents and non-delinquents for comparison, to take both offenders and controls from among Displaced Persons with the usual history of displacement, rather than from those who have suffered extreme oppression.

The subsequent discussion on this problem will therefore be limited to the group of fifteen Polish delinquents with a back-

ground of forced labour in industry or agriculture, and to those Polish Displaced Persons with a similar background who acted as controls for concentration camp group of D.P.s, and who had lived in U.N.R.R.A. camps since the war.

These two groups were not equated (as were the two groups of offenders discussed in the preceding paragraphs), but they were all of the same sex, citizenship, nationality¹ and religion, and came from similar districts in Poland and similar types of community. The educational level of the delinquents was, however, lower than that of the control group, even though those tested had a higher intelligence and better education than the majority of delinquents, who failed in the intelligence test and were unable to cope with the personality tests. The difference in age was considerable, the average age of the prison group being twenty-two years and that of the control group being twenty-nine years; but in intelligence the difference was very slight, the prison group having an average IQ only two points lower than the control.

The distribution of professions was similar in both groups, the majority being craftsmen and industrial workers, or students of elementary schools whose parents were craftsmen. But the percentage of agricultural workers in the prison group exceeded that in the U.N.R.R.A. group (20 per cent and 9 per cent respectively), while the prison group contained no students from secondary schools or universities, nor clerks, artists, journalists, etc., who made up 35 per cent of the U.N.R.R.A. group.²

Thus the prison group was, on the whole, younger, less well educated, and of lower socio-economic status than the control group of Displaced Persons. However, as will be shown in the discussion on the effect of intelligence and social status on the P.F.S. score, this difference is not considered to have invalidated the results.

(b) *The grouping of the scores*

As the samples compared are not equal in size, one consisting of only fifteen subjects, the other of fifty-seven, it seems advisable to compare the data as percentages of the scores, and not as actual figures.

¹ On the distinction between the term 'citizenship' and 'nationality', see footnote, Part I, page 35.

² There were some offenders with secondary or university education in the Stadelheim prison, but all of them had had concentration camp experience.

TABLE IX

P.F.S. scores of delinquent and non-delinquent D.P. samples, grouped according to the direction of aggression

<i>Sample</i>	<i>No. of Subjects</i>	<i>%E</i>	<i>%I</i>	<i>%M</i>
Polish offenders from industry and agriculture	15	62.3	16.3	21.4
Polish D.P.s from industry (Kempten)	18	46.7	24.0	29.3
Polish D.P.s from agriculture (Kempten)	18	53.9	21.4	24.7
Polish D.P.s from industry and agriculture (Murnau)	21	49.5	25.0	25.5

It can be seen from the above table that in all groups there are slightly more impunitive than intro-punitive responses, the extrapunitive responses being most frequent. As the percentage of extrapunitive responses increases, the percentages of both intro- and impunitive responses decrease. The group deported to forced labour in agriculture suffered more oppression than those deported to industrial centres and they are also slightly more extrapunitive. But the group of offenders composed of seven subjects with experience of hard labour in agriculture and of eight subjects from industry is still more extrapunitive. When we compare the percentage of extrapunitive responses of the prison group, with that of all the other groups taken together, and representing the 'normal' D.P. population from industry and agriculture to obtain the following figures:

TABLE X

Percentage of extrapunitive responses in delinquent and non-delinquent D.P. samples with the same background of displacement

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>	<i>Percentage of Extrapunitive Responses</i>
Polish offenders from industry and agriculture	15	62.266
Polish D.P.s from industry and agriculture	57	50.002

Thus our data suggest that delinquents are more extrapunitive than non-delinquents with similar backgrounds. We shall see later that this difference is statistically significant.

As a next step it seems appropriate to compare the data as percentages, and see what proportion of the responses of the delinquent and non-delinquent samples are preoccupied with the problem of the frustrating obstacle (obstacle-dominance), with the

problem of guilt and personality integration (ego-defence), and with that of the frustrated need and the solution of the conflict situation (need-persistence). The data are presented in the following table:

TABLE XI

P.F.S. scores of delinquent and non-delinquent D.P. samples, grouped according to the type of reaction

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>	% O-D	% E-D	% N-P
Polish offenders from industry and agriculture	15	17.9	54.1	27.9
Polish D.P.s from industry (Kempten)	18	13.3	49.6	37.1
Polish D.P.s from agriculture (Kempten)	18	13.1	57.4	29.5
Polish D.P.s from industry and agriculture (Murnau)	21	20.2	48.8	31.0

We can see from this table that the percentages vary slightly, but that there is no definite tendency for the delinquent group to exhibit any type of reaction more frequently than the non-delinquent groups.

The ego-defensive reaction is most frequent in all the groups, but this is in accordance with Rosenzweig's figures obtained for normal American subjects (569). Thus the analysis of the type of reaction brings no evidence of positive, or negative, association between delinquency and any type of reaction.

The next table gives a summary of the P.F.S. scores in detail. The actual scores for each individual are given in the Appendix.

TABLE XII

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of delinquent and non-delinquent D.P. samples in detail, expressed in percentages. Group P denotes 15 subjects from industry and agriculture, tested in prison; group I denotes 18 subjects from industry tested in Kempten; group A denotes 18 subjects from agriculture tested in Kempten; group AI denotes 21 subjects from industry and agriculture tested in Murnau

	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Total
P	13.1	31.1	4.1	12.3	5.7	0.0	0.4	4.9	7.8	0.0	3.7	10.2	6.1	0.4	100
I	6.9	21.3	4.6	13.3	0.9	0.6	4.6	7.5	10.1	1.4	5.5	10.4	13.0	0.0	100
A	8.8	28.7	5.3	10.8	1.8	0.6	4.4	5.8	10.5	0.0	3.5	12.3	7.6	0.0	100
AI	11.4	19.3	3.5	13.6	3.5	3.3	4.6	6.5	6.8	2.7	4.1	11.4	8.4	0.5	100

We can see from the table above that although, broadly speaking, the delinquent group is more extrapunitive, and less intro- and impunitive than all the control groups, the differences in detail scores are less impressive, and the frequencies are too low to apply tests of significance with any reliability. We can only speak of certain tendencies, suggestive, but too weak to give evidence amounting to scientific proof.

The trends of the delinquent group are:

A tendency to perceive ambiguous social situations as frustrating the subject, with the emphasis on the frustrating obstacle, while minimizing the frustration caused by him to others (Symbol E'); on the other hand the delinquent never regards frustration as beneficial to him (Symbol I'), and rarely as unimportant (Symbol M').

A reluctance to admit guilt and blame oneself (Symbol I very infrequent).

A reluctance to admit that any situation is 'super-ego blocking', or, in other words, a reluctance to admit that the subject can be accused at all. Instead of stressing the extenuating circumstances in such situations (Symbol I), or even simply denying his guilt (Symbol E) the delinquent either attacks and accuses others (Symbol E), or denies his guilt *and* accuses others (a frequent combination in the responses classed e²).

Delinquents less frequently than others express the hope that their needs will be satisfied and their problems solved in the course of time, they rarely express the impunitive type of optimism (Symbol m), but rather tend to think that something must be done to satisfy their needs. This finding tends to contradict Berdyaev's somewhat sweeping statement that 'pessimism is a profounder attitude to life and shows a greater sensitivity to suffering and evil' (66, p. 114). Delinquency can hardly exemplify a 'profounder' attitude to life, while sensitivity to one's own suffering tends to be negatively associated with sensitivity to the suffering of others. On the other hand our figures tend to corroborate Alexander's view that 'Frustration with hope is a constructive factor of life; without hope, it is destructive' (18). An article by G. W. Hartmann (315), discussing frustration phenomena in the social and political sphere, is worth noting here as it gives a good illustration of the effects of a partial (but not a complete) thwarting in the pattern of political frustration in American democracy.

As to the question *who* should solve the problem and satisfy the subject's needs my material is inconclusive. Control groups of Displaced Persons as often as delinquents want their needs to be satisfied by somebody else (Symbol e), and they are as unwilling to take the responsibility themselves (Symbol i).

This result requires some comment. Even in measurements of other attitudes Displaced Persons living in U.N.R.R.A. barracks

could not very well represent 'normality', as neither their former experience nor their present situation were completely normal. But in respect of the problem of responsibility for the satisfaction of needs the situation of Displaced Persons was so unusual as to invalidate their usefulness as controls for my prison population.

At the time this research was conducted the principle of the U.N.R.R.A. policy seemed to be (in spite of not a few assertions to the contrary) that this organization should satisfy all the needs of Displaced Persons without the slightest effort on their part. The extent to which these needs were, in fact, satisfied was never very great: there was overcrowding, several families often sleeping in one room, and there was undernourishment, understandable in view of the general shortage of food in Germany. But the main feature of the situation was neither undernourishment nor overcrowding, but the principle that it is up to U.N.R.R.A. to provide food and barracks, and that Displaced Persons themselves can do nothing about it. No Displaced Person could ever become an U.N.R.R.A. official with full rights, responsibilities, and salary. He could start no profitable work outside the U.N.R.R.A. camp, and working in the camp simply did not pay, as he was given the same rations in any case. He could not emigrate. There was only one decision left to him, to return to his own country, despite his deeply rooted fear of another foreign domination, and of another deportation, this time perhaps for ever. Whatever the objective basis for these fears, they were present when this research was conducted; and so the Displaced Persons remained in their barracks expecting U.N.R.R.A. to provide for them (attitude e), and unwilling to decide anything for themselves or to take responsibilities which could only make their situation more exasperating.

It may well be that the delinquents did not differ from 'normal' Displaced Persons in respect of the attitudes 'e' and 'i' *not* because they are similar to the normal population in this respect, but because the attitudes of Displaced Persons in general were so strongly affected by the situation described above.

The results of comparing the delinquent group with the controls in the *number of subjects* with strong extrapunitive tendencies may be seen in Table XIII.

It will be seen that in the prison group the number of subjects with less than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses is comparatively small, while in the control groups it is larger, and varies according to the former level of oppression. In all the prison group contains only 13 per cent subjects with less than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses while the D.P. group contains 44 per cent such subjects,

TABLE XIII

Delinquent and non-delinquent subjects with more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>		<i>Percentage of Subjects</i>	
	<i>E > 50 %</i>	<i>E < 50 %</i>	<i>E > 50 %</i>	<i>E < 50 %</i>
Delinquents, industry and agriculture	13	2	87	13
Non-delinquents, industry (Kempten)	9	9	50	50
Non-delinquents, agriculture (Kempten)	11	7	61	39
Non-delinquents, industry and agriculture (Murnau)	12	9	57	43
Non-delinquents, industry and agriculture (all D.P. camps)	32	25	56	44

the types of displacement being equated. The significance of this trend has been tested elsewhere with positive results.

When comparing the two equated samples of the prison population we modified our procedure by discarding all 'mixed answers', thus comparing the two groups in respect of the direction of their more concentrated forms of aggression. We concluded then that the modification did not change the results: samples that were equal in respect of all forms of aggression taken together were also equal in respect of its more concentrated form. But the delinquent and non-delinquent groups we are now considering are not equal in the general direction of aggression. We shall see, therefore, whether the difference between these groups will prove greater or smaller when we disregard the mixed answers as we did before.

TABLE XIV

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of delinquent and non-delinquent subjects, grouped according to the direction of aggression, with mixed answers excluded

	<i>E</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>% E</i>
Delinquents, industry and agriculture	176	32	51	67.95
Non-delinquents, industry (Kempten)	166	89	100	46.76
Non-delinquents, agriculture (Kempten)	195	73	80	56.03
Non-delinquents, industry and agriculture (Murnau)	202	98	92	51.53

This table shows that all the differences between the groups are greater than in Table IX. The delinquent group, particularly, has become more extrapunitive.

As the former modification proved fruitful, we shall proceed further in the same direction and disregard the two additional

scoring variants *E* and *I*. Thus we shall get rid of all doubtful cases. The results are as follows:

TABLE XV

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of delinquent and non-delinquent subjects, grouped according to the direction of the most explicit aggression

	E	I	M	% E
Delinquents, industry and agriculture	166	20	51	70.042
Non-delinquents, industry (Kempten)	150	63	100	47.923
Non-delinquents, agriculture (Kempten)	177	53	80	57.097
Non-delinquents, industry and agriculture (Murnau)	189	74	92	53.239

We can see that the more we restrict our investigation to the most explicit forms of aggression, the greater becomes the difference between our delinquent and control groups. With the modifications of procedure introduced above, our delinquent group becomes still more clearly extrapunitive, and the intropunitive tendencies gradually disappear. It appears that the delinquents were able to direct some portion of aggression inwards, when, within the same situation, at least some portion of it was directed outwards or repressed (in mixed answers, and in *E* and *I* responses). But when the delinquent directs all his aggression in one direction, it is almost exclusively outwards and very rarely inwards. If we disregard the cases in which aggression is not expressed (group M), only 10.7 per cent goes inwards and nearly 90 per cent outwards.

χ^2 calculated for the prison group and all the central groups taken together gives the highly significant figure of 18.1756. There are two degrees of freedom and any figure above 9.210 means that the probability of the difference being due to sampling errors would be less than one in a hundred ($P < .01$).

(c) *Scores of extrapuniteness and measures of significance*

The evidence given in the preceding paragraphs supports the hypothesis that delinquents deviate from the normal, i.e. balanced personality structure, by a stronger tendency to direct aggression outwards. In other words it appears that delinquents are more extrapunitive than non-delinquents, even when the latter group is composed of individuals who cannot claim to represent 'normality' or 'balance', but may themselves be suspected of some deviation in the same direction. As we know, our control groups have been subjected to several years of oppressive frustration. Both theoretical considerations and actual evidence already presented, suggest that the degree of extrapuniteness of all Displaced Persons may be increased because of their experiences.

It has also been found that the difference between delinquents and non-delinquents in the most explicit forms of aggression is apparently greater than when this aggression is diffused.

Here we shall try to see whether our material can provide evidence, amounting to scientific proof, that delinquents are definitely more extrapunitive than non-delinquents. Instead of restricting the measurement of aggression to its most explicit forms, we shall take all the scoring categories of the P.F.S. into account. Thus if we find that our delinquent group differs significantly from non-delinquent controls we shall not be accused of making an overestimate. It will be an underestimate, as firstly, the difference in respect of the most explicit forms of aggression should be greater; and secondly, the difference between delinquents and non-delinquents not subjected to the influence of oppression should be greater.

The significance of the difference between our delinquent and non-delinquent D.P. samples was calculated as follows:

Each individual was given a score of extrapuniteness. This score was the amount of extrapunitive responses expressed as a percentage of the subject's total number of responses. Thus if a subject gave twenty-four responses, of which twelve were extrapunitive, and twelve intro- and/or impulsive, his score of extrapuniteness would be fifty (denoting 50 per cent extrapunitive responses).

The individual scores of extrapuniteness for the delinquent group with a background of displacement in industry or agriculture were as follows:

91
68
72
67
57
50
41
42
57
62
61
56
72
70
68

Total = 934

Thus the sum of the delinquents' scores is 934. The sum of the scores of controls with experience of forced labour in industry or agriculture is 2,851. The mean score of the delinquent group is 62.2666, that of the controls 50.0175. The difference between the two means is 12.2491. The squares of the Standard Errors were

calculated as 10.8238 and 3.3148 respectively. The number of subjects in the two groups differed widely, and a significant difference between the two variances would invalidate the use of the 't' test. The two variances were therefore tested by the L_1 test and found not to differ significantly. Therefore the Standard Error of the difference between the two means was calculated. This is 3.7599, and the Critical Ratio ('t') is therefore 3.2576.

There are 70 degrees of freedom. Any value of t above 2.65 means therefore (Garrett, 271) that the probability of our two samples differing only through sampling accidents is less than 0.01. With a 't' as great as 3.2617 it can be claimed that the difference is statistically highly significant.

(d) *General observations*

This investigation of delinquent and non-delinquent groups, using the Picture-Frustration Study, has produced some quantitative results which might be presented in numbers rather than in words, and which could be elaborated statistically in a way which would allow of 'proving' or 'disproving' some hypothesis. Thus a general hypothesis of the association between strong extrapunitive tendencies and delinquency appears to be confirmed, but, in fact, the evidence on minor points is merely suggestive. The limitations of material did not allow of my drawing definite conclusions as to the particular strength of various forms of extrapuniteness in the delinquent population. I have not been able to prove that delinquents are more prone than the rest of the population to perceive ambiguous social situations as frustrating them but beneficial to others; nor that they are particularly reluctant to take responsibility; nor that they want their needs to be satisfied by others. Also the data on the tendency to deny their guilt altogether and to accuse others, instead of merely stressing the extenuating circumstances, is merely suggestive, not conclusive. The need for further research cannot be sufficiently stressed.

This evidence, however, though inconclusive, is not completely worthless. It has partly confirmed certain observations made before the statistical investigation was carried out, and partly clarified certain issues by indicating the mechanism of some psychological phenomena which had not been clearly understood.

It is, in particular, relevant to various observations I made while interviewing Displaced Persons in prisons in the course of the present research; and also to my experiences while interviewing prisoners in the course of other research projects in criminology, and in connection with my work at the Warsaw Bar before the war.

While at the Bar I noted the frequent tendency of defendants before conviction, and of convicted prisoners, to evade the im-

mediate problem of their offence, and to indulge in accusations of the plaintiff, of the public prosecutor, of the witnesses, of the police, of the prison administration, etc. One of the difficulties of the defending counsel in preparing the case with his client is often 'to come to the point', when 'the point' in the eye of the lawyer is the offence, but in the eye of his client is the fact that the *others* are guilty, whether their guilt has any connection with the alleged offence or not. This tendency is, of course, not so clear in the case of more sophisticated subjects who are well versed in the ways of speaking to lawyers.

In criminological research, where the offence is not the main point of investigation and may not even be mentioned by the tactful examiner, this tendency is still clearer. In the German prisons I visited, the character of the offence committed was mentioned by the subjects only when they wanted to discuss the legal possibility of appeal. Instead they criticized the Germans, the prison administration, the American administration of justice, the welfare authorities, and behaviour of the Great Powers in solving political problems.

I could not but agree with many of the remarks. Perhaps I am displaying extrapunitiveness myself but I am far from idealizing either the political or the administrative decisions which affected the Displaced Persons in Germany. I am largely affected by them myself and so, in a greater degree, were the Displaced Persons I tested in U.N.R.R.A. camps. I could not expect to make them believe that it is in accordance with the highest principles of justice that having 'won' the war, they cannot safely go home, but instead are forced to stay in the country in which they had been brutally oppressed and often sadistically ill treated. The prisoner's resentment against the Germans is understandable and we cannot expect him to enjoy being under German guards again, after the liberation.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that most, if not all, the prisoners were arrested and imprisoned by the American authorities for behaviour which is generally considered antisocial and morally wrong; and that, in the expressed opinion of the prisoner, this behaviour—if admitted at all—was completely justified. With one exception only (that of a young man, convicted for having caused a car accident through careless driving, who appeared to be more upset by this incident than by his sentence), practically all the attitudes displayed in interviews would be scored as 'E', 'E', 'E', and 'e', or as some combination of them. What was merely suggestive in test results, was striking in the actual behaviour.

For instance, I spoke to a group of men, eventually convicted of stealing a large quantity of butter from a public store. They all

denied their guilt¹ with impressive passion and power of persuasion (attitude *E*), but in addition they claimed that such a large quantity of butter should never have been stored. It should have been 'given to the people'. They gave the impression that it was the authorities, not they, who stole the butter from 'the people' (attitude *E/E*).

In another case (of robbery with murder: '*Raub-mord*' by an Ukrainian), the facts were not mentioned by the subject, but he made the general remark that killing one German is only just and inadequate retribution for the killing of millions of people by the Germans during the war.

These cases were not exceptional and, in my experience, they are not confined to Displaced Persons held in German prisons. In other prisons and in court I have met a similar state of mind. The evidence of the P.F.S. research only makes my former observations more meaningful. In particular the use of the test and its scoring categories gave me a better understanding of various problems I encountered during my practice at the Bar before the war. I refer to these personal questions because they throw light on the problem under investigation.

A question which puzzled me for some time, but which can be explained in the light of the theory accepted in this research, concerned the attitude of defendants towards basing the defence on extenuating circumstances.

Often, when pointing out extenuating circumstances, I noticed that the judges² took careful notes and looked impressed, but my client looked disgusted. When the sentence pronounced was more lenient than would normally be expected, the defendant felt that he was 'lucky' and that the judge was not 'too bad', but no credit was given to counsel. That the judge quoted defending counsel's argument when expounding the grounds for the reduction of the sentence seemed, in the mind of the defendant, to be an argument against rather than for his lawyer. The only verdict based on the defence that the defendant wished to hear was 'not guilty', even though realizing the weakness of his case, he himself had pleaded guilty.

Speaking in psycho-analytic terms, we might say that, as I wished to impress the judge and not the client, I identified myself with the judge too much to please the client. In cases where the question of guilt was open to no doubt, especially when the defendant had already pleaded guilty, I usually assumed the attitude scored '*T*'—admitting guilt but stressing the extenuating circumstances. This attitude could be considered reasonable, and I was

¹ I afterwards saw the report of this case. They were caught red-handed.

² There was no jury in Poland, and only professional magistrates with legal training sat in court.

sometimes complimented by judges for having made an able defence. But the attitude of my client was rarely that of 'I'—even if he pleaded guilty. On the conscious level he was preoccupied with the problem of reducing his sentence, and realized that pleading guilty was the only method of doing so. But unconsciously he had a far more important problem to face—that of personality integration and of ego-defence. Emotionally he did not plead guilty at all—he denied his guilt and wanted to gain strength by identifying himself with his counsel, who would not only deny guilt (attitude *E*), but would be bold enough to attack the prosecution (attitude *E*). To satisfy their unconscious needs the less sophisticated defendants preferred a different type of defending counsel.

At the beginning of my practice at the Bar I saw the performance of one of the most successful lawyers financially in the district. He made constant aggressive digressions, was frequently told by the judge to come to the point and was often so abusive towards the prosecutor and the witnesses that the judge had to intervene; indeed the whole defence was usually no defence at all, but merely a constant fierce attack. The judges were obviously annoyed and the sentences were at least as heavy as usual. But, in the opinion of the defendants, this was because the prosecutor and judges were very 'nasty' and the witnesses lied, whilst the defending counsel was the only man who was perfectly right—he satisfied the emotional needs of his clients.

'Common sense' would suggest that delinquents either often feel guilty—since they break moral and legal rules they 'should' feel guilty—or that at least they are 'conditioned' to deny their guilt, or to stress extenuating circumstances. In other words they would be expected to display attitudes *I*, *I*, and *E*.

Both the evidence of the Picture-Frustration Study and my observations of offenders' spontaneous behaviour are against such speculations. The attitudes of *I*, *I*, and *E* are apparently inadequate for the delinquent's ego-defence. He seeks stronger measures, those of attack and contra-accusation.

Similarly, one might think that a man in prison would consider the mildly frustrating situations of ordinary life as relatively bearable. So he does when he compares the conditions of *others* with his own frustrating situation in the prison. But when he is presented with the standardized mildly frustrating situations of the test, and considers them as if he were affected by them personally, he displays none of the philosophical attitude we might expect of him. He considers the situations deeply frustrating, even when others do not.

In interview situations the prisoners I investigated displayed their attitudes more dramatically than in the test, but one might feel that they had very good reasons to be dramatic. Certainly they

felt bitterly about their own situation, but it would obviously be very unpleasant for anybody. One might similarly find justification for many of their critical remarks about the prison administration, U.N.R.R.A., the military government, and other authorities. The value of the test, however, was not only that it made possible the translating of certain attitudes into numbers, dealing with them in statistical machines, and finally producing a mathematical proof of certain hypotheses. There was the further merit that, while in interviews or by direct observation we see prisoners' reactions to their actual situations, which cannot be compared with those of free people, the test situations are standardized, and therefore comparable. Even in these standardized situations certain attitudes persisted among the prisoners and some proved significantly more frequent than among their non-delinquent controls. When we observed their behaviour in the specific situation of the prison, the trends in the test were greatly magnified.

Chapter 6

THE PICTURE-FRUSTRATION STUDY OF THE LEVEL OF OPPRESSION

I. THE STUDY OF THE EQUATED SAMPLES

(a) *Introductory remarks*

In the preceding chapter we dealt with evidence supporting the hypothesis of an association between strong extrapunitive tendencies and delinquency. It was found that when faced with standardized social situations of the Picture-Frustration Study delinquents differ significantly from non-delinquents in the proportion of aggression turned outwards. In other words we have seen that strong extrapunitive tendencies, measured by the P.F.S., may be symptomatic of the antisocial behaviour pattern, exemplified by the group of delinquents tested in German prisons under American jurisdiction. We have also seen that the high level of oppression exemplified by the D.P. ex-prisoners of concentration camps, produces an extraordinarily high rate of delinquency, forty-five times higher than do the lower levels of oppression. Incidental evidence showed that the two lower levels of oppression—deportation to industry and agriculture—do not produce a uniform pattern of responses in the P.F.S.; but that deportation to forced labour in agriculture produced more extrapunitive tendencies than the relatively milder deportation to industrial centres, where certain human rights—of pay, working hours, food rations, etc.—were maintained.

We can therefore summarize the evidence obtained, and that still to be called from the study of equated samples of Displaced Persons in U.N.R.R.A. camps, which will be my subject of the present chapter:

We know that a higher level of oppression produces a higher rate of delinquency; we have some indication that it also produces stronger extrapunitive tendencies, but we have to make a more detailed analysis of this problem, and to see whether the differences are significant;

if we can produce evidence that higher levels of oppression produce significantly stronger extrapunitive tendencies, we shall already know the meaning of this finding, since we know that strong extrapuniteness is associated with antisocial behaviour. We cannot say that all extrapunitive individuals are necessarily antisocial, but we have seen that their type of reaction to frustration is typical of the delinquent. There may, of course, be numerous cases in which strong extrapunitive tendencies will not lead to delinquency, but to other expressions of aggression directed outwards. Delinquency is only one of these expressions.¹

To investigate the second point, equated samples of the Displaced Persons population were tested in the same experimental situation. The testing took place approximately one year after the liberation. During this year all Displaced Persons had lived in the controlled conditions of welfare camps, subject to the same environment, and facing the same personal and political problems.

There were seven such samples.

1. Three equated samples of men, tested in Kempten, representing three levels of oppression: forced labour in industry, forced labour in agriculture, and concentration camps.

2. Two equated samples of men:

- (a) representing backgrounds of labour in either industry or agriculture (in the proportion 10:11);
- (b) representing a background of imprisonment in concentration camps.

3. Two equated samples of women:

- (a) with backgrounds of industry or agriculture;
- (b) with a background of concentration camps.

The group of women was smaller than intended, since it was difficult to find many women with concentration camp experience in the districts I visited in Germany. In addition, any group of Polish women with concentration camp experience could be said to have undergone a process of self-selection, and therefore not to be comparable with other women, although fully equated in all but this one particular. This point perhaps requires further explanation.

As indicated before (Chapter 2), Polish males deported to con-

¹ We may also expect many extrapunitive subjects to indulge in antisocial behaviour that is not punishable by law. Bergman (70) goes as far as to say that choosing a sample of the criminal population in the prison is 'as if one sampled businessmen from among those appearing at a bankruptcy court'. He claims that 'the typical criminal of our times is not to be found in the penal institutions. He comes [. . .] from smoothly functioning organizations that maintain close and mutually satisfying contacts with politicians and with members of the judiciary. He keeps himself and his colleagues out of trouble.' Perhaps that statement is true for some countries—but if so, the 'typical criminal' can never be tested there.

centration camps were not selected on the basis of certain behavioural characteristics, as delinquency, or resistance against the occupant. In Poland the Germans conducted a policy of extermination and practically the whole Polish population followed a policy of active or passive resistance. In effect, comparatively few Poles arrested specifically for active resistance had any chance of surviving in concentration camps. The great majority, over 90 per cent in the unanimous opinion of the leaders of the organizations of former political prisoners, of the men liberated from these camps at the end of the war consisted of people who had just had the 'bad luck' to be deported. Generally, when a German was shot in Poland, no culprits were found, but the whole male population of the district, block of houses, or streets of the town, was deported to the camps. In another town an arrested teacher escaped—so all the teachers were deported to the camps, etc. When, on the other hand, Germany experienced shortages of labour in industry or agriculture, the necessary contingent was surrounded, put into trains, and directed to the places of 'milder' levels of oppression.¹ As a result of this policy concentration camps contained Polish males who were not temperamentally different from other Poles. If we now find that they are different, they were *made* so in the camps.

In respect of Polish women we cannot make such an assumption. Although a great number of Polish women got into concentration camps accidentally, and represent therefore a random population, a much larger percentage of women than of men were arrested for individual reasons. Whether they were arrested for taking part in the resistance movement, for helping people in the underground movement or 'Home Army', for moving in circles connected with this movement, for having broken special regulations imposed by the Germans, or for having committed ordinary criminal offences or prostitution—is immaterial. If there was any special reason for the arrest of individuals, they cannot represent a random population any more than could the delinquents tested in German prisons—very few, if any, got into prison accidentally.

In general the different treatment of women by the Germans expressed itself in two directions: when a woman was caught for having indulged in any illegal activity she was often dealt with

¹ See also official Polish documents and publications (81, 95, 139, 147, 180, 186, 332, 504, 525). In particular in a publication of the Polish Underground Movement (139) the organization of 'traps' for encircling and arresting random population is described. Nobody knew whether the purpose of any given hunt was to supply manual power for Germany's industry or farms, or deportation to concentration camps. A case of escape from a train is described (p. 12); immediately afterwards a neighbouring village was surrounded and a necessary number of peasants arrested to complete the number of prisoners prescribed for the transport.

more leniently, and only sent to a concentration camp when a man would be shot; when the Germans arrested people *en masse* (as a retributive measure, or any other reason) they often deported to concentration camps a random group of men but not of women, who were either set free or deported to forced labour. Consequently there were fewer women in the camps, and a large proportion of them were probably specially selected for some good, or bad, reason.¹

During the years since the liberation (spring 1945) all the groups of Displaced Persons were affected to some extent by the process of repatriation, and by members of the underground movement joining the Polish forces in the West.

Although on the face of it it would appear that those defections would prejudice the random distribution of the Displaced Persons population, in fact their influence was very slight, and even rather beneficial from the research point of view, as our samples became less affected by any process of self-selection and consequently more representative of a random population.

The repatriation to Poland had not yet reached its peak at the time of testing. There was some propaganda but comparatively little pressure, which started in earnest in August 1946, shortly after this research had been completed. Those who had been repatriated, as well as those who were still considering, did not feel, as far as I could judge, that their decision had a political character. It was usually not even a question of temperament. In the numerous interviews I held during this research the problem of repatriation was constantly worrying Polish Displaced Persons, but the basis of decision was mainly outside their influence. If anybody found his wife in Poland and had a letter saying that the house was not bombed, that his family was waiting for him—he went back although he did not feel any particular love for the Russians or Communists. If the situation was less favourable at home, or if he found members of his family in Germany, in Great Britain, or other countries of the West, he decided not to repatriate,

¹ The fact that Polish women underwent a process of selection, while the male population was allocated to different types of displacement more or less at random, was not confined to concentration camps. Similarly in Kempten I had no difficulty in matching three groups of men, one from industry, one from agriculture, and the third from concentration camps. In the case of the women I not only failed to form an adequate sample of the ex-concentration camp population, but could not even form two matched samples from industry and agriculture, although the number of Polish women deported to both these groups was considerable. As indicated before, women from industry were older, and had a better education and urban background, as compared with women from agriculture. That a certain amount of selection was applied by the Germans to women, as opposed to men, was confirmed in interviews by subjects of both sexes.

but emigrate. As emigration from Germany was practically impossible at the time of the investigation, he stayed in the U.N.R.R.A. camp and waited. Similarly waiting were those whose family situation was not clear—letters from home either non-existent, or not very encouraging, their families dispersed, etc. Every letter from home was read aloud to groups of friends, and widely commented upon.

Finally, if the decision to repatriate or to join the Polish Army in the West was not accidental, but based on certain temperamental factors, political attitudes, membership of the Home Army or of the Communist Party, etc.—it affected *all the samples* representing different levels of oppression *in the same way*. If there were more members of the Home Army or more Communists in the concentration camp group than in the industry or agricultural groups, more of them left U.N.R.R.A. camps and went eastwards or westwards. Those who remained in the camps were therefore even more likely to represent a random population as the selected individuals had gone. If there were more Communists in the industry group, they were entirely free to go to Poland and so they probably went.

Thus, if repatriation and joining the Polish forces affected the composition of the equated samples at all, it affected them in a positive way, correcting the existing differences, not increasing them as might have been feared.¹

In the end all the samples of male Displaced Persons could be considered random samples with the extreme cut off. In the case of women, the concentration camp group cannot claim to represent the general population, as the women in the concentration camps were not selected at random.

But even this selected sample had been influenced by the process of repatriation, etc., which had cut the extreme cases off. It was therefore at least partly corrected. Those women with concentration camp experience that I studied in the U.N.R.R.A. camps were at least more representative of the general population than those whom one found in welfare centres immediately after the liberation.

From the above considerations it is assumed that any differences in the responses tabled below will, in the case of males, represent only the influence of the type of displacement. In the case of

¹ This process of correction was particularly active in the samples of women who were more affected by the process of self-selection and where this correction was much more needed. Thus concentration camps contained a number of prostitutes sent there for having broken certain regulations. But in my study I encountered no prostitutes—neither in the ex-concentration camp group nor in the others. There was such a boom in this trade, with the Occupation Forces, that they soon left U.N.R.R.A. camps and were inaccessible for research purposes.

women, any difference will represent this influence increased or decreased by the original self-selection of the two samples, for which not even the most exact matching in age, intelligence, education, social status, etc., can offer adequate remedy.

(b) *Scores grouped according to the direction of aggression*

All the scores of individual subjects have been grouped according to direction of aggression, and totalled. Then all the individual scores, grouped as above, were added up for each sample of the D.P. population. The tables below give the final totals for each sample.

TABLE XVI

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of D.P. samples in Kempton, grouped according to the direction of aggression

Sample	No. of Subjects	No. of Responses			Percentage of Responses		
		E	I	M	E	I	E
Polish men from industry	18	192	101	118	46.7	24.0	29.3
Polish men from agriculture	18	233	89	102	53.9	21.3	24.8
Polish men from concentration camps	18	246	63	68	65.3	16.7	18.0

It can be seen from the above table that the higher the level of oppression the higher the proportion of extrapunitive responses and the lower the proportion of both intro- and impunitive responses. Although there are some individual variations (see Appendix) the general positive association between extrapunitiveness and level of oppression, as well as the negative association of both intro- and impunitiveness with oppression, are clearly visible. It will be seen later that this trend is statistically significant.

The same data for the Murnau groups are as follows:

TABLE XVII

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of D.P. male samples in Murnau, grouped according to the direction of aggression

Sample	No. of Subjects	No. of Responses			Percentage of Responses		
		E	I	M	E	I	M
Polish men from industry and agriculture	21	253	128	130	49.5	25.0	25.5
Polish men from concentration camps	21	299	71	94	64.4	15.3	20.3

It can be seen that the proportion of extra-, intro- and impunitive responses in the Murnau group of mixed subjects, with experience of forced labour in industry and agriculture, corresponds almost exactly to the averages between the responses of these two groups, treated separately in Kempten. The proportions of responses of the three types of aggression in the Murnau concentration camp sample are very close to the proportions of the Kempten sample. Thus it is apparent that the differences between U.N.R.R.A. camps are negligible, but the differences between groups of people representing different levels of former oppression are considerable and comparatively stable.

The fact that the differences between samples representing different levels of oppression are approximately the same in different U.N.R.R.A. camps is very important. It means that they are probably real, and do not merely occur by chance. The mathematical proof of the significance of these differences will be produced later on.

The data for the two samples of women are as follows:

TABLE XVIII

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of D.P. female samples in Murnau, grouped according to the direction of aggression

Sample	No. of Subjects	No. Responses			Percentage of Responses		
		E	I	M	E	I	M
Polish women from industry and agriculture	13	145	72	79	49.0	24.3	26.7
Polish women from concentration camps	13	185	58	66	59.9	18.8	21.4

It can be seen that although here we are comparing subjects of a different sex, and although our equated samples consist of one random group, and one group that is partly-random, partly-selected on the basis of certain behavioural characteristics, the general trends are the same as in the male samples. Women from concentration camps are again more extrapunitive, less intro- and impunitive than women deported to industry or agriculture.

(c) *Scores grouped according to the type of reaction*

The P.F.S. scores grouped according to type of reaction are presented in the following tables:

TABLE XIX

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of the Polish male samples in Kempton, grouped according to the type of reaction

Sample	Subjects	No. of Responses				Percentage of Responses		
		O-D	E-D	N-D	Total	O-D	E-D	N-P
Men from industry	18	45	168	126	339	13.3	49.6	37.1
Men from agriculture	18	44	193	99	336	13.1	57.4	29.5
Men from concentration camps	18	54	196	78	328	16.5	59.7	23.8

As far as we can see, there is a slight tendency towards increase in ego-defence and decreased need-persistence as we raise the level of frustration. In relation to obstacle dominance there are variations but no definite trend.

χ^2 was calculated to see whether these tendencies are statistically significant. The calculation was as follows (expected frequencies in brackets):

	O-D	E-D	N-P	Total
Men from industry	45 (48.34)	168 (188.25)	126 (102.41)	339
Men from agriculture	44 (47.91)	193 (186.58)	99 (101.51)	336
Men from concentration camps	54 (46.77)	196 (182.14)	78 (99.08)	328
	143	557	303	1003
$\chi^2 = 15.1024$				

There are four degrees of freedom. χ^2 is therefore significant at the 0.01 level and we can conclude that at least some of the differences between the samples are not merely accidental, but show a definite trend.

This evidence is supported by the data obtained for the male subjects in Murnau-Weilheim district:

TABLE XX

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of the Polish male samples in Murnau, grouped according to the type of reaction

Sample	No. of Subjects	No. of Responses				Percentage of Responses		
		O-D	E-D	N-P	Total	O-D	E-D	N-P
Men from industry and agriculture	21	69	167	106	342	20.2	48.8	31.0
Men from concentration camps	21	56	190	106	352	15.9	54.0	30.1

Here, again, the differences are slight but in the same direction: men from concentration camps are again more ego-defensive and slightly less need-persistent than controls with lower levels of frustration. Only in obstacle dominance does the concentration camp group seem to show the opposite tendency, but in this respect the Kempton data showed no definite trend, but merely slight variations.

TABLE XXI

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of the Polish female samples in Murnau, grouped according to the type of reaction

Sample	No. of Subjects	No. of Responses				Percentage of Responses		
		O-D	E-D	N-P	Total	O-D	E-D	N-P
Women from industry and agriculture	13	37	117	64	218	17.0	53.7	29.3
Women from concentration camps	13	37	113	70	220	16.8	51.4	31.8

It can be seen that in our female population the differences between the samples are smaller than in the male population, and the trends go in the opposite direction: women from concentration camps are slightly less ego-defensive and more need-persistent than the controls.

Can we conclude that under conditions of stress women are less preoccupied with ego-defence and personality integration than are men? Can we say that, instead of ruminating over the problem of guilt, they are more practically preoccupied with the solution of their problems and the satisfaction of their needs? I am afraid that even if we increased the size of our samples and collected data more statistically impressive than the above, such a conclusion would be completely unwarranted. It may very well be that more women were selected for deportation to concentration camps because, even before imprisonment, they were more insistent on the satisfaction of their desires, legally or otherwise. It may be that women with a higher standard of personality integration were more likely to be arrested, and that, under conditions of stress, their need for ego-defence was less pressing than it would have been if the concentration camp population had been selected at random. It must be admitted that all these questions have had to remain unsolved in the face of the inadequate material available in this research.

Some light may be thrown on the tendencies of our subjects by comparison of our data with those obtained by Rosenzweig in the samples of normal American subjects.

TABLE XXII

Based on Rosenzweig's table of Quartiles of the Percentages of the Various Scoring Categories Found Among Normal Subjects (*Journ. Personality*, XIV, 1945, No. 1)

Sample	No. of Subjects	Average		
		O-D	E-D	N-P
Normal Males	100	17	51.5	29.5
Normal Females	50	20	49	30

As far as can be judged from these figures, which are strictly speaking not comparable with ours, there are no striking differences between our samples and the corresponding American samples.¹ Thus in conclusion we can only say, that in our male samples we have noticed a slight positive association between level of oppression and ego-defence, and a slight negative association between level of oppression and need-persistence. This evidence, however, cannot be regarded as conclusive.

(d) *Scores in detail*

Each individual's scores are given in detail in the Appendix. Here we present a summary of the results. The mixed answers which were included in the tables above by simply considering every reaction on its own merits, are given separately here. When a response shows more than one reaction, it is classified as 'mixed' unless both reactions show the same direction of aggression. In this case it is classed e^2 , i^2 , or m^2 respectively. Both 'not clear' and 'faulty' responses, which were excluded from other tables, are given here in separate columns.

TABLE XXIII

Summary of the P.F.S. scores in detail. Group I denotes 18 males with a background of forced labour in industry, group A—in agriculture, and group C—in concentration camps

	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Clr.	Faulty	Total
I	24	74	16	46	3	2	16	26	35	5	19	36	45	0	27	1	3	378
A	30	98	18	37	6	2	15	20	36	0	12	42	26	0	33	3	0	378
C	29	122	11	52	8	5	8	26	16	0	20	29	10	0	17	11	14	378

¹ Rosenzweig has recently published new norms for his test (576), based on a larger sample, but these new norms are almost identical with the old ones. He has also found that in childhood the trend in the development of the direction of aggression is from E to I and M; in the type of reaction the trend is from O-D and E-D to N-P (581). Regarded in that light our results indicate that, in the pattern of reaction to frustrating experiences, oppression leads to regression.

We can see that while not all the differences between the groups are suggestive some of them are, namely:

The higher the level of oppression the greater the tendency to react towards frustration by blaming others (attitude 'E') and the less the tendency to blame oneself (attitude 'I').

In respect of need-persistence the concentration camp subjects tend to require from others the satisfaction of their needs more than either of the other groups; but it is interesting to note that the industrial group, although generally less extrapunitive than the agricultural group, is nevertheless more extrapunitive in this sphere. It should be pointed out that although the level of oppression of the industrial group was in general lower than that of the agricultural sample, in one particular, that of institutionalization, it was closer to the concentration camp group than were the subjects allocated to individual farmers. People deported to industry lived in labour camps while those deported to agriculture were mainly living with individual farmers. To avoid clouding the issue all subjects not allocated to individual farmers were from the beginning excluded from my agricultural samples.¹ Thus people from industry and concentration camps might be compared to children placed in institutions of the oppressive type (the 'institution' of concentration camps being definitely the more oppressive of the two), while our subjects from agriculture might be compared to children put out with very oppressive foster-parents. It may be that all institutions, whether benevolent or oppressive, and to whatever degree, develop in the individual an attitude of demanding, of expectance that all his needs will—or at least should—be satisfied by the institution or by other people. This hypothesis is, of course, only tentative, since our material warrants no definite conclusions in this respect.²

People from concentration camps are more reluctant to take responsibility (attitude 'i') than are the other groups.

They are also less inclined to expect that their problems will be solved and their needs satisfied in the course of time ('optimistic' attitude 'm').

They are less inclined to assume that nobody is guilty in frustrating situations (attitude 'M').

¹ Already before intelligence testing, when establishing displacement history, I asked every subject whether he had been living with and working for the 'Bauer' (the farmer), or on a large estate. As in the latter case his situation would be different (work in large groups, less personal contact with the boss, working hours more or less determined, etc.) he was not included into the 'agriculture' sample at all. Such cases were not very frequent, however.

² On Rorschach test differences between family-reared, institution-reared, and schizophrenic children, see Goldfarb (289). The weakness of his study seems to be insufficient matching of the groups, equated in age only.

They appear to be more egocentric, as they are less inclined to regard a situation from several points of view (less mixed answers), and find it more difficult to change their point of view and see the same situation from another angle, that of a different person (more faulty answers). Thus they are less capable of using their intelligence in conflicting social situations.¹

Before testing any of these tendencies for significance let us see whether they will be confirmed by the data of our Murnau samples:

TABLE XXIV

Summary of the P.F.S. scores in detail. Group IA denotes 21 subjects with background of forced labour in industry or agriculture, group C—in concentration camps

	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faul- Chr.	ty	Total
IA	42	71	13	50	13	12	17	24	25	10	15	42	31	2	59	5	10	44 ^I
C	30	120	13	72	10	8	3	25	13	0	18	29	21	0	47	9	23	44 ^I

We see that all the tendencies which were suggestive in the Kempten samples have reappeared in the Murnau samples. Only the differences between industrial and agricultural groups could not, technically, be tested here since separate samples from industry and from agriculture could not be formed.

In order to apply the χ^2 test of significance all the responses of the subjects from industry and agriculture were lumped together, and all the responses of the subjects from concentration camps were lumped together. We have, therefore, in the calculations below, the responses of fifty-seven subjects from industry and agriculture and of thirty-nine subjects from concentration camps. Each subject in the concentration camp group has one or two (one in Kempten, two in Murnau) controls having similar personal characteristics but a different background of displacement.

Firstly let us see whether the subjects from concentration camps give a significantly different number of extrapunitive ego-defensive responses from those of the controls. χ^2 was calculated to test the distribution of extrapunitive, intropunitive and impunitive responses of the two groups against the null hypothesis (i.e. against the hypothesis that there is no true difference between our two samples in this respect). The calculation was as follows (expected frequencies in brackets):

¹ They also gave more 'not clear' answers, and this may be partly due to the same factor. Some response might not have been clear because the subject did not shift his attention to the point of view of the person whose response he was supposed to give.

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	E	I + M	Total
57 subjects from industry and agriculture	243 (276.07)	168 (134.93)	411
39 subjects from concentration camps	242 (208.93)	69 (102.07)	311
Total	485	237	722

$$\chi^2 = 28.2145$$

Thus χ^2 is highly significant, P is less than 0.001, and the null hypothesis has been disproved. The fact that subjects with a background of detention in concentration camps gave more responses accusing others (E), and less responses admitting guilt (I) or expressing the opinion that nobody is to blame (M), cannot be explained by sampling fluctuations.

Similar are the data for need-persistent reactions:

	e	i + m	Total
57 subjects from industry and agriculture	133 (162.02)	198 (169.98)	331
39 subjects from concentration camps	124 (94.98)	70 (99.02)	194
Total	257	268	525

$$\chi^2 = 27.5534$$

χ^2 is again highly significant and we can conclude that the subjects from concentration camps definitely displayed more often than the controls the demand that their needs should be satisfied by somebody else (e), and less often the impulsive optimistic attitude (m), or the intropulsive willingness to take the responsibility themselves for the solution of the problem (i).

Finally χ^2 was calculated to test the rigidity and egocentricity of the ex-inmates of concentration camps:¹

	Mixed	Faulty	Total
57 subjects from industry and agriculture	119 (103.67)	13 (28.33)	132
39 subjects from concentration camps	64 (79.33)	37 (21.67)	101
Total	183	50	233

$$\chi^2 = 22.8059$$

¹ The reason why these figures give an estimate of rigidity and egocentricity has been given above, in the study of delinquent groups (Chapter 5). It was found that delinquents with concentration camps experience are more rigid and egocentric than other delinquents.

Since some entries are small a correction for continuity were introduced. This figure is again much larger than necessary for significance at the 0.01 level. We can conclude that people affected by the highest level of oppression have become definitely more rigid and egocentric, and less capable of using their intelligence in conflicting social situations.

The summary of the *women's* scores is given in the following table:

TABLE XXV

Summary of the P.F.S. scores in detail. Group IA denotes 13 female subjects with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture, group C—in concentration camps

	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix. Not Faul- Chr. ty	Total		
AI	21	57	11	24	4	7	13	8	21	3	9	28	19	1	36	3	8	273
C	27	61	8	41	12	0	4	17	12	6	10	23	17	0	24	6	5	273

It can be seen even from a superficial examination of the figures above that the differences between the two groups are rather smaller than in case of men, and that they are most marked in different areas of personality than in the case of men.

Thus women from concentration camps do not seem to be particularly more egocentric than the controls (perhaps because women do not become more egocentric in stress situations, but possibly because egocentric women were less likely to be deported to concentration camps). They are also nearly as optimistic as the controls (attitude *m*), while the men were far more pessimistic than their controls.

Suggestive differences are that women from concentration camps are more inclined than the controls to emphasize the frustration suffered, or minimize that inflicted on others (both scored as attitude '*E*'); and are less inclined to minimize the frustration suffered (attitude '*M*') or to accept it as beneficial (attitude '*I*'); they are (similarly to men) more inclined than the controls to blame others (attitude '*E*'), and less inclined to blame themselves (attitude '*I*'), or to assume that nobody is guilty (attitude '*M*'); they more frequently than the controls want others to satisfy their needs, and are more reluctant to take responsibility themselves.

To examine the significance of these differences the χ^2 test was applied to each:

	E'	I'+M'	Total
13 women from industry and agriculture	21 (24.00)	16 (13.00)	37
13 women from concentration camps	27 (24.00)	10 (13.00)	37
Total	48	26	74

A correction for continuity was applied. Thus, $\chi^2 (=1.4824)$ is not significant, and we cannot assume that women from concentration camps are more inclined than their controls to emphasize the frustration suffered, instead of minimizing it or accepting it as beneficial. The following data refer to ego-defence:

	E	I + M	Total
13 women from industry and agriculture	57 (62.17)	41 (35.83)	98
13 women from concentration camps	61 (55.83)	27 (32.17)	88
Total	118	68	186

$\chi^2 = 2.0280$, a non-significant figure.

A correction for continuity was applied.

Thus in the area of ego-defence there is again no statistically significant difference between our two samples as there was between the men's group and we cannot say that women from concentration camps are more apt than their controls to blame others instead of blaming themselves, or expressing the opinion that nobody is to blame. Here are data on need-persistence:

	e	i	Total
13 women from industry and agriculture	24 (29.85)	21 (15.15)	45
13 women from concentration camps	41 (35.15)	12 (17.85)	53
	65	33	98

$\chi^2 = 5.2660$

This figure is significant, very nearly at the 0.02 level. A correction for continuity was applied. We can therefore assume that in our samples women from concentration camps are really more inclined than their controls to demand satisfaction of their needs from others, and less willing to take responsibility for solving their problems themselves.

Unfortunately, even with a large χ^2 , we cannot claim that our sample has *acquired* these characteristics in the camps. As they are not a random sample, it is theoretically possible that women with this attitude of demanding and unwillingness to take responsibility, were more likely to get arrested and deported. Even if such attitudes did not contribute to their arrest (it is very unlikely that they would), they may be highly correlated with other traits like aggressiveness, rebelliousness, anti-authoritarian outlook, etc., which might very probably have led to their imprisonment.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that whatever the size of the χ^2 we can offer no definite evidence for the formation of certain types of reaction among women under the influence of oppression. The suggested trends are towards a stronger tendency to regard ambiguous social situations as frustrating to the subject, to blame and accuse others but not herself, and especially to demand from others the satisfaction of her needs instead of taking the responsibility on herself.

(e) *Subjects with more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses*

The data presented in the following tables require no comment:

TABLE XXVI

Men in Kempten with more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>		<i>Percentage of Subjects</i>	
	E > 50 %	E < 50 %	E > 50 %	E < 50 %
Polish men from industry	9	9	50	50
Polish men from agriculture	11	7	61	39
Polish men from concentration camps	15	3	83	17

TABLE XXVII

Men in Murnau with more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>		<i>Percentage of Subjects</i>	
	E > 50 %	E < 50 %	E > 50 %	E < 50 %
Polish men from industry and agriculture	12	9	57	43
Polish men from concentration camps	20	1	95	5

TABLE XXVIII

Men in both U.N.R.R.A. districts with more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses

	<i>No. of Subjects</i>		<i>Percentage of Subjects</i>	
	E > 50 %	E < 50 %	E > 50 %	E < 50 %
Polish men from industry and agriculture	32	25	56	44
Polish men from concentration camps	35	4	90	10

TABLE XXIX

Women with more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses

	No. of Subjects		Percentage of Subjects	
	E > 50 %	E < 50 %	E > 50 %	E < 50 %
Polish women from industry and agriculture	7	6	54	46
Polish women from concentration camps	9	4	69	31

It can be seen that the higher the level of oppression the greater the relative number of subjects giving more than 50 per cent extrapunitive responses. Male samples appear to differ more than female samples. The figures in the samples, especially in the last ones, are small, but the trend is always in the same direction, indicating the existence of an association between the level of oppression and extrapunitiveness. The significance of this trend has been tested elsewhere.

(f) *Scores of direction of aggression: mixed answers excluded*

As with the delinquents, we shall discard here all the mixed responses. Tables containing only those responses which show one direction of aggression are presented below. Only the general direction of aggression is indicated without any regard to the type of reaction (whether obstacle-dominant, ego-defensive or need-persistent).

TABLE XXX

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of the D.P. samples, grouped according to the direction of aggression, with mixed answers excluded

	E	I	M	% E	Difference
Kempton men from industry	166	89	100	46.761	9.273
Kempton men from agriculture	195	73	80	56.034	10.826
Kempton men from concentration camps	230	55	59	66.860	
Murnau men from industry and agriculture	202	98	92	51.531	17.017
Murnau men from concentration camps	255	49	68	68.548	
Murnau women from industry and agriculture	121	55	58	51.171	11.720
Murnau women from concentration camps	161	45	50	62.891	

Our general conclusions are that:

When we discard the mixed responses nearly all the differences between comparable samples of the D.P. population increase.

The differences between the men are greater than between the women, whether the concentration camp group is compared with the mixed group from industry and agriculture, or with both non-concentration camp Kempten groups taken together.

(g) *Scores of direction of aggression: further modification.*

Here the scoring variants *E* and *I* will be discarded¹ to give the more concentrated forms of aggression only. The impunitive scores are not affected by this modification.

TABLE XXXI

Summary of the P.F.S. scores of the D.P. samples grouped according to the direction of the most explicit aggression

	E	I	M	% E	Difference
Kempten men from industry	150	63	100	47.923	
Kempten men from agriculture	177	53	80	57.097	9.174
Kempten men from concentration camps	219	29	59	71.336	14.239
Murnau men from industry and agriculture	189	74	92	53.239	
Murnau men from concentration camps	242	24	68	72.455	19.216
Murnau women from industry and agriculture	110	47	58	51.163	
Murnau women from concentration camps	153	28	50	66.234	15.071

Here the differences between comparable samples have again been increased, except for the difference between the Kempten industry and agriculture groups. The differences between the men are still greater than between the women. The percentage of extrapunitive responses in the Kempten industry and agriculture groups taken together is almost the same as in the Murnau mixed group. The concentration camp samples in Kempten and in Murnau are also nearly equal.

Thus in whatever way we present our data: taking all the attitudes into account, discounting mixed answers, or choosing only the most explicit forms of aggression, the general trends remain the same. They are: the greater the oppression, the stronger the extrapunitive tendencies of individuals, both male and female, and

¹ The reasons for adopting this procedure have already been given (p. 25).

the weaker their intro- and impunitive tendencies. The differences between subjects from different levels of oppression are greater when only the more concentrated forms of aggression are considered, than when all the test attitudes are taken into account.

The differences between various U.N.R.R.A. districts are so small as to be virtually non-existent. We may therefore say that all our subjects lived for the year after the liberation in controlled environments tending to affect them in the same way. The test situation was, especially for field work, rather well controlled, and should not have invalidated the results.

(h) *Scores of extrapunitiveness and measures of significance*

From the preceding paragraphs we learned that individuals influenced by different levels of oppression differ on the Picture-Frustration Study in specific tendencies, and in general traits. We have seen that some of these differences are significant: the greater the oppression the greater the number of ego-defensive responses and the smaller of need-persistent; the greater the tendency to blame and accuse others, the less to blame oneself and feel guilty, etc. Now we shall see whether the general—and most important—tendency of extrapunitiveness (or the total amount of aggression directed outwards) is significantly different in groups of people subjected to different levels of oppression.

The general amount of extrapunitiveness is regarded as the most important personality trait to be considered in our study because it is a general tendency, and as such more important than specific attitudes, and may be, as opposed to attitudes, regarded as an element of personality, independent of specific objects or values;¹ because under conditions of oppression it is more dynamic than intro- or impunitiveness, as it is gaining strength while the others are becoming weaker; because it is, under different degrees of oppression, negatively correlated with both intro- and impunitiveness, while the correlation between these latter traits, calculated for forty-two subjects representing various levels of oppression, proved to be positive and significant at the .01 level (for the male groups in Kempton it was .455); because extrapunitiveness, representing the total amount of aggression directed outwards, may be theoretically regarded as an important factor from the point of view of the psychological aspect of civilization; and because it has proved to be an important factor distinguishing antisocial individuals from the 'normal' population.

An identical procedure to that used for calculating the significance of the difference between delinquents and non-delinquents was adopted in the study of the equated samples of Displaced Persons.

¹ Compare Allport's views (22, 23) on a more general and theoretical level.

Every individual in each equated sample was given a score of extrapunitiveness, which was the amount of extrapunitive responses expressed as a percentage of his total number of responses.¹

The individual scores of extrapunitiveness of the Kempton groups were as follows:

No.	Industry	Agriculture	Concentration Camps
1	69	68	81
2	32	38	75
3	55	59	45
4	70	53	86
5	37	64	63
6	13	40	52
7	34	48	52
8	69	51	57
9	50	58	32
10	41	80	82
11	60	38	63
12	60	58	60
13	17	75	72
14	50	38	77
15	42	65	85
16	38	50	45
17	45	59	77
18	54	48	71
<hr/>			
Total	841	970	1175
Mean	46.7222	53.8889	65.2778
Variance	256.8007	171.6340	245.9772
S.E. ²	14.2667	9.5252	13.6654

The difference between the means of the industry and agriculture groups is 7.1667, between the agriculture and concentration camp groups—11.3889, and between the industry and concentration camp groups—18.5556. The respective Standard Errors of these differences are: 4.8787, 4.8167 and 5.2851. Critical Ratios are therefore: for the industry and agriculture groups—1.4690, for the agriculture and concentration camp groups—2.3645, for the industry and concentration camp groups—3.5111.

We may therefore conclude that the concentration camp group is definitely more extrapunitive than either the industry or the agriculture group (according to Fisher's 't' table the differences are significant at the 0.02 and the 0.01 level respectively), but the difference between the industry and agriculture groups is merely suggestive (with a probability around 0.1).

¹ Only responses classified as 'not clear' or 'faulty' were excluded.

Analogous calculations were made for the Murnau groups (male and female):

No.	Men		Women	
	Ind. and Agric.	Conc. Camps	Ind. and Agric.	Conc. Camps
1	55	58	22	59
2	54	61	39	88
3	42	64	41	40
4	69	76	71	42
5	57	58	48	78
6	41	88	59	72
7	52	30	61	64
8	22	57	48	48
9	48	72	20	65
10	56	64	54	85
11	46	86	62	59
12	30	70	52	43
13	64	71	59	50
14	48	53	59	50
15	50	61	59	50
16	54	70	59	50
17	59	64	59	50
18	59	64	59	50
19	29	60	59	50
20	43	59	59	50
21	62	68	59	50
<hr/>				
Total	1040	1354	636	793
Mean	49.5238	64.4762	48.9231	61.0000
Variance	142.3619	142.8619	230.5833	262.6667
S.E. ²	6.7791	6.8029	17.7372	20.2821

The difference between the two samples of men (one with a background of labour in industry or agriculture, one with a background of concentration camps) is 14.9524, between the two samples of women—12.0769. Respective Standard Errors of these differences are: 3.6854 and 6.1660. Critical Ratios are therefore: 4.0572 and 1.9586. The difference between the samples of men is highly significant, between the samples of women is suggestive, but not significant (probability between 0.1 and 0.05).

Since the Critical Ratio of the women's samples is very near to significance at the 0.05 level, an attempt was made to obtain that significance by recalculating the scores of extrapuniveness, disregarding all mixed responses scored *E* and *I*. As we know the difference between the two samples in respect of more explicit aggression is greater than when all the mixed, *E* and *I* responses are included.

The sums of the revised scores of extrapuniveness were: 671

for the industry and agriculture sample, and 853 for the concentration camps sample. The means were 51.6153 and 65.6153, Standard Errors squared 22.3974 and 22.8910 respectively. The difference between the means increased to 14.00, but its Standard Error also increased to 6.7296. The resulting 't' of 2.0804 is slightly greater than in the original calculation, but still fails to reach the level of significance. Thus when we took only the most explicit forms of aggression, we certainly increased the difference between the two samples but we also increased the individual differences.

The Critical Ratio was calculated (without the above modification) for a group comprising all the male subjects with concentration camp experience ($N=39$) and a group comprising all the male subjects with backgrounds of industry or agriculture ($N=57$):¹ Critical Ratio is highly significant: 't'=5.2205; sums of the scores were 2529 and 2851, means 64.8462 and 50.0175, Standard Errors squared 4.7537 and 3.3148 respectively; the difference between the means was 14.8287 and its Standard Error 2.8405.

In conclusion we may say that several years of imprisonment in concentration camps has affected a random Polish male population by significantly increasing its tendency to direct aggression outwards in conflicting social situations of the Picture-Frustration Study type. This increase is significant even when calculated not against the original tendencies of that population—such a calculation was obviously impossible—but against a group of controls who themselves had spent several years under conditions of oppression and may be suspected of a similar tendency.

The evidence concerning women is inconclusive because the concentration camp population of women cannot be regarded as a random population; its sample is therefore not strictly comparable with the equated sample of women with backgrounds of labour in industry and agriculture, the latter representing a more or less random population. The samples of women were small, and the difference between them was statistically non-significant. The data suggest, however, that imprisonment in concentration camps influenced Polish women in much the same way as the men; though there are some differences between the two sexes in the more specific attitudes and traits developed under oppression.

There is some evidence that deportation to agriculture, involving definitely more oppressive treatment than deportation to industry, produced, in effect, more extrapunitive tendencies. The evidence based on the two equated samples of Polish men is suggestive, but did not reach statistical significance. That is not to say, however, that significance would not be reached if we could increase the size of the samples.

¹ Concentration camp subjects in Kempton had two controls each, in Murnau one control each.

2. THE EFFECT OF INTELLIGENCE AND SOCIAL STATUS

(a) *The professional and working classes—are they different?*

An accurate equation of the samples of Displaced Persons was considered necessary in the study of the influence of oppression on certain aspects of personality, because we feared that the equated personal characteristics were correlated with some of the tendencies we were trying to measure.

We could not test the influence of imprisonment in concentration camps on extrapunitiveness by comparing Jews from the professional classes who had been deported to these camps, with Polish peasants deported to agriculture. Even if we found that the concentration camps sample was significantly more extrapunitive, we should not know if this extrapunitiveness had been caused by the type of displacement or by the characteristics of the group. Perhaps Jews are more extrapunitive than Poles, 'intelligentsia' more so than peasants, subjects with a higher IQ more so than dull ones, etc.

Therefore the study of Displaced Persons was confined to people of one national and religious group, while other important characteristics (age, sex, intelligence, education, profession, etc.) were distributed and combined in the same way, in each of the samples to be compared.

Now, in order to measure the actual effect of certain characteristics on extrapunitiveness, we shall equate our two groups in respect of the type of displacement, but differentiate them according to some of these characteristics.

With uniformity of nationality, religion and sex in our samples, and with restriction of these samples in respect of age, the most important characteristics which showed considerable variation were those of intelligence and social status. We shall ask therefore:

Are the professional and working classes different in respect of extrapunitiveness if we equate nationality, religion, sex, and type of displacement? This question is not only of considerable interest in itself, but it is also relevant to our main study, since the influence of oppression on extrapunitiveness will become clearer once we see the influence of other important factors on the same trait. To answer the above question two groups of Polish men were selected on a completely different basis. In both groups there was the same proportion of ex-prisoners from concentration camps (50 per cent), from industry (25 per cent), and from agriculture (25 per cent). But, whereas for one group clerks, teachers, lawyers, journalists, etc., with a comparatively high social standard and intelligence were selected, the other group consisted of unskilled workers, farmers, etc., with an average intelligence 18 IQ points lower, as

measured by the Otis Alpha Test.¹ When compared, both groups of eighteen subjects each, showed the same percentage (60 per cent) of extrapunitive answers. Thus intelligence, education, profession and social standing seemed to have less effect, if any, on the extrapunitiveness of Displaced Persons than the years of deportation.

The performance of the groups in respect of intro-and impunitive responses was also similar. The exact percentages of responses of the three directions of aggression were (the professional group first): extrapunitive 60·2410 and 60·3053, intro-punitive 19·5181 and 18·5751, impunitive 20·2410 and 21·1196 respectively.

The only difference between the two groups was that subjects from the professional classes gave a slightly greater number of mixed responses and fewer unclear and faulty responses than subjects from the working class.

Thus in response to the same number of picture-situations subjects from the professional group gave 415 answers adequate for scoring, while working class subjects gave only 393 such answers. This difference is very small and quite understandable since, as was pointed out earlier, the intellectual factor plays a certain role in the number of mixed, unclear and faulty responses. People with a higher IQ and a better education could more easily understand the situations, express themselves more clearly, and give more complex statements (therefore more mixed responses) than the others. The fact that the difference between the two groups was, nevertheless, very small, suggests that other personality factors—like those of egocentricity and rigidity—were not actively differentiating between the two groups.²

To sum up, with backgrounds of displacement equated, subjects from the professional classes showed the same strength of the tendencies to direct aggression outwards or inwards, or to repress it, as did the working class subjects with poorer education and lower intelligence.

The only and very slight difference between the two groups concerned the total number of responses. That difference can be attributed to the intellectual factor alone, and did not affect the measurement of the main tendencies with which we are concerned. Whatever the total number of responses the percentages of E, I

¹ As a matter of fact, the difference was probably greater, as the type of test used had a damping effect.

² It is interesting to note that in respect of the number of responses adequate for scoring the difference between the 'intelligentsia' and working class groups, which may be attributed to the intellectual factor, was only 22 in 808 responses, while the difference between the concentration camp and the control group in Murnau, not attributable to the intellectual factor since both groups were equated in intelligence and education, was 47 in 975 responses.

and M must always add up to 100 and it is only their relative strength which is of interest to us.

I must admit I did not expect to find no difference between these two groups. I expected—and I still think it was a reasonable expectation—that the subjects from the professional group would be definitely *less* expunitive.¹ Although the Picture-Frustration Study attempts to measure the strength of the actual *tendencies* to direct aggression outwards, or inwards, or to repress it, I expected that in the test results these tendencies would be at least partly distorted by upbringing and the cultural background. Although the subjects were not asked to describe how they would actually behave in the social situations depicted in the test, one could expect that even their first associations would be influenced by their good or bad manners. People in the upper classes of society are taught to observe good manners rather more strictly; therefore in actual situations similar to those (at least some of those) represented in the P.F.S. they might be expected to say 'I am sorry' more often even if they did not feel it (no real attitude I); or, when hurt, to say: 'It does not matter' (attitude M') when, in actual fact, they were angry.

Similarly one might expect that people with a higher IQ would be able to regard the situations of the test more objectively, avoiding expunitive responses in situations which do not call for them. They may also be expected to be less frustrated since their abilities have enabled them to cope more efficiently with the difficulties of life.

The results of the test did not confirm these expectations. It is true that people with higher IQ and social status seldom used bad language in the test responses, but their use of more sophisticated expressions did not make them less expunitive. Manual workers or peasants often used expressions which might be offensive to sensitive ears, but after having called somebody 'a bastard' in one situation a subject would admit in the next that he himself was 'a crazy fool'.

Contrasted with this was the performance of a middle-aged woman with university education² who was (as revealed in the interview) very proud of having preserved good manners in the concentration camp in spite of the appalling conditions. Her T.A.T. stories were indicative of literary abilities, and the P.F.S.

¹ It must be noted that in a highly selected sample of mentally defective juvenile delinquents studied by Foulds (225) the *impunitive* subjects proved to be significantly *less intelligent* than the others. This relationship, however, may be regarded as limited to mental defectives. It is a well-known fact that among psychiatric cases of subnormal intelligence those *relatively* more intelligent are more aggressive. But it does not follow that people of normal or superior intelligence are still more aggressive.

² Not included into the sample as she was not of Polish nationality.

showed no rude or uncontrolled aggressiveness. Nevertheless she was extremely extrapunitive, as in practically every situation she indirectly but definitely implied that somebody else, never herself, was to blame and should do something for her. This attitude was only superficially covered by such introductory phrases as 'I am awfully sorry to say so, but . . .'; then would follow a carefully worded statement intended to convey that the lady was very much *upset* by the incident, which was caused by *somebody else*, and she would be 'extremely grateful' if *he* would be 'so kind' as to remove the frustration of which *he* was guilty.

Thus even exquisite manners were unable to conceal a tendency to direct aggression outwards as measured by the P.F.S. This tendency may not be so obvious in the actual behaviour of sophisticated subjects, but it can still be easily detected and measured by the test. The driving force of aggression is probably equally great in the different social classes, even though its expression may vary; and it is to be feared that although this woman managed to retain her good manners, her personality was nevertheless affected by oppression. She perceived the conflicting social situations and judged them in a different way from that which might be expected of a normal woman with a normal life history.

(b) *The professional and working classes—are they influenced by displacement in a different way?*

There was hardly a question in the present study on which I could speculate less than this. Regarding other problems my expectations were sometimes wrong;¹ but at least I had some basis for making them. The problem presented in this paragraph allowed only for such far-reaching speculations that I felt disinclined to make them. When I myself lived in a Soviet camp in the north, I observed the other inmates, belonging to various classes of society, but I admit I arrived at no definite or even tentative conclusions. That these people were changing under displacement and oppression I could see clearly enough although I myself was doubtless changing also. But to estimate the *degree* of change in my own or other social classes was beyond my capacity.

I was quite sincere in the interviews I held with Displaced Persons in Germany, when on many occasions I admitted that I did not know whether one of the groups had undergone a deeper or a different change from the others. When I asked the opinion of various subjects, they often threw the question back: What did I

¹ I expected, for instance, subjects from the intelligentsia to be less extrapunitive than workers—they were not; I expected delinquents to exhibit attitude *E* more frequently than normals—they did not; I expected the difference between the concentration camps samples and the controls to be greater in the female than in the male population—it was smaller, etc.

think? When I said I did not know, my answer was accepted with a smile of incredulity. They 'knew'.

But this 'knowledge', or rather belief, was totally different in subjects representing different strata of society. People from the professional group argued that education and intelligence allowed them to resist disintegration, and pointed to various incidents in support of their point. The subject interviewed was, himself, 'not changed at all', and the members of his social class behaved, with some exceptions, 'all right'; but, 'if you could have seen these uneducated people—they were quite wild in the camps!'

A similar argument was put forward by the subjects from the working class. 'I have always been tough'—went the usual argument—and so were most of my comrades. But these doctors, professors and the like! They went quite mad when they were beaten or had nothing to eat. Look at them even now—they are not at all normal. I never knew them like that when I was in Poland.'

The only conclusion I could draw from the interviews was, that subjects from all social strata tended to deny their own psychological change, to minimize the change within their social class, and to emphasize the change in other classes of society. The only way to solve the problem was to attempt to measure the change within each social class separately, and to compare the Critical Ratios.

In order to calculate the Critical Ratios, the scores of 36 subjects (18 subjects from the professional classes and 18 from the working class) were examined, and they were divided into four groups, of 9 subjects each.¹

Nine subjects from the professional group with a background of detention in concentration camps were compared with nine controls with backgrounds of forced labour in industry or agriculture. Similarly the two groups from the working class were compared with each other. The results are tabulated below.

TABLE XXXII

Differences between P.F.S. scores of extrapuniveness of subjects from concentration camps and their controls grouped according to social class

<i>Professional Class</i>			<i>Working Class</i>		
<i>Diff. betw. the Means</i>	<i>Its Standard Error</i>	<i>Critical Ratio</i>	<i>Diff. betw. the Means</i>	<i>Its Standard Error</i>	<i>Critical Ratio</i>
14.556	5.0385	2.8890	13.889	5.9371	2.3394

¹ The number of subjects from the working class could have been increased, but I had only nine subjects from the professional classes with a background of detention in concentration camps who had exactly matching controls with backgrounds of forced labour in industry or agriculture.

It can be seen that there is not much difference between the two classes. Although within the professional group the difference between the means is slightly greater and the corresponding Critical Ratio significant at the 0.02 level, while within the working class the Critical Ratio is significant only at the 0.05 level, the difference between the two Ratios cannot be regarded as significant and may be due to chance. We can conclude, therefore, that both social classes were affected by imprisonment in concentration camps approximately in the same way and to the same degree.

(c) *Are the scores of the controls correlated?*

Although, as we have seen, there are no significant differences between *social classes* in respect of direction of aggression or susceptibility to psychic changes under conditions of oppression, there may still be some association between certain *combinations of personal characteristics*, such as age, intelligence, education, profession, district of residence, etc., and the direction of aggression. We have seen that the fact that two subjects belong to different social classes does not make them different in the predominant direction of their aggression. So, if they belong to the same social class we cannot necessarily expect them to be alike in this respect.

Now we shall see whether the two controls, matched not only in social class but in other characteristics as well, are likely to resemble each other in their reactions to the P.F.S. problems. It can be assumed that if there is any significant association between the direction of aggression and any one of the personal characteristics which varied within the samples,¹ this association should express itself in a positive coefficient of correlation between the pairs of controls, whether that association be positive or negative, linear or curvilinear. The same applies to any combinations of these characteristics.

To give an example, let us assume that there is a positive association between age and extrapunitive up to the age of twenty-five, and a negative one after thirty. That would mean that in all our pairs of controls under twenty-five the older the pair the more extrapunitive it is—the correlation between the extrapunitive scores of the controls is positive since both of them are affected by age in the same manner and contributes to the total correlation in a positive way. Between twenty-five and thirty there is no correlation. After thirty the older the pair the less extrapunitive it is—but again the correlation between the scores of the controls will be positive, since always both controls are affected by the age factor in the same way, though in a different direction.

¹ Like age, intelligence, district of Poland, etc., but not nationality, religion or sex which were held constant.

Thus if there is any association, positive or negative, between age and extrapunitiveness, and our pairs of controls are equated in age, there should be a positive correlation between extrapunitive scores for the pairs of controls. If, in addition, there is an association between extrapunitiveness and intelligence, our pairs of controls, being equated in intelligence, should give still more positively correlated scores of extrapunitiveness. A non-significant correlation would mean that neither age, intelligence, education, nor profession, etc., separately or combined, are associated with extrapunitiveness in any significant way. A significant positive correlation would mean that at least one of these factors, or their combination, is related to extrapunitiveness. A negative significant correlation cannot theoretically be expected: if the two subjects have certain characteristics in common we may expect that, in addition, they will have another characteristic in common. But there is no reason to expect that they will be likely to differ in respect of that additional characteristic more than by pure chance.

To calculate the coefficient of correlation between the scores of the pairs of controls two samples of men (21 subjects each) and two samples of women (13 subjects each) were examined. Every subject was given his score of extrapunitiveness (representing the percentage of extrapunitive responses in the total of his responses). The product-moment correlation was calculated.

The correlation coefficient for the samples of men was found to be as small as $\cdot 040$, for the samples of women it was $\cdot 172$. Neither of these coefficients is significant, or even suggestive.

We can therefore conclude that within the limits of this research no association could be traced between extrapunitiveness and any of the personal characteristics which I had taken so much trouble to equate.

In order to eliminate the influence of these factors and justify the claim that the differences between my samples of Displaced Persons may be only due to the influence of the type of displacement, I spent more time and certainly more energy on the careful selection of the subjects than on the testing itself, and had to reduce very considerably the size of the samples. Out of the possible population of about 4,500 Displaced Persons only 150 were finally selected as suitable for the study of the equated samples. Now it appears that all this work was of little importance; and if our samples had not been equated at all, the results would probably have been the same, the samples bigger, and the statistical significance easier to obtain.

Such conclusions would not be justified, however. We know *now* that our pairs of controls are not correlated, and that therefore they are unaffected by the personal characteristics which

I had taken the trouble to equate, but we could not *start* with such an assumption.

Furthermore, we know that our subjects are uncorrelated, but *we have already excluded* all subjects under a certain age, intelligence quotient, etc., and we have excluded certain professions because there were no controls for their representatives. It may be, for instance, that the very young or the very old people are less extrapunitive than those within the middle range, it may be that lawyers are extrapunitive, priests impunitive, and undertakers intro-punitive. Our lack of correlation is limited to our samples and it may be that if we changed the samples, introduced the members of different professions, the young people, etc., a correlation would arise.

To illustrate the possibility that at least certain professions may be correlated with certain types of reaction to frustration, I may quote two cases of subjects who had been in concentration camps but for whom I could find no controls. One was a Roman Catholic priest, the other a public prosecutor.

The priest gave P.F.S. responses of a predominantly impunitive type: 43 per cent of his responses were impunitive, 31 per cent extrapunitive, and 26 per cent intro-punitive. He was the only subject with a background of imprisonment in concentration camps whose percentage of impunitive responses exceeded that of extrapunitive ones. Among fifty-four other ex-concentration camp subjects included in the samples, as well as among still more numerous subjects for whom no controls were found, not a single one approached that pattern of response.¹

The public prosecutor on the other hand gave a pattern which was well above the average in extrapunitiveness. He gave 80 per cent extrapunitive, 5 per cent intro-punitive, and 15 per cent impunitive responses. Nevertheless his behaviour as far as I could judge from personal observation (I was in daily contact with him for some time) was far from antisocial. He was one of the most idealistic and enthusiastic young men I met in the D.P. camps, although rather intolerant of the weaknesses of others and insisting that they should unhesitatingly follow his lofty principles of behaviour. When they did not, he would get very angry.

These examples may be of no importance. One cannot generalize from one priest and one prosecutor. But I quote them because, from my knowledge of Catholic priests in Poland, and of public

¹ There was only one ex-concentration camp subject whose intro-punitive (but not impunitive) tendencies proved stronger than his extrapunitive ones. He was a carpenter, a very shy and kind-hearted little man who was so co-operative that after having finished all his tests he came back on subsequent days to ask me whether I did not need him any more. He was quite willing to be tested again, if that were of any use to me.

prosecutors as I knew them during my practice at the Warsaw Bar, I should say that both these subjects corresponded to the general pattern of behaviour accepted in their professions.

Polish people are probably not more tolerant than other nations, but in one sphere, that of religion, their tolerance has been remarkable throughout history, and that tradition has been maintained by their priests. There has been no inquisition in Poland, no religious wars; and before she lost her independence, Poland was the refuge of many religious sects, and of Jews and Moslems, persecuted elsewhere in Europe.

The Polish priests have maintained the tradition of tolerance not only in problems of dogma. Even the numerous jokes about parsons describe them as kind-hearted figures, jovial, with a sense of humour, and no sense of sin. For their red cheeks they are often mockingly nicknamed 'tomatoes', and their round figures reflect their psychological characteristics. When, after confession, they pronounce: 'Ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis', I have never doubted that they mean it. The impunitiv attitude of the Polish priest I tested, maintained in spite of his imprisonment, may well be characteristic of his profession in Poland.¹

The job of the public prosecutor on the other hand, is not that of forgiving and forgetting—he must accuse, and extrapunitiveness is a part of his profession. A good public prosecutor may be thought of as an individual who has sublimated his aggression and directed his extrapunitive tendencies not against authority, but against all wrongdoers. He may be as prone to external conflicts as a delinquent, but in any conflict between delinquents and society he remains on the side of society. The delinquent and the psychopath might be conceived as exemplifying dispersed aggression, directed against all external agents, including authority. Finally the revolutionary may exemplify aggression directed mainly against authority. But external conflicts and extrapunitiveness are probably characteristic of all of them.

None of the above problems could be solved, or even attacked, in the course of this study. They have only been presented as indicating some of the additional complications and difficulties met with, and at the same time as sufficiently important in themselves to require further study. Unfortunately experimental research on the personality structure of various professions and social classes is as much lacking as in the field of 'national character'. The need for further research in both these fields cannot be overstressed.

¹ It does not follow that Poles are generally impunitiv, nor that priests outside Poland are. This observation is confined to one profession within one country.

3. OTHER EVIDENCE ON THE INFLUENCE OF OPPRESSION ON AGGRESSION

As far as I know no other experimental study of oppression and its influence on aggression has been made. There are, however, numerous studies dealing with similar problems which may be grouped into: (a) general studies of psychological changes in prisoners in concentration camps and prisoners of war; and (b) studies testing the frustration-aggression hypothesis, and experimental studies of autocratic and democratic atmospheres. No complete survey of this literature will be given here; but some of the more outstanding studies and those which are particularly relevant to this research, whether with regard to method, material or results, will be briefly mentioned.

(a) *Studies of concentration camps and related subjects*

Among the studies of the psychological aspects of concentration camps that by Bettelheim (73), who himself spent a year in Dachau and Buchenwald, seems to be the most remarkable. It has been referred to several times in this book and it presents a wealth of shrewd observation which can hardly be summarized.

The population whose reactions are described in Bettelheim's study is different from that of my research. It is predominantly a German population, and Bettelheim observes that those Germans who were neither criminals nor politically active against the Nazis did not question the wisdom of the German law and authorities, but persistently thought that they themselves were being persecuted by mistake. This could hardly apply to Displaced Persons who did not identify themselves with the Nazi régime. The Displaced Persons questioned the Nazi authority from the very beginning and they never, or only at the very end, reached what Bettelheim describes as 'the final stage of adjustment to the camp situation' when the prisoner 'had changed his personality so as to accept as his own the values of the Gestapo'. It cannot be denied, however, that many prisoners, irrespective of their nationality, took from the Gestapo some values mentioned by Bettelheim: the belief that none of them was any better than the others, the vocabulary of aggression and humiliation, the contemptuous attitude towards weaklings, and the whole pattern of behaviour when in charge of other prisoners.

Among the more general psychological mechanisms Bettelheim gives many valuable observations on regression to infantile behaviour, on projection, to which he also refers in his study on the dynamism of anti-Semitism in Gentiles and Jews (74) based on his own experiences. All that has been said here on the development of

extrapunitive in the concentration camp situation can be summarized in one short paragraph, from Bettelheim's study: 'They felt that they had atoned for any past shortcomings in their relations to their families and friends, and for any changes which might occur in them; in this way they were free from accepting any responsibility in this respect, and free from any guilt-feelings; and so they felt freer to hate other people, even their own families, for their defects.'

Other studies of concentration camp psychology also confirm our findings. Thus Bondy (93) mentions a complete loss of self-control, a ruthless struggle of 'each against all', envy and hate, unreliability, distrust and egocentricity as general products of internment. Friedman (263) discusses the sense of guilt at having remained alive when so many others had died which he found universal among the Jewish survivors. Bloch (87) describes the formation of specific attitudes, normally not found in institutions of detention; unfortunately he does not define these attitudes very clearly. Thompson (682) mentions suspicion and anxiety for personal safety as an outstanding feature of the camp's psychology. A short study by Niremberski (502) describes the 'concentration camp mentality' as characterized by aggressiveness and by lack of family ties, of responsibility, ethics and a sense of values. He also mentions that men seem to change more than women, which appears to confirm our findings—we also found greater differences in men than in women. It must be said, however, that the same factor which affected our research and made any difference between the two sexes, in respect of the direction of aggression, unreliable, was also active in Belsen where Niremberski made his observations. We found that our sample of women was not a random sample—it was highly selected, and composed mainly of those women who were either criminal or particularly active against the Nazis. The same would apply to Niremberski's women from Belsen. We still cannot therefore conclude that men are more influenced by oppression than women. We can only point out that there are indications that this may be so, and a new research in this field would certainly be worth undertaking.¹

For many reasons psychological changes in *Prisoners of War* are essentially different from those caused by other imprisonment. This is particularly well shown in a study by Lunden (426), who as a criminologist is well qualified to see the difference between the captivity of the P.O.W., and imprisonment of the offender. Even among the prisoners of war, however, Lunden found many of the symptoms present in inmates of concentration camps such as

¹ See also E. Jacobson (345) who maintains that female political prisoners faced cross-examination more easily than men.

irritability, restlessness, depression with outbursts of anger, and certain peculiar traits of dishonesty.

The studies by Brill (109) and Kirman (369) of prisoners released from the Japanese P.O.W. camps suggest that even there the incidence of psychoses and neuroses is negligible, while the mental picture reveals a state of tremendous resentment. A study of disorders of the ego in wartime by Schönberger (621) treats this problem from too specific an angle to be summarized here.

The psychological changes in *children* under the extreme hardships of war have received rather inadequate study. Relatively more has been done to study evacuated children in Great Britain (16, 105, 128, 129, 172, 353, 367, 460, 539, 624, 659, 698, 730, 731), while a little booklet by Margot Hicklin (330) shows her great insight into the problems of the 300 Jewish children evacuated in 1945 from Germany to England. She mentions symptoms similar to those which I observed in the U.N.R.R.A. camps: mutual accusations of dishonest occasional thefts, an increased emphasis on nationalism and on religious sectarianism, etc. What she notes, however, is the amazing rate of physical and mental recovery—a phenomenon hardly present in the adult population of U.N.R.R.A. camps. It is possible that children recover more quickly than adults—and there are obvious grounds for accepting this proposition—but the description of the reception and care with which the Jewish children in England were treated (by herself and her co-workers) differs so markedly from the treatment of the Displaced Persons in Germany that an alternative explanation seems more plausible. One cannot expect recovery when practically nothing is done to achieve it, when the subjects of recent brutal oppression are left in the same country, under the care of the same police, and when a considerable amount of pressure is exerted to persuade them to return to their countries now dominated by Russia where they expect further oppression. On the other hand all the reports I received from Sweden, where a number of former inmates of concentration camps found hospitality, show that in a tolerant country, in which there is no national discrimination, and a tremendous will to help others is shown by the entire population, the rate of recovery and readjustment can be relatively rapid in nearly all the victims of oppression.

The children described by Margot Hicklin had been directly affected by oppression and war. One might, therefore, expect confirmation of the observations and experimental findings of this research. It is not surprising, however, that a study by Lauretta Bender shows no marked anxieties or increased aggression in American children as the result of the war (60, p. 397). Her findings cannot, however, as she seems to think, contradict those of Anna Freud in Great Britain—there are vast differences between

the impact of the war upon American, British, and German-Jewish or Polish children. Similarly an observation by Bovet (97) that the 1914-18 war had no influence upon Franco-Swiss children cannot by any means contradict our findings as the existence of war, or of oppression, bears little relation to the feelings of those who are neither directly attacked nor oppressed.

Finally, one might mention here some experiments concerning one problem which was very acute in concentration camps, namely, *starvation*. These experiments, by Sanford (599, 600), and by Franklin and others (231) can again neither contradict nor confirm our findings, as the experimental situation in which Sanford's subjects were treated and both the experimental situation and the subjects themselves (conscientious objectors) of the investigation by Franklin, Schiele, Brożek and Keys (231), were either too artificial or too specific to give the same effect as semi-starvation in concentration camps. These writers do not mention any increase of aggression as the result of hunger—but it may be noted that Goodenough who observed children in their natural surroundings and conditions, found the peak of anger outbursts shortly before the meal hours (292, pp. 106-9, and 302).

(b) *Studies testing the frustration-aggression hypothesis*

The monograph by John Dollard and others (183), may be considered the principal work in this sphere. Their book aims at an exploration of this problem, and although it puts forward a hypothesis and some evidence for its support, it does not offer any definite proof. The original hypothesis stated that every aggression is the result of frustration and every frustration results in aggression, although aggression may be temporarily compressed, delayed, disguised, etc. Later on the statement that 'the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression' was rephrased by the authors (469) to read: 'Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression.' It was put forward that if the instigation to aggression is the strongest member of the hierarchy of instigations aroused by the frustration, then acts of aggression will be the first responses to occur. If the instigations to other responses incompatible with aggression are stronger than the instigation to aggression, then these other responses will occur at first and prevent, at least temporarily, the occurrence of acts of aggression. In the case of inhibition (for instance, by punishment) of directly expressed aggression, a process of summation occurs—the following frustration may produce more aggression, since the latter has gained in strength by summing with an already present but inhibited instigation to aggression.

We might say that the excessive tendency towards aggressive

(extrapunitive) behaviour found in the former inmates of concentration camps in the course of our study is based on such summation, since the strict rules in the camps prevented inmates from expressing the aggression to which they were constantly and strongly instigated.

On the other hand impunitiveness and, to some extent, intro-punitiveness, imply the ability to wait in frustrating situations. As it is expressed in 'Frustration and Aggression', those ready to wait in frustrating situations, are perhaps 'the ones whose experiences have led them to expect that the frustration of a particular goal-response will be followed in near succession by a gratifying substitute response series. Perhaps those who show the highest tendency to respond to any frustration with overt aggression are those who, on the basis of past experience, have not learned that gratifying alternative responses will ensue; or they may be suffering constantly from secret sources of severe frustration which summate with those whose origin is more readily observed.' [They] '... give a hyperactive character to any social movements in which they participate. One may think of each nation as having a large number of individuals who are constantly in need of some person, some idea, or some group towards whom aggression may be expressed' (p. 63). The book offers some evidence that frustrating conditions, like poverty, bad health, illegitimacy, etc., increase instigation to aggression, particularly in the form of crime.

Doob and Sears (184) investigated factors determining substitute behaviour and the overt expression of aggression. Since they studied the influence of such factors as the strength of anticipated satisfaction and punishment, and the strength of drive-instigation, their findings are not directly related to our research. Similar in this respect are some experiments by R. R. Sears and P. S. Sears attempting to measure the strength of frustration-reaction in an infant as related to the strength of drive (628), while a series of experiments by R. R. Sears, Hovland and Miller (627) failed, according to the writers themselves, to reflect aggression in any consistent and objectively measurable way.

R. R. Sears also investigated non-aggressive reactions to frustration (625). He mentions three such reactions: (1) the repetition of the same instrumental acts leading to the same goal response; (2) the use of a different set of instrumental acts to perform the same goal-response; and (3) the use of a different set to perform a different goal-response from that which was originally frustrated. In the terms of our research we might say that all these non-aggressive reactions belong to need-persistent intro-punitive responses (Symbol 'i').

They are all need-persistent since the subject insists on getting satisfaction of the original need or its substitute, and they are in-

tropunitive since he takes the responsibility for solving this problem himself. It seems that in subjects subjected to oppression they tend to disappear.

Hovland and Sears in a statistical study (342) showed the correlation of lynchings in the U.S.A. with various economic indices. They found correlations ranging from $-.61$ to $-.72$ between lynchings and various economic indices, and conclude that their study shows the mechanism of displacement: since 'one cannot be aggressive against a condition represented by index numbers', the aggression is directed against the persons who are in a less favourable and protected position and are unable to retaliate. They also explain the violence of lynching behaviour in terms of summation of instigation to aggression. A re-examination of their correlations by Mintz (471) gave much more conservative figures, but did not challenge their conclusions.

Another experimental study, by Miller and Bugelski (468), confirms our observation that former inmates of concentration camps tend to be hostile towards other nationals. In their experiments Miller and Bugelski found: '(a) that frustration arouses aggression, and (b) that the members of the out-group are sufficiently similar as stimulus objects to members of the in-group so that responses (in this case to aggression) will generalize from one to the other.' In particular they found their subjects made relatively more aggressive (we might say: 'extrapunitive') remarks about Japanese and Mexicans, whom they were asked to describe, after a frustrating experience.

An interesting experiment to examine the effect of antecedent frustration on projective play has been described by Yarrow (743). In this study 60 pre-school-children (30 boys and 30 girls, aged 3-0 to 5-7) were randomly assigned to 3 groups: control, failure and satiation, each consisting of 10 boys and 10 girls. Failure involved the construction of a windmill which was too difficult for the children; satiation involved working at a monotonous task for 20-30 minutes; 'control' involved 15 minutes' solitary play, and it is stressed that the experimenter 'attempted to make this a pleasurable, satisfying experience for the child'.

All three groups were observed during two sessions of playing with dolls, separated by an interval of one or two days. The play-with-dolls sessions, and the conditions preceding the first session were identical for all the groups. The differing experimental conditions described above were introduced immediately before the second doll-play session.

The results show that aggressive behaviour measured in its several aspects increased in all the groups on the second play session. There were very few significant differences between play behaviour after the 'frustration' and after the 'control' conditions.

These surprising results are not adequately analysed by the author. The explanation lies, in my opinion, in the fact that the 'control' situation was equally frustrating to the 'frustration' situation. Although the experimenter attempted to make the 'control' condition 'a pleasurable, satisfying experience for the child', it is obvious that a child left in solitude in strange surroundings for fifteen minutes cannot feel very happy. Thus *all* the groups experienced frustration and, consequently, all the groups exhibited aggression—Yarrow proved his point in a different way from that he had expected, and he does not even seem to realize the full implications of his findings.

Finally, in a recent study of identical twins, B. S. Burks (126) showed that a pair of twins reared apart exhibited many similarities in their pattern of behaviour (enuresis, nail-biting, difficulties accompanying an early puberty, intelligence, interests, competitiveness, etc.), but that the twin who suffered more frustration in family life appeared to be more aggressive.

Closely akin to the studies of the frustration-aggression hypothesis are those by Lewin, Lippitt and White (407), Mowrer (484), White (720), and Bavelas and Lewin (55). The first studies aggressive behaviour patterns in experimentally created social climates of democracy, autocracy, and *laissez-faire*; while the later ones already assume that democracy in small groups is preferable to autocracy or *laissez-faire*, and are concerned with the practical problems of achieving a genuine democracy, and of training in democratic leadership.

The results of the experiments described by Lewin, Lippitt and White are in general agreement with our results. They show that in autocracy (and there can hardly be a more complete autocracy than that of concentration camps or prisons) patterns of aggressive behaviour, hostility, egocentricity (exemplified by an ego-involved language), and the tendency to develop scapegoats increase significantly.

Studies of autocratic atmosphere are concerned with a specific problem in the general field of research on frustration. Frustration in autocracy is not the same as other kinds of frustration, whether inherent in democracy, or with no connection with social structure, as, for example, illness or poverty. In the same way the child-family relationship cannot be viewed solely from the point of view of the quantity of frustration suffered by the child. Different types of this relationship may produce different 'frustration-types' (226), and, as has been pointed out by Buxbaum (132) and Horney (337) in particular, the result of frustration depends on the total situation of the child, and on the spirit in which frustration is imposed. If we accept the suggestion by Berdyaev (66, p. 107) that there are

two kinds of frustration: a dark suffering leading to perdition and an illumined suffering leading to salvation—we should also consider the factors determining that differentiation. From our own material and from some of the studies mentioned above, we can see that frustration combined with hatred and oppression brings forth aggressive tendencies that Berdyaev would probably term 'perdition'. But it may well be that when the frustrator is perceived by the subject, in particular by a child, as a loving and omnipotent person, the aggression produced by frustration will be turned inwards, will engender or strengthen the conscience, and in this way will lead to salvation—or to neurosis which may sometimes only be a medical term for salvation.

Our study presents only a few of the results of the oppressive kind of frustration: it does not deal with 'frustration in general'. But, in my view, 'frustration in general' does not exist. There are only various types and kinds of frustration, each of which produces different results, and our study must accept these limitations.

Chapter 7

THE THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST

I. MATERIAL COLLECTED AND SCORING CATEGORIES

(a) *Introductory remarks*

In chapter 3 (p. 78 ff.) it was pointed out that the scoring categories employed in the analysis of the T.A.T. stories in this research depend on the actual material collected. Instead of devising various categories arbitrarily or on theoretical grounds only, and then forcing the material into these artificial cells, the analysis proceeded in three steps:

Firstly, the stories given by the subjects in all the groups tested were examined from as many points of view as were suggested by the quality of the material. In this way the possibilities of applying various scoring factors were explored.

Secondly, a limited number of scoring categories were selected: these were those categories which occurred with a certain frequency in one or more groups of subjects. Categories occurring infrequently and scattered throughout all the groups of subjects were excluded, unless it was found that although infrequent they were probably significant (e.g. suicide). In order to keep down the number of variables to be used only the more prominent ones were chosen: factors, even with a high frequency, which occurred in the stories in a subsidiary character only were therefore omitted. When two categories could be applied to one characteristic only one was selected (examples are given below).

Finally, the material in the stories was analysed once more on the basis of the selected categories.

In order to increase the reliability of the interpretation, the scoring of all the groups of subjects was done concurrently. For instance, instead of scoring the stories of all the delinquents first, and of all the non-delinquents afterwards, only a few stories from each group of subjects were analysed at a time. In this way it was hoped to avoid the influence of training upon the results; for even if, in the course of the work, there were a slight change in the

interpreter's application of various categories to the T.A.T. stories, it would affect all the groups in the same way and should not prejudice the results. In addition, any change in interpretation was minimized as far as possible by looking back to the stories already scored. Whenever a particular Thema, an Outcome, or other characteristic, recurred, the stories concerned were compared, and the same scoring categories applied to both. When, however, there was a difference between the stories an attempt was made to reflect it in the scores.

All the scoring categories can be put under the following four headings: Hero, Press, Thema, Outcome. Examples of the stories, illustrating the categories applied, are given in the section dealing with the analysis of the various groups of subjects.

(b) *Hero*

Under this heading come all the forces or tendencies which can be traced in the Hero of the story when an identification occurs. Sometimes, however, there is no identification with the Hero—he may even be a German, a figure hated and despised by the narrator—but the narrator himself clearly displays certain attitudes and tendencies towards the central figure of the story; in this case the tendencies exhibited by the narrator are classified as if they were the tendencies of the Hero. The following scoring categories are used to describe the tendencies of the Hero:

Abasement

The Hero submits to coercion or restraint in order to avoid blame, punishment, pain or death. He suffers disagreeable Press without opposition. He confesses, apologises, promises to reform. He resigns himself passively to scarcely bearable conditions.

There were not many stories showing tendencies which could be classified as above. These tendencies occurred, however, in nearly all groups of subjects, and some differences between the groups in respect of Abasement are suggestive or, in one case, statistically significant. Murray (495) considers Abasement as a need which may often be subsidiary, particularly to Affiliation (to submit to retain love and friendship) and to 'Harm-avoidance' (to submit to avoid pain). In my material it was exclusively subsidiary to Affiliation.

Intraggression

The Hero blames, reproves, belittles himself for wrongdoing, stupidity or failure. He is blamed by the narrator when identification occurs (i.e., the narrator blames himself in disguise, by blaming the Hero with whom he has identified himself). He suffers feelings of inferiority guilt, remorse. He punishes himself.

Suicide may be thought of as exemplifying extreme intraggression. It occurred in five stories only, but since its significance is different from that of other cases of intraggression, it was scored separately.

On the whole Intraggression was strongly associated with Abasement, but it occurred more frequently than the latter. There were also some stories exhibiting Abasement without Intraggression. Some significant differences in respect of Intraggression were found between the groups tested.

Aggression

The Hero hates, gets angry, criticises, blames, belittles somebody, fights or kills, punishes, takes revenge, pursues an enemy, destroys something.

Although in the former study, using the Picture-Frustration Test, aggression directed outwards was characteristic of all the groups of Displaced Persons, and of the delinquent and ex-concentration camp groups in particular, in the T.A.T. aggressive tendencies in the Hero were very rare. When they occurred, they were usually associated with the Thema of Revenge. Aggression was often exhibited by the narrator (especially in the stories given for picture No. 3, in which the central figure was seen as a German, surrounded by the graves of the people whom he had murdered). In nearly all the stories Aggression in the Hero had the character of 'Counteraction' (Murray's terminology), and may therefore be thought of as the fusion of these two needs (Aggression and Counteraction).

Dejection

The Hero suffers disappointment, disillusionment, depression, sorrow, grief, unhappiness, despair. He is anxious to avoid danger, fears injury, imprisonment or death, he tries to protect himself or seeks aid and protection from others.

This category, as defined above, is rather wide, and comprises some elements which are usually defined (by Murray, White and Sanford in particular) as representing feelings of 'Anxiety' and needs of 'Succorance', 'Intranurturance', and 'Harm-avoidance'. In general, some categories, which are otherwise treated separately, are amalgamated for statistical purposes to increase the frequency in the group concerned. In our material on the other hand, the frequency of 'Dejection' in the Hero was so great that for statistical elaboration subdivision rather than amalgamation was indicated. It was felt, however, that the feelings of 'Dejection' and 'Anxiety', the needs to avoid harm and seek protection, were here so interwoven that any division would be artificial. When the Hero is in despair because he has been arrested and put into a concen-

tration camp his feelings may be described in the story as of grief or sorrow only, but it is obvious that he is also afraid, and that he would like to seek protection and avoid harm if that were possible. He equally wants Autonomy (breaking out of confinement, freedom and independence, etc.). On the other hand, when we learn from the story that the Hero is unable to satisfy his needs of 'Harm-avoidance' and 'Succorance' because nobody can help him and he cannot escape, we know that he is in despair, which implies the inner state of 'Dejection', even when it is not explicitly mentioned.

In our material Dejection in the Hero was usually associated with Aggression in the Press, and with Personal Frustration and Family Frustration in the Thema; such stories described the Hero and his family in danger, in despair, threatened with deportation, or seeing one or more members of the family arrested or killed.

Affiliation

The Hero has friends, he loves his mother or other members of his family, he longs for their presence. He experiences feelings of love and tenderness.

In our material Affiliation in the Hero was often associated with Dejection (e.g. the Hero loves his mother, but must leave her because he has been arrested and deported; or his beloved brother is killed, etc.); with Aggression threatening the whole family in the Press; and with Affiliation in the Press (mutual love in the family). Occasionally Affiliation was associated with Sex (i.e. the Hero has a love affair, with both feelings of tenderness and physical attraction), but in general Sex did not occur very frequently and love had, if I may use the psycho-analytic term, an aim-inhibited character. Most cases of Affiliation could also have been scored as 'Nurturance' (the Hero giving support, help and sympathy to those whom he loves).

Sex

The Hero has a love affair, he enjoys the company of physically attractive members of the opposite sex. He courts, he gets married (or wants to).

Sex, as has been said above, was not frequent in our material. It was usually associated with Affiliation (with feelings of tenderness predominating), but sometimes the story indicated the need for sexual objects only, without any need for Affiliation. Some differences between the groups investigated in relation to Sex were suggestive.

Dominance

The Hero is a leader, he is able to influence the others and the course of events, he manages important affairs, he governs, creates,

accomplishes something important or desirable. He is energetic. He is successful in business.

The forces in the Hero entered under this category are generally defined either as need 'Dominance' or 'Achievement', but it was found more practicable not to make this distinction in our material.

Dominance in the Hero was usually associated with Achievement in the Thema, but it was also present in other Themas. It was a very important category being one of those which distinguished clearly between delinquents and non-delinquents, and between the various groups of subjects with different backgrounds of displacement. Some stories scored here for Dominance might as justifiably have been scored for 'Autonomy'.

Other forces

In the whole material of over 600 stories there were only a few cases, scattered in different groups of subjects, where the forces of the Hero in spite of their relative prominence in the story could not be entered under any of the above categories. For instance, there was one case representing the needs 'Passivity' and 'Sentience', in which the Hero enjoys relaxation and passive reception of sensuous impression of warmth, comfort, and beautiful scenery.

More frequently other forces in the Hero existed but had no central character: for instance, the Hero not only loses his mother, but he also admires her (need 'Deference'), he not only wants to dominate and achieve, but also, more particularly, wants this achievement in construction or in wealth (this has been defined by other writers as needs 'Construction' or 'Acquisition'). It was found more practicable to introduce as few categories as possible, and since, for instance, the need for Acquisition did not achieve prominence in any single story, it was not scored at all even where it occurred as subsidiary to other needs.¹

In a few cases the story was not scored at all because there was no clear identification of the subject tested with the central figure in his story, and therefore without further analysis (which was impracticable) it was not possible to ascertain which feelings and actions should be ascribed to the Hero and which to the Press. In some of these cases ambivalence was suspected: the same characters probably represented both the subject and his environment. In all these doubtful cases it was considered safer to omit the whole story than to score it at all. Since in nearly all the stories the identification with one of the figures was quite clear, or, in those cases in which no identification occurred, the feelings of the narrator himself were expressed, there were very few cases that

¹ The need Acquisition did not, in fact, occur at all, even in a subsidiary character, in the stories of the delinquent Polish groups, although most of the subjects were in prison for having illegally satisfied this need.

were not placed under one or other of the categories, and these exceptions should not invalidate the results.

(c) *Press*

The following six categories were used for the environmental forces acting upon the Hero:

Rejection

The Hero is repudiated, left alone, betrayed by a person in his environment, he is excluded from a group to which he wants to belong, ignored by the person he loves or admires, deserted by a love object, etc. Rejection in male subjects occurred mainly in the stories to picture No. 1 (an elderly woman standing with her back turned to a young man) the usual Thema was Guilt, with rejection by the mother. In female subjects (who were not given the picture described above) Rejection was associated mainly with the Thema of Love, in which the Hero (or rather the Heroine) was deserted by her lover.

Although the incidence of Rejection in the stories was generally very low, some of the differences between the groups were suggestive.

Dominance

The Hero is criticized or reprimanded. He is forced by someone to do something, or to abandon a project he likes. He receives unpleasant orders, or is persuaded to take a course of action that he does not like.

When the Hero is dominated by an aggressive person who hates and wishes to harm him, the Press was scored as Aggression and not Dominance.

For this reason the incidence of Dominance is rather low and is mainly associated with the Themes of Guilt and Quarrel, in which the Hero is dominated by his mother (picture No. 1). Although this category had to be introduced as this kind of Press occurred in a few of the stories in each group of subjects, there are no significant, or even suggestive, differences between the groups in this respect.

Aggression

The Hero is threatened, imprisoned, injured or killed. He is hated, slandered or ridiculed, physically assaulted or ill-treated. His property is destroyed, the members of his family are attacked or killed.

Usually this category covers cases in which the Hero is merely criticized or reprimanded, or incurs the anger of some person in his environment (498). But so great is the difference between this mild kind of emotional or verbal Aggression and the kind of

Aggression suffered by most of the Heroes in the stories collected in this research (being beaten to death by S.S. guards, imprisonment, ill-treatment, etc.) that some distinction had to be made. In all the cases of usual family discord the Press was scored as Rejection and/or Dominance. This could not be done, of course, in the case in which family discord leads to the murder of the son by his father (this story is given in full below); and where the Thema has nothing to do with the usual topic of the prodigal son criticized and dominated or rejected by his mother, or of a girl deserted by her lover.

Aggression exceeds in frequency all the other categories of Press in most groups of subjects, and some significant differences between the various groups were found. While in some groups of subjects there is not only Aggression in the Press, but Affiliation as well (e.g. the Hero is imprisoned by the Germans, but also loved by his family), in other subjects the same pictures represent Aggression alone—nobody either loves the Hero or cares to help him. Very often Aggression affects not only the Hero but his family as well.

Lack

There are two subdivisions of *Lack* wherein the Hero lacks sources of gratification: he is poor or alone; his family is destitute; he has no success, no opportunities, no friends; and where the Hero loses something: a member of his family dies, he becomes destitute, loses his job, etc.

This category applies only to cases in which lack or loss is not caused by aggression. When, for instance, the Hero's property is lost through enemy action, the score was Aggression and Aggression only. But if the Hero is poor and, in addition, the Germans kill his brother, both *Lack* and Aggression were scored.

Death occurs in many of the stories. In such a case it was always ascertained whether the character concerned had died a natural death, or whether he had been murdered; the scoring of Aggression or *Lack* in the Press often depended on the cause of the death in the story.

Affiliation

The Hero has loving parents, relatives, or friends, or congenial company. He is loved, guided, helped, supported, nursed, protected, etc.

Affiliation in the Press is comparable in frequency only to Aggression. Usually both are present (e.g. the Hero has not only a loving mother, but also threatening enemies); and in the majority of cases the forces in the Press representing Aggression are stronger than those representing Affiliation (e.g. the Hero is deported,

while the loving mother is left behind, etc.). In some of the groups Aggression often stands alone (i.e. the Hero has enemies but no friends); in others, Affiliation is stronger than Aggression in the Press. Hence, it is the relative strengths of Affiliation and Aggression and their inter-relationship, rather than their mere individual occurrence, that is important in our material; and that enables us to differentiate between groups of subjects with different backgrounds of displacement, or other important characteristics.¹

Sex

The Hero has a mutual love affair, he is successful in getting attention from members of the opposite sex. He is courted or seduced (this applied mainly to female subjects). This variable in the Press occurred mainly in conjunction with Sex in the Hero and with Love in the Thema.

Sex in the Press (like Sex in the Hero) is not frequent enough to draw any conclusions on its significance for different groups of subjects. It is interesting to note, however, that while in individual stories Sex was often positively associated with Affiliation, there was a general trend to *more* stories with the Thema of Love, with Sex in both Hero and Press, in those groups of subjects in which Affiliation (in Thema, Hero and Press) was *less* frequent.

(d) *Thema*

Eight categories were used:

Personal Frustration

In which the Hero himself is frustrated: deported, imprisoned, ill-treated, left alone, unsuccessful, ill, unemployed, etc.

This Thema is often associated with the next, namely:

Family Frustration

In which the members of Hero's family are threatened or deprived. In some groups the Hero's frustration was emphasized, the other members of his family being mentioned, while in the other groups the stories mainly contained facts relating to the subject's families and their misfortunes.

Both the above Themas are sometimes associated with the third:

Family Affiliation

Here the Hero enjoys the presence and love of his family. If a previous deportation is mentioned, but the whole story consists of the moment of re-union, with a description of mutual love, happi-

¹ A quotation from Rapaport (536) may be appropriate here: 'It is not the statistical frequency of a single motif, but rather the meaningful inter-relationship of several motifs, which here directs our understanding.'

ness and joy, a score of 'Family Affiliation' only was given. When, however, Personal or Family Frustrations are also described, they were scored as well; and when the story is mainly about frustration, and a family re-union is mentioned only at the end, as the happy outcome to a generally sad story, no score for 'Family Affiliation' was given, and the family re-union was reflected only in the score of 'Good Outcome'. Finally, there are a few stories in which the Thema is that of 'Family Affiliation', but the Outcome is bad—the picture may represent a happy family living in harmony and love, but at the end of the story a death or some other misfortune occurs.

Love

The Themas in this category contain love affairs only. Mutual tenderness between mother and son, brothers and sisters, etc., is scored as 'Family Affiliation'. But if the Hero gets married, or wants to, or forms a liaison of sexual character, the Thema is scored as 'Love'.

This Thema is rather infrequent in my material.

Achievement

The story describes the Hero's successes, the realization of his ambitions, the moment of victory over his enemies, etc.

This Thema is important since though it does not occur at all in certain groups of subjects, it is relatively frequent in other groups.

The most significant differences occur in the stories given for the blank card. Here some groups tend to recall their past frustrations, while others outline their future achievements.

Guilt

This Thema is not, on the whole, very frequent in my material, and occurs mainly in the stories given by male subjects to picture No. 1. The plot is scored 'Guilt' when the Hero's misdemeanours and his guilt feelings are the main feature, whether he subsequently submits, rebels or is forgiven.

Some of the differences in regard to Guilt Themas between the groups are suggestive.

Quarrel

A very rare Thema in which the Hero quarrels with his relatives (usually mother), friends or lover. Quarrel stories are generally not very dramatic in my material, and the difference between the groups are not even suggestive.

When the Hero's guilt feelings are emphasized in a story containing a quarrel, the Thema is scored as Guilt, and not as Quarrel.

Revenge

Here guilt feelings are often mentioned, but are not ascribed to the Hero. It is his enemies, usually the Germans, who feel remorse, regret and fear of punishment. Nevertheless, they are justly punished by the Hero, or his friends or allies. Punishment may, however, take place without the emotions of the offender being described; or the Hero may wish to take revenge, but be unable to do so. This Thema is associated with Aggression in both Hero and Press.

In the whole material there are only four stories in which, in the end, the enemy is not punished but is forgiven by the Hero. Those stories are entered under a separate sub-group of the main Thema of Revenge.

(e) Outcome

The Outcomes were grouped under three main headings: Good Outcome, in which the Hero obtains satisfaction; Neutral Outcome, in which the Hero is not gratified, but either submits, compromising between two incompatible needs, or gains no real benefit from his enemies' punishment; and Bad Outcome, in which the Hero dies, or remains frustrated.

Good Outcome

The following categories were used:

Adequacy in which the Hero succeeds because he is adequate (stronger than his enemies, intelligent, industrious, etc.);

Help in which final success is due to the external help of friends, or relatives; and

Luck in which the Hero succeeds simply because he is lucky, e.g. the war ends and he is liberated (but his liberators are not mentioned), or he finds the members of his family alive, his home destroyed, etc.

Whenever the Hero's success is due to two factors each is scored as one-half (for instance, if the Hero is clever and has powerful allies, the score would be: one-half Adequacy and one-half Help).

Whenever some of the needs of the Hero are gratified, while others are not (e.g. the Hero is liberated, but his mother dies), the appropriate categories of Good and Bad Outcome are each scored one-half. In no case was it found necessary to apply more than two categories of Outcome to one story.

Half-scores were introduced to facilitate the calculation of the Index of Optimism (see below).

Neutral Outcome

Only two categories were used, namely:

Punishment in which S.S. men or other Germans, Russians, etc.,

are punished, and revenge is achieved, but the Hero has no other gratification (indeed, often the Hero has already been killed, and the punishment takes place after his death); and *Submission* in which the Hero submits to the wishes of another person (usually his mother) whom he finds justified; he overcomes frustration (e.g. forgets a woman whom he wants to marry against his mother's wishes), but does not get real satisfaction (e.g. remains unmarried). In most cases Sex is the need renounced in order to satisfy the need of Affiliation.

Bad Outcome

Five categories of Bad Outcome were used:

Punishment in which the Hero is justly punished, remains frustrated, and does not reform;

Inadequacy in which the Hero is unsuccessful (but is not punished) because he is inadequate;

Enemies in which the bad ending is not due to the inadequacy of the Hero but to the power and ruthlessness of his enemies;

Bad Luck in which no person causes the bad ending, but the Hero is frustrated nevertheless (e.g. the firm in which he works goes bankrupt and he loses his job);

No Outcome in which the frustrating situation described in the story continues—there is no further development, no real ending, but the Hero remains unhappy and nothing can change his position. If, however, the continuing situation is satisfactory to the Hero, it was scored not under this category, but as a Good Outcome. No corresponding category was introduced into the Good Outcome since any situation which continued throughout the story without change, was usually frustrating. When a situation was satisfactory, the story usually had a definite ending also satisfactory: a 'Happy Ending'.¹

Sad endings scored 'No Outcome' are very frequent in certain groups of subjects, especially in response to the Blank Card: the subject describes himself in a D.P. camp, where he is unhappy and has no opportunities for success; the future seems to him as blank as the card he is holding before his eyes.

Index of Optimism

The Index of Optimism is the ratio of the number of definitely Good Outcomes to the number of definitely Bad Outcomes (Neutral Outcomes omitted). When the number of Good Outcomes equals that of Bad Outcomes, the Index of Optimism is 100.

¹ Coleman (157), studying the effect of recent experience on the T.A.T. performance found that 41 per cent of the 477 stories with a discernible outcome changed from an unhappy plot to a happy ending. Less than 3 per cent turned a happy plot into an unhappy outcome.

When there are more Good Outcomes, the Index is greater than 100, when there are more Bad Outcomes it is lower (in the case of Jewish delinquents who had been to concentration camps it dropped to as low as 27). No group of Displaced Persons reached an Index of 100, but non-delinquent men, with a background of the milder forms of oppression, had an Index of 97.5.

(f) *A test of the reliability of the interpretation*

To test the reliability of the scoring the above description of the variables used in this study was presented to Miss P. A. Sandiford who kindly agreed to collaborate in this experiment. After a period of practice scoring with the use of the variables and of the method of interpretation used in this study, the following procedure was adopted.

Miss Sandiford took singly, and at random, thirty T.A.T. stories from the material collected in this research. All the stories were in Polish with their English translation (by Mrs. Barbara Bannert, former translator to the Polish Foreign Ministry in London) written underneath. Only stories of male subjects were used, but Miss Sandiford was unaware of the displacement history or other characteristics (e.g. delinquency) of the subject whose story she was going to examine. The stories were scored by her according to the method and definitions adopted by the present writer. After the experiment the scores given by the writer and by Miss Sandiford were compared. If a variable was entered by one examiner but not by the other, a disagreement was noted. When Miss Sandiford was not clear about my definition and unable to reach a decision, half disagreement was noted. The stories concerned represented subjects of all types of displacement, delinquents as well as non-delinquents.

The stories were scored for 31 variables each. Thus the sum total of the variables scored (for 30 stories) was 930, only 27½ of which proved to be disagreements, the rest (902½) being agreements.

This high percentage of agreement (over 97 per cent) can be explained, I think, by several factors:

Miss Sandiford had been trained in Psychology, but not in the use of the T.A.T., and she was therefore able to adopt the writer's method of scoring without any preconceptions of her own.

All the variables were clearly defined, and adapted to the material obtained in the course of this study.¹

No attempt was made to seek any 'deep' interpretations. The scoring was concerned with obvious, perhaps rather superficial

¹ Cf. a study by Ericson (208) in which she urges well defined criteria for interpreting the T.A.T., and an article by Sisk (639) emphasizing the need for quantification of the T.A.T. material. A general discussion of this problem is given by Bott (96).

characteristics. A scoring system based on such superficial data as frequency of certain words or the number of words per story would certainly give as much as 100 per cent agreement; while a very deep interpretation would leave much room for individual judgement and projection on the part of the interpreter.

The stories obtained in the course of this research left very little room for doubt. Little was merely implied—nearly everything was overtly expressed. There were no cases in which the character with whom the testee identified himself could be doubted. The central figure was usually the object of a wholehearted identification and when this was not the case it was invariably either a hated person (e.g. S.S.-man), or a mother standing at the grave of her son.

(g) *The scoring factors and the level of personality*

All the scoring factors used in this research refer to the content of the stories and not to their formal characteristics. The dynamic content (what the subject imagines) is more important from our point of view than the form of the story (how he organizes his images, constructs a coherent plot, etc.), and this is therefore reflected in the scoring.

In addition, the analysis is contentual as opposed to structural. From the scores obtained we cannot simply measure a subject's aggressiveness, for instance, by noting the frequency with which Aggression occurs in the Hero. If we could, we should get some idea of the structure of the individual's mind. What we get instead is a picture of the subject's perception of the world, of himself in this world and the interaction between the two (Press, Hero and Thema). Thus the T.A.T. is used here not as a diagnostic instrument, but rather as an explanatory technique in conjunction with the Picture-Frustration Study.¹ The P.F.S. outlined the structure of the subject's mind, disclosed the relative strength of various tendencies at the level of action, and could be used for direct, if approximate, prediction of behaviour. The T.A.T., on the other hand, was used only for the comparative study of groups,² and, instead of depicting their members' ten-

¹ Jaques (349) and Rosenzweig (571) suggest that the exploration of unconscious dynamics is the main use of the T.A.T., as opposed to the Rorschach, which is used mainly for psychiatric diagnosis. Shakow, Rodnick and Lebeaux (630) suggest the P.F.S. for structural analysis of the affective function of the mind under conditions of stress, while the T.A.T. may be useful in both structural and contentual analysis, its unique value, however, lying in the contentual analysis under stress.

² While in the P.F.S. the individuals were assessed as separate units and then grouped together, here it was felt that we cannot make any assessment of the individual on the basis of his four T.A.T. stories. In the T.A.T. analysis, therefore, the groups of subjects were treated as units from the beginning. In the P.F.S. the assessment of a group went through the individuals, in the T.A.T. it was made directly from the stories.

dencies at the level of action, it showed their deeper feelings and their perception of the world which together provide *underlying motivation* for their actions.

There are several reasons why the T.A.T. is considered to reveal a deeper level of personality, while the P.F.S. measures the more superficial level of action:

It has been said, particularly in Murray's Manual (498) that the purpose of the T.A.T. is to reveal 'some of the dominant drives, emotions, sentiments, complexes and conflicts of a personality'. Special value is claimed to lie 'in its power to expose the underlying inhibited tendencies which the subject, or patient, is not willing to admit, or can not admit because he is unconscious of them'. It is also claimed (*Ibidem*) that 'the content of a set of T.A.T. stories represents second level, covert (i.e., inner and middle layer) personality, not first level, overt or public (i.e., outer layer) personality'. Some of the needs revealed by the T.A.T. have been found to correlate negatively with overt behaviour, while for the needs of Aggression and Achievement, very important in our material, there is 'no correlation at all' (*Ibidem*). Similarly White and Sanford (724) regard the T.A.T. as the method 'designed to penetrate somewhat below the peripheral personality and to disclose latent strivings, images, and sentiments which the subject would be unwilling or unable to embody in a direct communication'; while Tomkins (689) claims that 'the T.A.T. is more than an X-ray. It is an X-ray of the more crucial areas of personality.' These claims have been confirmed by studies of neurotic and psychiatric patients by Balken and Masserman (42, 453), Balken and Vander Veer (43, 44), and others. The Picture Frustration Study, on the other hand, attempts, according to its author, 'to evaluate typical modes of response in everyday situations of stress'. It is said to represent only (578) 'a limited projective procedure for disclosing patterns of response', and may be considered, therefore, to be more superficial than the T.A.T.

Although the P.F.S. pictures present situations which can be interpreted in several ways, they are not as ambiguous as the T.A.T. pictures. The P.F.S. situations are ordinary, everyday, concrete, and they are not dramatic at all, while the T.A.T. pictures are vague, very ambiguous, and rather dramatic in character. For that reason P.F.S. projections may be considered to be taken from that level of personality which deals with common, everyday problems (level of action), while the T.A.T. projections may be supposed to be taken from the level of fantasy, a 'deeper' level than the former.

This supposition was also confirmed by the observation of the subjects tested in the course of the present research. While taking the P.F.S. test the subjects would examine each picture-situation,

and, as with a sudden realization of its meaning, would write down a few words, which—so it appeared to the investigator—were their first reactions to it. While taking the T.A.T. test the subjects appeared to be taking each picture as a stimulus only, and would then think vaguely, more in images than in words (they often explicitly admitted 'seeing' images which were difficult to put into words), often in a way very close to day-dreaming. Their facial expressions seemed to reveal more personal involvement and 'deeper' emotions than when they were taking the P.F.S.

We may say that a test stimulating day-dreaming, fantasy, and deep emotions, reveals a deeper level of personality than a test eliciting relatively simple reactions.

The fact that the T.A.T. and the P.F.S. measure different personality levels has important consequences for the implications of this research. Some of these will be discussed below. Here I shall only suggest that any test or combination of tests tapping two layers of mental apparatus provides an excellent measure of personality integration and insight: a well integrated person will have similar needs and desires at all levels; but one who fears his own impulses will deny their existence and will project them on to objects and people in his environment.

2. THE DELINQUENTS

(a) *Illustrative cases and general comments*

Clarity of exposition seems to demand an immediate presentation of some illustrative cases, and this will provide a straightforward introduction to the subsequent analysis of the material. The testees were thirty Polish delinquents, held in German prisons for various offences committed under U.S.A. jurisdiction since the end of the war. They were grouped into two equated samples, one with a history of labour in industry and agriculture, the other with a history of detention in concentration camps. T.A.T. stories were also obtained from four Jewish delinquents with a history of concentration camp detention.

The following cases, taken at random, appear to be fairly representative of the whole sample:

Group: Polish. *Background:* Industry and Agriculture.¹

CASE NO. 1

Picture No. 1

'A mother is troubled. Her son has to go away either to a concentration camp or to forced labour. He does not know if or when

¹ 'Background: Industry and Agriculture' means that the particular subject had been deported *either* to industry or to agriculture, and he was grouped into a sample containing both these categories of displacement.

he will see his family again. He has to say good-bye to them. He thinks he is going to a concentration camp and will perhaps die there.

'The son says good-bye, and leaves. He will be deported for many years; he will write letters, and wonder if he will ever return to his own family.'

Picture No. 2

'A son is saying good-bye to his mother. The son himself does not know where he is going, if to a concentration camp or to forced labour. He thinks that he will come back only if the Americans one day liberate him. He does not know what will become of him, or if he will be ill-treated. His mother is sad; he is her only son and she has to part from him and does not know if she will set eyes on him again.

'Later this mother will always be thinking of her son, wondering if he is all right and whether he will come back, and she will pray for his return. And so it will continue. The mother will always be waiting and worrying, and praying for his liberation and return, and will not know if she will ever see him again.'

Picture No. 3

'A mother is standing by the grave of her son or daughter who died in a concentration camp. She asks herself what is left in life for her, now that her only child is dead. She remembers how it used to be when they lived together in their own country. And wonders who will help her now as the son or daughter did who is dead. She will go on thinking about these things like this until her thoughts overcome her completely.'

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'When I was liberated by the Americans I was glad to be free after six years, and thought I would soon see my people again—but meanwhile I got sent to prison. My mother is certainly waiting, thinking that her son¹ will come back at any moment. She does not know what has happened to him, whether he is alive, or perhaps is dead, or if he will return. Perhaps they will meet again after a few more years; she too thinks that he has perhaps been set free, but either does not want or is unable to return. So she will go on waiting for the moment to come and will always be thinking of her son.'

Group: Polish. *Background:* Industry and Agriculture

CASE NO. 2

Picture No. 1

'The Gestapo have entered the building and have arrested this woman's son. Now she is afraid they will kill her son in the lethal

¹ This change of person is characteristic of the subject's approach. In many stories 'I' changes into 'he' or 'they', or vice versa.

car. Her other son is standing there and they have just come for him.

'They will take him away too, either to the lethal car or to the concentration camp, and their mother will not see them any more.'

Picture No. 2

'Here are two men who are whispering to one another about some political secret. They are talking about how it will all end. They were previously caught and arrested and are now in a concentration camp. They will not survive and will die in the camp.'

Picture No. 3

'This is a man who has committed a crime and now has to answer for it. All these graves are those of his victims who were all tortured to death. Now he is thinking that the same fate awaits him. Now he in turn must pay the death penalty for the destruction of innocent people.'

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I am a prisoner here. I am alone, and am thinking that my family at home must be in despair because they think that I am dead. There is no way out of this situation. I cannot send them news, nor can I go back to such friends as those who took half of Poland from us.'

The above cases illustrate very well how the same *Themas*, the same forces in the *Hero* and in the *Press*, and the same or similar *Outcomes* run through all the stories of a subject. There is no essential difference between stories in which the subject describes the persons in the picture and their problems, and those in which he describes his own picture and personal problems. They are the same problems and the work of projection in the test situation is apparent.

These cases also illustrate how similar are the stories of different subjects belonging to the same group.

Most of the above stories and indeed most of the other stories in the same sample, represent the *Hero* in a state of Dejection, often combined with Affiliation, and represent the *Press* as containing both Aggression and Affiliation. The *Themas* given above are of Personal and Family Frustration (the most frequent *Themas* in the whole sample), and the *Outcome* in each case is definitely bad. Either the *Hero* is killed by his enemies, or the frustrating situation is not resolved ('And so it will continue. The mother will always be waiting and worrying and praying . . . '—Case No. 1, Picture No. 2).

The third story of Case No. 2 represents a different situation. Here there is no *Hero* with whom the subject identifies himself

(unless the whole nation can be taken as representing the subject), and the Thema is that of Revenge. This is a relatively frequent Thema in the delinquent groups, whether the background be labour or concentration camps. The following stories illustrate the same problem:

Group: Polish. *Background:* Industry and Agriculture

CASE NO. 3

Picture No. 3

'A man is sitting in his flat and remembering how he himself was in a concentration camp; he imagines himself at the cemetery where he will have to suffer for all the crimes he committed, for all those he put to death and beat up and tortured. This Camp Warden is a German.

'Now he will have to suffer for all those whom he murdered, and he knows a heavy punishment awaits him.'

Group: Polish. *Background:* Concentration camps

CASE NO. 1

Picture No. 3

'This is a Nazi standing and looking at all the graves for which he himself is responsible. Now he is worried and afraid he will be brought before the American law to answer for his crime.

'This is why he is sorry. They will hang him for what he did.'

The following story shows that the Thema woven into Picture No. 3 continues in the Blank Card, and is apparently dominating the subject's mind:

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I am sitting here and thinking: thinking how the Germans murdered people and stole their property, and how I can now avenge myself. This is how it will end, when we get out of here, that's what we must do. There are still many scoundrels about guilty of murder and not yet arrested. The person who got me arrested is still alive in Poland.'

The following story is rather unusual in that the mother has taken the role of avenger:

Group: Polish. *Background:* Concentration camps

CASE NO. 5

Picture No. 3

'A mother is standing by a grave in the cemetery. She lost her husband in a concentration camp. She is praying for them. She thinks what wretchedness the Germans brought to the whole world, how they murdered so many thousands of innocent people.

'She thinks that the Germans should be treated as they treated others. Perhaps she will kill some German afterwards.'

This strong need for revenge, so great as to be transferred even on to the mother, is also reflected in the story of the Blank Card.

Case as above

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I only wish I could meet the German who murdered my parents. I think how the Americans treat them well for all that they did to us. I myself saw the Gestapo murdering and torturing people, and suffered myself. I still see it, but don't see myself in this picture.'

Finally, the following story, given by a Jewish subject, presents the same Thema in a different form:

Group: Jewish. Background: Concentration camps

CASE NO. 1

Picture No. 3

'This is a cemetery, above which is the spirit of God, speaking to the dead and telling them not to worry or be sorrowful, for they fell for their faith and for God, and at the hands of barbarians. But vengeance was already overtaking that barbarous nation that fought against Christianity and all religion. The day of the Resurrection will come, and they will be witnesses when judgement is passed on the barbarians.'

The following case represents a slightly different pattern of responses in each of the subject's four T.A.T. stories:

Group: Polish. Background: Industry and Agriculture

CASE NO. 4

Picture No. 1

'A mother and son. The son is a waster, perhaps he threw his money away on girls. His mother told him that he ought to give up his bad ways, but it was no good, and she turned him out and expelled him from the family. She wants nothing more to do with him. Now she is crying and lamenting that she took such trouble in bringing him up and now he is such a scoundrel. It is hard that she had but one son, who was her only consolation, and now she will remain alone. This is the moment when they are parting. The son understands that he has done wrong and is sorry. He does not know what to do. But he will ask his mother to forgive him and leave his bad ways. No—he won't, he will take himself off.' (The subject said this decidedly and in a raised voice.)¹

¹ Here is a more sophisticated version of the same Thema, given by a subject with university education:

'My life has not been an easy one. I tried to rise to the top. I did not always take the honest—in your opinion—straightforward road. I could be brutal and used those surrounding me to attain my needs and desires. That is why I am a rich man to-day. Forget that I left you, Mother. That you saw nothing of me for so many years—it was against your will, certainly, that I went out into the world. Let us forget this. You see that riches have not brought me the satisfac-

Picture No. 2

'Here are a man and a woman. They loved one another dearly. He went to the war, or some misfortune separated them and now they are re-united after a long absence. They embrace one another, happy to be together again. Now they will be happy together and nothing will separate them.'

Picture No. 3

'This is Katyn.¹ Those are the graves of men who fell for the glory of their country. They are forsaken by all, these murdered ones. Perhaps they fought for the good of humanity, or for their native land. When they died, no one was with them, they were forsaken. They had to leave their nearest and dearest, sweethearts, wives or children. They died to save others and now they sleep peacefully in the ground, and only crosses remain to show that they were at one time on this earth.

'This man is a patriot, and his deeds, thoughts and spirit are the same as theirs. He has understood, and is standing thinking of all this, of the whole tragedy. He thinks that he too is a man, and must return to dust like these others. And perhaps he thinks of someone dear to him, lying in some foreign soil. Man is dust and must return to dust. This man is old and will also die before long.'

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'It is 2.30 a.m. The Gestapo have come to take away the whole family. The German is arrogant, insolent and brutal. . . . My mother is crying: I am prepared for anything.

'Then they put us into a lorry and took us away. They shouted at tion in life that I hoped for. Perhaps it is because I possess them. Happiness seems to lie in striving and struggling—not in possessing. I must nevertheless do something. I sucked in scruples with the milk of your breast, and to-day they are reviving in me. I am your son, unchanged. I am returning to you, seeking your heart, to warm and perhaps to touch mine. You know how cold the world is. It does not reject, but it does not accept either. Do you forgive me, then? I must tell you once again in all fairness that in the course of my career I have permitted myself deeds which do not recall the sweet-smelling innocent flowers of our meadows. Once in a passion I killed a man who had offended me. I ask you for nothing—that would be foreign to my nature. I only ask—do you accept or reject me?

'You have turned away from me. Ha—your eternal aristocratic pride cannot reconcile itself to what I say. I will go, then—but, remember, I shall not come back again. I sometimes think that in your stony pride you are no mother, but arrogance personified. I know that even now you are praying for me, and that you suffer—and yet you repulse me. So you will remain alone: I am going into the battle of life, into the soulless world. If I become a man of stone, this will be your work, Mother. To-day repentance would still have been possible. Farewell, Mother.'

¹ A place in the U.S.S.R. where most of 13,000 Polish officers, captured by the Russians during their collaboration with Nazi Germany, were shot.

us and treated us brutally, but promised that things would not be too bad. There were sick people and children crying; but they had no pity. They pushed us into cattle trucks and took us to the concentration camp. In the camp we slept on the ground and there were bugs crawling on the walls.'

In the first story the Thema of Guilt is introduced—the Hero is rejected and does not reform. This Thema is relatively frequent in the Polish Delinquent sample with a background of labour, very frequent in the Jewish Delinquent sample and in other Jewish subjects with concentration camp experience, but completely absent in the Polish Delinquent sample with a background of concentration camps.

Story No. 2 combines a Thema of Family Affiliation—relatively less frequent in both Delinquent samples—with Affiliation in both Hero and Press, and with a Good Outcome. The last two stories do not essentially differ from those previously presented. They represent the usual pattern of a state of Dejection in the Hero, Affiliation in both Hero and Press, strong Aggression in Press, and a Thema of Personal and Family Frustration.

Finally the following is a rather exceptional story which was found impossible to score:

Picture No. 2

'A man and woman have met in a café. He asked her to dance. Now he asks her to go away with him. But she is married and does not know what to do. But I think she will do it. She will leave her husband and go with him.'

It is possible that the subject identified himself with the seducer; but it may well be, that the Hero is the deserted husband, and that, therefore, he does not appear in this story. It is also possible that there is a double identification, with both the seducer and the deserted husband; and that the seducer, although successful, feels guilty and is unhappy. So we do not really know who is the Hero, what are the forces in him and in the Press, what is the Thema (from the point of view of the subject it may not be a Thema of Love, but of Personal Frustration), and whether or not the Outcome is successful. The story is too short and too ambiguous for satisfactory scoring and was therefore not included in the statistical elaboration.

(b) *Statistical analysis*

As with the P.F.S., the T.A.T. study of the delinquent groups provides no adequate basis for estimating the influence of a particular type of displacement. The whole prison population is so highly selected that a background of one type of displacement or another is relatively unimportant. The scoring patterns are very

similar, and any difference may be due to chance only. The frequencies found in the two groups of Polish delinquents, of fifteen subjects each, are as follows:

	<i>Ind. and Conc. Agri. Camps</i>			<i>Ind. and Conc. Agri. Camps</i>	
THE HERO			THE PRESS		
Abasement	3	1	Rejection	5	1
Intraggression	6	0	Dominance	2	1
Aggression	7	6	Aggression	46	45
Dejection	42	50	Lack	7	10
Affiliation	24	16	Affiliation	30	24
Sex	2	3	Sex	1	3
Dominance	2	3			
THE THEMA			THE OUTCOME		
Person. Frustration	30	35	Good: Adequacy	0	1½
Family Frustration	22	30	Help	1	3½
Family Affiliation	11	7	Luck	11	11
Love	2	2	Neutral: Punishment		
Achievement	0	3	of enemy	3	3
Guilt	6	0	Submiss. of Hero	3	0
Quarrel	0	0	Bad: Pun. of Hero	3	0
Revenge	5	5	Inadequacy	3½	0
			Enemies	15½	17
			Bad Luck	0	4
			No outcome	18	20

The *Index of Optimism* is low for both groups: thirty and thirty-one respectively. Suggestive differences between the groups are¹:

A complete absence of the Guilt Thema in stories of subjects with a background of concentration camps. In this particular the sample of Polish delinquents from concentration camps is a unique one—in all other male samples there are at least a few stories with this Thema and the corresponding Intraggression in the Hero. It looks as if these subjects who had been detained in concentration camps felt that they had already atoned for all their sins: they cannot ascribe any guilt to themselves at either the P.F.S. level, or at that of the T.A.T. In this respect they differ from their controls, who had not suffered under such extreme oppression and who, although not intropunitive at the level of action, at least occasionally feel guilty at the deeper level of the T.A.T.² As the frequencies of Guilt

¹ A definition of the term 'suggestive' has been given elsewhere (p. 117 footnote).

² A discussion on the layers of personality from which the T.A.T. projections are assumed to have been made has been given in the Part I, Chapter 3. The difference between the T.A.T. and the P.F.S. in this respect has been discussed above (p. 188 ff.).

and Intraggression are so small in the Industry and Agriculture sample and are absent in the concentration camp group, the significance of this difference could not be measured.

There is more Dejection in the Hero in the group with concentration camp experience. This agrees with the data on ordinary D.P. population where again ex-inmates of concentration camps showed more dejection in their stories than did their less violently oppressed controls. Measures of significance were applied to the data obtained from these non-delinquent D.P. subjects and the results are reported in the next section, where the whole problem is discussed in greater detail.

There is less Affiliation in the Hero in the group with concentration camp experience. The study of the non-delinquent D.P. population, which will be discussed in the next Section, showed similar results.

There is less Affiliation in the Press of the concentration camps group. Both groups feel they live in an aggressive world, but while subjects from Industry and Agriculture often feel that there are at least some people who care for them, subjects from concentration camps are more often left quite alone with their oppressors.

Even picture No. 2, interpreted throughout the remainder of my material as depicting two relatives or friends (the facial expressions of the persons on the picture clearly suggest feelings of love rather than hate), was sometimes described in this group as showing two enemies. Thus subject No. 6 described the picture as that of an S.S.-man interrogating a Pole.

In the *Themas*, Personal and Family Frustrations prevail in both groups, but especially so in the concentration camp sample. The *Thema* of Family Affiliation is, on the other hand, *less* frequent among concentration camp subjects. These trends are again in agreement with the study of the non-delinquent D.P. population and will be discussed in detail in the next Section.

All the other differences between the two groups are too small to be even suggestive. In particular, there is practically no difference in the frequency of Aggression in the Hero, and none at all in the frequency of the *Thema* of Revenge. The quality of the Outcomes show a similar pattern: Bad Outcomes prevail, and those which are good, are due to good luck. The slight difference in the Index of Optimism is very far from significant— χ^2 was applied and gave the figure of 0.33753.

χ^2 was applied in the following way. All the Good Outcomes were lumped together, and all the Bad Outcomes were lumped together; Neutral Outcomes were omitted. The 2×2 table was constructed to represent the frequencies obtained (with expected frequencies in brackets). It is considered that this method of calculation tests the significance of the difference between the two

groups in the ratio of Good Outcomes to Bad Outcomes. It was applied throughout the statistical analysis of the T.A.T. results.

	<i>Good Outcome</i>	<i>Bad Outcome</i>	<i>Total</i>
Polish delinquents from Industry and agriculture	12 (13·36)	40 (38·64)	52
Polish delinquents from concentration camps	16 (14·64)	41 (42·36)	57
Total	28	81	109

$$\chi^2 = 0.33753$$

In conclusion, the T.A.T. seems to have revealed a similar pattern of apperception in both groups of Polish delinquents, irrespective of their previous displacement and consequent degree of oppression. There are, also, some differences between the groups, although these are less striking than the similarities. One of them is the absence of the Thema of Guilt in the sample with concentration camp experience, suggesting either a very deep repression of guilt feelings (and of the Super-Ego) in these subjects, or a feeling that by suffering in the camps they have atoned for all their sins, past, present and possibly future. Other differences correspond to the general pattern of differences between subjects representing different degrees of oppression and will be discussed in greater detail in the next Chapter.

The small sample of Jewish delinquents shows a similar pattern of responses, but with one striking difference, namely, the frequency of the Thema of Guilt, which is far greater than in any other sample tested whether delinquent or not, with the corresponding Intraggression in the Hero, and Punishment of the Hero in the Outcome. While the Polish delinquents with concentration camp experience show no Themas of Guilt in seventy-nine Themas, no Intraggression in seventy-nine categories, and no Punishment of the Hero in sixty Outcomes, in the Jewish sample Guilt and Punishment of the Hero shows the highest frequency of all the Themas and Outcomes respectively. In the categories referring to the forces in the Hero Intraggression nearly equals Dejection in the Jewish sample, while in the Polish one there are fifty cases of Dejection and none of Intraggression.

Four delinquent cases are not an adequate basis for any hypothesis. Other Jewish cases, tested in U.N.R.R.A. camps, represent a highly selected group of the most co-operative subjects. If, therefore, we suspect that Jews from concentration camps suffer from a guilt complex, with a strong denial of guilt at the level of action (as reflected in the high scores of extrapunitive and ego-defence

in the P.F.S.), we may also assume that this complex will be less pronounced in these exceptional subjects who were willing to co-operate while all the rest refused. Even among those co-operative subjects, not all finished the whole T.A.T. All of them, however, described picture No. 1, which, in all the groups, suggested the Thema of Guilt more than any other picture. Here again, in spite of their relative willingness to co-operate, the Thema of Guilt proved more frequent than in the stories given by non-Jewish subjects to the same picture. When all the frequencies of the Jewish subjects were lumped together, and all the frequencies of non-Jewish subjects with concentration camp experience were lumped together, a 2×2 table for the measurement of χ^2 could be constructed (expected frequencies in brackets):

	<i>Guilt</i>	<i>Non-Guilt</i>	<i>Total</i>
Jewish males from conc. camps	9 (4.87)	7 (11.13)	16
Polish males from conc. camps	12 (16.13)	41 (36.87)	53
	21	48	69

$$\chi^2 = 5.06395$$

Since this figure is significant at the 0.05 level and is very nearly significant at the 0.02 level, the difference between the groups can hardly be ascribed to chance. (A correction for continuity was applied). Among the sixteen Jewish subjects the Thema of Guilt is definitely more frequent than among the fifty-three Polish concentration camp subjects. There is, therefore, some suspicion of a specific 'guilt complex' in the Jewish group.

This suspicion was strengthened (or rather aroused independently before the statistical calculations were made) by my interviews with the Jewish subjects. I had the feeling that the Jews and the Poles reacted differently when asked about the fate of their relatives. The Poles usually answered in a more or less straightforward way, telling me who in their families survived and where they were, who died or was killed. Although most of the Poles had lost some or even the majority of their close relatives, the reaction to my question on that point was that of grief rather than resentment.

Among the Jews I interrogated this question aroused mainly bitter resentment, often projected against the investigator. The whole question appeared indecent—of course all their relatives had been murdered, all went to gas chambers. How could I ask such stupid questions? The tension produced by that question, quite innocent in itself, made me suspect that the subject felt that he himself was not quite in order in this matter.

When I discussed this problem with Dr. Leo Srole, U.N.R.R.A.

psychologist attached to the big Jewish camp in Landsberg, he put forward a hypothesis based on a much longer and more intimate contact with Jewish Displaced Persons than I had had and could hope to have. This was to the effect that a survival in the concentration camp when all the close relatives (parents in particular) had to die, gave rise to a specific guilt complex. Those subjects, usually young and healthy, who, passing before the S.S. Selection Board, were directed to work in concentration camps when all their relatives examined with them were directed to gas chambers as being no use to the Germans, felt as if *they*, and not the Germans had committed the murder. Some of them did not take advantage of the favourable decision of the Board, and went with their parents, children or siblings. Others took the chance and survived but at the cost of strong guilt feelings, mostly repressed and unconscious and adding another burden to their innumerable sufferings under oppression.

The following case, of a Jewish delinquent I examined in one of the prisons, may illustrate the point:

The subject lost his father, mother and two siblings, much younger than himself, in the gas chamber. Two brothers whom he later contacted died in concentration camps. His only sister, who survived the whole war in a concentration camp, died shortly after the liberation. Not one even of his more distant relatives is alive.

While in the concentration camp he was constantly tortured by thoughts of his family and wanted to commit suicide. It seemed to him that he had sinned greatly in being the only one of them all to be saved. If he had been good, he too would have been put to death, and would not have survived. 'I felt as if it were my duty to follow my family and die too. I only felt it—I *knew* that it was not really so; and in my mind I knew that it was not my fault, and that I should try to hold out.'

During the interview the subject was friendly and co-operative, but very nervous. He was pale and very tense, his voice was trembling, and at times he would stop and blush suddenly. When he was asked to relate two events in the camp which came into his head, he gave the following episode: 'Two fellow-prisoners tried to escape. They were caught and tied to a bus and so dragged back to the camp. They were dead on arrival and their bodies were hung on a tree in the square. In this square we had our evening meal. It was winter time. The serving of the food was specially rearranged so that each of us in turn had to go to fetch his soup from the cauldron. Every man had to pass by the hanging bodies and take a good look at them before getting his soup.'

Then he related another event: 'I was a Play producer in a labour camp. I managed to form a group of eight people and we acted a scene containing strong criticism of the German authorities. In spite

of this, nothing happened to me, except that I was forbidden to appear on the stage again.'

Suddenly he stopped, blushed and muttered: 'We had some concerts and theatre in the camps, you know . . . it is hard to reconcile . . . this German attitude I mean. . . .' Then he described how the German policy in the camps was full of paradoxes, and how they added to the complexities of the camp life. It was obvious, however, that there were other things within himself that the subject found hard to reconcile, and it is plausible that the complicated pattern of aggression, guilt feelings, the wish to die and the will to survive was not specific to this individual, but had a more general character, related to the situation in which Jewish Displaced Persons found themselves under the German domination.

In order to compare the delinquent and 'normal' subjects the frequencies of the various T.A.T. categories in the fifteen delinquents with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture¹ were collated with those of the fifty-five 'normal' Displaced Persons with the same background of displacement.² For a first rough comparison, the frequencies in the larger group ('normal' subjects) were corrected, so that instead of actual frequencies we had those which would be expected if both groups were equal in size (fifteen subjects each). Otherwise, all the frequencies in the large 'normal' group would naturally be greater than in the small delinquent group, and no estimate of difference could be made without further calculation. This correction was only necessary to make a superficial examination of the data easier, and the presentation clearer; but all the statistical elaboration is based on the original scores.

These frequencies are as follows:

	<i>Delin- quent</i>	<i>'Nor- mal'</i>		<i>Delin- quent</i>	<i>'Nor- mal'</i>
THE HERO			THE PRESS		
Abasement	3	2	Rejection	5	1.4
Intr aggression	6	3.5	Dominance	2	5.5
Aggression	7	4.4	Aggression	46	28.4
Dejection	42	38.4	Lack	7	13.7
Affiliation	24	33.5	Affiliation	30	33.5
Sex	2	2.5	Sex	1	1.4
Dominance	2	13.6			

¹ The reasons for comparing only groups with this background are given above (p. 123).

² In the P.F.S. the number of subjects in this group was fifty-seven. The decrease was due to one subject leaving the Kempton camp during the course of the investigation, after having completed the P.F.S. but before the completion of the T.A.T. Although he was in the Concentration Camp group, and therefore of no importance to the calculations here, the controls from the Industry and Agriculture groups had also to be excluded.

THE THEMA	Delin- 'Nor-		THE OUTCOME	Delin- 'Nor-	
	quent	mal'		quent	mal'
Person. Frustration	30	25	Good: Adequacy	0	9
Family Frustration	22	26.6	Help	1	4.2
Family Affiliation	11	15.3	Luck	11	11.9
Love	2	1.4	Neutral: Punishment		
Achievement	0	9.8	of enemy	3	1.1
Guilt	6	3.3	Submiss. of Hero	3	0.5
Quarrel	0	3.5	Bad: Pun. of Hero	3	1
Revenge	5	1.6	Inadequacy	3.5	0
			Enemies	15.5	3.5
			Bad Luck	0	5.4
			No outcome	18	16.1

The *Index of Optimism* is 30 and 97.5 respectively.

Suggestive differences between the groups are:

(i) The delinquents show more Abasement and Intraggression in the Hero than the non-delinquents. Although in action they do not submit to the rules of Society, and when tested at the level of action by the P.F.S. their Intraggression (or Intropunitiveness) is significantly low, at the deeper level of the T.A.T. they seem more inclined to self-blame than do the non-delinquent controls.

(ii) The corresponding Thema of Guilt is also more frequent in the delinquent group. This supports the view that delinquency may be associated with unconscious guilt feelings, although in real conflict situation (or in the quasi-real situations of the P.F.S.) the delinquents deny guilt and accuse others. Unfortunately the frequency is too low for a reliable test of significance to be applied.

(iii) A force in the Hero which may be considered as the opposite to Abasement and Intraggression, is Dominance. In the delinquent group the frequency of this category is extremely low—it occurs in only two subjects, in both of whom it is nearer to the need 'Autonomy' than to 'Achievement' (in one story the Hero feels guilty and wants to submit, but at the same time wants to dominate by resisting coercion; in the other case, the Hero is oppressed and frustrated, and wants to dominate his enemies, but is not successful). In non-delinquents, Dominance in the Hero is frequent and usually associated with a Thema of Achievement. The delinquent group shows no Themas of Achievement at all, while in the controls there are fifty incidents of Dominance, and thirty-six of Achievement.

An attempt was made to measure the significance of the difference between the two groups by applying the χ^2 test to the categories of Abasement and Intraggression lumped together, and opposed to that of Dominance.

The following table (based on the actual figures, without any 'size' correction) was constructed:

	<i>Abase. and Intrag.</i>	<i>Dominance</i>	<i>Total</i>
Polish delinquents from industry and agriculture	9 (3.94)	2 (7.06)	11
Non-delinquents from industry and agriculture	20 (25.06)	50 (44.94)	70
Total	29	52	81

$$\chi^2 = 9.5153$$

A correction for continuity was applied. This figure is highly significant, being, according to Fisher and Yates's tables, near to the 0.001 level, but it must be admitted that the calculation is not entirely satisfactory from the point of view of statistical technique, since one of the expected frequencies is very low. From the common sense point of view, however, the same fact may be regarded as most significant. Still more significant is the complete absence of the Thema of Achievement in the delinquent group, while in the control group the same Thema is quite frequent.

(iv) The delinquent's Heroes show slightly more Aggression than do the Heroes of the non-delinquents. The frequency of Aggression in both groups is rather low, however, and the difference between the groups in this respect is not significant. (In the χ^2 test Aggression was opposed to non-Aggression, i.e. all other forces in the Hero; in another application of the same test it was opposed to Affiliation. Both tests gave non-significant results.)

Aggression in the Heroes of delinquents was associated either with the Thema of Revenge or of Personal Frustration. In both cases it had a character of Counteraction—the Hero was aggressive not because he wanted to hurt somebody, but because he himself had been attacked and was therefore merely counter-attacking.

(v) The Heroes of the delinquent group feel more frequently dejected, and less frequently have anybody whom they love, than do the Heroes of the controls. The difference proved to be non-significant ($\chi^2 = 2.2357$).

(vi) Similarly in the Press the delinquents' Heroes more often encounter Aggression than Affiliation—they live in a more hostile world than do the Heroes of non-delinquents and the difference in this case is significant at the 0.05 level ($\chi^2 = 4.9339$). The frequencies are high enough, the smallest cell being thirty, to consider the measurement fairly reliable.

(vii) The delinquents tell more stories about Rejection by the mother. The frequency of Rejection is still too low to make the measurements reliable, and the χ^2 , based on the categories of Rejection and Non-Rejection in the Press, is not significant. This result

is nevertheless interesting in view of the large amount of criminological evidence for the frequency of rejection in the actual experience of delinquents.¹ We know from other investigations that delinquents are often rejected by their parents—here we may only suggest that they often imagine such rejection. The mothers of the non-delinquents' Heroes fairly frequently dominate their children, but they do not reject them.

Since most of the T.A.T. stories in my material evidently have an autobiographical character, there are some grounds for supposing that my delinquents had suffered rejection in their early life.

It may be significant that delinquents with concentration camp experience, who possibly acquired their criminal tendencies in the camps, do not show Rejection as often as 'normal delinquents'. There was only one story of this kind in the whole group.

(viii) In the Thema, the delinquents seem to be mainly concerned with Personal Frustration, rather than with Family Frustration, while the controls show the opposite tendency. There is also less Family Affiliation among the delinquents.

So, generally speaking, in the Themas of delinquents, Personal Frustration dominates the more successful Themas of Family Affiliation and Achievement. The Heroes mostly suffer, rarely have the good luck of rejoining their families, and never achieve anything positive by their own efforts. The controls show the opposite trend, and the difference between the groups is significant:

	<i>Pers. Frustr.</i>	<i>Fam. Aff. Ach.</i>	<i>Total</i>
Polish delinquents from industry and agriculture	30 (21·80)	11 (19·20)	41
Non-delinquents from industry and agriculture	87 (95·20)	92 (83·80)	179
Total	117	103	220

$\chi^2 = 7.1380$

This figure is significant at the 0·01 level. A correction for continuity was applied.

(ix) In the Outcome the delinquents are definitely more pessimistic than are the non-delinquents. The χ^2 , based on the frequency of Good Outcome as opposed to Bad Outcome, is as high as 12·1929, significant at the 0·001 level. In particular, the Heroes of the delinquent group never succeed because of their own Adequacy, and there is only one case of Help. If they are successful at all, they are merely lucky (eleven cases). In the non-delinquent group the frequencies are: Adequacy 33, Help 15, Luck 43½. Among the

¹ Cf. in particular the studies by Lander (382), Lippman (415), Friedlander (260, 261), Anna Freud (248) and Van Ophuijsen (697), and monographs by Agatha Bowley (97) and Symonds (666).

Bad Outcomes relatively frequent are Punishment of the Hero, his Inadequacy, and the power of his Enemies. Non-delinquents sometimes imagine a Bad Outcome in which nobody is guilty (nineteen cases) while delinquents do not register this category at all.

(c) *Summary of the results and their relation to the P.F. Study*

The Thematic Apperception Test was used in the study of the delinquent D.P. population with two main objectives in mind: (i) to observe, and possibly to measure, the influence of concentration camp experience on delinquents' perception of themselves, of the world around them, and the inter-action of these two; and (ii) to see whether delinquents differ from non-delinquents in respect of this perception, in so far as it is shown by the test.

(i) The study brought positive results, indicating that there is a difference between delinquents with concentration camp experience and those with experience of milder forms of oppression. A similar study using the P.F.S., gave very few positive results in specific attitudes, and none in the general trends.

This fact is worth considering because of its possible implications. The P.F.S. gave, at least in one aspect, the structure of an individual's mind at the 'level of action' (see pp. 188 ff. for the explanation of this term), and at that level no essential difference was found between the two groups of Polish delinquents. Once the individual was in prison, he displayed the same hostility towards the others, the same denial of guilt, the same pessimism, etc., irrespective of his personal history which brought him into prison. But the T.A.T. seems to reveal some processes underlying this mental structure; and while some features of these processes are common to both groups of delinquents, some appear to differentiate between delinquents according to their former displacement.

Since the material from which the T.A.T. stories were constructed is mainly biographical and concerns the recent past, the test reflects their different experience: ex-inmates of concentration camps encountered more dramatic Aggression in actual life, so there is relatively more dramatic Aggression in the Press of their T.A.T. stories and more Frustration in the Thema. They were isolated from their families by physical barriers, and more pre-occupied with personal problems,¹ and so they show less Affiliation in the Hero, in the Press, and in the Thema.

¹ It was evident from the interviews I held both in prisons and in U.N.R.R.A. camps that the inmates of concentration camps relatively quickly suppressed all discussions and even thoughts about their families, while the others did not. The subject of family was 'tabooed' as undermining the morale of the camp. The inmates were also naturally more preoccupied with the everyday struggle for existence. In the P.F.S. the ex-concentration camp delinquents were found significantly more egocentric than other delinquents.

On the other hand 'normal delinquents' more frequently than those with concentration camp experience regard themselves as inadequate, guilty and rejected by their mothers. While those whose criminal behaviour may be mainly attributed to the influence of concentration camp experience had probably less frequently been rejected or found inadequate, and had some achievements to their credit, 'normal delinquents' had had none worth speaking about, and did not expect to have any.

Thus, although at the level of action both groups of delinquents are similar—and so their criminal actions are similar—at the T.A.T. level ex-inmates of concentration camps appear to reveal more frustrating experiences during the war, while 'normal delinquents' revealed more frustrating experiences in earlier periods of their life, and more feeling of personal inadequacy.

(ii) The difference between delinquents and non-delinquents as measured by the T.A.T. seems to be even more revealing. The detailed differences between the two groups have been described above: the main characteristic of the delinquent population as opposed to non-delinquent is that their whole perception appears to be coloured by a feeling of the overwhelming power of an inimical Press.

It seems that to the delinquent his Press appears to contain mainly Aggression, while even those whom he loves often reject him. When he is aggressive himself, he gets no satisfaction—he merely counteracts to defend himself or to take revenge. The Press, as it appears to him, brings him Dejection: fear, anxiety and despair. He often tries to submit to this Press and, even in his imagination, he never succeeds in dominating it. The interaction between himself and the Press causes mainly Personal Frustration, the Outcomes are unhappy, and, in particular, he never succeeds because of his own Adequacy or the Help of others—though he may be merely lucky. When he fails—and this is much more often the case—it is due either to the power and wickedness of his Enemies, or to his own Inadequacy, or to a combination of the two (Punishment).

When we compare the results of the T.A.T. study of the delinquents with those of the P.F.S., the difference between the two levels of personality is apparent. At the level of action the delinquent is aggressive (that is, he turns aggression outwards, is extra-punitive in the P.F.S., and also transgresses the law), but at the level of fantasy he is the victim. In his imagination, in his perception of the external world he finds hostility directed against him—and there is much evidence that this type of perception depends not only on the personality of the subject but on actual experience as well. His perception, on which every new experience puts an additional stamp, may be thought of as an underlying motivation

for action in conflict situations. These actions begin at the level of perception—the ultimate reaction of the subject depends on the way in which he views the situation. We know from the P.F.S. that the delinquent perceives the same social situations in a different way from the non-delinquent, and he also reacts to them in a different fashion. If we introduce the notions of cause and effect we might say: the delinquent has a different perception of the world around him and of his own role in this world; that general trend of thought changes his perception of social events in which he is involved and affects his actions. Thus, in a way, the T.A.T. may reveal the causes of the results of the P.F.S.

We can summarize the evidence on the most important variables in the T.A.T. study of the three groups (delinquents from concentration camps, 'normal delinquents', and 'normal D.P.') in the following way:

Both groups of delinquents show a great deal of Aggression in the Press and of Frustration in the Thema. The situations of Aggression and Frustration are particularly dramatic in the stories of delinquents with concentration camp experience.

'Normal delinquents' show particularly strong feelings of personal Inadequacy; and their inimical Press, with strong Aggression and little Affiliation, seems to date from earlier periods of life.

'Normal Displaced Persons' show less Aggression in the Press, less Frustration in the Thema, more successful Themata, more Affiliation (in Hero, Press, and Thema), more Dominance and Achievement, more optimism and feelings of personal Adequacy.

Guilt feelings (Intraggression) and the Themata of Guilt are most frequent in 'normal delinquents', completely absent in those from concentration camps, and infrequent in normal Displaced Persons.

At the P.F.S. level and in superficial interview situations both groups of delinquents showed a lack of guilt feelings, and their Aggression was mainly turned outwards, while 'normal delinquents' showed no feelings on personal inadequacy.

3. DISPLACED PERSONS AND THE LEVEL OF OPPRESSION

(a) *Illustrative cases and general comments*

Happy Themata in my material collected in U.N.R.R.A. camps occurred mainly in the stories of subjects with a relatively less frustrating background of displacement (Industry and Agriculture), and centered almost exclusively around two problems: Achievement and Family Affiliation. The Thema of Love was rather infrequent and not always happy.

The following examples illustrate the Thema of Achievement.

The first one, very naïve, was given by a tailor, and the content is such that it leaves no doubt as to his profession and ambitions:¹

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Agriculture

CASE NO. 9

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I should like times to change, so that I could go on working as a tailor.

'I should have a fine portrait made of myself and should hang it in my own workroom with the caption: "Ladies' and Gentlemen's Tailor".'

The second story is perhaps as naïve but more fantastical, with strong elements of omnipotence of thought:

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Agriculture

CASE NO. 17

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I hear on the wireless that Stalin is dead. I return to Poland, join the fight for independence, organize armed risings, arrest the present government, make contact with other enslaved nations to join in the armed struggle against Communism. The Allies give us assistance. In this way we regain our independence.'

Among several stories of this character, containing the Thema of Achievement at the level of omnipotence² none is given by a subject with a background of concentration camp or delinquency. One might have expected the opposite: that most frustrated individuals will compensate in wishful thinking, and that those who are inadequate will be omnipotent in the T.A.T. stories. My material shows a definite trend in the other direction: those groups of subjects which give more stories of Achievement at the level of reality (where they are successful in business, acquire knowledge, organize, etc.) also give stories of Achievement at the level of omnipotence. The others have no Achievement at all: neither modest and real, nor great and fantastical.

The Themas of Family Affiliation are only frequent in groups with a background of the milder types of oppression. The stories are usually very similar in character, with strong forces of Affiliation in the Hero and in the Press.

¹ It is, of course, realized that this simple and naïve 'story' may have a deeper meaning as well, and a deep analysis might be very fruitful—but none was attempted as it would go beyond the scope of the investigation.

² In one of them the subject gives no picture of himself: he 'cannot be seen' as he is a good spirit who governs the world and brings peace and security to all people.

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Industry and Agriculture

CASE NO. 7

Picture No. 2

'A father, greeting his son after a long absence, clasped him in his arms with such emotion as only a father can feel. The son, who also loves his father dearly, returned his embrace and they stood for a moment in one another's arms. The father was the first to realize that his beloved son would also want to embrace his mother and greet the other members of the family. He took his son's hand and they went quickly home to continue their mutual rejoicing in the bosom of the family after the long absence.'

The above story with only slight variations was given by numerous subjects with a background of displacement in Industry and Agriculture, male and female, in all U.N.R.R.A. camps. The picture evoking fantasies of Family Affiliation was usually picture No. 2, but not infrequently the Blank Card or even picture No. 1—the fact that the elderly woman on this picture stands with her back turned to the young man is interpreted as her being too happy to speak to him; the young man's perplexed expression either is not noticed or commented upon, or is dismissed as unimportant: he has just remembered somebody who has died but essentially he is happy and everything will be all right.¹

In several stories given to the Blank Card there is no proper Family Affiliation, but the Hero is back in his fatherland: he can see his native town, the Cathedral, the river under the old castle, people walking towards the Holy Picture of God's Mother, etc., and the emotional experience of giving such a story appears to be as deep as in the stories in which the Hero meets his parents and relatives.²

¹ In female subject's stories the Heroine more often is meeting her husband or lover, and not her parents. In the story below the whole Thema has a definite sexual element, absent in the stories of male subjects which were scored Family Affiliation:

'I am standing in a train and suddenly meet my beloved. We are standing by the window of a moving train. We kiss one another and talk of the past, and of how we had already no more hope of seeing one another again. He had already despaired of our ever meeting again. We are tremendously happy and continually kiss one another. Through the windows we can see the tree-covered Alps, gardens and beautiful country.'

² The example given above was taken from a story related by a subject deported from Wilno, a town in eastern Poland, occupied by the Soviet forces and incorporated into the U.S.S.R. In the story he visits his native town in a plane to avoid arrest and deportation by the Soviet forces. This subject, after having contemplated the card for a while, suddenly exclaimed: 'I can see my picture' and, showing great emotion, started writing the story. The same motive appears also in the story of a female subject, deported from the same district, whose 'whole picture is in the fatherland, in Poland, but not in the Soviet one'.

The following story was told by a village blacksmith who could neither read nor write properly but spoke the beautiful language of the Polish peasants, in a voice trembling with emotion. He was speaking very slowly so that I could take down every word and I was impressed by the depth and directness of his feelings:

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Agriculture

CASE NO. 10

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'My fatherland is the mirror in which I always see myself; this picture is still before my eyes, I cannot help seeking myself in its reflection. My native village is the image of my country. In this picture I see that sooner or later I will be there again and will breathe that air that I have longed for through so many years.'

Unhappy stories describing the *present frustrating situation* of the individual, and with a 'No Outcome' ending, were common in all the groups. They were particularly frequent in the Industry and Agriculture samples, and they represent these groups' variation of the Thema of Personal Frustration. Subjects with concentration camp experience usually gave a different variation of the same Thema, describing past instead of present frustration, sometimes with 'No Outcome', but often with a definitely Bad Outcome, e.g. death (usually caused by enemies).

This fact suggests that the main frustration of the concentration camp subjects lay in the past: even U.N.R.R.A. barracks and the hopeless future were infinitely better than starvation, ill-treatment and the constant fear of death suffered in the camp. In contrast, the main frustration of the other groups lay in the present, i.e. the time of the investigation. Although their physical conditions improved with the liberation, and the enemy's oppression was largely stopped, they appear to have preferred the blunt humiliations at the hands of the Germans to the more subtle ones from their Allies¹ which deprived them of all hope for the future.

¹ Although they were not formally discriminated against at the time of the investigation (they did not wear the letter 'P', had most of the human rights, food, lodging and second-hand clothes offered by Welfare organizations), their movements were restricted, they had no proper personal documents, no rights of employment above the lowest level of U.N.R.R.A., and they were treated not as normal human beings but as a species apart. In numerous contacts with U.N.R.R.A. and military government officials I noticed how far my passport, my uniform, my coming from London and having a home to go back to, distinguished me from my compatriots in the camp. My nationality was unquestionable—theirs was not. I was treated as a Pole, but they were only 'Polish D.P.'—the word 'D.P.' was never omitted in any remarks on the subject, and indicated a difference of species nearly as essential as between an Englishman and an English cow. This attitude towards 'Polish D.P.'s' was noticeable even in those persons most willing to help them.

The most distinctive characteristic of the stories of Personal Frustration describing the subject's situation at the time of the test is that of hopelessness. The following illustrations will make this point clear:

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Agriculture

CASE NO. 10

Picture No. 3

'This is our life. We stand by graves, as this man does, and think how death is approaching. We can see no light before us to bring us happiness.'

The same Thema is presented by another subject, describing his own picture:

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Industry and Agriculture

CASE NO. 11

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'My own picture. This picture represents the present time so clearly, but nevertheless has no purpose, or, if there is a purpose, it is somewhere very far distant. The picture will show a man standing at the crossroads, who has so many roads to choose from, yet none of them is clear. Only in the far distance there shines the light of the goal chosen in the dawn of youth, the goal towards which he was aiming in former times, but to-day he does not know which road to take in order to reach it.'

The stories describing *past frustration*, given by the former inmates of concentration camps, were most dramatic when they referred to their own pictures:

Group: Polish male (Kempten). *Background:* Concentration Camps

CASE NO. 9

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I see myself hanging on the post, suspended by ropes, attached to my hands tied behind me. I have to hang like this for two hours. I keep fainting, they throw water over me and I become conscious again, and think I must die soon. I ask God to help me to hold out . . .'

Group: Polish male (Kempten). *Background:* Concentration Camps

CASE NO. 11

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'A man is hanging on the post¹ with his shirt undone so that it

¹ The punishment of the post was one of the commonest in German concentration camps. It took place on Sundays so as not to waste a working day. People were suspended with their hands crossed behind the back and fettered with chains hung up on hooks. Since the men were hanging only a few inches above the ground they would instinctively seek support for their feet and increase the pain in the wrists with every movement.

should not tear under the strain of his distorted joints. Sweat pours down his face in a stream. Afterwards his arms are stiff and hard as wood. He cannot even take the chains off his arms and has to ask the S.S. man to do it for him. The S.S. man kicks him contemptuously but finally frees him.' (The subject adds by way of explanation: 'I went through that, and I shall never forget it. They tortured me like that.')

There is no essential difference between the above descriptions and the next one, although there the subject did not obey the instructions, and instead of depicting himself, portrayed a friend with whom he identified himself (the subject himself survived, but lost a leg above the knee):

Group: Polish male (Kempton). *Background:* Concentration Camps
CASE NO. 10

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I am in a concentration camp and watch while an S.S. man is beating my friend until he is covered with blood and his skin everywhere broken. A dog is worrying him. I am standing to attention and have to watch with the rest of the camp. They throw buckets of water over him and go on torturing him. I keep thinking how this Pole is suffering undeservedly, I feel hot and cold, and know that the same thing may happen to me at any moment. He died the next day in the punishment cell and I lost one leg.'

A similar identification occurred with the figure presented in the picture No. 3:

Group: Polish male (Kempton). *Background:* Concentration camps
CASE NO. 8

Picture No. 3

'These are memorials in memory of our camp, so that everyone will know how we died there and how they put us to death.'

'That plaster figure with chains on its hands, beaten up and ill-treated, is a prisoner from the camp, to remind others of our sufferings.'

In another story the subject can definitely see his own picture in the mirror:

Group: Polish male (Murnau). *Background:* Concentration camps
CASE NO. 7

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'When I was released to the living hut after fourteen days in the punishment cell, I was able to look at myself in a mirror, and I could not believe that this was me, or that anyone could look like that. My head was cut open, my face livid from the beatings and unshaven—it looked just like an animal's. . . .'

Another subject (same sample, case No. 11) who described himself as a 'Moslem'¹ showed to me with expressive gestures how weak he was, staggering under the weight of the heavy stones in the Mauthausen Camp quarry and under the blows of the guards.

In all these examples the Hero was left completely alone—there was nobody in the Press representing Affiliation, no one who loved him, who could help him, cared for him. In contrast, in the Industry and Agriculture samples such persons were often introduced. One might say that in the Blank Card and in picture No. 3 the subject was free in this respect, and need introduce no congenial persons. With pictures Nos. 1 and 2 that seemed to be impossible: the first one indicates clearly the presence of a mother, the second a parent, relative or close friend.

But in the imagination of ex-inmates of concentration camps the congenial figures portrayed on the pictures can be made as unreal, as those non-existent ones were made real—they just disappear from reality and are transformed into a dream. Even a happy ending is only tentative, with a point of interrogation and implication: 'Would that be possible?'

In the following series of very short stories, the Hero is longing for his mother even in his grave, but is left alone; his most daring dream is not of happiness but merely of an absence of fear and oppression:

Group: Polish male (Kempton). *Background:* Concentration camps
CASE NO. 7

Picture No. 1

'A mother and her son are hundreds of miles apart. Only in their thoughts they are together, because they are thinking of one another. He was deported to a concentration camp. Perhaps he will return afterwards?'

Picture No. 2

'A son and his father. The son is alone and is dreaming of his father. He is worrying about him, whether he is alive and what has happened to him. The son himself is in a concentration camp. Perhaps he will return home and see his father again?'

Picture No. 3

'A son is lying in his grave and is dreaming of his mother that she has come to the cemetery to pray for him. The son was killed in the war.'

¹ 'Moslem' in the slang of all German concentration camps indicated an inmate on the point of dying from starvation. In the Soviet camps a more self-explanatory Russian term was used for the same state of half-death: *dokhodiaga* which means 'just coming to'. When those who nevertheless survived went with the Second Corps of the Polish Army to the Middle East, they called the real Moslems 'kangaroos'.

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'I am at work in a factory somewhere in America or some other country. It is peaceful and quiet—no one oppresses me.'

The following story illustrates *the mechanism of identification*. The Heroine in the picture is first of all described in an objective way and her actions referred to in the third person. But soon the subject feels so strongly that *she* is the Heroine that she refers to her actions in the first person singular. This is subsequently corrected:

Group: Polish female. *Background:* Industry and Agriculture

CASE NO. 10

Picture No. 1

'Despair. The Germans have just arrested this woman's husband, and, while searching the house have found arms and pamphlets. The wife is left with two small children. She is alone in the house. The position seems desperate. What is she to do? I am all alone, without the means of existence. The first reaction: helplessness and despair at the loss of the one dearest to one. She realises the situation: she may never see him again. They will torture him. Nevertheless she believes she will recover from this, for the duty of bringing up the children upholds her and leads her to believe that she will manage to come through: perhaps, if the good God wills, her husband will return and will be proud of what she has done. Freedom and together again.'

In other stories the mechanism of identification is less obvious. In one story, for instance (Polish male, background: Industry), the adventures of the Hero had apparently nothing to do with the personal history of the subject—there was only one minor but significant point: in the story the Hero succeeds after six years of struggle and deprivations, in reality the subject spent exactly the same amount of time in deportation.

The following story illustrates *the use of dreams* in the T.A.T. stories:

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Industry

CASE NO. 10

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'A real dream. I was going back to liberated Poland. I reached my place of residence as indicated to me. I am returning to my family's house and talk to my relatives. The N.K.V.D.¹ is there and arrests me on Stalin's order. They deport me to somewhere in Siberia, and imprison me in a cave. I escape, crossing through bushes. When I came out on the other side, I saw Americans. It

¹ The Soviet special police, concerned with political offences and the maintenance of concentration camps.

was the U.S. Zone. I told them my adventures. They said O.K.—and at that moment I awoke.'

Actual dreams were used in several stories given to the blank card. Sometimes when the subject wanted to imagine his own picture he recalled a dream and was willing to relate it. In several cases I consented, in others I was not even asked, but the subject gave as his own the picture he best remembered, taken from the dream. Here is the next case:

Group: Polish female. *Background:* Concentration camps

CASE NO. 5

Picture No. 4 (Blank Card)

'A large drawing room with nothing in it but a grand piano. The air is chilly. On the highly-polished parquet floor there is a big Persian carpet—a large French window is veiled by a thin curtain through which the sun's rays penetrate. The piano gleams. The doors to the other rooms are open wide. I see myself as a beautiful, well-dressed young woman. I am wearing an evening cloak of blue fox. I am standing by the piano. At some distance from the window stands my husband. We do not speak to one another: there has been some unpleasantness between us. Suddenly on the threshold of the open door stands the figure of Concentration Camp Death. She wears the striped dress of a prisoner, her hands hang stiffly—her head, in a striped, pointed cap, hangs on her breast. Her face is as pale as a corpse. A feeling of terror and overwhelming repulsion makes my hair stand on end. There is complete silence. At last I master myself, go to her, embrace her, and, laying my head on her wasted breast, I say, "Take me, take me, take me". Then, slowly, stiffly she raises her arm and puts it round me.'

The above dream represents a story in which the general background of concentration camps and the death-figure taken from that *background*, is *intermingled with more personal problems*, with individual fears and worries. It also represents the tendencies towards suicide, which was sixteen times more frequent among the women than among the men (equally distributed between the sample from concentration camps and the controls). The next story also illustrates individual problems and complexes superimposed on a general background of underground activities, war and deportation:

Group: Polish male. *Background:* Concentration camps

CASE NO. 6

Picture No. 3

'A mother is standing by the graves of her husband and son. It is after the Warsaw Rising. There is already a new occupant.

'She had two sons, who belonged to the Home Army.¹ Their father did not know of this, and did not approve of the Home Army. The Germans found out about it, and arrested the mother and the elder son, but the father and younger son, who were away from home, escaped arrest. The younger son told his father nothing of the reason for the arrest, but the father guessed it. The father himself killed his son during the night, by stabbing him with a dagger. When his comrades in the Home Army learned of this, they pronounced sentence on the father and killed him. After the Rising, at the end of the war, the mother was released from the concentration camp and returned home. The elder son died in a labour camp. Now the mother is left alone, and stands in the cemetery, thinking of her fate.'

The above story is rather unusual and suggests a strong conflict between the subject and his father. A similar motif appears in the first story of the same subject—a very lengthy and elaborate story covering the two generations.² In the first part the Hero is contemptuous and full of guilt, rejected by the mother and unwilling to reform. In the second part he finally reforms and atones, and has a son who is an exemplary character and supports the whole family. In this second part the son becomes a Hero and the former Hero becomes a secondary figure.

These examples illustrate the complications of the T.A.T. stories which, if they were too numerous, would destroy the purpose of the investigation, which was the study of general trends rather than the detection of individual complexes. Fortunately they were exceptional—nearly all the T.A.T. stories represented the general background, and their pattern was often so similar that the stories of two different individuals tested in different districts of Bavaria looked as if they were copied from each other.

(b) *Statistical analysis*

(i) *Men.* All the T.A.T. stories of Polish males in U.N.R.R.A. camps were first arranged in five groups: Kempten men from industry, Kempten men from agriculture, Kempten men from concentration camps, Murnau-Weilheim men from industry and agriculture, and Murnau-Weilheim men from concentration camps. This procedure appeared unnecessary, however, since there were practically no differences in the relative frequencies of the various scoring categories between both Kempten samples from industry and agriculture, and the mixed sample from industry and agriculture tested in Murnau-Weilheim district. The relative fre-

¹ Polish Underground Army.

² The subject himself exhibited many pathological traits: his peculiar speech, tremor, obsessional repetition of certain phrases, etc., indicated a high degree of maladjustment.

quencies in the concentration camp samples from Kempten and Murnau-Weilheim were almost identical. The material, therefore, was rearranged into two groups: one representing the fifty-five subjects from industry and agriculture, the other the equated sample from concentration camps.

The frequencies below have been corrected to equalize the size of the groups,¹ since in Kempten there were originally two control samples—one from industry and one from agriculture—equated with one sample from concentration camps. This correction did not change the distribution of the various personal characteristics in respect of which all the samples had been equated. Therefore, the frequencies of the various T.A.T. categories given below are based on the same number of stories, given by the two samples, which were matched exactly in respect of age, intelligence, education, profession, etc. This correction was only made to facilitate a superficial examination of the data, and to make the presentation clearer, but not for the statistical elaboration.

The corrected frequencies are as follows:

	<i>Ind. and Agri.</i>	<i>Conc. Camps</i>		<i>Ind. and Agri.</i>	<i>Conc. Camps</i>
THE HERO			THE PRESS		
Abasement	7	14	Rejection	5	13
Intraggession	13	22	Dominance	20	18
Aggression	16	12	Aggression	104	155
Dejection	141	179	Lack	51	32
Affiliation	123	105	Affiliation	123	95
Sex	9	17	Sex	5	7
Dominance	50	13			
THE THEMA			THE OUTCOME		
Person. Frustration	87	129	Good: Adequacy	33	9
Family Frustration	98	96	Help	15	8.5
Family Affiliation	56	27	Luck	43.5	34
Love	5	7	Neutral: Punishment		
Achievement	36	8	of enemy	4	7
Guilt	12	20	Submiss. of Hero	2	11.5
Quarrel	13	9	Bad: Pun. of Hero	3.5	1
Revenge	6	9	Inadequacy	0	3
			Enemies	13	35
			Bad Luck	19	11
			No outcome	59	83

The Index of Optimism is 97.5 and 38.8 respectively.

¹ In a way similar to that described above (p. 202) in the study of the delinquent population.

Suggestive differences between the groups are:

The sample with concentration camp experience shows more Abasement and Intraggression in the Hero and more Submission of the Hero in the Outcome than the controls (there are ten cases of Submission in this group and one in which the submitting Hero is also helped—scored Submission 0.5; the corresponding frequency in the other group is only two). In personal interviews all the subjects in this group denied emphatically any tendency to submit not only to the Germans, but to any authority which is not 'really just'.

On the other hand that force in the Hero which may be considered as opposite to Abasement, namely Dominance, is much less frequent in concentration camp sample.

The χ^2 test was applied to see whether the two groups differ significantly in respect of Abasement and Dominance. The calculation was as follows:¹

	<i>Abasement</i>	<i>Dominance</i>	<i>Total</i>
Polish males from industry and agriculture	7 (12.75)	50 (44.25)	57
Polish males from concentration camps	10 (4.75)	9 (14.75)	19
Total	17	59	76

$$\chi^2 = 11.13857$$

A correction for continuity was applied. This figure is highly significant (above the 0.001 level). To the blank card, the concentration camp sample gave only five responses of Dominance in the Hero, as compared with twenty-eight in the control sample. Our findings correspond to those of Rodnick and Klebanoff (452) who made an experimental study of projective reactions to induced frustration.

In both groups Dejection and Affiliation are the most frequently occurring forces in the Hero, but when ex-inmates of concentration camps show Dejection they are usually in despair, threatened, and left alone, while the controls usually have somebody they love. This difference is statistically significant, and nearly so at the 0.02 level ($\chi^2 = 5.2101$). When responding to the blank card the concentration camp sample gave forty-seven stories containing Dejection and only fourteen containing Affiliation, while the figures for the control sample are thirty-three and twenty-two respectively.

While showing less Affiliation in the Hero—a type of sublimated

¹ It may be seen that the frequencies in the concentration camps' group presented here differ from those given in the table on p. 218. The frequencies in that table were corrected in order to make the size of both groups identical.

love—the concentration camp sample shows more Sex—a type of love less sublimated or not sublimated at all. The difference is not statistically significant.

The concentration camp sample records more Rejection in the Press than the control one, but the difference is not significant. Similarly non-significant is the difference between the two groups in respect of Dominance in the Press, Sex in the Press, Love, Guilt, Quarrel and Revenge in the Thema.

The most striking difference between the two groups as regards the Press lies in the incidence of Aggression and Affiliation. While in the concentration camp sample the strength of Aggression in the Press markedly exceeds that of Affiliation, in the control sample this relationship is reversed. The Heroes of ex-inmates of concentration camps live in a much more hostile world than those of the subjects with a background of milder forms of oppression. The difference is statistically highly significant (at the 0.001 level, with $\chi^2=12.5655$). Aggression in the Press of the concentration camp sample exceeds that of the control sample in response to all the pictures and to the blank card. Even picture No. 3, representing a scene among graves, produces some differences—while a number of the control groups' Heroes (seventeen cases) die peacefully, the Heroes of ex-inmates of concentration camps are nearly all murdered or killed by the enemy.¹ In general the Heroes of ex-inmates of concentration camps rarely suffer Lack without Aggression, while the Heroes of the controls record such incidents far more often. This might also be interpreted as indicating that ex-inmates of concentration camps rarely feel merely deprived: they regard the Press as a threat to their personalities.²

In the Themas of ex-inmates of concentration camps Personal Frustration predominates, while the frequency of Achievement is less than a quarter of that of the controls. χ^2 in respect of those two Themas, Personal Frustration *v.* Achievement, is highly significant ($\chi^2=23.65006$, with P of less than 0.001). In responses to the blank card the difference between the groups is still more striking. The controls tell about their achievements as often as about their frustrations, while the subjects from concentration camps describe almost exclusively their frustrations (forty-eight frustrations and only four achievements). The Thema of Family Affiliation occurs in ex-concentration camp group three times, in the control group thirteen times. χ^2 was calculated to compare the frequency of Personal Frustration with that of Family Affiliation and Achievement lumped together. The difference between the two groups proved to be statistically highly significant ($\chi^2=25.40099$).

¹ The difference proved to be statistically significant at the 0.02 level ($\chi^2=6.21835$).

² On the meaning and implications of this distinction see Maslow (450).

Similarly striking are the differences between the two groups in respect of Outcome. Ex-inmates of concentration camps appear much more pessimistic than the controls, and χ^2 based on the categories of Good Outcome as opposed to Bad Outcome is significant at the 0.001 level ($\chi^2=17.67952$). In particular, the controls give far more Good Outcomes due to the Hero's Adequacy: 33 cases as against 9 cases in the concentration camp sample (in response to the blank card the figures are 18.5 and 3 respectively); due to external Help (85 cases and 15 cases respectively); and even due to luck (43.5 and 34 respectively). The Heroes of the concentration camp sample, on the other hand, are more often defeated by their Enemies (35 and 13 cases respectively). When asked to describe themselves (in the blank card story) the subjects of this sample give a Bad Outcome due to the power of their Enemies 11 times, while the controls do so once only. They are also more frequently left in the frustrating situation (frequencies are 34.5 and 14 respectively).

(ii) *Women.* The frequencies of the T.A.T. categories in the stories told by the two samples of women are as follows:

	<i>Ind. and Conc. Agri. Camps</i>			<i>Ind. and Conc. Agri. Camps</i>	
THE HERO			THE PRESS		
Abasement	0	1	Rejection	2	1
Intraggression	4	3	Dominance	1	0
Aggression	3	0	Aggression	36	36
Dejection	43	39	Lack	7	9
Affiliation	31	29	Affiliation	26	19
Sex	2	1	Sex	1	2
Dominance	2	8			
THE THEMA			THE OUTCOME		
Person. Frustration	29	33	Good: Adequacy	3.5	4
Family Frustration	32	24	Help	1	2
Family Affiliation	10	8	Luck	11.5	9
Love	2	2	Neutral: Punishment		
Achievement	2	3	of enemy	1	2
Guilt	2	2	Submiss. of Hero	0	0
Quarrel	0	2	Bad: Pun. of Hero	1	0
Revenge	1	4	Inadequacy	1	2
			Enemies	12	9
			Bad Luck	1	3
			No outcome	18	14

The Index of Optimism is 48.4 and 53.5 respectively.

It can be seen from the above data that, in contrast to the men, the two samples of women do not show any suggestive differences.

Although it may be theoretically possible that, in respect of the aspects of personality investigated by the T.A.T., Polish women were not influenced by concentration camp experience while the men were, such a difference between the two sexes seems highly improbable. Another interpretation appears more plausible.

As we know from the previous discussion on the subject, the sample of women with a background of concentration camp experience was not a random sample at all, and this fact might have caused this otherwise surprising result.

It is possible that the same personality factors which played a part in the selection of women for concentration camps (the men, as we know, were largely taken at random) made them immune to certain camp influences. It may be that their definite status of political prisoners also helped them to maintain the integration of their personality.¹ In this way they might have changed no more than ordinary women deported to industry and agriculture.

It is, however, possible that they did change more, but that that change, instead of increasing the difference between this selected group and the random group deported to forced labour, cancelled out certain differences which would otherwise have been reflected in the T.A.T.

Judging from the T.A.T. study of the men the experience of oppression makes people more pessimistic, more submissive, and less dominant (at least on the T.A.T. level). It may be that the women, arrested in the majority of cases for some form of resistance against the Nazis, were more optimistic, dominant, and less submissive, than the random sample. When influenced by the camp experience they therefore became *more* and not less like the sample of controls. Even after this experience they tend to be more dominant (this difference is suggestive) and more optimistic (this difference is not statistically significant) than the controls. In other respects the influence of concentration camps might have been just to cancel out the differences which existed between the groups before imprisonment.

Thus the only conclusion which can be drawn from the T.A.T. study of women is that no profitable study of the two samples can be made when one of these samples has undergone a process of self-selection and we are unable to estimate the direction and extent of this self-selective process on the variables we are trying to compare.

(c) *Summary of the results and their relation to the P.F. Study*

The Thematic Apperception Test was used in the study of Polish Displaced Persons to compare equated samples of the D.P.

¹ Compare Bettelheim's observations on the subject (73, 74).

population representing different backgrounds of displacement. In this way an attempt was made to estimate the influence of different levels of oppression on the subject's perception of the world, of himself in this world, and the interaction between the two. When used to supplement the material obtained in the P.F.S. study, the T.A.T. aimed at disclosing the underlying motivation for the tendencies exhibited on the level of action in the P.F.S.

The T.A.T. study of men brought positive results, the study of women did not, and owing to methodological difficulties the negative results in the case of women cannot be adequately explained.

The detailed differences between the groups of men have been described above. The main characteristic of the subjects who had undergone the highest level of oppression, as opposed to those with milder forms of oppression in their background, appears to be the feeling of the overwhelming power of an inimical Press. It was also that characteristic that distinguished delinquents from non-delinquents.

Judging from the T.A.T., the ex-inmate of a concentration camp perceives the world around him as a hostile force as does the delinquent. The Press consists mainly of Aggression, and it brings him Dejection and Personal Frustration. The subject affected by oppression neither depicts himself as an aggressive person (in blank card stories), nor identifies with an aggressive Hero. He feels rather that he is aggressed upon, and in his T.A.T. fantasies he usually submits to the Press, and only rarely and unsuccessfully tries to dominate it. In his imagination he neither recalls Achievements nor dreams about future ones, and is mostly concerned with bitter recollections of Personal Frustration in the past. His stories end badly: he very rarely feels able to succeed because of his own Adequacy, and he rarely enjoys Help; on the other hand he frequently suffers defeat through the power and wickedness of his Enemies.

As in the study of the delinquent population, the study of the equated samples of Displaced Persons with different levels of oppression reveals two levels of personality, one measured by the T.A.T., the other by the P.F.S.

The actual experience of oppression was that of frustration under a hostile Press. At the T.A.T. level we can see how far that fact has changed the subject's apperception, how far his past experience influences the interpretation of the pictures, how far he still, a year after liberation, regards the world around him as mainly hostile, and himself as inadequate to cope with the aggressive Press. At the P.F.S. level we see how he reacts to everyday conflict situations in action. It is apparent that those groups of subjects which record a great deal of Aggression in the Press, as measured by the T.A.T.,

direct their aggression mainly outwards on the level of action, as measured by the P.F.S. On the other hand there appears to be no significant relationship between the subject's need for Aggression (in the T.A.T.), and his actual aggressiveness at the level of action (in the P.F.S.).¹

In order to examine this point more closely, and find a numerical expression of the existing relationship between Aggression in the Hero and Aggression in the Press on the one hand, and Extrapunitiveness in the P.F.S. on the other, the following calculation of correlation coefficients was made:

All the groups of Polish males² received their scores of Aggression in the Hero, Aggression in the Press, and of Extrapunitiveness. The score of Aggression in the hero was numerically expressed not as the actual frequency, but as the proportion of this category to the total frequency of all the forces in the Hero, recorded by the given group of subjects. The score of Aggression in the Press denotes the percentage of Aggression and Rejection (lumped together) in the sum of all the forces recorded in the Press. The score of Extrapunitiveness denotes the percentage of extrapunitive responses in the sum of all responses given to the P.F.S. by the particular group of subjects.

On this basis the group scores of Hero-Aggression, Press-Aggression, and Extrapunitiveness were arranged in the following way:

<i>Sample</i>	<i>Background</i>	<i>Hero-Agg.</i>	<i>Press-Agg.</i>	<i>Extra-punitiveness</i>
Delinquent	Ind. and agric.	7.9	56.0	62.3
Delinquent	Conc. camps	7.6	54.8	62.0
Kempton	Industry	5.1	35.3	46.7
Kempton	Agriculture	3.6	40.8	53.9
Kempton	Conc. Camps	4.3	53.4	65.3
Murnau	Ind. and agric.	4.5	30.6	49.5
Murnau	Conc. Camps	1.6	50.9	64.4

¹ I must admit that Rosenzweig does not assume that the P.F.S. measures personality at the level of action. According to him (574, 581) projections are often made from a mixture of levels. In particular responses to the P.F.S. can be made at any of the three levels of personality: opinion, overt or implicit. He is in agreement with my findings, however, saying that in his clinical experience the P.F.S. is mainly valid at the overt (i.e. behaviour) level. Rosenzweig thinks that the average record reveals mainly the actual mode of behaviour in life situations; I should say that its prediction of behaviour is not necessarily accurate for life situations. The test measures general trends in behaviour, rather than predicts reactions on specific occasions.

² The Jewish sample was not included in this calculation as being too small and as presenting specific problems. The samples of women received different sets of T.A.T. pictures and are therefore not comparable. The individuals were not treated as units in the T.A.T. study (groups were taken as units), did not receive individual scores, and their performance could not provide an adequate basis for this calculation.

Product-moment coefficients of correlation were calculated with the following result: the correlation between Extrapunitiveness and Aggression in the Hero is around zero ($+0.047$) and indicates no association at all; the correlation between Extrapunitiveness and Aggression in the Press is as high as $+0.933$. The correlation between the T.A.T. scores of Aggression in the Hero and Aggression in the Press is not significant ($+0.321$).¹

These correlations confirm what has been said above: Extrapunitiveness, i.e. Aggression directed outwards at the level of action, is correlated at the T.A.T. level *not* with Aggression in the Hero, but with Aggression in the Press. If we introduce the notion of cause and effect we might say:

In the population tested aggressive subjects do not direct their aggression outwards because they have a 'need' for it. They do not show such a need in the T.A.T., and when the Heroes record Aggression at all, they usually merely counteract against a threat from outside.

On the other hand, aggressiveness at the level of action is highly correlated with Aggression in the Press, representing that threat from outside. It may, therefore, be regarded not as a drive bringing satisfaction to the subject, but as a defensive process, or a tool considered necessary to avoid destruction.²

Both the projective techniques used in this study show how subjects who have undergone extreme oppression feel threatened and deprived.

The same stimuli—the T.A.T. pictures and the P.F.S. picture-situations—appear to them much more hostile, deprivational, and threatening, than they do to the controls. At the T.A.T. level these subjects merely suffer, sometimes submit, and rarely counteract. But at the level of action, in the ordinary everyday situations of the P.F.S., far less dramatic than most of those produced in the

¹ Murray (411) also notes 'no correlation at all' between the need of Aggression in the Hero and overt manifestation of aggression in the subject. On the other hand Holzberg and Posner (334) found that aggression in the P.F.S. is related to aggression at the fantasy level, and *not* to aggression at the level of behaviour. The results of their study seem open to question, however. Firstly, they assumed that aggression 'is equated for the most part with assertiveness'; for that reason they assumed that initiative and ability in discussion groups, planning ability, ability to be a member of the student council and to give advice in personal matters are indicative of aggressiveness. This seems a hardly justifiable assumption. Secondly, they used a modified version of the T.A.T. in which the investigators provided the stories and the subjects were only to choose between fifteen pairs of interpretations, one assertive and one non-assertive. Thus they really measured neither aggressive behaviour nor fantasy (except perhaps their own, in the stories they gave to their subjects), and it is not surprising that their correlations are rather unusual.

² It must be noted that Rosenzweig also regards extrapunitiveness as a defence mechanism.

T.A.T. fantasies, they do counteract. They throw the whole aggression back—where as they feel, it came from—and direct blame, hostility and requests towards the other subjects involved in these situations.

Chapter 8

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

I. THE STUDY OF THE DELINQUENTS

(a) *Extrapunitiveness and delinquency*

The criminal often does not see'—says Donald Clemmer in his excellent book on the prison community (156, p. 6)—'the beauty of American life, the slow but inevitable progress of our nation and the ideals of kindness, service, and honesty which are common in many persons. He does not understand or consider social trends. He does not compare the standard of life, nation with nation. He does not objectify the perceptions he receives.'

The psychopath's frustration is 'sharply apprehended and deeply nourished'—says Lindner (410), and that is why 'the psychopathic way of life is characterized by its effects—aggressive behaviour, the expression and actional counterpart of a belligerent social attitude, the forceful surmounting of frustration—provoking barriers by acts of voluntary wilfulness, as well as by techniques of escape and avoidance the exercise of which removes the psychopath from the frustrating situation'.¹

The meaning of these words from the point of view of our concepts is clear. In addition to those frustrations suffered by the criminal which would be judged as such even by our standards, he also regards as frustrating and inimical certain situations, people and events which would not be so regarded by another person. As far as *obstacle* is concerned, he emphasizes the fact that he is frustrated (obstacle-dominant extra-punitive reaction, symbol E'). We may also add that criminals frequently feel that they are abused (see Bender, Keiser and Schilder, 61); that 'sociopaths' (to use Partridge's term) believe that the world is against them; and when they themselves are the frustrators, they exhibit another

¹ Kvaraceus (379, p. 56) rightly remarked that the fact that Lindner's subject was diagnosed as a psychopathic personality does not alter the representative character of his criminal career.

variant of the extrapunitive E' reaction in showing no sympathy for their victims (see in particular autobiographical studies such as Mark Benney's *Low Company*, 65; James Spenser's *Limey Breaks In*, 651; or Clifford Shaw's *The Jack-Roller*, 631, and *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, 632). They minimize the frustration caused to others, and even perceive 'super-ego-blocking' situations as 'ego-blocking': thus Alexander's and Healy's *Solitary Offender*, who robbed his employer, spoke about it in such a way, that 'it sounded as though his employer had committed something against him, not the opposite' (19, p. 238). Elsewhere Healy mentions 'mental dissatisfactions', 'criminalistic imagery' and 'irritative mental reactions to environmental conditions' as principal bases of delinquency (321, p. 32) and states that delinquency is largely a reaction to frustration (323, p. 205).

An excellent illustration of extrapunitive obstacle-dominance in the criminal is given by Banay (48): '... the criminal knows no remorse, in the sense of compassion for his victim or profound regret for the hurt he has inflicted. . . . Regret he knows, but it is regret for the consequences of his crime on himself, though interpreted as penitence for what he has done to others. One of our sentimental clichés about the criminal is that he is haunted by the vision of his victim, haunted until remorse drives him to reformation or despair. This is a social superstition and a sentimental myth. The murderer hardly ever thinks of himself by that harsh term, and never even refers to "the man I killed", but always to "the deceased", and he immediately follows with the remark, "look what they have done to me".'

As in the sphere of perception of the outer world, particularly frustrating agents, so in the sphere of *ego-defence*, involving the evaluation of the self and of others, the psychopath and the criminal show both variations of extrapunitive reaction: E and E'. Thus Norwood East's (201) 'Aggressive egocentric personality', a central figure in psychopathy and crime, is characterized as self-indulgent and narcissistic, unboundedly self-confident and assertive, and uncritical of himself (Rosenzweig's reaction E) while sharply critical of others (reaction E'). Banay (46) mentions an intensive desire, common among repeated offenders, to awaken sympathy and to prove that they are innocent, and that the fault lies with the police, the lawyers, the judge, the jury, etc.

Autobiographies, even if subjective and uncritical, throw much light on the psychology of the delinquent in this sphere also. They reveal the subject's attitudes and his evaluation of himself and the world around him, although the *facts* we want to know are often lost in lengthy narratives containing a mass of minor details. It may be deplored, that in such studies as Ben Karpman's *Case*

Studies in the Psychopathology of Crime (p. 1008), in the patients' autobiographies 'there are hundreds of pages devoted to their successes with women, their plans for outwitting other crooks and their self-righteous accounts of how the authorities ill-treated them' (99). But if we examined these accounts for symptoms of defence-mechanism, they might corroborate our hypothesis, that criminals, including 'psychopathic personalities', are extrapunitive in ego-defence, aggressively denying their own guilt (E), and accusing others (E).

Other examples may be found in Sydney Blozman's account of himself (632) in which he accuses society, the Court, public opinion, etc. (see especially pp. 180 ff.), justice (p. 190), the prison system and prison staff (p. 193), but never himself. Clifford Shaw's *Stanley* goes as far as to state: 'Sometimes the guards are killed, and I think the prisoners are justified in slaying, instead of being run over and terrorized by punishment . . .' (632, p. 111). Similarly Spenser's *Limey* (651) criticizes society, law, the administration of justice, the warders, Borstals, prisons, etc., and even criminals, but rarely, if ever, himself. He says that 'society is often a little arbitrary in imposing its will on rebels' (p. 157), but when he is discharged from the Borstal he is glad mainly because he had been annoyed by the other inmates—that is the rebels (p. 171). In a conversation after capture he is told by a policeman: 'From the way you talk anybody 'ud think I was the criminal and you were the policeman' (p. 132). Even in the Introduction Spenser quotes this extrapunitive statement by Robert Service: 'I should live the same life over if I had to live again, and the chances are I go where most men go.' About himself Spenser says: 'I have never found it difficult to push my way into higher social circles, and, in prison especially, I have often found it necessary to do that in order to associate with men of my own mental calibre' (p. 283).

David Wills (728) mentions how the offender, when he pays his fine, has a perfectly easy conscience. 'He has bought a little exhilaration and excitement just like he might buy a pair of boot-laces, and is often indignant when he is also admonished by the bench.' Then his account is squared and he can start on the next transaction (p. 90).

H. Mannheim (441, pp. 44-5) quotes Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkman* as an illustration of the psychology of the great criminal as well as of the great warmonger. Having spent several years in prison Borkman analyses his case: 'I have re-tried the whole case—by myself. Time after time I have re-tried it. I have been my own accuser, my own defender, and my own judge. I have been more impartial than any one else could be. . . . I had power in my hands! And then I felt the irresistible vocation within me! The others . . . hadn't my brains. And, if they had done it, it would not have

been with my aims in view—the act would have been a different act. In short, I have acquitted myself.’

Need-persistence in the criminal or psychopathic personality is important for two reasons:

Firstly, because the need, while persisting against the obstacles raised by society, may change its form, and appear in sublimations. A non-sublimated need may lead to crime. A sublimated one may increase creativity, enrich personality by encouraging scientific and artistic interests, and become a positive factor in the development of culture.

Secondly, because some theories, translated into our terminology, would claim that delinquency is extrapunitive need-persistence.

The first question does not need a great deal of clarification. The criminal’s inability to sublimate, his paucity of interests, his inability to keep a steady, persistent interest in any activity, is stressed by many writers. This is often combined with a kind of very mild and disguised extrapunitive need-persistence: the criminal wants *others* to solve the problem of his boredom. In leisure time, he favours the cinema, or the kind of ‘sport’ in which he is a mere spectator.¹ A recent increase in such passive leisure ‘activities’ not only among individuals recognized as antisocial, but also among the general public, may be symptomatic of some grave changes in the psychology of our society.

In psychopaths and delinquents the attitude of expectation and insistence that somebody else should satisfy their needs and solve their problems takes an extreme form. Lindner (410, p. 7) emphasizes ‘the psychopath’s unselected exploitation of everyone and everything. Just like the infant, the psychopath will trade upon the good-will and sympathy of all without distinction, without plan, system, programme or choice. He victimizes and exploits randomly and not for profit but instant gratification, his aggressiveness pointed at society-as-a-whole, while he is patently indifferent to individuals.’

David Wills (728, 729) mentions the reluctance to take responsibility that he noticed in his delinquent boys. He notes as one of the outstanding characteristics of the Camp Council that they never wanted the responsibility of running their own affairs. ‘Both as a community and as individuals they have much preferred that someone should give orders which they are expected to obey.’ On the other hand it appears from both Wills’s books that they resent and disobey such rules. Adler (10, pp. 232–3) also declares that criminals ‘think that it is sufficient that they should want

¹ See D. Clemmer (156, pp. 206–48). Merrill (465) found delinquents’ participation in active games significantly less frequent than that of controls (C.R.=5.7).

something and that the world should hasten to fulfill their demands; and if they are not given everything they want, they feel unfairly treated and refuse to co-operate.'

Alexander and Healy say that the basic attitude of a criminal to his mother is one of demanding. This attitude, they say, has been transferred to society. 'He not only has no guilt feelings towards those who have treated him well and whom he has robbed, but sometimes he shows just the opposite, anger and accusation' (19, p. 237). Criminality may be explained by the development of a dependent receptive attitude, resulting in the loss of self-esteem and, especially in stealing and robbery, in an attempt to regain self-esteem by a kind of pseudo-masculinity (op. cit., p. 285).

Following this argument we might treat the extrapunitive need-persistence (which is precisely a demanding attitude), as the core of criminality and antisocial character formation.

I will not go as far as that. Overemphasis of the frustrations suffered, and minimization of those inflicted, in the sphere of obstacle-perception; self-justification and accusation of others in the sphere of ego-defence, may be recognized as equally, if not more important factors. There are also many other factors, whose importance cannot be denied, not mentioned here because of the limitations of the present investigation.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that in psychopathic and delinquent individuals predominant extrapunitive tendencies in all three types of reactions to frustration can be detected; and this finding occurs in the literature on the subject although expressed perhaps in a different terminology and with different concepts.

Thus the evidence of the present research confirms numerous observations made on psychopaths and criminals. By using standardized techniques and applying statistical tests this research was able to support them objectively; because of its relatively high degree of conceptualization we were able to arrive at some general notions. Our evidence suggests that the pattern of response distinguishing the antisocial character structure from that of the 'normal' population is the turning of aggression outwards expressed in a variety of ways. This was manifested by my delinquent subjects in their responses to the Picture-Frustration Study, and in their general behaviour. We shall see now whether our concept of antisocial character structure will stand the challenge of other theories of delinquency.

(b) *Other theories of delinquency*

It would be pointless to discuss here, or even to recount the numerous theories of delinquency. I shall limit the discussion to the more popular ones, especially those which may either disprove or support our argument. Theories ascribing delinquency to social,

especially economic factors, are not relevant to our problem—there is no doubt that these factors play an extremely important role in the etiology of crime, but they do it indirectly by influencing the psyche of the individual. If this influence is deep and permanent we have to see how far it changes the whole personality structure. If it is only temporary the mechanism is usually more simple and does not affect our main problem, the relation of personality structure to culture. We must first determine which personality structure is essentially antisocial—the environmental factors which build up such a structure are important, but this is a different question and is discussed elsewhere.

Of the theories of antisocial personality structure we may mention here: those ascribing delinquency to a search for real gratification while neurotic and socially adjusted individuals find outlet in symbolic, symptomatic or socially harmless activities, such as dreams; theories viewing delinquency as symptomatic of other mental disturbances; theories ascribing delinquency to the individual's inability to follow the 'reality principle', and to a fixation in early childhood of the 'pleasure principle'; the theory of the 'anal character structure'; the theory that criminals should be regarded as egocentric personalities; and theories stressing the importance of the 'criminal conscience' or 'criminal super-ego', based on an identification with criminal prototypes.

(i) The first theory has been discussed already (see Part I, pages 16 ff.). It goes back as far as Plato who defined 'good people' as those who content themselves with dreaming what the others, the bad people, really do.¹ Our essential point is that there must be a force preventing the neurotic or the socially mal-adjusted individual from acting in an antisocial way, and making him seek only symbolic or other socially harmless (often socially useful) gratifications. This force has been variously defined as aggression turned inwards, as the power of self-control, as the tendency to take the demands of society as one's own, and the ability to blame oneself for certain actions which are inimical to the interest of the group. This force may be defined simply as conscience; in our terminology (necessary in order to clarify certain concepts which make possible the measurement of this force), it corresponds to the intro-punitive tendency.

The existence and relative strength of this force is the principal factor determining whether the gratifications sought by an individual are 'real' (that is, primitive), or controlled.

The lack of ability to control primitive drives and antisocial modes of behaviour may be regarded as the essential characteristic

¹ Here is a 1949 edition of this theory (434): '... the chief distinction between the neurosis and delinquency is that we find symptoms in the former and actions in the latter. ...'

of psychopathy (Cason, 142-144), as well as of criminal personality. 'Normal' personality depends, as Cason rightly pointed out, on a state of equilibrium: 'Some people with weak antisocial tendencies, and with still weaker controls, are psychopathic. Others with strong antisocial tendencies, but with still stronger controls, are not psychopathic.' The satisfaction may be felt as more direct when immediate in time and unchanged in form.

But directness is not yet reality. A controlled gratification may be as 'real' as the primitive one, and if the amount of final satisfaction is the test of reality, it is certainly more real.

(ii) There can be no doubt that delinquency is often a symptom of some other *mental disturbance*, organic, psychotic, or psychoneurotic in nature. Although I do not regard the frequency of such cases as high, their existence cannot be denied. Here, however, we have no 'criminal personality', no 'psychopathic personality', no 'antisocial character formation'. A case of kleptomania is hardly that of a common thief; similarly a schizophrenic, whatever the nature of his crime, is not a criminal, but a mental patient. He may be called an 'offender', as from the legal point of view he has committed an offence. But if we define a 'criminal' or 'delinquent' as an individual whose essential feature is proneness to crime, we shall say that such mentally disturbed individuals are not criminals at all, and their delinquency is only accidental. As such, this type of delinquency is outside the scope of this study.

(iii) Psycho-analytic literature gives many interesting and emphatic examples of the criminal's undisciplined *search for pleasure*, of his inability to give up an immediate pleasure in favour of a deferred one. The same is found to be the essential characteristic of the psychopath. 'He cannot wait'—says Lindner (410)—'upon the development of prestige in society: his egoistic ambitions lead him to leap into headlines by daring performances. Like a red thread, the predominance of this mechanism for immediate satisfaction runs through the history of every psychopath.' 'The psychopath, like the child, cannot delay the pleasure of gratification.'

This theory, although very plausible, seems to be rather a starting point than a final elucidation in the vast majority of psycho-analytic writings. Lindner himself goes further in his exposition of psychopathic personality, and underlines the under-development of the super-ego, the agency which puts certain restrictions on the drive to seek pleasure at any cost. Aichhorn (14), one of the best exponents of the application of psycho-analytic theories to crime, gives numerous illustrations of the dominance of the pleasure principle in juvenile delinquency, but he admits that the study of crime from the viewpoint of the pleasure principle only is one-sided and by no means exhaustive. He goes further, to the structure of the super-ego, and the mechanisms controlling the be-

haviour of the individual. Freud himself goes 'Beyond the pleasure principle' in his exposition of the death-instinct.

That the criminal and the psychopath seek pleasure in spite of social reality means that they have not developed certain necessary restrictions on their activities—a sense of duty, the ability to set the interests of society before one's own impulses, and an objective evaluation of the self and of the world around. In psychosis, we have a complete break with reality, and in this case it may be better to use Bleuler's expression: autism, as wider and more explanatory. (See Flügel's criticism of the pleasure principle, 224, pp. 215 ff.). Sometimes, in the study of dreams or symptomatic gratification, we may speak of the pleasure principle in 'sensu stricto', but then it is irrelevant to our discussion.

If it is relevant, it means a lack of restriction on behaviour, and I think the technique developed by Rosenzweig measures the mechanism of these restrictions much better than any method based on the dichotomy, 'pleasure principle' and 'reality principle' alone. Needless to say, no experimental method for the study of the 'pleasure principle' has so far been developed.¹

(iv) The theory of the *anal character structure* is less popular than the others, but Alexander and Staub (20, p. 39) point out that anal traits present a number of antisocial and criminal characteristics. They say that 'the exaggerated, unsocial, stubborn bluntness of some violators of the law corresponds to the unyielding persistence of infantile anal spite. The characteristic self-centred stubbornness of the anal character acquires in the majority of criminals the form of proud, inaccessible spite, which is directed against all humanity.'

Other descriptions of the anal character structure, including that by Freud himself, include, however, many traits which are certainly not antisocial. The picture, given by two most prominent writers on the subject, Abraham (1) and Ernest Jones (354), is rather that of a law-abiding citizen, a custodian of a museum, a librarian, or a scientist, than that of an antisocial individual. They describe 'anal' orderliness, pedantry, parsimony, industry and persistence, the sense of duty, the insistence on absolute justice, self-control amounting to asceticism, reliability, etc. Abraham's 'oral' character (2) has more antisocial traits than his 'anal' one. Orally fixated individuals are often hostile and malicious, others (depending on the effects of the sucking period) are unwilling to make any effort and even disdain to undertake a bread-winning

¹ Recently the explanation of the 'antisocial character' by the failure of the ego to develop toward the reality principle has been criticized by Bergman (70) who points out that the capable criminal 'in many social constellations creates a better chance of survival for himself and for those whom he supports than does the average honest man'. He says: 'There is no evidence that inability to wait for satisfaction is characteristic of more than a few of the petty criminals.'

occupation. Some oral characters are always asking for something, modestly or aggressively, even with some element of cruelty (op. cit., pp. 1400-1). Others merely talk too much.

It is interesting to note that in the eyes of the criminal himself law-abiding citizens and criminals roughly correspond to the anal and oral character structures respectively. Mark Benney (65, p. 25) gives the following description of the 'Mugs' (respectable people) and 'Wide Men' (criminals): 'The Mugs are respectable, honest, hard-working, moderate-living, dull, church-going, fundamentally stupid and credulous. The Wide people are totally indifferent to the virtues defined and possessed by the Mug majority. They live gaily, love promiscuously, drink vastly, sing loudly, lie brazenly, swagger outrageously and hate dangerously. Above all they never work. Work is the province of Mugs.'

On the other hand there are some anal character traits, like obstinacy and defiant disobedience (Jones), and those expressed by the 'anal motto' (Abraham, 1): 'Whoever gives me something is my friend, whoever desires something from me is my enemy,' and some other traits which are certainly antisocial.

The theories of the anal and oral characters are not theories of personality traits. They are concerned with psycho-biological development, while the ultimate personality picture depends on a number of factors and mechanisms: e.g. on the stage of fixation or regression; on libidinal localization, mode and object; on the mechanism of continuation, reaction-formation, or sublimation.¹ The personality is the result of the interaction of all those and many other factors.

If inaccessible spite directed against all humanity is anal it is also extremely extrapunitive. Other anal traits are neither extrapunitive nor antisocial. The same applies to oral traits. The tendency to abuse other people is oral, extrapunitive and antisocial, but other oral activities may form most valuable contributions to society and culture.

When we say that an individual has an anal character structure we do not know if he is a moral pedant, scrupulous and reliable, or an aggressive individual, prone to conflict with society. We do not know whether he is miserly or extravagant, clean or dirty, docile or disobedient. Only when we know his whole personality picture and want to examine the factors which produced it, may the psycho-analytic theory of psycho-sexual development be found useful. If we see a certain combination of traits, we may ascribe them to a combination of social and biological causative factors. Some of these traits and some of the causative factors are conceived by the psycho-analysts as belonging to the anal erogenic sphere:

¹ See in particular J. F. Brown (116).

and they may be right. But some of these traits are social, others antisocial; and whatever the merits of these concepts we must look elsewhere for some unambiguous variables of personality which will lead more directly to neurotic, socially adjusted, or antisocial behaviour.

(v) *Egocentricity* appears in many writings on the subject to be one of these variables, possibly the main one. The criminal world is a world of 'I', 'me', and 'mine' rather than 'ours', 'theirs', and 'his'—says Clemmer. The criminal's speech is characterized by the principle of self-reference. The aggressive psychopathic personality, as described by East (see p. 226) is also essentially egocentric. According to Russell (592), 'all crime is egocentric, that is to say, the person who commits the crime looks upon the world around him as destined to minister to his pleasure, to his comfort, or to his safety regardless of the necessary inhibitions upon complete freedom of action which are imposed upon him as one of a civilized group.' To Russell the same applies to patriotism and political crimes, only here group loyalty is extended to all the inhabitants of a particular geographical area. Even the under-development of of the 'reality-principle' discussed above might be explained by egocentricity—according to Gough (293) the psychopath is unable to foresee the consequences of his own acts, especially their social implications, because he does not know how to judge his own behaviour from another's standpoint. 'When confronted with disapproval, the psychopath often expresses surprise and resentment. He cannot understand the reasons for the observer's objection or disapprobation. The psychopath cannot admit the justice of punishment or deprivation, because this involves an evaluation of his behaviour from the standpoint of the generalized other, or society. The psychopath will violate another's wishes and desires because he does not conceive of his own actions as inimical to their wants. He forms no deep attachments because he does not know how to identify himself with another or to share another's viewpoint. He lacks control because he cannot anticipate objections which others will make to his behaviour' (444).

The process of socialization, of social adjustment in thought and morality, has been described by Piaget (518-21) as an evolution from autism, through egocentric thought and morality, to logical reasoning and social behaviour. As in children, who are at first extremely egocentric, so in some criminal personalities the same path of adjustment and reform may be traced. Thus a 'reformed criminal', Mark Benney, describes the theme of his history as 'coming gradually to identify the particular with the general', as 'finding a world's case' in his own conflict of motives. The importance of egocentricity in the causation of war, as well as of crime, will be discussed below.

Egocentricity *per se* does not form the definition of a psychopathic or criminal personality, however. Absence of social interest has been found by Adler in neurotics, psychotics, suicides, drunkards and sexual perverts as well as in criminals. East's psychopathic personality is not only egocentric—it is also aggressive, and, as we have said, extrapunitive.

Egocentricity—if present beyond the limits set by age and culture—is certainly a sign of maladjustment. But in what direction—antisocial or anti-individual—remains to be seen.

It may be defined as a tendency to refer all objects and situations to oneself. Thus an individual who in every situation stresses that *he* is not guilty, the others are—is certainly egocentric. But the individual who, whatever happens, is apt to think that it is all *his* fault—is equally egocentric. Extreme extrapuniteness, just as extreme intropunitiveness, implies egocentricity. On the other hand it is not implied by a proper balance between the two tendencies, or an ability to evaluate a situation objectively according to its specific characteristics. To feel guilty for certain actions, to blame other people in some situations, and to forgive and forget in others implies rather a lack of egocentricity, as it requires a many-sided evaluation of the world.

The degree of extrapuniteness and intropunitiveness is not a substitute for the degree of egocentricity, which is of sufficient importance to be treated separately. But it will give at least some indication of both the degree and nature of egocentricity. The Picture-Frustration Study gives additional information, valuable if incidental, on the degree of egocentricity.

The limitations of this procedure are obvious. Unfortunately, no satisfactory procedure has so far been devised to measure egocentric tendencies in thought and social behaviour. The alternative is observation, interviews, or very laborious experiments which were impracticable in this research. An attempt to collect quantitative data on the degree of egocentricity was made in the course of the study by noticing all self-references made during the interviews. I found it impossible, however, to collect information, make observations, and note self-references at the same time. This would have required team work and was therefore impracticable.

Thus egocentricity appears to be an important personality factor related to both kinds of maladjustment—antisocial (in psychopathy and delinquency), and anti-individual (in neuroticism), but it is difficult to measure in isolation. As, however, it seems to be related to extreme forms of both extrapuniteness and intropunitiveness, their measurements by the Picture-Frustration Study provide at least some indications of the degree to which it is present.

(vi) The theory that the '*criminal conscience*', or the criminal system of values, should be regarded as the essential basis of delinquency has been expressed most clearly by Alexander and Staub, who describe 'the normal criminal' as a person 'whose psychic organization is similar to that of the normal individual, except that he identified himself with criminal prototypes' (20, pp. 53-4). Following similar lines Professor Burgess (125) expresses the opinion that a criminal may be reformed merely by a change in his 'social type'. The so-called permutations of personality—he argues—are abrupt and often revolutionary changes in social type, not in basic personality patterns. The transformation from a criminal to a law-abiding citizen does not affect the personality pattern at all. 'Our hypothesis is that personality patterns, since they are fixed in infancy and in early childhood, are likewise susceptible to reconditioning only in this same period. The conditioning of social types takes place in later experiences and may accordingly be reconditioned in youth and maturity' (125, p. 194). '... there is a sense'—writes Mark Benney about his criminal career (65, p. 9), 'in which I have been an almost abjectly law-abiding person. From my very first years I adapted myself whole-heartedly to the community I lived in, accepting its values, obeying its imperatives, observing its customs. Submissiveness could go no further.'

There is no doubt that the above statements explicitly contradict the whole basis of our study—the concept of antisocial personality structure, and the view, hitherto accepted, that the criminal personality breaks the rules imposed by any society or group. According to the above opinions, the difference between a law-abiding citizen and a criminal lies only in his system of values—the personality pattern remains the same, but the individual follows different rules from the rest of us.

It cannot be denied that criminals have a different system of values. It would be superfluous to multiply the evidence on this point. There is, however, some evidence, that (1) this system of values corresponds to a certain personality structure, and is not entirely independent; and that (2) the rules imposed by the criminal group are often disobeyed, indeed in the majority of cases are broken much more frequently than the rules of society at large are broken by law-abiding citizens.

Evidence for (1) may be found even in the writings which have been quoted above as expounding the concept of the criminal code of behaviour. Thus in Benney's *Low Company* (65) we find paragraphs which not only represent the accepted pattern of behaviour, but some deeper personality traits as well. For instance, he describes life in the industrial school where the bigger boys reserved for themselves the amusement of making the smaller boys dance by whipping their legs with hazel switches. 'But the sign of dis-

inction'—he says (*op. cit.*, p. 142)—'was to have lackies who were indeed lackies: to have frightened younger boys so thoroughly that they would clean your shoes, make your bed, do your morning task work, run your errands and even give you their weekly pocket money rather than risk your displeasure. To rise to this pre-eminence was the ambition of every boy of spirit.'

The above description reveals not only the cultural pattern of the industrial school: that pattern could not have existed without the strong elements of cruelty, aggressiveness and striving for power in the school's population. The social and psychological elements are inseparable.

Professor Burgess provides similar evidence against his own statements. He discusses the character of a young man (Stanley) whom he regards as typical of the delinquency area. Having stated that the personality pattern does not distinguish the criminal from the law-abiding citizen, he nevertheless opens the list of Stanley's personality traits in the following way (*op. cit.*, pp. 190-1):

Early rise and persistence of a sense of injustice.

Self-pity.

Hypercritical of others.

Always right; never takes blame, but readily blames others.

It may be noticed that a persistent sense of injustice involves in general (i) an emphasis on the frustrating character of situations in which the individual finds himself (obstacle-dominant extrapunitive reaction, Symbol E'), (ii) readiness to deny one's own guilt when accused—supposedly unjustly—by others (Symbol E), and (iii) to blame others for the injustice (Symbol E). Self-pity is equally extrapunitive in obstacle-dominance, and the last two points in ego-defence.

Thus the list of traits opens in a way corresponding exactly to the definitions given by Rosenzweig in his exposition of extrapunitive reaction-patterns. Later points made by Professor Burgess might be related to extrapunitiveness and projection, e.g. suspiciousness, tendency to moralize; to factors positively correlated with extrapunitiveness (resentment of correction and immunity to suggestion); or to egocentricity (lack of insight which, as Professor Burgess himself explains, is characteristic of the self-centered person).

The fact that Professor Burgess's list so exactly tallies with the concepts underlying the present writing can hardly be a coincidence.¹

There have been attempts to ascribe delinquency to such super-

¹ J. L. Reusser (reported by Merrill, 465, p. 157) also found delinquent boys more egocentric, more critical and less able to understand how others feel than non-delinquent boys.

ficial layers of personality as habit-formation.¹ They have proved as futile as the attempts to trace the origins of behaviour down to biology, ignoring anything that is not 'basic' enough. If we study the surface, we can see so many behavioural patterns that we cannot accept any notion of general traits—every personality is unique and has its own mode of expression. If we go to the depths of the Unconscious we are all alike.

We may try to study the surface and develop psychological tests that will tell us directly whether the given individual is honest or dishonest, trustworthy or not. (Cf. Hartshorne and May's *Studies in Deceit*, 319). Superficially this procedure appears to be sensible and promising—why build up concepts of direction of aggression and construct tests to measure it, when we can measure the individual's proneness to crime directly, by giving him a test of honesty, that is by providing him with a situation in which it pays to be dishonest and see whether he will take the opportunity offered? However, all such attempts have failed. The subjects were most inconsistent in their behaviour. The attempt made in Poland to measure the 'moral feelings' of delinquents met a similar fate (350). Delinquents as a class seem to vary among themselves much more than they differ from non-delinquents.

A particular habit, a particular way of committing a crime, may be an entirely individual, or narrow group, formation. Behaviour in a test situation gives no true indication whether the individual will be equally honest or dishonest in his private or public life. From the fact that an individual has robbed a stranger, we cannot conclude that he will rob his neighbour. Here we really have systems of values and habits which are too complicated to be measured by a single device. The *forms* of behaviour differ, and we find that (according to an informant of Clemmer, 156, p. 154) 'a banker who steals from his depositors looks with horror upon a bank robber who does his stealing violently, and the bank robber with disgust upon a banker who has betrayed persons who trusted him'.

But an individual is not the sum of his habits and values. He is a structure with a certain system, in which some parts are more essential and dominate the rest. The prevailing mode of directing aggression in frustrating situations may be considered such an organized trait. If we measure this mode, we still cannot determine the form of expression: whether in stealing, robbery, war, political life, or ideological warfare. What we can do, however, is to determine the individual's proneness to external or internal conflicts. If an individual is prone to external conflicts he may express this tendency in many ways: crime is one of them. If we

¹ Harris and Odoroff (309, 310, 506) went as far as to regard delinquency merely as the efforts of a group of individuals, exhibiting limitations of various sorts, to entertain themselves.

reform a criminal superficially, changing only his ways of expression, he may refrain from committing offences, but will remain at bottom a troublemaker, perhaps more dangerous to society than any offender.¹

The difference between a pick-pocket and a shop-lifter may be superficial—a question of habit and opportunity. The difference between a burglar and a political gangster may lie largely in the opportunities they have encountered in the course of their lives, and no reliable personality test will ever differentiate between them.

But the difference between a trouble-maker and a person undergoing internal conflict is far deeper than that. It does not involve the *sphere* of the restrictions imposed by the super-ego—a bank burglar may find a house burglary below his dignity and refrain from it. Rather it involves the *strength* of restriction in conflict situations. The purpose of applying the Picture-Frustration Study in this research was the measurement of this directional tendency, to which all 'social types' of expression are only secondary.

There is also some evidence that the rules imposed by the criminal group are often disobeyed by its members; and that they are broken more frequently than might be anticipated by those writers who think that there are no essential personality differences between criminals and the general population. This evidence is usually neither summarized nor explicitly defined by observers, and often not even admitted by writers on the subject. It may, however, be easily detected in the personal documents of offenders, in their autobiographies, and in novels of criminal life written by them.² *Low Company* (65) is a society full of mutual conflicts as well as of conflicts with the authorities. Even if 'The Prison Community' (156) makes explicit rules—permitting theft from the state, but not the sale of such stolen articles, which must be given away; most categorically forbidding theft from other prisoners—all these rules are soon broken, and 'seldom a day passes that some prisoner does not lose something by theft' (an informant of Clemmer, op. cit., p. 156).

In addition to the breaking of the group's explicit rules, we have the confusing of these rules: 'The prisoner's world is an atomized

✓ ¹ To Russell (593, p. 104) the really harmful acts are: 'sharp practice in business of the sort not punished by law, harshness towards employees, cruelty towards the wife and children, malevolence towards competitors, ferocity in political conflicts—these are the really harmful sins that are common among respectable and respected citizens. By means of these sins a man spreads misery in his immediate circle and does his bit towards destroying civilization.'

² The works of two Polish writers on the subject, one a Jew who began his criminal career in early childhood (Urke Nachalnik), the other a man of education, a Polish gentleman who became a smuggler (Sergiusz Piasecki), both keen and intelligent observers, are unfortunately inaccessible to the English reader.

world'—says Clemmer (pp. 297-8). 'Its people are atoms interacting in confusion. It is dominated and it submits. Its own community is without a well established social structure. Recognized values produce a myriad of conflicting attitudes. There are no definite communal objectives. There is no consensus for a common goal. The inmates' conflict with officialdom and opposition toward society is only slightly greater in degree than conflict and opposition among themselves. Trickery and dishonesty overshadow sympathy and co-operation. Such co-operation as exists is largely symbiotic in nature. Social controls are only partially effective. . . . No one knows, the dogmas and codes notwithstanding, exactly what is important.'¹

To sum up the above survey we conclude that all extrapunitive traits are found by observers among psychopathic and delinquent subjects and are exhibited by these subjects in their autobiographies. Our research gives experimental evidence and a conceptual scheme in support of these observations.

2. THE PROBLEM OF WAR AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

(a) *Introductory remarks*

For several reasons the question of war claims the place of honour among the problems specific to the present crisis of civilization. For the first time in history as soon as we emerged from one world war we were worrying about the next. That is, perhaps, more than any civilization can endure. We cannot develop the normal institutions of a happy society when the society itself is constantly threatened with the shattering of its very structure. Moreover, with the development of new war techniques—in which attack always seems to be much ahead of defence—we begin to think that the very basis of our civilization, and the population of the most advanced countries, may suffer complete annihilation. Finally, warfare itself has been conceived by some authors as the by-product of social evolution (516, p. 132), and it is claimed that far from civilization having tamed the savage (who was, according to this view, essentially peaceful) it has made man more cruel (*Ibidem*, pp. 208-9). Thus warfare has grown like a parasitic plant

¹ Similar to the fallacy of the strictly obeyed criminal code of behaviour is the fallacy of 'democracy' in the criminal community. Clifford Shaw (631, p. 113) quotes in this respect the view of Jack Black, who was a burglar for twenty-five years and published his autobiography: 'There is no more caste in the heart of India than in an American penitentiary. A bank burglar assumes an air with a house burglar, a house burglar sneers at a pickpocket, a pickpocket calls a forger "a short story writer", and they all make a common cause against the stool-pigeon.'

on the trunk of civilization 'until it now threatens to destroy the host on which it lives' (*Ibidem*, pp. 15-16).

I do not propose to discuss this last view, as I do not believe that warfare—even as a parasitic plant—is implied in the growth of civilization.¹ I agree that in the process of civilization we have neurosis and psychopathy, crime and warfare, but these evils are no more implied in the cultural development than are the diseases from which we suffer implied in the development of the individual. On the contrary, in the successful development of civilization we may expect the disappearance of warfare,² as of other diseases of society. On the other hand, if we treat warfare as a disease it should be studied as such, and its causes determined.

In this research we could not even attempt to determine the causes of war, as it would have led us too far from our main purpose and from our method. But if we briefly survey what other writers regard as the causes of war, we may find that some factors are related to our research. We have been studying some of the personality changes taking place at the present time, and have determined whether they grow stronger or weaker under oppression; now it will be our task to examine whether they work for peace or war. But first of all let us consider whether we may expect any psychological factors at all in the causation of war.

(b) *Economic causes of war*

Some writers, explicitly or implicitly, deny the existence of any psychic factors in the causation of war. They blame the economic structure of society as the root of all evil, ignoring the psychological aspect of warfare altogether (110). Thus the capitalist system has been blamed for wars in general, and rival capitalistic imperialisms for the more recent events in particular (386). On the other hand, Sir Norman Angell (33) points out that in some cases the working class was responsible for legislation of the anti-Alien, anti-Negro, anti-Chinese or anti-Japanese character, that is, legislation which calls for conflicts including armed conflict, and is the final repudiation of the doctrine of Universal Brotherhood. Sometimes capitalists are regarded as a 'criminal class' and used as scapegoats, but this, instead of clarifying, only simplifies the problem. It would be a similar mistake—and one that Sir Norman Angell never commits—to find a new scapegoat in the narrow-mindedness of the working class.

It would be out of place to discuss here the merits and fallacies of the Marxist views on the causation of war. Some of the arguments

¹ According to Durbin and Bowlby (190), primitive communities are as war-like as civilized ones.

² Cf. Leonard Woolf (736) who thinks that war is preventable like cannibalism, cholera, or witch-burning, all of which have been abolished by civilization.

—for instance, that wars, while not paying any nation as a whole, yet do pay certain sections of society (276)—are certainly convincing, although the business of war has become pretty bad and very uncertain for everybody. Others—for instance, blaming capitalists for all wars—are obviously unfounded, since we have had wars without capital, capitalists or capitalistic systems, and Soviet Russia itself may serve as an example of imperialism without capitalism. But all this controversy remains outside any psychological approach as long as we make no psychological assumptions. What brings the argument into our field, and at the same time allows us to dismiss the whole doctrine as inadequately founded, is the psychological assumption underlying the doctrine. That assumption is, that the object of any war is a search for wealth even if the citizens of the state in whose name the war is waged deem themselves to be fighting for liberty, or national rights, for the vindication of their national honour or the maintenance of democracy (385).

From the psychological point of view we cannot make such assumptions. We cannot claim that the motives of men are economic even if they are unconscious. We cannot dismiss Freud's doctrine of the sexual character of the id—the primary source of impulses—simply adopting an economic id instead. The evidence for any such assumption is too weak to convince the psychologist. We may find evidence to the contrary that motives which we commonly regard as economic are often political or emotional in nature (32).

Similarly unfounded is another Marxist assumption, made by Szalai (671). He argues that in a society in which the means of production and the goods produced do not belong to the workers who produce them the whole process of production is split up; this results in a general split in morality and leads directly to the formation of war-like attitudes. To my mind none of the accepted psychological theories explains in any way the process by which this is done and we must leave the hypothesis as incapable of being proven or disproved in the present state of knowledge.

The causation of war is too complex to be explained by any one political or—we must admit it—psychological theory. Sometimes one theory, sometimes another throws more light on the causation of one particular war. We cannot even blame the man-in-the-street and say that war is caused by him, rather than by governments of capitalists (32, p. 76)—for sometimes it may be caused by governments or capitalists. But what Bismarck said is certainly true (quoted in 275, p. 170)—‘the statesman can do nothing of himself’. War cannot be waged without the co-operation of the man-in-the-street. The non-psychological causes of war may vary—but yet in the people's minds we may find some elements work-

ing for war, and making war more probable. What are these elements?

(c) *Human nature*

Let us consider the whole of all these elements together: Human Nature, the instinctive inheritance of Man.

As the late Karl Mannheim pointed out (448, p. 121), there are few ideologies more dangerous in their consequences than the one attributing war (or any other social evil) to an unchanging human nature. If human nature is unchanging (and it is, on this argument, irrational, aggressive, and looking for trouble), there is no hope for humanity whatsoever.

Fortunately for us there is a world of difference between a genotype and a phenotype, and the term 'human nature' as an unchanging factor—or changing very slowly and with extreme difficulty—may be applied to the first concept only. Men, especially when mature and able to influence their own fate as well as that of others, are not just 'human natures', but natures, greatly modified by their environment, by their family and by the innumerable sets of institutions, laws and habits, which are constantly moulding their characters. 'We cannot change human nature, but we may change human behaviour'—writes Sir Norman Angell.¹ The fact is that people living in different cultures and at different times *are* different, that there are peaceful as well as belligerent nations (448, p. 124), and even the most aggressive ones sometimes take a rest, and co-operate.

As we cannot explain war or, indeed, any other phenomenon of social life by human nature, so we cannot explain it by the existence of primitive impulses. Even if in some psycho-analytic writings these impulses are very much stressed, and perhaps over-emphasized, it does not follow that the author is unaware of other psychological factors or mechanisms which may promote war. But, again, we cannot treat these factors as being constant. As Ginsberg (274) made clear, we cannot account for the variations in human behaviour by appealing to certain permanent elements in the family situation. Some psycho-analytic writings suffer from this weakness; and even if, for instance, we are ready to believe Pryn's Hopkins (336, pp. 118–131), that sadism, narcissism, exhibitionism, homosexuality, heterosexuality, Oedipus complex or ambivalence may be responsible for building up war psychology, we still do not know *when* they are responsible for that, since in other conditions they may be very well responsible for peace. To

¹ A better term, used by Durbin and Bowlby (190), would be 'changing human beings', as they themselves really do change, and not only their behaviour.

account for war as well as for peace we must find changing, not permanent, factors. Only the change in the cause may explain the change in the effect.¹

(d) *Unreason*

The Irrationality of Man may be such a changing factor, possessing great force in engendering war, hindering co-operation, and breeding hatred.

This element appears to be a basic problem for those who are trying to solve the problem of war by the abolition of sovereignty, and the application of international law or collective security. They all want the legal machinery, and police force, but they also require the spirit of co-operation and the application of reason to the facts of international life; they demand that we should apply the knowledge which is universally possessed to public policy, and see the meaning of the facts 'which are beneath our noses' (33, p. 46).

Rational behaviour is usually defined as having reference to an end or purpose, a high degree of consciousness.² There are, however, other no less important elements which are often stressed in discussions about the prevention of war, and international co-operation in general.

One of these is the ability to take long views, or, if I may use Freudian terminology, to apply the reality principle instead of the pleasure principle.³ For instance, in an interesting discussion between Sir Norman Angell and Professor Laski (110) they both agree that war does not pay the capitalists in the long run, but also that the capitalists are not wise, and take short views. When Professor Laski argues that the capitalists are obviously less interested in the long run than Sir Norman Angell for 'while he is a philosopher, they are capitalists'—it might be added that in order to ensure international co-operation and abolish war we need both capitalists and socialists to be philosophers. It is obvious that warfare pays nobody in the long run, but it is also obvious, as the late Professor K. Mannheim said (448, p. 39), that the common belief in the gradual process of Reason in history was entirely unfounded. The fact that we have wars which benefit no one is in itself sufficient evidence of our unreason.

¹ The importance of those psychological factors which are changeable and controllable has been recognized by many psychologists in the field of international relations; for that very reason any contribution of psychology to the making of peace is much to be desired (94, 123, 316, 317, 352, 355, 405, 474, 489, 654, 686).

² On unconscious factors in the causation of war see among others E. Glover (282-4) and W. Brown (120).

³ The reality principle might be defined as the pleasure principle in the long run.

The other element, distinguishing rational from irrational behaviour and thought, is, I feel, even more fundamental and important. It is, as Professor Ginsberg says (277, p. 242) the power of taking an 'impersonal' view, or, if I may give a negative definition, the ability to get rid of one's own egocentricity. Egocentricity is a term applied to the ego, or in other words, to the individual's self. We may, however, draw a parallel, and say, that in group formation we may have a similar phenomenon, which I should like to call 'circulocentricity', having as its basis the tendency to see all objects only in relation to the particular group, as in egocentricity all objects are perceived only in relation to the subject.¹

Egocentricity involves not only the inability to see the facts in their proper relations, but also the inability to apply law and morality. For that reason it may be regarded as one of the main obstacles in the development of personal relations—leading to neurosis or crime; or as 'circulocentricity', in international relations—leading to lack of co-operation, conflict and war.

It was mainly Piaget (518-21) who put forward the parallelism between intellectual and moral development, and claimed that 'logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action'. In view of the criminological research on similar lines where the relation between intelligence and delinquency is far from established, it is difficult to claim that this parallelism is complete. It can easily be seen, however, that in the stage of individual development, where we have thoughts akin to day-dreams, truth confused with desire, omnipotence of thought, and no objective observation or reasoning—we can have no proper morality, or ability to apply law. In the egocentric stage we are already able to make certain observations of reality, but we fail to realize the personal nature of our own point of view, and regard it as absolute and shared by all. It is a deformation of objects, and if continued (as is more likely, I think, in group life), it gives rise to an enormous number of false ideas, conceits, Utopias, suspicions and megalomaniac fantasies.² In the sphere of morality, in the egocentric stage, although we regard the rules by which we are bound as sacred and unchangeable, we interpret them in the individualistic manner (518), and apply them from the subjective point of view. In group life this tendency seems to survive even more definitely, and makes international co-operation more diffi-

¹ *Circulus*=surrounding people, group, orbit. A special term 'statocentrism', has been proposed for the tendency to evaluate everything in terms of one's own social standards, developed within one social class (72); MacCurdy (430) gives an illuminating discussion on how much harm is done by applying social standards developed in one nation to evaluate another nation's policy. See also various studies of ethnocentrism which will be discussed below, in the Section on Oppression and Prejudice.

² Piaget (520) gives some excellent illustrations of these tendencies in children.

cult. Russia's tendency to regard the Yalta and Potsdam agreements as sacred and unchangeable, while interpreting them in the individual manner, may serve as a good example of 'circulocentricity' in international relations.¹

Only at the highest stage of personality development are we able on the one hand to build up a universe of relations in our perception of the world, and on the other hand to regard laws and other rules of behaviour as based on co-operation, and therefore not unchangeable, but founded on a free agreement to obey the decision of majority.

In group life it seems to be more difficult to reach this stage of development. When our Ego, as the relatively conscious, reality assessing agency, reaches a stage when we are able to see the relations between things, and not merely the one relation of everything to ourselves—we seem to regress in our individual development when taking part in the group life. There, instead of referring everything to himself, the individual refers everything to his group. Instead of assuming, as Piaget's children do, that people understand him and agree with him, and that everything in the world has the sole purpose of serving and resembling him, in the stage of 'circulocentricity' the individual repeats this assumption in relation to his group. Now everything must serve and resemble his State and its structure. When the individual realizes that his thoughts are not omnipotent and that he is not sovereign, he is still likely to believe that his group is omnipotent and sovereign.² That is perhaps why international law is so much behind private law, and its application is so much more difficult. The agencies representing international law and order act in an atmosphere unheard of in any law-respecting country and violating the principles of justice, as elaborated in the thousands of years old development of law abiding private citizens.³ Exerting pressure and threatening the

¹ On the role of suspicions and delusions in the political sphere see J. T. MacCurdy (430). The present writer (301) gave certain illustrations on the amount of egocentricity among psychiatric patients of certain nationality and 'circulocentricity' of that nation in politics.

² The similar point has been made by Emery Reves in his little book on peace and international co-operation (545). He opens the book as follows: 'Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the centre of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such method of observation should create an entirely false perspective. Yet this is the only method admitted and used by the seventy or eighty national governments of our world, by our legislators and diplomats, by our press and radio. All the conclusions, principles and policies of the peoples are necessarily drawn from the warped picture of the world obtained by so primitive a method of observation.' On group approval in War Crimes see Alexander (21).

³ The Nuremberg Trial offers a good example of this. Not only were the Powers, conducting the procedure, at the same time victors, police force, prosecutors, and judges, but sometimes they might have been (and in some

judges has fortunately ceased to be a common feature of the administration of Law in civilized countries, but it still remains, under the euphemistic term of 'power politics' or even 'reality politics', the usual way in which international disputes are settled.

Human beings, it appears, have extreme difficulty in getting rid of their egocentricity in the process of socialization.¹ Equally, in their thinking processes, in observing the facts around them, as in their actions, especially moral and legal actions, they are apt to identify themselves with the group, which they call 'sovereign', and then indulge in behaviour, which they would call immature if related to a single individual instead of to the aggregate of individuals called the State or Nation.

Thus the difference between egocentricity and 'circulocentricity' is merely that of degree, and the psychological mechanism is the same. So the effects of both these phenomena are different only in degree, and making a sharp distinction by claiming that 'circulocentricity' and actions based on it are morally justified, is one of the most dangerous fallacies of our time.

The effect of 'circulocentricity' is warfare and lack of international co-operation, while the effect of egocentricity is individual maladjustment in the form of neurosis or crime. If we define crime in general terms as antisocial behaviour, the difference between war and crime almost disappears.²

Here again I do not claim that war is caused by 'circulocentricity' only, or that crime is nothing else but emotional immaturity of the egocentric type. There are other elements playing a no less important role in the causation of war and crime, and I shall refer to them later. But ego- (or circulo-) centricity seems to be a basic factor in both these kinds of maladjustment, and has been described as such by other writers. Adler's notions of the criminal's egocentricity especially may be easily applied to the political sphere: thus the fact that criminals 'are not concerned with their fellow-beings', or that 'the criminal's superiority exists only for himself and only in his own imagination' may have a wider application in group life. Here we all seem to feel justified in not being concerned with the citizens of other countries, and claiming an

instances even were) accused of the same crimes of which they accused the defendants. In the case of the murder of 13,000 Polish officers, prisoners of war, the defence explicitly charged one of the four Powers, represented in the Tribunal, of having committed that crime. In the end the defendants were neither convicted nor acquitted in respect of this murder, and the case remains open.

¹ This term, used by Piaget, denotes the adaptation of the individual both to reality and society, especially to the latter.

² H. Mannheim (441) notes that in primitive communities there was no distinction between criminals and prisoners of war. We have recently come to this practice again.

imaginary superiority for our own State and Nation. Another of Adler's (10) statements on the criminal's psychology, referring to his striving for superiority 'in a private and personal manner', and to his lack of interest in others, has been quoted by H. Mannheim (441) with the remark that there is no need to comment upon its applicability to the causation of war.

Mannheim, as Adler, relates egocentricity to inferiority feelings,¹ and there is no need to multiply the evidence in support of this view. I shall, however, restrict the present argument to egocentricity as such, without implying inferiority feelings or other factors associated with the phenomenon.² Here, as I want to restrict the discussion to the central psychological factors, I will only note, that in view of the above argument egocentricity might be called such a factor. Its importance in the criminological sphere is widely recognized irrespective of the line of approach, Freudian, Adlerian, orthodox psychiatric, or sociological.³ As shown above, there seems to be enough evidence on the importance of this tendency in the international sphere as well.

(e) *Aggressiveness*

The place of aggressiveness in the causation of war is so obvious, that it need not be discussed in detail here. War is not only caused by aggressiveness—it is a kind of organized aggression. The causes of aggression in general, and of this kind in particular, may be manifold. But we cannot have war without aggressiveness, without the disposition in people's minds to behave in a certain way which we call aggressive. Thus aggressiveness is more than a cause of warfare—it is its primary condition.⁴

¹ He says (441, p. 54): '... the commission of a crime is one of the surest ways to draw attention to one's person, to become a centre of interest, to stand in the limelight. Consequently it is a possible method of compensating for the inferiority feeling. The same applies to the bellicose attitude of a nation; a persistent blowing of the war-trumpet is the surest way to publicity until you have talked so much war that you cannot withdraw without destroying your artificially acquired prestige beyond any hope of repair.'

² Among the other phenomena, closely associated with egocentricity, and according to Piaget (519, 521) fairly characteristic of this stage of development, animism is one of the most important. According to Durbin and Bowlby (190, pp. 13-15) animism, as the tendency to attribute all events in the world to the deliberate activity of human or para-human will, may claim an important place in the causation of war. The combination of animism with aggression will be discussed later on.

³ In a tabulation of the psychiatric interview of inmates of an American penitentiary institution the cases of 'psychopathic personality of the egocentric type' comprised of 48.9 per cent of the total 5,976 individuals (Clifford R. Shaw, 632, Appendix I).

⁴ Cf. Durbin and Bowlby who regard war as one species of a larger genius of fighting (190, p. 3). Although they profess a pluralistic theory of international war they say that people can fight only because they are able to release the explosive stores of transformed aggression (p. 28).

In view of our concept of the direction of aggression we will modify our statement as to the aggressive basis of war, and say that it is aggression turned outwards, against others. In this respect it is again similar to crime, but while in crime the aggression turns against the society to which the individual belongs, in war the individual attacks other groups of people, with the help of the members of his own group. Crime is an individual's aggression against other individuals, and, by destroying law and order, against society as a whole. War is a group's aggression against other groups of individuals (states or nations), and, by destroying law and order, against humanity as a whole. If we do not often realize this parallel, it is because of our own 'circulocentricity' in politics—as the egocentric is not concerned with Society, so we, at present are very little concerned with Humanity.¹

If we agree, following the above argument, that both war and crime are types of outward-turned aggression, we may also examine further assumptions which, if allowed, would bring us in line with the starting point of our research.

The central question we put in our attempt to test the psychological changes occurring under oppression was: do men under oppression tend to direct their aggression more and more outwards or inwards, or do they tend to repress it? In other words are they becoming more neurotic, more balanced, or more antisocial? If we tend to direct aggression outwards, the result will probably be an increase in delinquency; if inwards—an increase in neuroticism; if we manage to dispose of our aggression with plasticity and a sense of proportion we may accept a balanced development of the psychological aspect of civilization.

We thus assumed a correlation between the tendency to turn aggression outwards, and delinquency; and we felt we were not justified in making this assumption without verification. Therefore a study of criminal and non-criminal groups was carried out to establish a definite association between outward aggressiveness and antisocial behaviour. But has this study covered this very specific kind of antisocial behaviour, the tendency to wage aggressive war? It would be extremely difficult to say whether the aggressive elements in human nature will express themselves in war or in other forms of violence.

I do not think, therefore, that we should be justified in making the above assumption, and, without any verification, in drawing definite conclusions as to the future of warfare on the basis of a study of individuals. We may have a decrease of warfare together

¹ Professor Ginsberg rightly says (274) that we must think of war not as a genus uniquely opposed to peace, but as a species of violence opposed to social order and security. It is obvious that crime belongs to the same species, and should be treated as such.

with an increase of other forms of antisocial behaviour. Warlike nations should be studied, to ascertain whether they differ significantly from peaceful nations in the personality structure of their members. For practical reasons, such a study could not be attempted by the present writer, and no definite conclusions regarding the belligerency of people can be reached in the present study.

But, while far from being conclusive, our material may yet be suggestive. If the personality structure deviates from the norm or balance to a certain degree, it acquires a rigidity that facilitates prediction. A normal person will sometimes be calm and sometimes excited, but a highly excitable person will become excited under almost any conditions.¹ So a normal person will have a certain amount of aggression turned outwards, but it will be difficult to predict its means of expression—experience shows that the usual way is to find some socially acceptable channels for such aggression. But a highly aggressive person will express aggression under almost any circumstances—now in sport, now in crime, now in national hatred, now in war. Aggressive people will probably be much more easily induced to promote and indulge in any kind of aggression, including war. On the other hand it is doubtful whether any nation with a high rate of neuroticism could be induced to make war, except in self-defence.

Too much attention has, I think, been paid to finding socially acceptable channels of aggression for antisocial individuals. If the pressure of impulses is too great they will flow through any channels.

The group situation, the political propaganda, make the process of 'rationalization'² only too easy, and convince an aggressive individual that his hostility against foreigners, his defiance of existing treaties and international obligations are morally justified. We can sublimate a certain amount of our aggressive impulses, but not too great an amount, and not without a constantly vigilant public opinion. If the amount of aggression is too great we can expect anything: not only bull-fighting, but murders, dictatorship and oppression, revolutions and internal wars. Only fear—the most dangerous weapon in securing law and order—will restrain an aggressive nation from waging external war, and trying to conquer others, when it cannot achieve internal peace.

It is true that the more primitive people indulge in aggression more directly, and their tendencies are easier to discover. For more 'cultured' or sophisticated individuals some refinement of

¹ The same applies to animals. Pavlov (513, pp. 302 ff.) describes an exceedingly inhibitable 'neurotic' dog which could not withstand any strong conditioned stimuli, immediately entering into an inhibitory state.

² I.e. unconscious self-deception and pseudo-rationalistic justification of actions, unconsciously motivated.

primitive reactions is needed, and for this purpose war may be regarded as the conventionalization of murder, as diplomacy is that of cheating, or marriage of sexual attitudes (680, p. 1867). But while the conventionalization of sex changes the essence of sexual relations, giving them a social purpose, the conventionalization of cheating and murder in diplomacy and war makes these actions only more dangerous. It is true as Durbin and Bowlby said (190, p. 12) that: 'Apes and children when they fight, simply fight. Men and women first construct towering systems of theology and religion, complex analyses of racial character and class structure, or moralities of group life and virility before they kill one another.' But these towering systems do not change much. Murder is murder, even if it is mass murder, highly refined and conventionalized. If the tendency to kill people is strong enough, it will express itself with or without convention.

(f) *Aggressiveness combined with other mechanisms*

The place of aggressiveness in the causation of war is still more important when we consider its combination with other psychological mechanisms—a phenomenon so frequent that it appears as a rule rather than an exception. The process of 'rationalization' has already been mentioned; the emotional compensations of war may be added. To the doubt that war, although not paying the nation as a whole, does in fact profit certain sections of the nation (276)—we may add the suggestion of recent writers (183, 224, 308) that war may bring satisfaction to certain parts of our minds. In addition to a release of tension, caused by unexploded aggressiveness, we find in war adventure and heroism, we fight for 'great' causes and escape from boredom; through an increased sense of unity with other members of our nation and its allies we escape from our loneliness, from our individual worries and responsibility, from the stress of public opinion and from family ties. Instead of our feeling of personal insignificance we acquire pride in the greatness and importance of our group—individually we have only to fulfill our duty. Even that duty brings us some compensation and enjoyment, satisfying the 'need to be needed'. For people with inferiority feelings the battledress may appeal as a symbol of power and importance. According to Adler (9) the goal of superiority always tends to introduce into our life a hostile and fighting tendency.

In this way our aggressive tendencies are finding allies within our own minds, all driving our actions in the same direction—towards war and destruction. Other mechanisms, related to aggressiveness more directly, will also increase its driving force.

Two of these mechanisms, animism and egocentricity, have already been mentioned, although without reference to aggressive-

ness. When they are combined together with aggression and with the third mechanism of projection the mixture becomes inflammatory.¹

If we attribute all disasters in the world to some deliberate action of hostile individuals, if all the actions our imaginary enemies may undertake are related in our mind to our own welfare or that of our group, and if, in the end, we project our own hatred of others on to them and claim that they hate us as intensely—we must build up the legend of encirclement, and be prone to start an aggressive war in 'self-defence'.²

Out of the four interacting elements; aggression, egocentricity, animism and projection, animism is probably not entirely independent, and may be regarded (as for instance by Piaget) as one expression of the egocentric type of thought, or (by Fenichel, 217, p. 150) of projection. On the other hand there are good grounds for believing that projection as a mechanism of defence is closely related to the tendency to direct aggressive impulses outwards. In a series of experiments by H. A. Murray and his associates (496) high correlations were found between prejudice, the tendency to use the mechanism of projection, and the tendency to direct aggression against the outer world.³ Anger and hostility in the sphere of emotions, condemnation of the outer world in the sphere of judgements, aggression outwardly directed in the sphere of drives, and projection as a mode of defence, may represent various aspects of the same thing (564). If we accepted the Freudian theory of aggression and said that the outward direction of it is only secondary—as the death instinct is originally directed against the self⁴—we might deduce that aggression against others implies a kind of projection in its very mechanism.

(g) *Conclusions*

If we accept the view that psychological factors play some part in the causation of war, the implications of the findings of this research are quite clear. We found that people under oppression become more aggressive, more egocentric and more rigid in their

¹ Another mechanism, allied to projection, is that of displacement. According to Miller and Bugelski (468): 'War, race prejudice, and other forms of hostility against members of the out-group, usually involve [. . .] a certain component of irrational aggression which is brought into play by the mechanism of displacement.'

² Partridge (511) stresses the paranoid belief of sociopaths that the whole world is against them—it is almost a personal legend of encirclement. On the importance of paranoid tendencies in the formation of war attitudes see L. G. Brown (119, p. 577).

³ It must be admitted, as Wright's experiments with children have shown, that altruism can be projected as well (737).

⁴ Personally I am not making this assumption. On the role of repression of aggressive impulses in the causation of war, see Rickman (547).

mental operations; we have grounds to believe that they also become more prone to projection, which appears to be their main 'defence mechanism'. The role of these factors in ethnocentricity, prejudice and war-like attitude is generally recognized, although no research has been done to examine now far their incidence within a nation correlates with the actual outbreaks of wars waged by that nation.¹ There is, however, a great deal of evidence that extrapunitive behaviour correlates positively with racial prejudice; this point will be discussed in the following Section.

Observations I made in the course of this research also suggest that the turning of aggression outwards in the P.F.S. test situation is associated with sharp in-group *v.* out-group distinctions, and with hostility and resentment directed against out-groups. The failure of my experiment with the Jewish population outside the prisons is one example of this; while the co-operation of all the Poles and of all delinquents, whether Polish, Jewish, Russian or Ukrainian, meant, to my mind, that I had succeeded in being accepted as a member of their in-group. In all interviews in the course of this research my main problem was to achieve this acceptance, and I felt that the question dominating my subjects' minds before they decided to co-operate was: 'Is he (the investigator) one of us?' When the answer was negative, the prejudice was against me and I could not be trusted. Friendliness on the part of a person who was not a member of the in-group was unthinkable in the existing frame of mind of my subjects.

One incident which happened in one of the camps just before I left it, and after all the testing and preliminary scoring of the P.F.S. had been completed, is worth quoting as an illustration. It might be described as a kind of riot: with protest meetings, a threat of a hunger strike, and heightened tension and excitement. The main point was the distribution of cigarettes—then the most fulminatory problem in Germany—and the question of leadership. Once the revolt started, hostility and accusations turned against U.N.R.R.A. officials in general, against supposed favouritism of 'other groups' of Displaced Persons (I could not find out which these groups were—they seemed to be all out-groups from the point of view of the accusers), and against the Germans.

I still do not know who was in the right, but I took careful note of the most aggressive individuals, who were considered to be 'ring-leaders' by the others. In the Polish groups there were ten such men and I established that six of them had been deported to concentration camps, four to forced labour in agriculture, none to industry. At that time the concentration camp group comprised only 4 per cent of the Polish camp population, the agricultural

¹ Allport (25) puts forward practical suggestions in this respect. On social attitude studies of war and aggressiveness see Eysenck (213).

and the industrial groups being approximately equal to each other in strength.

Six of the ring leaders had taken the P.F.S. and all but one proved highly extrapunitive. The one who was not more than average in that respect was a highly strung individual, who had come to me to seek advice for his insomnia, tremor and stuttering. Once he joined the revolt, his neurotic symptoms almost disappeared, and he did not seem to stutter when he was accusing his opponents, although he had done so before in general and in the interview and test situations.

I interpret this incident of the revolt as an indication, that individuals having high scores of extrapunitiveness, and larger groups containing many such persons, are not only relatively more prone to individual conflict and crime, but to group conflict as well. In stress situations they are joined by unbalanced subjects, whose mixed aggression then becomes concentrated on the out-group. This I regard as essentially the same situation as that which, when the in-group is the whole population of a sovereign state, is likely to create war.

3. OPPRESSION AND PREJUDICE¹

(a) *Introductory remarks*

In 1948 and 1949 Dr. J. H. Robb carried out a piece of field research² into certain aspects of anti-Semitism. He had three main objectives in view; to gain quantitative data on various aspects of personality which seemed to be connected with anti-Semitism; to study the dynamics of the connection between social and psychological forces in the production of anti-Semitic attitudes; and to extend the psychological knowledge of a group not customarily studied. He chose for his area of study an East End District of London with a highly homogeneous working class population, a district that is regarded as one of the most strongly anti-Semitic areas in London. Because of the limitations imposed by time and labour on all research carried out by one person, he concerned himself only with the attitudes of Gentiles towards Jews and towards their own group, and confined his study to adult males, obtaining his information by means of indirect participant observation, interviews with non-working class or local informants, interviews with a random sample of subjects and, in a few selected cases, an analysis of the subjects' responses to the Rorschach test.

¹ This section was written after the rest of the book had been submitted to London University as a Ph.D. thesis.

² 'A Study of Anti-Semitism in a working-class area', Ph.D. thesis 549. I am indebted to Dr. Robb for his permission to quote from his thesis.

At first sight this investigation may appear to have little in common with my work on oppression. The problems into which we were enquiring, the populations studied, even the methods used, were all very different: yet the *results* of our studies proved to be amazingly similar. We had frequently discussed general problems of frustration and aggression, were familiar with each other's terminology and frame of reference, and could not dismiss this similarity of results as spurious and due to a difference in semantics. The personality pictures of the oppressed and the criminal which emerged from my research corresponded in so many details to the personality picture of the anti-Semite described by Dr. Robb that they seemed almost the same type of person. And, regarded more closely, even the situations against which we viewed our subjects were essentially similar—we were both concerned with oppression and prejudice, but while Dr. Robb studied the oppressors (or, at least, potential oppressors), I studied the victims.

Dr. Robb's research, invaluable as it is, is only one of numerous studies of prejudice published in recent years. But the striking concurrence of our results suggests that a comparison of my findings with those of other studies of prejudice may reveal some interesting relationships between oppression and prejudice. A full review of these studies would mean embarking upon a new book, so I propose here only to summarize those results which are relevant to my study of oppression and crime. Many studies of interracial tension, particularly historical, sociological, and educational researches, proceed on such different lines that references to them here would throw little light on the concepts developed in my book. It is only recently that studies of prejudice have centred on the personality structure of the prejudiced persons themselves. But then often to such an extent that all balance and sense of proportion have been lost and many writers have implied—even if they did not actually state so—that the persons against whom prejudice is directed are only living projective material for the prejudiced. This view cannot be upheld: we must regard prejudice as an interpersonal relationship and not merely as a function of the prejudiced.

In the same sense oppression is an interpersonal relationship. So far we have concentrated our attention on various psychological elements which change and develop in the oppressed: disregarding the oppressor was a methodological necessity. Having done this we can now look at the other side of the same relationship and analyse the personality of the oppressor. The prejudiced person is at least a *potential* oppressor *par excellence*.

The great majority of studies of prejudice have been devoted to anti-Semitism. This may appear a deplorable limitation: we can just as well be prejudiced against other races, social classes, or

even against 'colleges, cities or cookery' (Allport, 26, p. 367). However, some studies have included anti-Negro feeling (29, 85, 118, 153, 182, 183, 233, 715) and anti-White prejudice amongst the Negroes (153, 173, 182, 715), and the results were not much different. Bettelheim and Janovitz, for instance, found anti-Semitic and anti-Negro attitudes to be correlated with the same psychological and social characteristics, and in almost the same order of correlation (76, p. 148). Hartley (314) measured prejudice against seven political or ideological and forty-two national groups. He included three fictitious groups (Danireans, Pireneans, and Wallonians) and found that prejudiced subjects tended to express their prejudice even against these 'nonesuch' groups.¹ The high correlation coefficients (.95 to .96) which he obtained between two independently calculated scores of prejudice for each individual² 'suggest that the degree of tolerance expressed by individuals is a generalized function of the individual and is not completely determined by the specific group toward which the attitude is directed' (314, p. 25). I shall accept this assumption in our survey as a working hypothesis: and I have similarly assumed that the results of my own study do not reflect merely the specific relationship between the German guards and a few hundred Poles, but that they reveal more general patterns of reaction.

I do not propose to make an historical survey of prejudice studies. It is worth mentioning, however, that the general trend in emphasis seems to have been from relatively specific attitudes and stereotypes to more and more general factors, both psychological and social. This emphasis on generalization is characteristic of nearly all recent research, irrespective of the specific field and method of enquiry.

Thus Levinson, studying anti-Semitism, came to the conclusion that it is 'not a specific aversion but an ideology, a general way of thinking about Jews and Jewish-Gentile interaction' (394, p. 92). The same writer went a stage further in his discussion of the relation of ethnocentricity to politico-economic ideology and group membership: he found ethnocentricity to be 'but one aspect of a broader pattern of social thinking and group functioning' (396, p. 207). This hypothesis was accepted and extended by the whole group of research workers headed by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford, who assumed 'that anti-Semitism probably is not a specific or isolated phenomenon but a part of a broader ideological framework, and that an individual's susceptibility to

¹ One might say that Hartley used a projective test. There is no essential difference between his 'nonesuch' people and my T.A.T. and P.F.S. pictures.

² Thirty-two of the national groups were numbered, and separate scores calculated from the odd numbers and the even numbers, there being sixteen of each.

this ideology depends primarily upon his psychological needs'. (12, p. 3).

The studies by Eysenck and his collaborators show the same trend. They carried out a series of experiments 'in the hope of isolating, defining and measuring Primary Social Attitudes', and of discovering what personality and other factors are related to them (211, p. 49). They used a forty-item Social Attitudes Inventory and analysed the answers of 250 Conservatives, 250 Liberals, and 250 Socialists. Proceeding by the method of factorial analysis, based on 780 tetrachoric correlations between each of the forty items and all the others,¹ they isolated two factors. The first factor was labelled 'conservatism-radicalism' and was grouped clearly into two opposite sets: a belief that private property should be abolished, the death penalty ought to go, Sunday observance is old-fashioned, Jews are valuable citizens, the divorce laws ought to be altered, we should give up part of our sovereignty, abolish abortion laws, cure criminals rather than punish them, laws favour the rich, companionate marriage should be allowed, and that patriotism is a force which works against peace; and a belief that nationalization is inefficient, compulsory religious education is desirable, the Japanese are cruel by nature, we should go back to religion, Jews are too powerful in this country, flogging should be retained as a deterrent, war is inherent in human nature, conscientious objectors are traitors, birth control should be made illegal and that coloured people are inferior. The second factor, which revealed the dichotomy between 'tender-minded' and 'tough-minded' people, was analysed on similar lines but all the items occurred in a different combination. There were also two group factors, each covering only a few of the forty items: 'conscious feminism', associated with attitudes favourable toward women, and 'humanitarianism', associated with favourable attitudes toward the Jews and lenient treatment of criminals.

This finding that attitudes to people and social situations are not a series of disconnected events but fall into patterns is important for the study of prejudice. According to Eysenck 'almost one-half of the anti-Semitic attitudes . . . could be accounted for in terms of generalized "primary attitudes"'. (211, p. 71). This 'suggests very strongly that anti-Semitism is not an isolated phenomenon that can be dealt with on its own merits, and which we can hope to eradicate by propaganda and education specifically directed against it. Quite on the contrary, it would appear that anti-Semitism is umbricated with a large number of other social attitudes, and it may be this whole complex structure which must be attacked before we can succeed in stamping out anti-Semitism'

¹ These were later reduced to 741 correlations, as some had to be omitted as unreliable.

(211, p. 71). Eysenck suggests that social attitudes present a hierarchical picture, with at least four levels of organization: unpremeditated spontaneous opinions, permanent opinions, attitudes (combining intercorrelated opinions), and primary social attitudes (combining intercorrelated attitudes).

In a later investigation Eysenck singled out anti-Semitic attitudes and correlated them with all the other items in his inventory. He concluded that anti-Semitism is by no means a specific reaction and it can only be understood in terms of the most general investigation of the genesis and nature of social attitudes as a whole (212, p. 280). He also put forward a tentative suggestion that some specific attitudes, which cannot be reliably predicted from the score of one or both of the factors he extracted (i.e. radicalism and tendermindedness), may be determined by other still unknown Primary Social Attitudes. Alternatively, they may be 'so closely correlated that one is very rarely found without the others, so that they are all really only different masks for the same fascist face' (215, p. 59). Finally, he incorporated his concepts of Primary Social Attitudes into his models of personality, with a hierarchical structure of four levels of organization (214).

Allport goes further in the same direction. To him the problem of prejudice 'may be viewed as one empirical focus in the wide region of social conflict and action' (26, p. 365). As such it provides a test case for the fruitfulness of the general theory of action developed by himself and others in America (510).¹ In this light 'prejudice is manifestly a value-orientation. It can be, and should be, studied at the level of *personality system*, at the level of *social system*, and at the level of *cultural system*. Each approach . . . is conceptually independent in its handling of the numerous elements of action involved. But at the same time prejudice as a concrete phenomenon cannot be fully understood unless it is regarded as reflecting simultaneously all three forms of systematization. Thus a methodological paradox exists: prejudice (like all other forms of social behaviour) is many things; it is one thing' (26, p. 365). While I am ready to accept this view as theoretically justified, in practice it would lead us too far: we only want to compare the experimental results of studies of prejudice with my research of oppression. Some limitation on the field of study is a necessity, however broad the outlook of the research worker.

Similarly Ackerman and Jahoda, although their study is, through necessity, almost exclusively clinical and carried out on orthodox psycho-analytic lines, assumed that 'all forms of interpersonal behaviour—including anti-Semitism—are the result of a continu-

¹ The other members of this group are: Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Edward C. Tolman, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon, and Samuel A. Stouffer.

ous interaction between intrapsychic needs and social factors' (5, p. 73), and concluded that their evidence 'points against any one-sided attempt to explain anti-Semitism exclusively as a psychological phenomenon. Social and psychological determinants are inseparable' (p. 85).

Summing up this broad outline of studies of prejudice let us compare the conclusions arrived at by Robb (549), who well represents the consensus of opinion, with the general implication of my study of oppression. According to him 'prejudice is a highly generalized factor. People who have a more than average prejudice against one out-group are likely to have a more than average prejudice against most others. The differences between anti-Semitism, anti-Negroism and general xenophobia are less fundamental than is commonly supposed. They can best be regarded as slightly different manifestations of basically similar conditions.' In the same way the attitudes of the oppressed as I found them formed a general pattern. They differed from those of non-oppressed (or less)-oppressed subjects not only in the narrow field of relations with the actual oppressors, but also in their relationships with most or all other human beings. To Robb, 'prejudice is a function of personality at least in the sense that it is dependent far more on the prejudiced person than on the out-group against which the prejudice is directed'. In my experiments I found specific characteristics of the oppressed and of the criminal at the level of personality. These characteristics had achieved autonomy and could be measured in an 'objective' test situation; the personality traits I measured were already, at the time of testing, relatively independent of the interaction between the oppressed and the oppressors, the criminals and the police. According to Robb 'prejudice is part of a personality pattern, i.e. it is possible to assess prejudice in a person by measuring other aspects of his personality. . . . The extent to which these correlates vary from culture to culture and from class to class can only be guessed at, but it seems that the basic personality traits associated with prejudice show less variation than their behavioural manifestations.' In my experiments the attitudes and personality traits of the subjects were measured without any reference to their previous condition of oppression, or, in the case of delinquents, to their criminal activities. I also assumed that the personality traits measured show less variation than their behavioural manifestations.

The following discussion of defence mechanisms, attitudes, personality traits, and personality formation of the prejudiced, the oppressed and the criminal is based on the above assumption of generality of patterns of response. It is necessary to realize that this assumption is correct only up to a point, and that in some

sense 'la personnalité est toujours en situation' (Lagache, 380, p. 6). But as far as possible we shall work on an artificial model of personality *in vacuo*, without any situation. Or, in some cases, on personality in the specialized situation of testing.

(b) *Personality structure*

The number of *methods* used in studying prejudice seems to be in direct proportion to the great variety of definitions of the concept of prejudice. Some of these methods are too far removed from mine to make comparison worthwhile; and the following outline will therefore be limited to those studies which are comparable in technique or material to my own.

Psychoanalytic interviews, supported by information on social and other environmental data, were used by Ackerman and Jahoda (4, 5).

Social-psychiatric interviews were also used by Bettelheim, Janovitz and Shils (76, 77). Their interviews were standardized and conducted by psychiatrically trained examiners; in addition to social and economic data they included projective questions to evaluate the subject's apprehensions. Systematic content analysis was made of all references to ethnic groups, and all cases were rated on a four-point continuum of intolerance.

Frenkel-Brunswik (235-47) used psychiatric interviews on psychoanalytic lines, and also included the Thematic Apperception Test.

'Open-type' interviews were used by Campbell (136), dealing, among other things, with attitudes to the Jews, to the support of the war, to the Federal Administration, and to economic satisfaction.

Adorno and his collaborators (12) also used psycho-analytically oriented clinical interviews, as well as factual questionnaires, dealing mainly with past and present group memberships, social status, etc.; opinion-attitude scales to obtain quantitative estimates of anti-Semitism, ethnocentricity, politico-economic conservatism, and of anti-democratic tendencies in the personality; 'projective' (open answer) questions; and the Thematic Apperception Test.

Questionnaires of various types were used by many investigators. Those of Allport and Kramer (29) contained questions concerning the personal data and life experiences of their subjects, including contacts with various minorities at various levels; and twenty-one statements the agreement or disagreement with which was to be indicated on a four-point scale: nine of these statements concerned Negroes, eight Jews, and four Roman Catholics. They also asked their subjects to examine each of twenty standard photographs and report whether it was of a Jew or a non-Jew. This last method may appear naïve—in fact it gave interesting results as the more

prejudiced subjects reported significantly more faces to be Jewish and were significantly more correct in their reports than the less prejudiced subjects.

Eysenck's methods (211, 212, 214, 215) have already been mentioned: he used Social Attitudes Inventories (basically a questionnaire) and factorial analysis.

Hartley (314), also mentioned above, used a modified social distance scale, a 'word-pair' test, a personality inventory and personality sketches.

Several investigators used projective techniques, usually in conjunction with other methods. For example, Adorno and Frenkel-Brunswik already mentioned, and Lindzey (412-14), who used the Picture-Frustration Study, the Thematic Apperception Test, the Allport-Kramer Scale, a Nationalism Questionnaire, and some related measures.

Gough also used the Picture-Frustration Study as well as the M.M.P.I., the Allport-Vernon Scale of Values, and the Wrightstone Scale of Civic Beliefs.

Lundberg (424) used the sociometric technique developed by Moreno.

Finally, Robb, in his study of anti-Semitism in a working class area (549), used the methods of indirect participant observation (he worked as a part-time barman in a local public house), interviews with non-working class informants and with local informants, and interviews (which included a number of projective questions) with a random sample of subjects. He also applied the Rorschach test to a selected group of subjects; and rated his subjects on a number of variables such as feelings in relation to ability to control the environment, feelings of optimism or pessimism, attitude to authority, degree of social isolation, and experience of unemployment.

The subjects studied by the various techniques mentioned above included psychiatric patients (4, 5), University men and women, Service Club men, prison inmates, Marine officers, Service Veterans, working class and middle class men and women (12), high-school boys and girls (296, 424), college students (29, 314, 412-14), veterans of World War II (76, 77) a random sample of white non-Jewish Americans (136), and a random sample of non-Jewish working class men in a London area (549).

The above summary is, of course, not exhaustive. In the following discussion of results many other investigations will be mentioned, and some further references to methodology cannot be avoided. But it is well to have a general picture of the methods used in comparable investigations at the back of one's mind while considering the results of any one method in particular.

In discussing the *Picture Frustration Study in relation to prejudice*

I have already mentioned (p. 71) some experiments by J. F. Brown (118) who used a modified Picture-Frustration Test and found a positive correlation between extrapunitive and racial prejudice. Here I shall analyse the results of other investigations using the P.F.S., in the order of attitudes, traits, and defence mechanisms in which I presented my own findings.

The *tendency to emphasize one's own frustration* and to minimize the frustration caused to others (Rosenzweig's E' score) has been found to be characteristic of prejudiced people, in particular by Bettelheim, Janowitz and Shils (76, 77), who put forward a hypothesis that 'hostility toward out-groups is a function of the hostile individual's feeling that he has suffered deprivations in the past'. Their evidence showed that prejudiced veterans who were equal to tolerant ones on objectively measured army deprivation, five times more frequently claimed to have been deprived, and felt bitter about it. Their prejudiced group also felt that civilians gained through the war, and they recalled deprivations in the last economic depression significantly more frequently than the tolerant subjects. The writers conclude that ethnic intolerance is not as closely related to apparent or objective barriers or frustrations as it is to individually or subjectively defined frustrations. This subjectively defined frustration, coupled with the feeling that others have benefited, is exactly what the Rosenzweig score measures: the 'objective' situation is that of the P.F.S. pictures and it is, of course, the same for all the subjects taking the test.

These findings are in agreement with those of Allport and Kramer (29), Campbell (136), Frenkel-Brunswik (239, 241), and Robb (549). Allport and Kramer found among their prejudiced subjects significantly more often than in the tolerant group a feeling that they themselves had been the victims of prejudice. Campbell found a significant positive correlation between prejudice and economic and political dissatisfaction. Frenkel-Brunswik found among ethnocentric children and among prejudiced women the feeling that they had been victimized by their parents. Robb found that prejudiced subjects feel more often deprived than gratified, while his tolerant subjects tended to take the existing difficulties for granted. Although in Robb's sample the extreme anti-Semites were, on the whole, better housed than the tolerant individuals, they did not seem to appreciate it, and they had a feeling of universal deterioration which was missing in the tolerant people. By contrast Robb quotes a tolerant subject who 'lives in what must be one of the oldest and most dilapidated houses' in the district and relates his quarrels with his landlord as 'a huge joke'.

Gough (296) found prejudiced boys and girls, as compared with the tolerant control group, to be more grumbling and discontented on the M.M.P.I. scale, although he obtained no statistically

significant differences between the two groups on the Picture-Frustration categories. Similarly Lindzey (412-14) found no statistically significant differences in the direction of aggression as measured by the T.A.T. and P.F. Study, but he found the prejudiced subjects to be relatively more 'susceptible to frustration' (this was rated on the basis of their reports of their feelings of frustration in an experimentally created stress situation), and less tolerant of frustration (as measured by the degree of overt disturbance rated by two observers during the same experiment). He found no significant difference between the prejudiced and the tolerant group in 'frustration tolerance' with 'subjective frustration' held constant, but this is not surprising since both these concepts cover essentially the same factor: if one measure of a factor is held constant we cannot expect any differences in its other measure. When he applied an 'annoyance scale' (again measuring the same factor of extrapunitive obstacle-dominance) he found, as one might expect, the prejudiced subjects to score higher than the tolerant ones. Both Gough and Lindzey employed very small and atypical samples, and their failure to reach statistical significance on the Picture-Frustration Study may be due to these limitations.

The '*ego-defensive extrapunitive reaction*' (score E), the most characteristic reaction of the oppressed and the criminal subjects in my samples, has been found, under different terminology to be equally typical of intolerant individuals.

Thus the intolerant veterans investigated by Bettelheim, Janowitz and Shils (76) mentioned before, also felt significantly more often than their tolerant companions, that not enough was being done for the veterans, and that the existing political system was faulty. Frenkel-Brunswick (235) found among prejudiced women college students ego-defensive self-idealization and lack of self-criticism, coupled with vilification of human nature and with punitiveness and projection. In another investigation (242) she found moralistic condemnation of others and extrapunitiveness in general significantly more frequent among men and women scoring 'high' on the ethnic prejudice questionnaire scale, than among those scoring 'low' on the same scale. Her previous finding that prejudiced women show a tendency toward self-glorification was confirmed, and this tendency was seen to be equally significant among men.

A similar finding was noted by Levinson (400) in her study of psychiatric patients. The prejudiced patients experienced certain impulses, problems and even some symptoms as completely 'foreign' to the self. They were unable either to accept or to admit them. They even developed externalized theories of onset and causation of their illness. 'It is this strenuous denial of many of one's impulses and the attempt at seeing everything unacceptable

as outside the self, which seems to be the common denominator for most [prejudiced patients]' (400, p. 943).

Ackerman and Jahoda (4) noted in anti-Semitic subjects 'fear of injury to their integrity as individuals, exaggerated sense of vulnerability in all spheres'. On the other hand 'none of the cases manifested a genuine, deep depression' which is usually associated with the turning of aggression inwards (5, p. 25). The more prejudiced the individual the less guilty he felt about his prejudice (Allport and Kramer, 29).

By contrast, Frenkel-Brunswik (244) found that tolerant individuals not only tend to accept and to face their impulses and weaknesses, but also to ruminate about them and to blame themselves for mishaps. These attitudes may be termed 'ego-defensive intropunitive reactions' (score I); I found them to be extremely rare among the most oppressed subjects and among criminals.

Robb (549) in his analysis of tolerant subjects confirms the conclusion arrived at by Ackerman and Jahoda: according to him 'if the anxiety is . . . turned against the self and revealed in the form of marked guilt feelings the result will be a personality of a depressive type, and prejudiced characteristics are unlikely to appear'. He adds: 'Practically every member of the tolerant group praises his employer; not one of them gives a description which is adverse on the whole. Anti-Semites talk about their employers much less and when they do mention them do so impersonally or produce a great deal of criticism.' It is interesting that one of the tolerant individuals described in detail by Robb is a stammerer; in my clinical practice I have found stammering to be associated with the turning of aggression inwards.¹

The 'ego-defensive impunitive reaction' (score M), almost equally rare among my oppressed and delinquent subjects, is mentioned by Robb as typical of tolerant individuals. Robb does not use the same phraseology, but his finding that tolerant individuals 'seem also to be tolerant in their views of what constitutes moral behaviour', and that 'some of them express almost amoral attitudes' can only mean that their reaction is impunitive. Gough (295), who used the P.F. Study, found prejudiced subjects to be relatively less impunitive; this tendency approached statistical significance: $t=1.88$. Using other measures Gough found prejudiced subjects to be distrustful, misanthropic, querulous, and aggressive.

To sum up we may say that in the sphere of ego-defence the prejudiced, the oppressed and the delinquent tend to blame external agents and thus to direct their aggression outwards; they rarely turn aggression inwards and feel guilty or depressed; nor do

¹ See Alice E. Buck and T. Grygier *A new attempt in psychotherapy with juvenile delinquents* (121).

they repress their aggression altogether, evading all blame for the frustrating situation.

Within the '*need persistive*' type of reaction an outward direction of aggression is again characteristic of prejudiced individuals. Prejudiced veterans significantly more often than tolerant ones feel that not enough is being done for them and urge the Government to provide assistance (76). Social relations of the prejudiced are exploitive (236, 242), and they depend on their parents for material benefits (241). By contrast, they show unwillingness to accept responsibility (314, 549), or to expect that their needs will be satisfied and their problems solved automatically in the course of time: they are apprehensive about future unemployment (76, 77) pessimistic about the chances for a good peace (76), they expect a general deterioration in affairs which will affect them personally, and in general they are pessimistic for themselves and for the groups to which they belong (549). To them 'the past is best, the present is unattractive, the future is black' (549).

One of my findings on the consequences of oppression referred to *rigidity and egocentricity*. The oppressed subjects tended to be unable to regard any situation from several points of view, or to change their point of view and adopt a new one. In the literature on prejudice similar findings are frequently recorded.

Some of the experiments by Rokeach (553-556) and his theory of 'generalized mental rigidity' have a bearing here. The evidence on the general character of mental rigidity is, however, conflicting. In particular Luchins (423) regards rigidity in behaviour and the degree of abstraction of thought processes as 'a function of field conditions' rather than the result of rigidity in personality structure. Moldawsky (472) rightly points out that the term 'rigidity' has been used to cover several concepts: a general personality trait, a defence mechanism, cortical pathology, intellectual rigidity, and dispositional rigidity. In his own experiments Moldawsky used a fifty-item paper-pencil inventory to measure rigidity as a general personality trait, and a 'spontaneity test' on the lines of Moreno to assess behavioural rigidity. He found no association between the two assessments and concluded that rigidity is not a general trait—but it is open to serious doubt whether Moldawsky's instruments did in fact measure what they were supposed to measure.

A more specific concept of rigidity has been frequently mentioned as associated with ethnocentricity. It is a tendency to make rigid distinctions between two stereotypes, one good, one bad. Thus prejudiced delinquents classify all women as 'pure', 'sweet' (unsexual) women (like 'mothers'), or as 'bad' (sexual) women (Morrow, 481, p. 866). Frenkel-Brunswik found in prejudiced men and women a statistically significant trend toward 'rigid-

moralistic-anal reaction formations' with 'totalitarian-moralistic (positive and negative) typologizing' (243, p. 443 ff.).¹ She found the same tendency among prejudiced children: 'toward a rigid, dichotomizing conception of sex roles, being intolerant of passive or feminine manifestations in boys and masculine or tomboyish manifestations in girls' (239, p. 299). To the prejudiced children 'there is only one right way to do anything' (op. cit., p. 303).² In another study (238) Frenkel-Brunswik reported that while tolerant subjects tend to accept diversities and ambiguities, the prejudiced dichotomize various concepts and judge people according to dimensions of power-weakness, cleanliness-dirtiness, morality-immorality or conformance-divergence. They also show a tendency toward unqualified statements and a disinclination to think in terms of probability. In agreement with Rokeach she found ethnocentric children and adults relatively unable to abandon mental sets in intellectual tasks, such as in solving mathematical problems. Frenkel-Brunswik's hypothesis of a positive association between ethnocentricity and intolerance of ambiguity has been recently confirmed in an experiment by Block and Block (88).

Robb (549) mentions a similar tendency among working class men. While the tolerant ones make realistic assessments of any given employer and 'give the devil its due', the intolerant ones stress all situations in terms of their own outlook rather than in terms of the actual position, thus 'demonstrating a rigid approach to life, with very little insight into [their] own mental processes'.

Robb also gives a good example of another aspect of egocentric tendencies and of the way in which they are transformed into an ethnocentric outlook. When he asked his subjects who they thought should be given priority in new housing areas, the prejudiced men nearly always named a group which would include themselves: thus an old man without any children would say that priority should be given to old people without children. By contrast the tolerant subjects tended to look for 'objective' solutions, regardless of their own circumstances. I noted the same tendency in the camps for Displaced Persons: while the more oppressed subjects nearly always claimed special privileges for their own group³ the

¹ The same tendency toward a rigid and dogmatic outlook has been mentioned by Gough (296).

² On the same tendency as characteristic of the Russian national character and of the Soviet approach to scientific theories see *The psychological problems of Soviet Russia* (305) and *Soviet Views on Western crime and criminology* (304) by the present writer.

³ Some of these claims could, of course, be rationally justified. Thus when men who had been in concentration camps said that all people from concentration camps should have special food rations and more cigarettes—their arguments could be accepted as objectively valid. But some fine distinctions were

less oppressed ones tended to think in terms of objective criteria.

The close association between egocentricity and prejudice has also been mentioned by Hartley (314), Morrow (481), and many other writers.

Let us now examine the relation of such factors as *sex, intelligence, education and social background* to the type of reaction to frustration and to the degree of prejudice.

There has been little evidence on the differences between the two sexes in respect of aggression and prejudice. In my own study the results of oppression affected both sexes in the same way, but the scatter was consistently greater among the men than among the women. In this respect the results of several investigations by Frenkel-Brunswick correspond closely to mine: she found (244) that differentiation between prejudiced and tolerant subjects is consistently less clearcut for women than for men, but that the differences point in the same direction. One cannot draw any far-reaching conclusions from our scanty evidence. But a tentative hypothesis suggests itself: that it is not only in intelligence that men show a greater scatter than women; it may be that men are more differentiated than women in most, if not all, aspects of personality—the strength of drives, the strength of aggression, its direction and concentration, the degree of conditioning by the environment. It may also be that men are, in general, more conditioned by environment than women: the greater scatter in personality traits merely being an end product of the higher degree of adaptability. Or, on the contrary, women may be more adaptable—reaching a satisfactory adjustment without adopting extreme patterns of reaction. But this problem requires special research and cannot be satisfactorily discussed here.

On the relation of intelligence, education and social background to the degree of prejudice the evidence is somewhat conflicting. Levinson (397) found the degree of prejudice to have low negative correlations with intelligence test scores and with the amount of education expressed in years of training; both correlations were statistically significant. Gough (296) reports a similar trend. On the other hand Robb (549) maintains that 'all the theories

made that were less convincing. Thus a group of men deported at a certain date from a certain town would claim special treatment, saying that those deported earlier had occupied all the best posts in the camp and had had little work and plenty of food; those deported later were supposed not to have suffered long enough; while those deported from other towns were usually either 'Communist' or 'smugglers' or 'collaborators', but never such a fine group as those deported from the said town A in the winter of 1943. Similar distinctions were made between various places of deprivation: men from Dachau would assume an air of superiority toward men from Mauthausen and vice versa; those who had been to several concentration camps would usually minimize these differences—but emphasize other criteria.

and all the evidence provided by research suggests that in anti-Semitism the irrational elements are the most important, that prejudice is not a negative thing, an absence of knowledge, but rather something positive, the fulfilment of a need'. Crown (reported by Robb, 549) found less educated subjects to be more prejudiced than the highly educated; Campbell (136) found no significant correlation between the two factors. In respect of age, sex, country of origin, religion and income Campbell found no significant correlation with anti-Semitism; in Robb's sample there was a significant correlation between age and anti-Semitism, and his finding in London has already been confirmed in the U.S.A. (Levinson, 395, p. 141). Bettelheim, Janovitz and Shils (77) found no correlation of anti-Semitism with social-economic status, country of origin of parents, formal composition of the family, political or organizational affiliation, religious denomination or reading and radio listening habits; Gough (296) reports anti-Semites to be of relatively lower social status.

To sum up, it appears that any correlations between the degree of prejudice and the intellectual and social factors are low and possibly accidental (i.e. due not to direct causation of one factor by the other, but to an association of both with a third, unknown factor). The irrational, affective element is more important in the formation of prejudice—and it was also more important in the determination of reaction to frustration in the subjects I tested.

The upshot of this survey of prejudice in relation to the tendencies revealed by my P.F. Study of the oppressed and the delinquent, seems to be this:

All these groups tend to externalize their conflicts. The oppressed, the prejudiced, or the criminal is relatively unable to take any blame for his actions. He is moralistic and professes a philosophy according to which *somebody* is always responsible for misfortunes; but he tends to deny any weakness or fault in himself. Instead, he projects the blame on to other people: minorities, authority, police, etc. He feels frustrated, and considers himself a victim of persecution. He feels no personal responsibility for the frustration he suffers, and he is inclined to minimize the frustration suffered by others. In his attempts to solve his problems and to avoid unpleasant situations he again puts the responsibility on external agents and is unwilling to take it himself. In situations of conflict he is rigid and egocentric, and he finds it difficult to accept any other point of view than the one with which he originally started. He dichotomizes people into good and bad, and attributes blame and responsibility accordingly; the underlying assumption being that he himself is good and so are all those who are like him and who agree with him.

Does all this mean that the oppressed, the prejudiced and the delinquent form one definite personality type? That, from the psychological point of view, no distinctions can be made between, for instance, the oppressor and his victim? We should not be justified in going so far in our conclusions. It is true that in our present state of knowledge the differences seem almost negligible and appear to be the effect of social conditions rather than of basic personality formation. But we know from typology, from factorial analysis, and from almost all branches of science, that whenever we discover a 'type' we can subdivide it into sub-types, that when we find a 'general factor' there is always a bi-polar factor around and we must apply more refined methods of analysis to determine its contribution. For that reason *some* differences between the oppressors and their victims are only to be expected. Even within each group we shall probably find some differences; between, for instance, victims of racial prejudice and victims of class struggle, between anti-Semites and the believers in the Colour Bar. Different psychological and social mechanisms may be involved, and different results may follow, according to whether oppression takes place within one national group or whether one nation oppresses another. And there always are many individual variations.

We cannot analyse these differences for the moment. What we have done is rather to push generalization of the traits and attitudes connected with racial prejudice a step further. We have found the same patterns of reaction on both sides of the prejudice barrier, on both sides of oppression. We may suspect that they also exist on both sides of the law. But at the moment we can go no further; we shall return to this general problem after having examined in some detail the mode of apperception of prejudiced people.

Studies using the Thematic Apperception Test have shown (in accordance with the results of my research on oppression and delinquency) that prejudiced individuals score relatively high on Abasement and Intraggression.¹

Thus Aron (37) found prejudiced men to score 'notably' high on Abasement and Blame-avoidance. The conventionality of ethnocentric individuals has been mentioned by a number of investigators and linked with the concept of the externalized

¹ The definitions I accepted were as follows: '(1) *Abasement*. The Hero submits to coercion or restraint in order to avoid blame, punishment, pain or death. He suffers disagreeable Press without opposition. He confesses, apologizes, promises to reform. He resigns himself passively to scarcely bearable conditions.' '(2) *Intraggression*. The Hero blames, reproves, belittles himself for wrongdoing, stupidity or failure. He is blamed by the narrator when identification occurs (i.e. the narrator blames himself in disguise, by blaming the Hero with whom he has identified himself). He suffers feelings of inferiority, guilt, remorse. He punishes himself.'

super-ego (see in particular Adorno *et al.* 12, and Allport and Kramer, 29). According to Fromm the authoritarian character responds automatically by love to powerful, by hatred and contempt to helpless persons; he may be rebellious, but his longing for submission remains, conscious or unconscious (265, pp. 415-16). Sanford and others (605) mention authoritarian submission as one of the variables distinguishing between prejudiced and non-prejudiced subjects.

Submission to *parental authority* was analysed by the California group of research workers; especially by Frenkel-Brunswik, Morrow, and Sanford. Frenkel-Brunswik (235) found in prejudiced subjects an idealising and submissive attitude toward their parents (in interviews) coupled with considerable hostility against parental figures (on the T.A.T.). In another investigation, based on projective interviews (241), she found prejudiced men and women to be significantly more submissive to their parents, while tolerant subjects were more independent. According to her, family relationships based clearly on defined roles of dominance and submission to parental authority lead to fearful subservience to the demands of the parents and to an early suppression of impulses not acceptable to them (241, p. 385). As submission to parental authority is superficial, the repressed aggression is poorly canalized and tends to be displaced, thus contributing to the general lack of insight, rigidity of defence, and narrowness of the ego: 'He expects—and gives—social approval on the basis of external moral values. . . . He condemns others for their nonconformity to such values, conformity being an all-or-none affair. The functioning of his super-ego is mainly directed toward punishment, condemnation, and exclusion of others, thus mirroring the type of discipline to which he himself was apparently exposed' (244, p. 483).

Morrow confirms these findings, particularly with regard to the attitude toward the 'stronger' parent, i.e. the father. In this fearful submission 'homosexual aspects are hardly even disguised' (481, p. 880). By contrast, tolerant subjects show a capacity for objective evaluation of their parents and for resistance to parental authority (p. 884). In another study Sanford (603) concludes that 'acceptance of religion mainly as an expression of submission to a clear pattern of parental authority is a condition favourable to ethnocentrism' (p. 221). In general, he found gross objective factors—such as denomination and frequency of church attendance—to be less related to prejudice than were certain psychological trends revealed in the subject's attitude to religion.

On 'Dejection'¹ both the criminal and the oppressed subjects in

¹ Defined, for the purposes of this book, as a feeling of disappointment, disillusionment, depression or despair, often accompanied by a fear of injury, imprisonment or death.

my study scored relatively high. As has been indicated above in connection with 'extrapunitive obstacle-dominance', a similar characteristic has been found among the racially prejudiced.

The fear of a hostile and powerful environment,¹ so characteristic of the oppressed and of the delinquent, has been mentioned in many studies of prejudice.

Thus Allport and Kramer (29) found prejudiced subjects to have a statistically significant tendency to regard the world as evil and dangerous. Aron (37), who used the T.A.T., reported prejudiced men and women to score highly on Press Acquisition, Affliction, Bad Luck, Death of Hero, Uncongenial Environment, and Physical Danger. In contrast to this general tendency, the prejudiced men scored relatively low on Injury, and Lack and Loss, the prejudiced women on Rejection. It is not clear whether her findings were tested for statistical significance. Frenkel-Brunswik, in her T.A.T. study of prejudiced women (235), reported them to score *high* on Press Rejection, as well as on Affliction, Uncongenial Environment and Punishment. In her study of ethnocentric children (239) she also mentions their preoccupation with the problem of punishment² and their readiness to conceive of dangers and catastrophes, and to feel helplessly exposed to external powers. The ethnocentric subjects investigated by Sanford (*et al.*, 605) believe that 'wild and dangerous things go on in the world', and that 'our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places' (p. 257). In contrast to the prejudiced, the tolerant college students investigated by Hartley (314) conceive of college as a relatively non-aggressive, non-competitive place.

In their relations with their parents prejudiced subjects think in terms of dominance-submission and have a tendency toward 'father-domination', while tolerant subjects are 'mother-oriented' and think in terms of love (5, 241, 242, 244). In this respect my oppressed and delinquent subjects went even further: instead of the Thema of Family Affiliation which corresponds to 'mother-oriented' love, they chose Themas of Personal Frustration in which they were not only dominated, but actually persecuted by male figures in authority. Thus their 'father substitutes' behaved even more cruelly than the real fathers of the prejudiced subjects.

The anti-Semitic workers studied by Robb (549) gave many good illustrations of hostile, dangerous 'Press'. They felt that the difficulties with which they were faced were inexorable forces, too powerful to be overcome. They were concerned with ideas of

¹ In my research it was represented in the Thematic Apperception Test by Rejection, Dominance, Aggression and Lack in the Press, by the Thema of Personal Frustration, and by Bad Outcome in which the Hero is punished, gets no help, is overpowered by his enemies, is inadequate or simply has 'bad luck'.

² See also Robb (549).

power and they felt that Jews have great power. Since they assumed that the world around them was unfriendly, their social contacts were poor in quality and few in number.

By contrast, the tolerant workers were confident that they and their fellowmen were capable of coping with the problems set up by the external environment. They saw people and nations 'not as sinister powers, incapable fools and rogues, but rather as relatively co-operative beings without sinister intentions'. They viewed fate, economic forces, and the political outlook with much less gloom, and they did not expect wars or slumps in the immediate future.

Robb, quite rightly, refers the fear of a hostile environment to feelings of personal inadequacy and failure. This link is understandable, and was also apparent in my T.A.T. results in which those groups recording hostile, sinister forces in the environmental pressures tended to score low on Adequacy and Achievement. Robb put forward a hypothesis that anti-Semitism is positively correlated with fears about one's ability to control the environment, and that these fears lead to pessimism with respect to the self and to the collectivity. All the parts of this hypothesis were confirmed in his investigation with a fair degree of confidence ($P < .01$).

His findings do not mean, however, that prejudiced individuals are able to admit their own inadequacy. As with my delinquents and inmates of concentration camps, they boast about their power and achievements. They are 'strong, good, intelligent, hard-working' and altogether 'outstanding', but 'fate, traitors, outsiders, the forces of events are against them and somehow just cannot be overcome' (549). We needed projective tests or projective interviews to get under the surface of their boastful statements and to find the underlying feelings of fear and weakness. 'Fundamentally these people were weak,' say Ackerman and Jahoda (4), 'they had a wish to control which was not realized in the normal channels of constructive social action. They endeavoured to deny to consciousness this inferior, crippled self-image. Overtly they had to conform, but unconsciously they resented the compulsory submission and reacted with destructive rebellion.' Gough's finding (296) that prejudiced subjects do not score particularly low on the Achievement Scale of the M.M.P.I. but that they lack hope and confidence according to a more thorough analysis of their attitudes, is in line with the above conclusions. Among many other investigators expressing similar views we should mention Aron (37) and Frenkel-Brunswik (235) who reported that prejudiced women score relatively low on Achievement in the T.A.T.; and Hartley (314) who found that prejudiced men score low on self-confidence on the Bernreuter Personality Inventory.

A feeling of inadequacy, whatever its basis (and in this respect,

as we shall see later, there are important differences between the oppressed and the prejudiced subjects), may have many different psychological consequences. In combination with the factors discussed above it may create that whole cluster of attitudes, usually termed 'the authoritarian character', which only in part fits the oppressed or the delinquent personality. It is the authoritarian personality, not the merely prejudiced personality, that was at the psychological basis of the Nazi movement in Germany. It is only for this character that, as Erich Fromm says (265), lack of power is always a sign of guilt and inferiority; and if the authority in which he believes shows signs of weakness, his love and respect change into contempt and hatred. 'To suffer without complaining is his highest virtue—not the courage of trying to end suffering or at least diminish it. Not to change fate, but to submit to it, is the heroism of the authoritarian character' (op. cit., p. 417). It was certainly not the highest virtue of the Poles under Nazi oppression.

Other aspects of the authoritarian personality are closer to our concepts of criminality and oppression. Thus the crimes committed by highly prejudiced individuals 'express the emotional complex that seems to dominate their lives: desperate fear of their own "weakness", which they try to deny by a façade of masculinity' (Morrow, 481, p. 889).¹ Their prejudices are explained by Sanford (604, p. 800) as 'attempts to conceal weakness by verbal denial and by presenting a façade of toughness, to get rid of weakness by projecting it onto other people, chiefly out-groups, and then condemning them on this score'. 'The most primitive mechanism for dispelling a sense of weakness is the projection, "I am not weak, they are".' (Op. cit., p. 802).

This projection of undesirable characteristics on to out-groups and the tendency to blame them for failure to master past and present experiences is one of the main hypotheses of the dynamics of prejudice put forward by Bettelheim and Janovitz (76). According to Frenkel-Brunswick (242, p. 440), energy, decisiveness, and aggressiveness in competition are prominent in the ego-ideal of prejudiced men, but their repeated assertions of independence are only a defence against feelings of dependence, passivity and helplessness. These are rarely recognized or accepted without attempts at self-justification—as we may call it, without extra-punitive ego-defence. Displacement, projection and rationalization are all used in this process (see also J. F. Brown, 117, p. 137).

The realization that feelings of inadequacy may lead to projection has led some investigators to suggest that prejudice is correlated with anxiety. Robb (549), for instance, put forward a hypothesis

¹ The fact that illegal possession of arms constituted as much as 27 per cent of all offences committed by Polish D.P's in Germany in 1946 is understandable in this context.

that anti-Semitism is correlated with free-floating anxiety. However, his data did not confirm this hypothesis and he replaced it by another, namely, that anti-Semitism is negatively correlated with a willingness to *verbalize* anxieties. He concluded that anti-Semites are lacking in insight while tolerant persons are not so much lacking in anxieties and conflicts as are more aware of their nature, even though they may be no more successful in dealing with them.

Similarly Ackerman and Jahoda (4), who found diffuse anxiety in their anti-Semitic patients, name denial of anxiety and substitution of aggression as their characteristic defence mechanisms. Elsewhere (5) they list as the main defence mechanisms of prejudiced subjects: externalization of inner conflicts by projection, denial of unwanted characteristics in the self, and displacement and social aggression to relieve anxiety. The difference between anxiety which is admitted and accepted by consciousness and that which is denied explains why in one of her preliminary experiments Frenkel-Brunswik (235) found her *unprejudiced* women to show relatively more anxiety than the prejudiced ones. In her more recent writings she only says that the liberal child has 'more open anxieties, more directly faced insecurities, more conflicts', and that in the attempt to solve these conflicts he is less likely to employ projection and displacement (239, p. 306). Among prejudiced adults she found a break between the conscious and the unconscious layers in the personality, contrasted with greater fluidity of transition and intercommunication between the different strata of personality in tolerant subjects; prejudiced individuals repress and externalize their instinctual tendencies while tolerant ones tend to accept and face their impulses and weaknesses (244).

In their more specific attitudes prejudiced subjects are less conscious of conflicts concerning loyalties and duties (Hartley, 314); they tend to isolate sexual impulses from the rest of the personality, and to express superficial admiration of the other sex coupled with underlying resentment (Frenkel-Brunswik, 242); and they state their psychiatric problems in terms of somatic symptoms rather than in terms of faulty adjustment or emotional difficulties (Levinson, 400). In their attitudes toward their parents prejudiced people are relatively unable to verbalize mild aggression and to combine it with genuine affection; they tend toward conventional idealization of parents and have no capacity for their objective evaluation (Frenkel-Brunswik, 236, 241; Morrow, 481). All these trends are attributed by Sanford (604) to the childhood relationships with the mother: subjects whose early relationships were close and satisfying can face fears, anxieties and doubts; those who had had severe traumatic experiences repress their worries and deny their existence.

This hypothesis has been indirectly confirmed in an experiment by Virginia M. Axline (on 'Play Therapy and Race Conflict', unpublished, but quoted in Klineberg, 371). She reported that when a group of children were allowed to work out their individual and group antagonisms under friendly guidance in a play situation, these antagonisms tended to disappear. This finding is interpreted by Klineberg as indicating that 'individuals need to express freely their own difficulties, worries, hostilities, etc., if they are to achieve harmonious relationships' (op. cit., p. 153).

There is a lot to be said for this view, but we should be more critical about the concept of 'free expression' of antagonisms and conflicts. Does that mean free expression in all situations? Obviously not; and the misguided attempts of some educators, struggling under a misconception of the psycho-analytic principles, have probably produced as much neurosis—and perhaps more crime—as the orthodox, repressive views. Free expression in some situations, but control of impulses in other situations is a much more realistic procedure; and one which has been successfully applied in play therapy with unusually aggressive juvenile delinquents at the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency in London (see Ethel Perry, 515).

Throughout this book I have emphasized the necessity of balance between impulses and their control, and maintained that without such a balance some disturbance of mental health is inevitable. Moreover, as I said before (p. 71), we cannot expect linearity between moral conflict and the direction of aggression. In cases of extreme expunitiveness, of psychopathy and delinquency, and, as we see now, of racial prejudice, internal conflicts have been externalized. In a neurotic the tendency to check drives may be so strong as to repress it from consciousness altogether: the internal mental conflict remains but it becomes unconscious. It is only in a balanced, mentally healthy individual that we have moral conflicts at the conscious level.

That is the reason why all correlations between mental health, neurosis, 'neuroticism' or similar variables and such behavioural tendencies as expunitiveness, delinquency or prejudice, remain uncertain. All depends on the concepts used—and these are usually not very clearly defined. The correlation of mental health with prejudice cannot be linear: Klineberg's non-committal statement that 'prejudice and hostility do develop more readily and more fully in persons whose mental adjustment is unsatisfactory in one way or another' (371, p. 207) is only partly true. They develop *less* readily in *some* maladjusted persons. According to Eysenck (212) both anti- and directly pro-Semitic subjects are less stable than the average.

From this point of view an investigation of psychiatric patients

by Maria Levinson (400) is particularly interesting. Although the psychiatric patients she studied were slightly less prejudiced than the average, this group was also younger, more educated, intelligent and co-operative than the average. She concluded that it would be reasonable to assume that disturbed people taken at random from the general population would make prejudice scores similar to non-disturbed people. In some clinical disorders, like 'mixed psychoneurosis' and reactive depression, the degree of prejudice was low: in some, like psychopathy, it was high; but on the whole prejudice cut across diagnostic classifications. She concluded that strong opposition to prejudice is related to some personality structure which tends to lead to psychoneurotic rather than psychotic disturbances. In our terminology we may say: it is a neurotic and intropunitive or impunitive personality structure—not a particularly happy personality, but certainly not anti-social.

At the other end of the scale of personality deviations, psychopathy appears to be closely related to prejudice. In particular more crude and violent forms of intolerance have been linked with psychopathic personalities, with underdeveloped conscience and weak powers of repression (4, 5). Adorno (11) in his classification of prejudiced individuals draws a distinction between 'the authoritarian syndrome' (with sado-masochistic impulse structure, compulsive and anal-sadistic character formation, rigid and restrictive super-ego, and identification with symbols of power), and 'the rebel and the psychopath', with irrational hatred of all authority, emphasis on bodily strength and toughness, and with destructiveness. It is clear from the above description that the subjects I studied in Germany belong to the second rather than to the first category.

Little research has been done on the relationship of delinquency to racial intolerance, although some criminologists realize that the criminal is, on the whole, an intolerant person. There can hardly be a better illustration of prejudice than in a little book by Marie Paneth, (508) called *Branch Street*, a sociological study of a delinquency area. The author, a successful and devoted manager of the Play Centre she herself created, was beaten up by the children when she revealed that she was an Austrian: as such she was decreed as a friend of Hitler's, her hair was pulled, her hat torn off, and they tried to throw her on the floor. She was not, of course, the only victim of out-group intolerance: as she says (p. 55), 'there is an old-established and very solid animosity between the streets'.

An interesting research on 110 inmates of San Quentin State Prison by William R. Morrow (481) has already been referred to here on several occasions. This group obtained higher means on the Ethnocentrism Scale and on the Fascist Scale than any other

group tested by Adorno and his collaborators (12), and on both scales the low end of the frequency distribution was cut off: practically none of the inmates could be classified as tolerant. In their accusations the prisoners tended to ascribe to minority groups exactly those characteristics which the criminologists ascribe to them: uninhibited sexuality, laziness, dirtiness, crude aggression, asocial acquisitiveness, lying, exhibitionism, and general lack of self-control. Morrow quotes some of their typical statements, for instance that of a repeated criminal, convicted for attempted rape of pre-adolescent girls after getting them drunk—who was yet highly moralistic about sex; he was also 'wrongly drawing Army compensation for years' and thus avoiding work, but he disapproved of people who 'rob and steal'. Another inmate, with a long record of thefts and gang robberies, was full of condemnation for greed. Sexual perversions were in general strongly disapproved of, and most inmates insisted that they should be severely punished; yet perversions flourished in the prison, and those who were most moralistic indulged in them no less than the others. Morrow concludes that criminals are *not* 'genuine rebels who act according to some principle, however dissident, and whose conflict with authority is accompanied by some consideration for the weak or oppressed. On the contrary, they would appear to be full of hate and fear toward underdogs. Themselves disfranchised, prisoners and social outcasts, a kind if ultimate out-group, they are yet unable to identify with other out-groups' (pp. 823-4). They make moralistic distinctions between themselves and the 'ordinary criminals', they want racial segregation in the prison, they complain, for instance, of 'people that go around stealin', or say: 'Hell, you can't have real friends in here. . . . Stab you in the back. Can't trust any of them.' (pp. 824 and 851).

This picture corresponds very closely to that of the German prisons I visited in the course of my investigation. Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians were all united in defiance of the authorities—but in very little else. As I have mentioned (pp. 90 ff.), the crucial problem for securing co-operation in my research was to become a member of the in-group in a population in which almost everybody was regarded as a member of an out-group. The relative decrease of anti-Semitism among the Poles in German prisons, and the corresponding change of attitude among the Jews, were probably due to the fact that they were united by their hatred of the Germans and so avoided expression of any attitudes which they knew to be typical of the Germans. Anti-Semitism is not always the best measure of racial prejudice.

To sum up the findings on the mode of apperception of the prejudiced, the oppressed and the delinquent we shall say:

The most important factor which operated in all three groups is the fear of a hostile, uncongenial and powerful environment. This environment consists mainly, for some subjects, of the threatening father and the unloving mother; for others, of the powerful members of another national group; for some, of the police guards, and other people in authority. In every case the result is hostility and displacement of aggression. The original hostility against the powerful figure in the subject's environment may be coupled with superficial admiration (that is the way prejudiced children usually feel about their parents); it may be partly turned against the oppressor in hopeless rebellion; and it may remain conscious but be blocked in expression by the fear of punishment: but in each case there remains a surplus of aggression which tends to be displaced.

In the degree of submissiveness to, *v.* rebellion against, authority there are great individual variations and probably also some group differences. It seems that in the prejudiced there is more submissiveness on the surface, while the oppressed and the delinquent are overemphatic in alleging complete independence—but in fact none of them is independent. Neither submission nor rebellion are signs of autonomy, and in most cases these tendencies operate at the same time at two poorly integrated levels of personality.

In cases of superficial submission to authority there is usually rigid conventionalism and insistence on moral principles; but this is coupled with behaviour which we should normally regard as morally wrong. Just as there are two ill-integrated *levels* of personality there are also in these cases two *areas* of morality: one concerning behaviour towards authority and in-groups, the other—almost without restrictions—towards weaklings and out-groups.

When the tendency to submit to authority is repressed, conventionalism is not so marked; but often defiance of conventions becomes itself a convention and operates with the same vigour as in the righteous conservatives.

The fear of a hostile world leads to pessimism and bitter resentment; and it brings about a feeling of inadequacy which is too painful to bear. So people deny any weakness in themselves: they project all their faults on to other individuals and groups, and blame them in most situations, particularly those of conflict.

It is not anxiety itself, but the lack of insight into their own emotional problems that is prominent in the prejudiced, the oppressed and the delinquent. How this lack of insight and inability to face anxiety are produced is not yet clear. In all three groups we can trace ego-threat and poor personality integration. But in some this may be due to early unsatisfactory parent-child relationships; in others later traumatic experiences may be so

severe that repression of anxiety is the only defence mechanism which can secure survival. While the ego is weak or subservient to the id, the super-ego is rigid and restrictive in some prejudiced subjects; but in others it is weak and underdeveloped. It is certainly weak in most delinquents, and seems to be repressed in many victims of oppression.

Although it appears that most delinquents are also prejudiced, it does not follow that most prejudiced subjects tend to be delinquent: the morality of the 'authoritarian character' will by no means bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, but it is a *kind* of morality which may be adequate for checking antisocial acts punishable by law.

Thus, in the general pattern of apperception and of reaction against the threatening image of the world we can already distinguish some differentiating signs. The 'general factor' still holds; but some useful subdivision of the personality type under discussion is gradually emerging. It will become more pronounced in the following discussion on etiology.

(c) *Origins of prejudice*

Whether we ascribe prejudice to a specific personality structure, to 'primary social attitudes', or even to stereotypes, we must still look for the underlying factors which have created these personalities, attitudes or stereotypes. I shall not discuss here the views ascribing intolerance to faulty education, except perhaps in the sense in which the French use the word—as a process of adjustment of the development of attitudes rather than the acquiring of knowledge. It is of little interest to us to what extent prejudices are fostered by propaganda, for to be successful propaganda must satisfy the emotional needs of those to whom it is directed, and the needs themselves are more important than the techniques used to exploit them. We should only mention in passing those investigators who ascribe racial prejudice to economic insecurity and depression (342), to crises in general (whether economic or not), and to unrest and to political instability (329, 522). All these views really boil down to the frustration-aggression hypotheses developed by Dollard and his collaborators (183) and to the scapegoat theory of prejudice.

Studies testing the frustration-aggression hypotheses have been referred to in another section of this book (pp. 171-175). The scapegoat theory has also been mentioned. It has recently received support from another angle in a sociometric investigation by Lundberg and Dickson (424): in the high-school population investigated by them 90 per cent of the students were chosen as friends by at least one person and no one received more than 13 friendship choices, but only 50 per cent of the students were

named as 'enemies' and 21 of them received 14 or more rejections. These results show clearly that aggression tends to be concentrated on a few individuals. Lundberg and Dickson studied a racially mixed population, and applied their results to inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.A. In another research, carried out at about the same time in England by Croft and myself (1966), we discussed the formation of scapegoats in more general terms and related it to social maladjustment, delinquency and truancy.

Among the studies mentioned in this section the results obtained by Bettelheim, Janovitz and Shils (76, 77) are rather conflicting. The prejudiced veterans they interviewed had shown relatively more downward social mobility and relatively less upward social mobility than the tolerant veterans (both results being statistically significant), which indicates a correlation of prejudice with objectively measured frustration. On the other hand the prejudiced were equal to the tolerant group on objectively measured army deprivation, although they five times more frequently claimed to have been deprived. It seems, therefore, that although objectively measured frustration does increase the tendency to displace aggression on to out-groups, subjectively felt deprivation is an even more important factor. The question is: what makes for an increase in *subjectively* felt deprivation?

The same writers provide us with a clue to the answer: they reported those veterans who moved up rapidly in the social scale to be less tolerant than average. These veterans were certainly *less* frustrated in objective terms; but their security was probably low, and they may have had to be so aggressive in order to achieve their position that they feared counter-aggression from their environment. Thus it may be not so much *frustrating* situations as *anxiety creating* situations that are responsible for the increase in hostility. This is a hypothesis put forward by Robb in his study of anti-Semitism (549) and by Frazier in his book on anti-Negro attitudes (233). Robb proves his point for some spheres of life but fails to reach statistically significant results for other spheres. Again we are faced with conflicting results, to which, however, some of Robb's data give an indirect answer.

He mentions the feeling of isolation and insecurity even in their own group among the intolerant individuals: a person who has suffered frustration and faces the problem of attributing the blame cannot place blame on himself or on his group if his ego is weak and his social ties uncertain. 'He clings all the more grimly to those he has and... he cannot face the consequences of turning his blame on to them' (549). Here we have at the same time an answer, and another question: what makes for isolation and emotional insecurity?

Robb offers a clear hypothesis about this: 'A predisposition to open hostility towards out-groups is formed when early childhood,

and later social, experiences combine to produce an expectation of affection and security insufficient to meet the needs of personality.⁷ His analysis of life in a London working class district traces the ways in which early rejections by the parents produce expectations that the environment will always be hostile and deprivative. Ackerman and Jahoda (5) make a similar point, while Frenkel-Brunswick (239) stresses the authoritarian character of the parent-child relationships of prejudiced children. H. V. Dicks, in his illuminating study of the character formation of the followers of the Nazi movement in Germany (179), also shows how an undue acceptance of parental authority leads to submissiveness towards those above, and an assumed right to dominate those below; how the authoritarian set-up leads to rejection of, and shame about, tender relationships in the family, with the resulting brutality, projection, and tendency to form scapegoats. Finally, Sanford (604) puts forward a hypothesis that internalization of punishment and disapproval, which is a necessary condition of independent conscience, depends on the amount of love received from the parents. When little love is received, the sacrifices are not worthwhile and aggression, instead of being turned against the self, is displaced on to out-groups.

This last point brings us again to the problem of frustration *v.* oppression. As I said above, in the discussion about the frustration-aggression hypothesis (p. 174), the type of reaction to frustrating experiences depends on many factors: on the type of family relationships in early childhood, on the total situation in which frustration occurs, and on the total set of attitudes both in the frustrating agent and in the victim.¹

In my research I dealt exclusively with adults and with only one type of frustrating experience, namely that of continuous oppression, and this is a serious limitation. Firstly, any changes in personality due to frustrating experiences in adulthood may differ from changes due to similar experiences in childhood. Even within the first five years of a child's life Bowlby (103) distinguishes three stages of development and ascribes different deformations of character to the different periods when deprivations occur. This view finds a strong theoretical support in an earlier paper by

¹ In a recent survey of experimental work on frustration Hilde Himmelweit (331) distinguishes between frustration due to (a) physical obstruction (this includes deprivation of desired objects), (b) satiation, (c) a discrepancy between desire and ability to solve a task, and (d) unsatisfactory leadership. She makes no claim that her list is complete and admits that the experiments reported by her failed to create the frustrating experiences considered important by Freud. She also agrees that no frustration can be viewed in isolation: it has a different meaning to different individuals according to their past experiences of frustration and to many other factors associated with both the past and the actual frustrations.

Edward Glover (285) in which he distinguishes the stresses existing at a time when the ego is not yet organized, the stresses existing when the ego is more organized and employs specific defence-mechanisms but is still subject more to anxiety than to guilt, and the stresses acting upon the developed ego. This distinction is particularly important since, as Glover states elsewhere (281), 'the function of the ego as a whole is to effect a compromise between the demands of instinct and the amount of gratification possible in the external world'. Pathological distortion of the ego is only one of the three possible lines of action in the attempts at adaption (*ibidem*).

Secondly, according to Bowlby, 'the more complete the deprivation in the early years the more isolated and asocial the child, whereas the more that deprivation is interspersed with satisfaction, the more ambivalent and antisocial he becomes' (103, p. 47). In my research deprivation was continuous and yet it produced results which would be expected of children whose deprivation was interspersed with satisfaction. It may be that, since all my subjects were adults and most of them must have achieved some satisfaction in earlier life, my results do not, in fact, contradict those reported by Bowlby. It may also be that none of the adults I studied suffered complete rejection; most of them had some constructive social ties at the place of deportation and outside it, and this fact may have made all the difference for the changes in personality. An investigation by Powdermaker *et al.* (527) relating success in psychotherapy to the presence or absence of constructive family ties is most illuminating in this respect.

Thirdly, Bowlby's 'affectionless character' lacks the ability to identify with others at all, while prejudiced or oppressed individuals are able to identify with in-groups: it is only in situations of conflict that they immediately classify every antagonist as a member of an out-group and feel justified in not identifying with him at all.

What is the upshot of all this discussion? What are the main genetic factors in prejudice and delinquency? The answer is that we do not exactly know. We can only say that an oppressive environment tends to foster prejudice, conflict and delinquency whether it occurs in early childhood or in later life. Deprivation in early childhood is, of course, more influential, but seems to act in the same direction.¹

¹ In a discussion with Dr. Bowlby at one of the meetings of the British Psychological Society we traced the same reactions in the children separated from their mothers and placed in the friendly environment of a hospital, and in the adults deported from their country and interned in concentration camps. There was also the same sequence of reactions: firstly despair, then apathy, finally superficial adjustment to social reality. In both cases changes in personality were related to the third stage, that of so-called 'adjustment'.

As there are so many similarities between the oppressed, the prejudiced and the delinquent, there are also many similarities in the genesis of their personality structure. To use the terminology of factorial analysis rather loosely, we may say that there is a general genetic factor corresponding to a general personality factor. We can only suspect a bi-polar genetic factor, one which determines the authoritarian rather than the rebellious and delinquent structure.

Perhaps we should go further than this. We can already envisage some sub-types in the general group of frustrating situations, and ascribe neurosis, delinquency or prejudice according to the specific as well as to the common influences. We must assume that in all these cases there is an *excess* of frustration—if there is no excess, and if there are no other disturbing factors involved, there is, of course, no pathology.

Thus, if the frustrating agent is powerful and loving—in particular, in the case of stern but affectionate parents—the subject can return love and identify with the frustrator without disturbing the libidinal equilibrium. He will throw aggression inwards and punish himself. His super-ego will be strong and demanding—in more extreme cases he will develop neurotic tendencies. But little, if any, aggression will be displaced.

If the frustrating agent is powerful and restrictive but gives inadequate affection and approval, we should expect a different solution. Identification with the frustrator will still usually occur and a part of the aggression will be turned inwards. The super-ego will be stern and rigid in some areas. But the individual who gets no love or recognition cannot adequately cope with his difficulties. His ego is weak and minor frustrations are regarded as a threat to the personality. He cannot throw too much aggression inwards without losing all sense of self-respect and worthiness and developing a severe depression. It is natural for him to find some justification for throwing aggression outwards: not on to the original frustrator who is too powerful to be attacked, but on to other individuals and groups who are in some ways different from him and from the authority he admires. The result is an authoritarian personality structure, with superficial submission to authority, rigid but poorly internalized super-ego, lack of insight and the displacement of aggression on to out-groups. He will have a morality of a kind, and may be able to follow the letter of the law. But, especially if he unites with others like him, he will be a trouble-maker at the group level: he will not offend against his own group, but will feel no remorse in oppressing weaker groups and individuals. This is the usual pattern of the authoritarian family with a powerful father-figure, and of the dictatorial political system.

If the frustrator is weak, or is, for other reasons, inadequate as an object of admiration, identification will not occur. In that case a part of the aggression will be turned against him. The super-ego will be weak: it will remain underdeveloped in children of inadequate parents; it will be weakened, distorted, often consciously suppressed, in adults suffering from extreme forms of oppression. If the frustrator has enough force to break opposition there will be displacement of aggression, and prejudice is one of the forms it will take. This will occur, in particular, if the frustrator is powerful, but inadequate as an object of identification because he is too different from the subject. In that case, *hostility* against him will remain, but most of the actual *aggression* will be discharged in other directions. This is the pattern of reaction under foreign domination.

In most cases, however, there will be at least partial identification with the powerful oppressor, and his victim will take over some of his values while retaining some of his own. Once the frustrator has lost his power, rebellion will follow and nearly the whole load of aggression will be turned against him and his followers. But until that moment comes most of the aggression will be displaced; and the individual will become a social outcast, in conflict with authority, and without a group to which he can properly belong.

We have, as yet, no evidence to prove these points. Nor have we adequate data about the extent to which the oppressors are similar and to which they differ from the victims of their prejudices. We only know that the similarities are striking enough to *increase* intolerance in both groups: if the oppressed could themselves remain tolerant, the oppressors would probably feel less need to persecute them.¹ But psychological laws are cruel: the more we oppress people the more they justify persecution by their own behaviour. We need new lines of research in order to discover more about the positive aspects of human relations. If we succeed, we shall, perhaps, help to replace the vicious circle of oppression and prejudice by a self-perpetuating pattern of tolerance. This survey can do no more than indicate the need for research on both the positive and negative aspects of human behaviour in situations of co-operation and conflict; and to suggest some lines along which such research can usually proceed.

We have looked at both sides of the wall which divides people and nations. We have found a different world—and the same world. In all analysis looking at the other side of a relationship

¹ On this point see an admirable account of mutual prejudices in a concentration camp by Bettelheim (74), and a critical analysis of prejudice by Zawadzki (745).

throws light on both patterns of behaviour. In that sense our survey may help in the understanding of oppression and prejudice, of the mechanisms of delinquency—and of the ruthless persecution of offenders. The opposed groups are never as different as they would like to think. And comparisons—if they are made without bias or rancour—lead to more insight into the tensions which divide us all.

4. CULTURE AND REACTIONS TO FRUSTRATION

(a) *Two basic cultural configurations*

The last point of our discussion on theories of delinquency brought us to the problem of cultural configurations. The view of delinquency as the product of a 'delinquency area' is a link between the study of crime and the study of culture.

Here I shall only refer to those cultural configurations which bear directly upon the concepts on which the Picture-Frustration Study is based. Concepts of civilization have already been discussed in the first chapter of this book.

There are two contrasting cultural configurations which appear to have much in common with types of reactions to frustration. One is the Apollonian, described by Nietzsche and Spengler, and made use of in anthropology by Benedict; the other is the Dionysian of Nietzsche, the Faustian of Spengler.

Spengler's views are only indirectly related to our discussion. Firstly, because our concept of civilization, especially of its most important aspect, is psychological and collective, while Spengler's is organic and unitary: to him only the world is collective, as a sum of cultures.¹ Spengler opposes the 'world-as-organism', to the 'world-as-mechanism', and favours the first disregarding the latter. To the psychologist, not the world but the individual is an organism, and the study of this organism is approached through an analysis of the mechanisms which direct its behaviour. Spengler is violently anti-psychological.²

Secondly, Spengler's exposition of his cultural configuration is too vague to provide a firm basis for any psychological theory of traits. For instance (650, Vol I, p. 183): 'The nude statue is

¹ He says (650, Vol. I, p. 104): 'Cultures are organisms and world history is their collective biography.'

² He regards scientific psychology as 'the shallowest and most worthless of the disciplines of philosophy, a field so empty that it has been left entirely to mediocre minds and barren systematics. . . .' (op. cit. Vol. I, p. 299). Psychology's greatest offence has been that it 'has put a mechanism in place of organism' (p. 302). Spengler's view may be contrasted with that of Eddington, who, having started with the study of atomic physics, concludes that science is the knowledge of structures and not of things.

Apollonian, the art of the figure Faustian. Apollonian are: mechanical statics, the sensuous cult of the Olympian gods, the politically individual city-states of Greece, the doom of *Œdipus* and the phallus-symbol. Faustian are: Galileian dynamics, Catholic and Protestant dogmatics, the great dynasties of the Baroque with their cabinet diplomacy, the destiny of Lear and the Madonna—ideal from Dante's Beatrice to the last line of *Faust II*. The painting that defines the individual body by contours is Apollonian, that which forms space by means of light and shade is Faustian.'

Similar in character is his exposition of the Apollonian and Faustian mathematics, music and plastic, architecture and economics, including the Faustian concept of money, and double-entry in book-keeping (Vol. II, pp. 489 ff.). A reference to the two forms of painting and perception, by contours, and by means of light and shade, is too vague to warrant a Rorschach investigation.

With these reservations we may note that the Apollonian soul, and the world of Apollonian 'destiny ideas' is classical, based on a sense of proportion, and devoid of conflicts, either internal or external. As such, Apollonian culture and personality structure corresponds to our concept of equilibrium. If balance is the test of civilization, there is no other culture but the Apollonian—everything that disturbs this balance is pathological. Without being rigid, our concept has certainly been Hellenic, allowing for variations, but stressing the importance of balance in the personality structure as well as in social institutions. Those institutions should be based on a hierarchy of freedoms and duties, allowing the maximum freedom for each individual consistent with minimum interference with the freedom of others. A similar equilibrium between the individual's feelings of rights and duties has been taken as the criterion of normality. In terms of reaction to frustration, such equilibrium would demand balance between the tendencies towards extrapunitive, intropunitive and impunitive responses. Such a balance is, therefore, close to Apollonian or classical proportions.

On the other hand, the Faustian soul is in endless conflict. Combating obstacles for him is the essence of existence. The dynamism of the Faustian makes him more dramatic, heroic, and more prone to conflict with others. Extrapunitive tendencies appear to prevail, and there is certainly no place for impunitive compromise and forgiveness. Spengler goes as far as to assert that the rule of force in all the relationships between people is not a tragic fate for humanity, but a healthy and beautiful act. He quotes Goethe to the effect that 'the doer is always conscienceless; no one has a conscience except a spectator.' Thus to Spengler 'Imperialism is so necessary a product of any Civilization that

when a people refuses to assume the role of master, it is seized and pushed into it' (Vol. II, p. 422).

Similarly Nietzsche's Apollonian is plastic, his Dionysian non-plastic; the Apollonian regards measure in the Hellenic sense as the highest law, while the Dionysian seeks drunkenness and ecstasy; the Apollonian impunitively avoids excess, removing excessive experiences from consciousness, while the Dionysian extrapunitively breaks all rules and limitations.

(b) *The anthropological approach*

These two contrasting cultures described by Spengler as destiny ideas, and by Nietzsche as ways of arriving at the values of existence, are more comprehensible when translated by Benedict (62) into two contrasting patterns of behaviour. In her description of the Apollonian South-west Pueblo Indians, and the Dionysian Dobu and Kwakiutl the two behaviour patterns have much in common with the types of reaction to frustration measured by the Picture-Frustration Study.

To the South-west Pueblo Indians sin, in sex or in other spheres, is unfamiliar and when accused by others they suffer from no guilt complexes, engendering either intropunitive guilt feelings, or extrapunitive guilt denial. Moderation is the highest virtue: there is no abuse of power or authority, and no rebellion. Relations between the sexes and between people in general are pleasant and devoid of conflict and recrimination. People are polite, happy, and spontaneously co-operative. Crime and punishment are rare, extreme hatred unknown.

The Dobu, on the other hand, are lawless and treacherous, with no chiefs, no political organization, with ill-will and treachery as recognized virtues, with animosity and malignancy. Existence is a cut-throat struggle of deadly antagonism, with suspicion and cruelty as trusted weapons. A Dobu is incapable of impunitive forgiveness—he gives no mercy and asks none. Kwakiutl Indians demonstrate similar extrapunitive tendencies, or those closely associated with extrapunitiveness, such as self-glorification and humiliation of others, paranoid tendencies, aggressiveness to the degree of practising cannibalism and head-hunting. In spite, or perhaps because, of constant frustration, their frustration tolerance is low and they often respond to it by acts of desperation.¹

Similar is the contrast between the co-operative culture of the Arapesh, based on love, and the competitive culture of the Mundugumor, based on aggression and hostility, as described by Margaret Mead (462). The love of the Arapesh is not a kind of Dionysian ecstasy—they repudiate passion—but it is the known,

¹ On the differences in frustration tolerance in various cultures see Bateson's study of Iatmul and Balinese (53).

the domesticated love that the Arapesh want, 'the love which is concerned with food given and received, with many years of sleeping in the same village' (op. cit., p. 101). There is no hatred among them, no strong conflict, no emphasis given to frustrating events, there is forgiveness and optimism (all signs of impunitive attitudes), there is love and mutual trust, and sex is merged with tenderness.

Contrasted with the Arapesh are the Mundugumor. 'On their own high fertile land, which they hold by virtue of a greater ferocity and recklessness than any of their neighbours, the Mundugumor live among themselves in a state of mutual distrust and uncomfortableness' (op. cit., p. 173). It is a culture in which the individual's equipment for success must be 'a capacity for violence, for seeing and avenging insult, for holding his own safety very lightly and the lives of others even more lightly' (p. 189). It is a culture in which the individual either oppresses the weaker, or is oppressed by the stronger, a state of affairs not unknown in modern times when, as Russell rightly remarked (595, p. 180), 'as soon as an oppressed nation achieves its freedom, the nationalism which was formerly heroic becomes oppressive'.

Certainly the Dionysian culture is more heroic. Here courage seems to be rated much higher in the hierarchy of values than in the Apollonian society. But this courage has also the excessive character of the fighter rather than the moderate reliability of the man who does his duty. Courage is not a strictly defined psychological term. It may be conceived, as in MacCurdy's *The Structure of morale* (429), as manipulative ability in danger, that is the ability to take all the elements of dangerous reality into account. But it may also be regarded as the ability *not* to take any of the elements of danger into account. In this second sense it is a recognized virtue in a heroic society, and in the delinquent who boldly asserts that he fears nothing.¹

The basis of this kind of courage may lie largely in the suppression of fear, and has its origin in deep feelings of insecurity. It is in this sense that Adler regards every murderer as 'a coward intoxicated with the idea of being a hero'. The Dionysian society as described by Benedict is certainly full of insecurity, fears, and heroic attempts to overcome these fears.

The Apollonian society, as an example of a cultural pattern and personality structure based on equilibrium and adjustment, is entirely consistent with our concept of civilization and at the same time does not contradict other accepted theories of culture. This is not so with the Dionysian society.

¹ Merrill (465) found highly significant differences between delinquents and non-delinquents in this respect (C.R. = 4.4). Evidence by Bender, Keiser and Schilder (61) has been mentioned before.

The fact that the Dionysian society is full of conflicts, that it is lawless, aggressive and, in our terminology, extremely extra-punitive, makes us ask ourselves whether this society has produced a civilization as 'good' as any other (for instance the Apollonian), or whether it is a psychopathic deviation from norm. In our own view the Dionysian society represents a psychopathic deviation.

(c) *Adjustment to the group versus internal harmony*

This view may be opposed on the grounds that psychopathy is an individual's maladjustment to the group; the group as a whole cannot be maladjusted. Or, if we consider that a maladjusted or psychopathic individual is one who does not fit into his human environment, psychopathic culture would be one that did not fit into the surrounding cultures (13). In a Dionysian society a well balanced Apollonian would be regarded as a maladjusted individual and a coward because he would not fit into his human environment.

Within the frame of reference accepted in this writing, individual adjustment to the group, or group adjustment to the larger constellation of groups, is not a criterion of 'normality', either as regards psychopathy or culture. According to our criteria, presented in the introductory chapter, 'normality' depends on a balance in reaction types. Psychopathy represents a deviation from this balance in one direction, neuroticism in the other. As Cason (144) has recently pointed out, if psychopathy is defined as a personality reaction type, and the psychopath is described in terms of his own characteristics, he will be a psychopath in many different cultures.

A psychopathic society is one composed of individuals defined in terms of their own characteristics as psychopaths. Its relation to surrounding societies is immaterial. In this sense such a society may be termed 'antisocial', however paradoxical this may sound.

Thus, within our frame of reference, the Apollonian society represents the highest achievement in the psychological 'dimension' of civilization. As we have seen, in terms of types of reaction to frustration, such a society is characterized by a lack of excessive reactions in any direction. The torture of others is as foreign to the Apollonian as self-torture.

The Dionysian society represents a possible deviation. We have excess instead of balance, strong extrapunitive and aggressive features, many psychopathic traits, and a system of values corresponding to the psychopathic personality structure of the individual. Mark Benney would say that the Dionysians are 'Wide' men. Their system of values reflects deeper layers of personality which, it is hoped, can be measured by the technique adopted in this research.

(d) *Implications of the present research*

The scope of this research is too limited to answer any essential questions regarding the present cultural change. But since science progresses by stages, it is hoped that this research may at least be taken as a pilot investigation into the methods of measuring cultural trends. The method used is, admittedly, not the only possible method; and this research should be treated merely as one experimental contribution to the study of a field in which experimenting is at present extremely difficult. Its value seems to be mainly methodological, and its results would be of very doubtful validity if taken without reference to the existing anthropological evidence discussed above, and to the experiments exploring the psychological elements of democracy and autocracy (55, 137, 235, 236, 278, 315-7, 407, 474, 484, 602, 720), of ethnocentricity and general mental rigidity (7, 393, 423, 434-6).

Viewed in the right perspective, the implications of my findings seem to be:

Extreme forms of foreign oppression tend to develop those elements of personality which are characteristic of the Dionysian rather than Apollonian culture. They develop ego- and ethnocentricity, a mental rigidity which prevents people from making full use of their intellectual powers; external conflicts and delinquency rather than neurosis; low frustration tolerance in spite of the constant recurrence of frustration; prejudice, and inability to co-operate with out-groups in spite of the apparent need for tolerance and co-operation.

These implications are far reaching, especially in view of the limits of this research. The experiment urgently needs confirmation; indirectly, by different methods and with different populations; and directly, when new political events will bring freedom to the present victims of oppression, and make new experiments of a similar type possible for other investigators.

5. SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS OF THIS RESEARCH

(a) *The problem*

To examine the changes in the psychological aspect of culture under oppression.

(b) *The concept of culture*

This is four-dimensional, involving four aspects, or dimensions of civilization—the creative, the sociological, the psychological, and the historical aspect; the psychological aspect of culture, with

which we are mainly concerned, has the character of a dynamic equilibrium.

(c) *The basic hypotheses*

The main hypothesis suggests that an oppressive environment brings about certain measurable changes in personality. If so, it remains to be seen whether the development is towards excessive aggression, excessive inward aggression, or a balanced personality structure.

The subsidiary hypothesis aims at explaining any such changes within the psychological aspect of culture. It is suggested that there is a positive relationship between the strength of conscience expressed in social behaviour, and the strength of guilt feelings expressed in a tendency to direct aggression inwards, blaming oneself instead of others.

The same relationship may be expressed differently: antisocial behaviour is positively related to a lack of guilt feelings and a tendency to direct aggression outwards, blaming others instead of oneself.

The combination of the above hypotheses envisages three possible developments in the psychological aspect of culture under oppression:

A balance—an ideal development.

A neurotic deviation—a predominance of aggression turned inwards, of guilt feelings and self-blame.

A psychopathic deviation—a predominance of aggression turned outwards and of external conflicts.

(d) *The method*

(1) A study of the direction of aggression in a group of antisocial, as opposed to 'normal', subjects to verify the hypothesis of a positive relationship between social behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression inwards, and between antisocial behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression outwards.

(2) A study of the predominant direction of aggression developed under oppression by testing equated samples of Displaced Persons who had been subjected to three 'levels of oppression': (a) forced labour in industry, (b) forced labour in agriculture, and (c) concentration camps.

(e) *The experimental population*

	<i>Number of subjects</i>	
	<i>In the prisons</i>	<i>In the D.P. camps</i>
Personal data examined	181	4,100
Took the intelligence test	102	650
Took the personality tests	50	230
Included in the equated samples	30	122

(f) *The personality tests*

(1) The Picture-Frustration Study—to examine the predominant direction of aggression in various groups of subjects, at the level of action.

(2) The Thematic Apperception Test—to trace the psychological mechanisms underlying the tendencies as above, to study the prevalent thought content, the attitude towards the environment and the general scheme of apperception in various groups of subjects, and to examine the predominant direction of aggression at the level of fantasy.

(g) *The evidence for the positive relationship between antisocial behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression outwards*

(1) Observations made in the prisons and D.P. camps.

(2) Test results: significantly more 'extrapunitive' P.F.S. responses occurred in the delinquent group than in the control. In particular the delinquents showed a tendency to perceive ambiguous social situations as frustrating them but beneficial to others (symbol E') a reluctance to admit guilt (symbol I), a tendency to attack and blame others (symbol E), and a pessimistic attitude with regard to the satisfaction of their needs. The delinquents differed from the controls in the general direction of aggression as measured by the P.F.S., and still more in the direction of the more concentrated forms of aggression, throwing more than 70 per cent of it outwards.

(h) *The delinquent mind studied at the level of fantasy*

The delinquents showed : (a) a tendency towards abasement and intraggression, (b) frequent themas of guilt, (c) a lack of achievement in their stories, (d) much aggression in the 'Press', but relatively little in the 'Hero', (e) a predominance of the thema of personal frustration, with pessimism and feelings of inadequacy as opposed to the power of an inimical environment.

(i) *The evidence suggesting the development of psychopathic trends under oppression*

(1) Observations made in the D.P. camps.

(2) Test results: significantly more 'extrapunitive' P.F.S. responses were given by the relatively more oppressed subjects; in particular: (a) a tendency to accuse and blame others (symbol E), as opposed to admitting guilt or expressing the opinion that nobody is to blame (symbols I and M); (b) an insistence that others should satisfy their needs (symbol e), as opposed to optimism or willingness to take responsibility (symbols m and i); (c) more rigidity and egocentricity.

(3) A delinquency rate of the oppressed group forty-five times higher than that of the control.

(j) *The oppressed people studied at the level of fantasy*

The oppressed subjects showed: (a) a tendency towards abasement and intraggression, (b) very few achievements in their stories, (c) much aggression in the 'Press', but relatively little in the 'Hero', (d) a predominance of the thema of personal frustration, with pessimism and feelings of isolation and helplessness, and of personal inadequacy as opposed to the power of an inimical environment.

(k) *Other evidence*

(1) The professional and working classes seemed to be influenced by oppression in approximately the same way and to the same degree.

(2) Within the limits of this research, age, intelligence, education, profession and district of residence were not related to the direction of aggression as measured by the P.F.S. It may well be, however, that certain professions, specific districts (e.g. delinquency areas), very high or very low intelligence, etc., are related to the direction of aggression.

(3) Aggression at the level of action as measured by the P.F.S., is closely associated with aggression in the 'Press' as measured by the T.A.T. at the level of fantasy, but is not related to aggression in the 'Hero'.

(l) *Hypotheses emerging from this research*

(1) The personality tests used reveal two different levels of personality: the level of action and the level of fantasy.

(2) Aggression at the level of action is not due to a drive bringing satisfaction to the subject, but rather to a defensive process; under oppression it becomes a tool considered necessary to avoid destruction.

(3) Aggression at the level of action is closely associated with a scheme of apperception regarding the subject's environment as hostile and threatening, and his own situation as frustrating.

(4) Oppression is conducive to the formation of the antisocial character structure, which is prone to external conflicts and crime, and characterized by egocentricity and projection and by sharp in-group *v.* out-group distinction with hostility and resentment directed against out-groups; the main feature of this personality structure is the turning of aggression outwards at the level of action and a scheme of apperception regarding the world as hostile and threatening. Under foreign oppression the psychological aspect of culture acquires the character of a psychopathic deviation, corresponding to the Dionysian cultural pattern.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

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Appendix 2

POPULATION OF POLAND

1. Population of Poland according to age and sex (1931), in percentages. Based on the Table 22, *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland*, published by the Polish Ministry of Information, London, 1941.

Urban Rural Sex	Total	Aged 15-49 only	Age of population, in years							
			0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70 & over
Poland	100.0	51.5	24.9	18.2	19.3	13.3	9.4	7.1	5.1	2.7
Males	100.0	50.6	26.1	18.7	19.0	13.0	9.0	6.8	4.9	2.5
Females	100.0	52.4	23.8	17.8	19.5	13.7	9.7	7.3	5.3	2.9
Urban	100.0	56.4	20.3	17.3	20.8	15.2	10.8	7.8	5.2	2.6
Rural	100.0	49.7	26.7	18.6	18.7	12.6	8.8	6.8	5.1	2.7

2. Population of Poland by occupational groups (1931), in percentages. Based on the Table 20, source as above.

Poland	100.0	in urban areas	4.8
in urban areas	100.0	in rural areas	1.8
in rural areas	100.0	Public service and Church	2.2
Agriculture	60.6	in urban areas	5.7
in urban areas	7.0	in rural areas	0.9
in rural areas	80.9	Schools and Culture	1.1
Forest, Fishing, Gardening	0.7	in urban areas	2.4
in urban areas	0.5	in rural areas	0.5
in rural areas	0.8	Therapy, Sanitary services, Welfare bodies	0.9
Mining and Industry	19.3	in urban areas	2.5
in urban areas	43.2	in rural areas	0.2
in rural areas	10.4	Domestic service	1.4
Commerce and Insurance	6.1	in urban areas	3.6
in urban areas	17.0	in rural areas	0.6
in rural areas	2.0	Other occupations	4.1
Communication and Transport	3.6	in urban areas	9.7
		in rural areas	1.9

Appendix 3

POLISH DISPLACED PERSONS

Polish Displaced Persons in Germany by occupational groups, in percentages. Based on the table prepared by U.N.R.R.A. H.Q. in Germany, and published by *Dziennik Polski I Dziennik Żołnierza*, 23rd July 1946.

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
	%	%
Agriculture, Forestry, Dairying	45·1	45·01
Social work, Domestic service	18·2	35·44
Building	9·5	2·7
Communication and Transport	7·7	0·79
Metallurgy	4·5	2·93
Intellectual workers	3·9	5·23
Mining and Chemical industry	2·06	0·07
Professional workers, Artists	1·84	1·36
Other occupations	7·2	6·46

Appendix 4

POLISH DELINQUENTS IN GERMANY

Displaced Persons claiming Polish citizenship who took the Intelligence Test in the course of this research in the German prisons under U.S. jurisdiction.

	<i>Industry and Agriculture</i>	<i>Concentration Camps</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agriculture	9	8	17
Craftsmen	21	45	66
Labourers (urban)	3	2	5
Shopkeeper	0	1	1
Cook	0	1	1
Railway worker	1	0	1
Sailor	1	0	1
Circus artist	0	1	1
Army officer	0	1	1
School pupils	2	3	5
University student	0	1	1
Unknown	1	1	2
Total	38	64	102

Appendix 5

P.F.S. SCORES IN DETAIL

1. Polish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture.

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total	
1		16	1		1						1				2	1	21	
2	2	7		4				1			2		2		1	1	21	
3	2	3			6	1		2			1				4	1	21	
4	3	5			1		1	1			3					3	4	21
5	1	8		3				1	3		1	1	1		2			21
6	4	2		3					2			7	1		1		1	21
7	2	3							4			1	2		5	2	2	21
8	3			2				2	3			2	3		5		1	21
9	4	1	2	1	2			1			1	5			4			21
10		5	3	2	1							1	1	1	5	1	1	21
11	1	7	1	2				1	1		1	1	1		4	1		21
12	1	5	1	2					1		2	2	1		4		2	21
13	6	4	1	1	2			2	2				1		2			21
14	2	5	1	5					1		1	1	1		3	1		21
15	1	5		5	1			1	1				1		6			21
Total	32	76	10	30	14	0	1	12	19	0	9	25	15	1	47	10	14	315

2. Polish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, with a background of concentration camp experience.

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Not Faul- cl. ty			Total
															Mix.			
1	2	7	1	1	1					2	3	1			1	1	1	21
2		6	1	3				1			1	2	3		1	1	1	21
3		5		4	1			2	1			1	3	1		1	1	21
4	1	4	1				1				1				1	1	5	21
5	3	2	1	5	1					1	1	1				3		21
6	2	8	1	4				1			1	1			5			21
7	3	2	1	2	1				2		2	3			3	1	1	21
8	3	2	1	6	3				1						3			21
9	3	3	1	4				1	3			2	1		7			21
10		5	1	2			1	1	2		1	1			7			21
11		2		4	2				1			4	1		7			21
12	1	7	1	4	1	1	1		1				1		3			21

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total		
13	2	3	1	2			1	1			4	1		2	1	3	21	
14	1	2	1	3			2	3		3	1					5	21	
15	2	5		4	1		2			1	2	1		2		1	21	
Total	23	63	12	48	11	1	3	12	17	0	13	23	11	1	37	11	29	315

3. Jewish D.P.s held in German prisons in 1946, with a background of concentration camp experience.

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	<i>Not Faul- cl. ty</i>	Total	
1	1	9	1	1	1				2			2			2	1	1	21
2	4	8		1			1	2	1		1		1		1		1	21
3	2	12	1								1		1			3	1	21
4	1	5	2	4		1			1		1	3			3			21
Total	8	34	4	6	1	1	1	2	4	0	3	5	2	0	6	4	3	84

4. Polish D.P.s in the Kempton area, with a background of forced labour in industry.

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Fault- cl. ty	Total	
1	3	8	1	2			1	1	2				2			1	21	
2	4	2	2	2				1	3		2	1	1		3		21	
3	2			3	1			3	1	1	1	3	4		2		21	
4	2	8	1	4			1		2			2	1				21	
5		1	1	4			3		2	2		1	3		4		21	
6		2		2			1	2	5		1	3	5				21	
7	2	1	1	1			1	1	2		1	5	2		3	1	21	
8		9	1	4		1			1		1	1	2			1	21	
9	1	3	3	4			1	1	1		1	1	5				21	
10	1	2		3	1				2	4		3	3		2		21	
11	2	6		3			1	2			1	2			4		21	
12	1	6	2	3		1		1			2	1	3			1	21	
13		1		1				1	5		1	7	3		2		21	
14		8	1	1			2	1	2		4		1		1		21	
15	1	3	2	3			1	2	1		2	2	4				21	
16		4		3			1	3	3	2		1	1		3		21	
17	3	4	1	2			2	2	1			1	4		1		21	
18	2	6		1	1		1	3			2	2	1		2		21	
Total	24	74	16	46	3	2	16	26	35	5	19	36	45	0	27	1	3	378

5. Polish D.P.s in the Kempton area, with a background of forced labour in agriculture.

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total	
1	3	6	1	4		1	1	1			2	1				1	21	
2	1	5	1	1					4		6	3					21	
3	1	7	2	2			1		4		3				1		21	
4	1	5	1	3	1		1		1		2	2			4		21	
5	2	6	2	2	1			2			2	1			3		21	
6	1	3		1	1			2	3		3	3	1		3		21	
7	2	1	1	2	1		1	2	2		1	1	2		5		21	
8	2	4	4	1				2			1	4	1		2		21	
9	4	3	1	2	1		1	1	3			1	2		3		21	
10	2	13		2				1	1		2						21	
11	1	3	1	3			4	1	2		2	3	1				21	
12	1	2	1	1			3	2	2			3			5		21	
13		13		3				1	2								21	
14		3		2	1		1	2	4		2	1	2		3		21	
15	1	6	1	4				1	1		1	3			1	2	21	
16	4	4	1	2				1	3		1	2	2		1		21	
17	4	6	1	1		1			1		3	3			1		21	
18		8		1			2	3	1		1	1	2		2		21	
Total	30	98	18	37	6	2	15	20	36	0	12	42	26	0	33	3	0	378

6. Polish D.P.s in the Kempton area, with a background of concentration camp experience.

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total	
1	3	7	1	5				1				1			2	1	21	
2	1	9		2			2				2					2	3	21
3	1	5		3		1		3			4	2	1		1			21
4		12		2				1			1					2	3	21
5	2	5	2	4				3	1			3			1			21
6	2	5		3		1	1		2		1	4			1	1		21
7		5	1	3	1				3		1	2	4		1			21
8	1	6		5				3	1		3	2						21
9	4	2				1		4	4			3	2		1			21
10		11	1	2				1	1		1						4	21
11	2	7	1	2							1	3	2			2		21
12	1	7		3			1	3			1		1		3		1	21
13	1	4	2	6	1		1	1			1	1			2			21
14	1	5		6	2		1	1			2	1			1	2		21
15	2	11	1	1	1		1	1							1		1	21
16	2	2	1	3		1		1	2		1	5			1	1	1	21
17	4	8	1	2	1			2	1			1			1			21
18	2	11		2		1	1	1			1	1			1			21
Total	29	122	11	52	8	5	8	26	16	0	20	29	10	0	17	11	14	378

7. Polish D.P.s in the Murnau-Weilheim area, with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture (male sample).

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faulty	Total	
1	2	2	2	2		1			1		1	3			2	1	4	21
2	1	6	1	3		1			1		1		4		2		1	21
3	2	3	1			1	1	2	1		1	1	2		6			21
4	3	4	1	4	1		3					1	1		3			21
5	3	5		2		1	1	1			2	3			2		1	21
6	2	2		2	2		1	3	2	2		3	2					21
7	4	7				1	1	2		1		1	1		3			21
8				3		1	1		4		3	5	2		2			21
9	3	4		2		2		1	1				2		6			21
10	5	2	2	2				3			1	3	1		2			21
11	2	3		1	1	1	1	1	2		1	2	2		3		1	21
12	3		1				1	1	1	1	1	2	2		8			21
13		5		4	2			1	1	1			1		5		1	21
14	3			4	1	1		2	2	1		2			4	1		21
15			1	4	5				1	2		1	2	2	2		1	21
16	2	3	1	5			1	1	3			2	2		1			21
17	2	5	2	2			1	1			1	4			2	1		21
18	1	10		2			1	2	1		1		2		1			21
19		1		1	1		1	1	2	1	1	4	3		3	2		21
20	3	5		1		2	1	1	1	1		4	1		1			21
21	1	4	1	6			2	1	1		1	1	1		1		1	21
Total	42	71	13	50	13	12	17	24	25	10	15	42	31	2	59	5	10	441

8. Polish D.P.s in the Murnau-Weilheim area, with a background of concentration camp experience (male sample).

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix.	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total	
1		4	1	5				2	1			1	2		4		1	21
2	3	5	1	2			1	2				3			2	1	1	21
3	1	8						2			1	1	1			2	5	21
4	2	4		5	2			1							4		3	21
5		6	2	2		1			2		2		2		1		3	21
6		9	1	5									1		1		4	21
7	2		1			1			1		1	6	3		4	2		21
8	3	1	1	7					1	1	3	3	1					21
9	3	7	1	4				1			1	2			1			21
10	1	9			1	1						3	1		4	1		21
11	2	10	2	4					1			1			1			21
12	1	6		7				2	1		2		1			1		21
13	4	6		3		1	1	2			1				3			21
14	2	6		2		1		1	2		1	2	2		1	1		21
15	2	6		3	1			3				1	1	1	3			21
16	1	5	1	6				2				1	1		3		1	21
17	2	8		2		1		1	1		1	1			4			21
18	1	6		1	3			1	3			2	1		2	1		21
19		6	1	4			1				4		2		1		2	21
20		4	1	5	1			2			1	2	2		3			21
21		4		5	2	1		2							4		3	21
Total	30	120	13	72	10	8	3	25	13	0	18	29	21	1	46	9	23	441

9. Polish D.P.s in the Murnau-Weilheim area, with a background of forced labour in industry or agriculture (female sample).

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total
1	2	1		2			3		4	2					7		21
2	1	1	1	5			1	3	2		1	2	2		2		21
3	1	4		1	1			1	3		1	3	3		2	1	21
4	1	6	2	2	2				1			2	2		2		21
5	2	3	1	2		2	1	1	1			3	1		4		21
6		9		1		1	2					2	1		3	2	21
7	2	6	3	1					2			1	4		2		21
8	3	6		1			1	2				2	1		4	1	21
9	2					1	1		6		2	2	3	1	3		21
10	1	5	1	3	1	2			2	1	1	1			3		21
11	1	6	1	2			1				3	1	1			2 3	21
12	2	5	2	1			2		1			6			2		21
13	3	5		3		1	1				1	3	1		2	1	21
Total	21	57	11	24	4	7	13	8	21	3	9	28	19	1	36	3 8	273

10. Polish D.P.s in the Murnau-Weilheim area, with a background of concentration camp experience (female sample).

No.	E'	E	E	e	e ²	I'	I	I	i	i ²	M'	M	m	m ²	Mix	Not Faul- cl. ty	Total
1	2	6		3	1			2	1		2	3	1			4 1	21
2	5	7	1	1							1		1		7		21
3	1	1		4				1	3	1		3			2		21
4	2	5		2				1	1	2	1	3	2				21
5	1	7	2	4	2			2	1				2				21
6	2	8		5				1				2	3		1	1	21
7	3	3		7				1	1		1	2	1		2		21
8	2	3	1	4				1	1	1	1	3	1		3	1	21
9	1	4	1	2	3	1	1	1			1	2			1		21
10	3	4	2	3	4	1			2		1	1	1		5		21
11	1	5	1	2	1			1							1	2	21
12	3	3		2			1	1		2		2	4		2		21
13	1	5		2	1		1	3	1		2	2	1				
Total	27	61	8	41	12	0	4	17	12	6	10	23	17	0	24	6 5	273

Appendix 6

THE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION

The frequency distribution of the P.F.S. scores of extrapunitive-ness in various D.P. samples:

Score of extrapun- itiveness	KEMPTEN			TOTAL		MURNAU	
	Men from industry	Men from agriculture	Men from concentra- tion camps	Men from industry & agriculture	Men from concentra- tion camps	Women from industry & agriculture	Women from concentra- tion camps
11-20	2			2		1	
21-30				3	1	1	
31-40	4	5	1	9	1	1	1
41-50	5	3	2	15	2	3	4
51-60	4	5	4	17	10	4	2
61-70	3	3	2	9	11	2	2
71-80		2	5	2	8	1	2
81-90			4		6		2
91-100							
Total	18	18	18	57	39	13	13

Appendix 7

THE SCHEME OF INTERVIEW

1. Shock of arrest, beating and conditions in the camps, etc., and reaction later. First experiences in prisons and concentration camps, on forced labour and after liberation.
2. Initiative or disappearance of initiative in various groups in concentration camps, or on forced labour in various situations and periods.
3. Childish behaviour resulting from influence of concentration camp in the camp itself or after liberation. Attitude of a spoilt child. Tears, laughter, request for special treatment, etc.
4. Patience, endurance, reactions to the necessity for waiting.
5. Subjects of thoughts and interests (problem of food, interest in politics, intellectual pursuits, sex, etc.).
6. Hierarchy of needs and desires (to cease to be beaten and tortured, to have enough to eat, desire for freedom, love, revenge, sexual urges, etc.).
7. Dreams and fantasies, escape from reality, life in a dream world.
8. Delusions of persecution, delusions of grandeur, fantastic rumours.
9. Capacity for forgiveness. Dreams of vengeance.
10. Relations with camp authorities. Mutual fulfilment of obligations, chicanery, trickery, etc. Impossibility of applying former standards and principles. Instances of immediate boss (e.g. Kapo or farmer) forcing Displaced Persons to commit crimes against the higher authorities. Relations with heads of factories, police, etc.
11. Solidarity with the authorities or with fellow prisoners in case of conflict between them (as a rule, and in exceptional cases, description of such cases). Co-operation of groups with the authorities in oppressing their fellow-prisoners (e.g. those stealing their bread, etc.).
12. Change in moral and ethical principles. New moral code (principles of behaviour), its rigours and penalties, etc. Relation to former ethic principles (e.g. theft of fellow-prisoners'.

bread and other thefts; crimes penalized in Poland but not condemned by public opinion among Polish prisoners in Germany, etc.).

13. Conflict between the culture and customs of different nationalities and ranks of society. Mutual influence. Cultural contact. Eventual levelling of all cultures.
14. Social groups and cliques (in camps or factories), their composition, formation and disappearance, mutual relations.
15. *Elite* in camp or factory. System of electing their own authorities (at a low level), e.g. Kapo, Block Master, etc. Spiritual leaders and camp authorities. Their type, career and subsequent fate—their relations with the group.
16. Socialization. Anti-social reactions among the prisoners and deportees (also after liberation).
17. Reaction to humiliation. Feeling of humiliation or of superiority. Mixed feelings. Reaction to dirt, negligence and external appearance. Feeling of their own ugly and ridiculous appearance. Reaction to wearing convicts' stripes. Respect for others and for themselves.
18. Penalties for various forms of wrongdoing—degree of severity.
19. Sadistic tendencies among prisoners. Cases (even if exceptional) of pleasure derived by certain prisoners at being beaten or humiliated, and, in this connection, provocation of such treatment (so-called masochism).
20. Feelings of guilt. Consciousness of wrongdoing. Cases of feelings of guilt although there was no consciousness that a sin or crime had been committed. Need for religious confession.
21. Faith in God. Faith in ideals.
22. Need for love and family affection (in the first period and after a long stay in Germany). Cases where it was possible partly to satisfy these needs.

Statements had to be illustrated as far as possible with examples giving the place (camp) and date, even if only approximate (e.g. spring, 1943). Subjects were encouraged to attempt to analyse psychic reactions in concentration camps, in factories and on farms; and subsequently after liberation in a Displaced Persons' camp or outside it.

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THE AUTHOR

The author was born in Warsaw in 1915 and studied Political Science at Cracow University and law and psychology at Warsaw University. In 1940 he was deported by the Russians and spent some time in a Soviet concentration camp in Siberia, and, as a prisoner, worked in a psychiatric hospital there. After the Stalin-Sikorski Pact in 1941 he became the first foreign representative in Siktivkar, the capital of the Komi Republic and the main centre of Soviet concentration camps. Later he was forced to leave and was evacuated to Kuybyshev, the war capital of Russia, and from there to Teheran. In Autumn 1944 he came to London to become Director of the Department of Studies at the Polish Ministry of Information. When, in 1945, the Polish Government in London ceased to be recognised by the Western Powers he returned to his previous work in social and criminal psychology, and obtained his Ph.D. at London University in 1950. Since then Dr. Grygier has been engaged in researches and clinical work at the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency in London and in the Universities of Chicago, California and Harvard.

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